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3 1924 088 055 508 

The original of this book is in 
the Cornell University Library. 

There are no known copyright restrictions in 
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WAR is a collection of documents concerning the 
War in all its aspects, so arranged as to record the events 
of the great struggle in which the Nations are now involved, 
and the circumstances which led up to them. 

It consists of documents issued officially or recognised 
by the various belligerents, such as diplomatic correspondence, 
proclamations, ultimatums, military orders, reports, des- 
patches, messages from monarchs to their peoples, etc., 
together with public statements by responsible Ministers 
and Correspondence in the Press of an authoritative 
character ; the whole collated, classified, indexed, and where 
necessary cross-referenced and annotated. 

The documents are left to speak for themselves, except 
where brief unbiased notes are needed to elucidate them. 
These are placed within square brackets, to distinguish 
them from the notes in the originals. 

The Times, with its network of Correspondents in all parts 
of the world, is in a particularly favourable position to obtain 
information, and, having at its service an experienced staff, 
is able to reach sources not generally accessible to others. 

As the large mass of documents involved in the collection 
has been systematically classified and arranged from the 
commencement of the War, it has been found possible to 
issue to the pubhc simultaneously a representative series of 



A survey of the constantly accumulating material would 
appear to indicate that The Times Documentary History 
OF THE War will be grouped into at least five main 
divisions : — 

I. Diplomatic. 

II. Naval. 

III. Military. 

IV. Overseas, comprising documents dealing with 

events in the Dominions and Possessions Over- 
seas and in enemy territories not included in 
the first three divisions. 

V. International Law, including documents relating 
to the Laws of War, the Proceedings of Prize 
Courts, etc. 

Each division will appear in its own distinct set of 



THIS volume is very closely connected with its pre- 
decessor, of which, indeed, it would have formed part 
had not the mass of material made a division into two more 
convenient. Both relate to the same period and subject — the 
Outbreak of the War — and the Preface to the first elucidates 
the contents of both. In the first volume also will be found 
an explanatory list of the principal persons mentioned in the 
diplomatic correspondence ; but for the convenience of the 
reader the list of abbreviations is here reproduced. 

The index of the present volume incorporates all the 
references contained in that of its predecessor and is thus 
a combined analytical index to both. 



B = The British Blue-book. 

G = The Belgian Grey-book (official translation). 

= The Russian Orange-book (official translation). 

R = The Austro-Hungarian Red-book (official transla- 

S = The Serbian Blue-book (official translation). 

W = The German White-book (" only authorised trans- 
lation," pubUshed by Liebheit & Thiesen, 

t = The French Yellow-book (official translation). 

C.D.D. = " Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to 
the Outbreak of the European War. Lon- 
don : Printed under the authority of His 
Majesty's Stationery Office by Harrison & 
Sons, Printers in Ordinary to His Majesty. 

D.O.W. = " Documents relating to the Outbreak of the 
War. Published by the Imperial German 
Foreign Office." (An Enghsh translation 
of the second German White-book, " Akten- 
stiicke zum Kriegsausbruch. Herausgegeben 
vom Auswartigen Amte." Verlag von Georg 
Stilke, Berhn.) 



app. = appendix. 

end. = enclosure, enclosed. 

Eng. tr. = Official English Translation. 

exh. = exhibit. 

F.O. = British Foreign Office. 

intro. = introduction. 

Note. — In the marginal cross-references the seven "blue-books" are 
distinguished by their index letters {see list above), and the individual 
despatches by their numbers. A number standing alone, without an index 
letter, refers to a despatch in the same book in which the cross-reference 
itself appears. 











{a) Documents Published by Germany 

(6) Documents Published by Great Britain . 

(c) Document Published by Belgium . 











I. In the House of Commons ..... 397 

II. Public Speeches ...... 439 









Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of 
His Majesty. October 1914. 

[Official Translation Published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous 
No. 12 (1914). Cd. 7627.] 




Count E. de Dudzeele 
to M. Davignon 

M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at Paris, 
Berlin, London, Vi- 
enna, and St. Peters- 

M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at The 
Hague, Rome, and 

M. M. de Welle to M. 

Count Clary to M. 

Baron Beyens to M. 


July 24 






Forwards text of Austro- 
Hungarian ultimatum to 

Instructions for eventual 
presentation of a note to 
the respective Govern- 
ments informing them of 
Belgian determination to 
remain neutral in the event 
of a European war 

Instructions eventually to 
present a note to the Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs in 
same terms as that to be 
addressed to the five 
Powers guaranteeing Bel- 
gian neutraUty . . 

Forwards text of reply of 
Serbian Government to 
the Austro-Hungarian note 

Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment consider the Serbian 
reply unsatisfactory and 
have broken off diplomatic 
relations with Serbia 

British Government suggest 
intervention at Vienna 
and St. Petersburg by 
Great Britain, France, 
Germany, and Italy to 
find a basis of compromise. 
Germany alone has not 
yet replied 













Count E. de Dudzeele 
to M. Davignon 


M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, 
Paris, London, Vien- 
na, St. Petersburg, 
Rome, The Hague, 
and Luxemburg 

M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, 
Paris, and London 

M. Davignon to all Bel- 
gian Heads of Mis- 



M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, 
Paris, and London 

M. Davignon to Belgian 
Legations at Berlin, 
Paris, and London 

Count de Lalaing to M. 


July 28 






Aug. I 

Declaration of war by Aus- 
tria-Hungary against Ser- 

an Government have 
placed army on strength- 
ened peace footing. This 
step should not be mis- 
taken for mobilisation , . 

French assurance to Belgium 
that no French troops 
wiU invade Belgium even 
if considerable forces are 
massed upon the Belgian 
frontiers .. 

Belgian mobilisation ordered 
as from Saturday, ist 

British Government have 
asked French and German 
Governments separately 
if each of them is prepared 
to respect Belgian neutral- 
ity, provided it is not 
violated by any other 

Baron van der Elst has re- 
minded German Minister 
of the assurances given by 
Germany to Belgiiun re- 
garding respect of her 

France accepts British sug- 
gestion that she should not 
violate Belgian neutrahty, 
provided it is respected 
by Germany (see No. 11) 









Baron Beyens to M. 


Aug. I 

Germany refuses to answer 
British proposal to respect 
Belgian neutrality 



M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, 
Paris, and London 


France explains the condi- 
tions on which she will 
respect Belgian neutrality 



M. Davignon to Belgian 

Ministers accredited 

to Guarantor Powers 



To carry out the instructions 
contained in the despatch 
of 24th July (see No. 2) 



M. Davignon to Belgian 
Legations at Rome, 
The Hague, and 



To carry out the instructions 
contained in the despatch 
tif 24th July (see No. 3) 



M. Eyschen to M. 



The President of the Luxem- 
burg Government protests 
against the violation of 
the neutrality of the Grand 
Duchy guaranteed by the 
Treaty of London of 1867 



M. Davignon to the 
Belgian Ministers ac- 
credited to Guarantor 


French Minister has pub- 
lished his declaration of 
ist August. Belgium 
would greatly value a 
similar assurance from 
Germany . . 



Herr von Below to M. 


Presentation of German ulti- 
matum. Germany calls 
upon Belgium to allow 
the passage of German 




Interview between Herr 
von Below and Baron 
van der Elst 


Germany complains to Bel- 
gium of the violation of 
her frontiers by dirigibles, 
and a French patrol 









M. Davignon to Herr 
von Below 

Aug. 3 

Belgian reply to German 
ultimatum. Belgium can- 
not fail in the duties im- 
posed upon her by the 
treaties of 1839 . . 



M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at Paris, 
London, Vienna, Ber- 
lin, St. Petersburg, 
and The Hague 



Informs of German action 
and of Belgian attitude 



M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at Berlin, 
Paris, London, Vien- 
na, and St. Petersburg 


Belgium has informed France 
that for the moment she 
does not appeal to the 
guarantee of the Powers. 
She wiU eventually decide 
what must be done 



The King of Belgium to 
the King of England 


Belgium makes a supreme 
appeal to the British Gov- 
ernment to safeguard her 



Count de Lalaing to M. 



Great Britain declares she 
will go to war if the neu- 
trality of Belgium is vio- 
lated (see No. 23) 



Herr von Below to M. 


Germany will take, if neces- 
sary by force of arms, 
such steps as she may con- 
sider necessary for her 
safety in face of French 
menaces . . 



Sir F. VilUers to M. 


Great Britain expects Bel- 
gium to resist to her ut- 
most the pressure exerted 
by Germany to make her 
abandon her neutrality 
and that she wiU appeal 
to the guaranteeing Powers 
















Baron Fallon to M. 

M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at London 
and Paris 


M. Davignon to Herr 
von Below 

Herr von Below to M. 

M. Davignon to Baron 


M. Davignon to Baron 


Baron Beyens to M. 


Count de Lalaing to M. 

Aug. 4 

Holland informs Belgian 
Government that she may 
perhaps be forced to estab- 
lish war buoying of the 
Scheldt 35 

Violation of Belgian territory 
at Genmienich . . . . 36 

Forwards passports to Ger- 
man Minister . . . . 37 

Germany leaves German in- 
terests in Belgium in hands 
of the United States of 
America . . . . . . '7 

Belgian Government request 
Spanish Government to 
take charge of Belgian 
interests in Germany . . 37 

Instructions to ask for his 
passports . , . . • • 37 

Speech of Herr von Beth- 
mann HoUweg in the 
Reichstag, in which the 
Chancellor admitted that 
Germany committed an 
injustice in disregarding 
the protests of the Luxem- 
burg and Belgian Govern- 
ments . . . . . . 38 ~ 

British attitude in the 
European dispute . . 38 












Count de Lalaing to M. 


M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at Paris, 
London, and St. 

Count de Lalaing to M. 


M. Davignon to British, 
French, and Russian 
Ministers at Brussels 

Count de Lalaing to M. 


M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at Paris, 
London, and St. 


Aug. 4 

Great Britain expects that 
Norway, Holland, and Bel- 
gium will resist German 
pressure and will preserve 
their neutrahty. In that 
event they will be sup- 
ported by her 

Summary of the diplomatic 
situation. No act of war 
having been conmiitted 
before the expiration of 
the ultimatum, the Cabinet 
decided on 3rd August, at 
10 o'clock, not yet to 
appeal to the guarantee- 
ing Powers 

Great Britain has called upon 
Germany to respect Bel- 
gian neutrahty. The ulti- 
matum expires at midnight 

German troops 
tered Belgium 
Great Britain, 
Russia to co- 
the defence 
territory . . 

having en- 
, the Belgian 
appeal to 
France, and 
•operate, as 
Powers, in 
of Belgian 

Great Britain has declared 
war against Germany . . 

Belgiimi appeals to the 
Powers guaranteeing her 

Summary of the diplomatic 
situation . . 
























M. Davignon to all 
Heads of Belgian Mis- 


Baron Beyens to M. 


Baron Grenier to M. 


Baron Guillaume to M. 

Sir F. Villiers to M. 

Count de Lalaing to 
M. Davignon 


Baron Fallon to M. 


M. Davignon to Baron 


M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at Paris, 
London, and St. 

Aug. 5 

In virtue of article 10 of the 
Fifth Hague Convention of 
1907, Belgium, in forcibly 
repelling the infringement 
of her neutrality, commits 
no hostile act 

Staff of Belgian Legation in 
Germany will leave Berlin 
on 6th August 

Spanish Government under- 
take the protection of 
Belgian interests in Ger- 

Germany declared war on 
France on 3rd August at 
6 p.M 

Great Britain agrees to co- 
operate, cLS a guaranteeing 
Power, in the defence of 
Belgian territory 

British fleet wiU ensure free 
passage of the Scheldt for 
the provisioning of Antwerp 

War buoying is about to be 
established (see No. 29) . . 

Belgian Government thank 
Spanish Government for 
taking charge of Belgian 
interests in Germany 

France and Russia agree to 
co-operate with Great 
Britain in the defence of 
Belgian territory 
















53 M. de Weede to M. 

54 M. Davignon to Baron 


55 Baron Fallon to M. 


56 M. Davignon to Baron 


57 M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at Paris and 






Baron Guillaume to 
M. Davignon 

Baron Fallon to M. 


Baron Guillaume to 
M. Davignon 


Aug. 6 

Communicates declaration of 
Netherlands neutraUty in 
war between Belgium and 
Germany . . 

Regulation of commercial 
navigation of the Scheldt 
(see No. 50) 

Same subject as above 

Same subject as above 

Belgian Government anxious 
that war should not ex- 
tend to Central Africa. 
Do French and British 
Governments agree to 
Belgian proposal to neutra- 
Use the Congo conventional 
basin ? 

Despatch explaining preced- 
ing telegram 

France reserves her reply 
respecting Belgian pro- 
posal to neutralise Congo 
conventional basin 

Communication of a fresh 
German proposal repeat- 
ing the ultimatum of 2nd 

French Government are in- 
clined to proclaim the 
neutraUty of the Congo 
conventional basin (see 
No. 59) 







Baron Fallon to M. 

M. Davignon to Baron 







M. Davignon to British, 
Russian, and French 

M. Davignon to Belgian 
Ministers at London, 
Paris, and St. Peters- 

Mr. Whitlock to M. 

Sir F. Villiers to M. 

M. Klobukowski to M. 

Aug. 10 








Communicates German text 
(containing an error) of 
the second German pro- 
posal and a translation of 
that document (containing 
another error) 

Belgian Government have 
received the fresh German 
proposals and wiU reply 

To ask German Government 
the meaning they attach 
to the word " Auseinander- 
setzung " . . 

Belgian Government com- 
municate to Represen- 
tives of the guaranteeing 
Powers the text of the 
second German note and of 
the reply which they pro- 
pose to return 

Luxemburg authorities have 
asked Belgian Minister to 
leave Luxemburg. In 
the circumstances, Belgian 
Government have not 
taken a similar step with 
regard to Luxemburg 
Representative at Brussels 

United States of America 
agree to take charge of 
German interests in Bel- 

Great Britain concurs in 
proposed Belgian reply to 
second German ultimatum 
(see No. 65) 

French Government hkewise 
entirely agree in proposed 
reply (see No. 65) 
















70 Baron Fallon to N. 


71 M. Davignon to Baron 


72 M. Sazonof to M. Davig- 


73 Baron Fallon to M. 

74 Baron Guillaume to M. 

75 Count de Lalaing to M. 

76 M. Tombeur to M 


77 Count Clary to M. 


78 M. Davignon to Baron 


79 M. Davignon to all 
Heads of Belgian Mis- 


Aug. 12 










The German text contained 
an error. The meaning is 
" her conflict with France" 

The new German proposal re- 
peats the proposal con- 
tained in the ultimatum of 
2nd August. Belgium can 
only repeat the reply she 
gave to that ultimatum . . 

Russian Government con- 
gratulate Belgian Govern- 
ment on their firm and 
dignified attitude (see No. 

Belgian reply to second 
German proposal pre- 
sented on 13th August . . 

France no longer wishes to 
neutralise the Congo con- 
ventional basin (see Nos. 
57 and 58) 

British Government cannot 
agree to Belgian proposal 
to neutrahse the Congo 
conventional basin 

Germans attacked Belgian 
Congo on 22nd August . . 

Austria-Hungary declares 
war against Belgium . . 

Belgian reply to Austro- 
Hungarian declaration of 

Information respecting Ger- 
man allegations against 
Belgium contained in 
British Parliamentary 
White Paper 




(July 24 — August 29.) 

No. I. 

Count Enembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, 
to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign 

Vienna, July 24, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the text of the 
Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia. 

Enclosure in No. i. 
[Text of Austro-Hungarian note, for which see B. 4.] 

No. 2. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, 
and St. Petersburg. 

Brussels, July 24, 1914. l^^^ No. 

THE Belgian Government have had under their con- 
sideration whether, in present circumstances, it would not 
be advisable to address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian 
independence and neutrality a communication assuring them 
of Belgium's determination to fulfil the international obUga- 
tions imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war break- 
ing out on her frontiers. 

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a 

communication would be premature at present, but that 

events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to 

■forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the 

Belgian representatives abroad. 


[G. 2] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [July 24, 

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and 
to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give 
you now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by 
you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more 

I enclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you 
should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which 
you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a 
communication necessary. 

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on 
these instructions. 

This telegram will be despatched when the order is given 
for the mobiUsation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our 
earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful 
settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme 
measure of precaution. 

Enclosure in No. 2. 

[See Nos. 3 THE international situation is serious, and the possibiUty 
and 17.] of a war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the 
Belgian Government. 

Belgium has most scrupulously observed the duties of a 
neutral State imposed upon her by the treaties of April ig, 
'"[See p. 1839'" ' 3,nd those duties she wiU strive unflinchingly to fulfil, 
487-] whatever the circumstances may be. 

The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been 
so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her 
territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities 
break out upon her frontiers. 

All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutraUty 
'''' [cf. No. have nevertheless been taken by the Government. "" The 
I3-] Belgian army has been mobilised and is taking up such 
strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defence 
of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts 
of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of 

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these 

measures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to 

fulfil her international obligations ; and it is obvious that 

they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with 



any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the 
Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those Powers. 
In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to 
communicate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration 
by the Belgian Government, and to request that you will be 
good enough to take note of it. 

g;^ A similar communication has been made to the other 
Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality. 

No. 3. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to the Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and 

Brussels, July 25, 1914. 

I HAVE addressed an undated circular note, a copy of [See No. 
which is enclosed, to the Belgian representatives accredited 17J 

to the Powers guaranteeing the independence and neutrality 
of Belgium. 

Should the danger of a war between France and Germany 
become imminent, this circular note will be communicated 
to the Governments of the guaranteeing Powers, in order 
to inform them of our fixed determination to fulfil those 
international obligations that are imposed upon us by the 
treaties of 1839. '" '" [See p. 

The communications in question would only be made 487.] 

upon telegraphic instructions from me. 

If circumstances lead me to issue such instructions, I 
shall request you also, by telegram, to notify the Government 
to which you are accredited of the step we have taken, and 
to communicate to them a copy of the enclosed circular 
note for their information, and without any request that 
they should take note thereof. 

My telegram will inform you of the date to be given to 
the circular note, which you should be careful to fill in on 
the copy which you hand to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

It is unnecessary to point out that this despatch and its 
enclosure should be treated as strictly confidential until the 
receipt of fresh instructions from me. 


[G. 4] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [July 25, 

Enclosure in No. 3. 

[See Enclosure in No. 2.) 

No. 4. 

Monsieur Michotte de Welle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade, 
to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign 

Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text 
of the reply returned by the Serbian Government to the 
Austro-Hungarian note of the 10 (23) July. 

Enclosure in No. 4. 

[Text of the Serbian reply, for which see B. 39.] 

No. 5. 

Communication made on July 26, 1914, hy the Austro-Hun- 
garian Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 

MONSIEUR PASHITCH gave the reply of the Serbian 

''I [B. 39.] Government "' to the Austro-Hungarian note before six 
o'clock yesterday. This reply not having been considered 
satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been broken off and 
the Minister and staff of the Austrian Legation have ,left 

'"'[B. 23, Belgrade."' Serbian mobilisation''' had already been ordered 

3I-] before three o'clock. 
Y. 75(2).] No. 6. 

Baron Bey ens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 27, 1914. 

ACCORDING to a telegram from the British Charge 
d'Affaires at Belgrade, the Serbian Government have given 
way on all the points of the Austrian note. They even allow 
the intervention of Austrian officials if such a proceeding is 
in conformitj^ with the usages of international law. The 



British Charge d' Affaires considers that this reply'" should "'[B. 39-] 
satisfy Austria if she is not desirous of war. Nevertheless, 
a more hopeful atmosphere prevails here to-day, more particu- 
larly because hostilities against Serbia have not begun. 
The British Government suggest"' mediation by Great "" [B. ro, 
Britain, Germany, France, and Italy at St. Petersburg and ^^-^ 

Vienna in order to find some basis for compromise. Germany 
alone has not yet replied.'^' The decision rests with the "'[c/. B. 
Emperor. 43]- 

No. 7. 

Count ErrembauU de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to 
M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me of the 
declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia. '^' '" [Text B. 

No. 8. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, 
St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg. 

Brussels, July 29, 1914. 

THE Belgian Government have decided to place the army 
upon a strengthened peace footing."' (')[c/. y. 

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation. 87.3 

Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium 
consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on 
the ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed 
militia ; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the 
recall of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry 
division comprise effective units of the same strength as 
those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier 
zones of the neighbouring Powers. 

This information will enable you to reply to any questions 
which may be addressed to you. 

II-B 17 

[G. 9] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [July 31, 

No. 9. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London. 

Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

THE French Minister came to show me a telegram from 
the Agence Havas reporting a state of war in Germany, and 
<^'[c/.No. said:—"' 

125 • Y "I ^^^^^ *^^^ opportunity to declare that no incursion of 

119.3 French troops into Belgium will take place, even if consider- 
able forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. 
France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as 
Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act. In- 
structions in this sense will be given to the French authorities." 
I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for his communication, 
and I felt bound to observe that we had always had the 
greatest confidence in the loyal observance by both our 
neighbouring States of their engagements towards us. We 
have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the 
German Government will be the same as that of the Govern- 
ment of the French Republic. 

No. 10. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
all Heads of Belgian Missions abroad. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

THE Minister of War informs me that mobiUsation has 
[c/. No. been ordered, "" and that Saturday, the ist August, will be the 
II.] first day. 

No. II. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris. 

Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

THE British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, 
and made the following communication, which he had hoped 




for some days to be able to present to me : Owing to the 
possibility of a European war. Sir Edward Grey has asked 
the French and German Governments separately'" if they "'[B. 114.] 
were each of them ready to respect Belgian neutrality pro- 
vided that no other Power violated it : — 

" In view of existing treaties I am instructed to inform 
the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and 
to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will 
do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she 
desires and expects that the other Powers will respect and 
maintain it." '"' <^'[c/. B. 

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this com- i^5] 

munication, '"' which the Belgian Government particularly '" [cf. B. 
appreciate, and I added that Great Britain and the other 128.] 

nations guaranteeing our independence could rest assured 
that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and 
that we were convinced that the other Powers, in view of the 
excellent relations of friendship and confidence which had 
always existed between us, would respect and maintain that 

I did not fail to state that our military forces, which 
had been considerably developed in consequence of our 
recent re-organisation, were sufficient to enable us to defend 
ourselves energetically in the event of the violation of our 

In the course of the ensuing conversation. Sir Francis 
seemed to me somewhat surprised at the spewed with which 
we had decided to mobiUse our army. '^' I pointed out to him '" [No. 10.] 
that the Netherlands had come to a similar decision'"' before '"'[c/. B. 
we had done so, and that, moreover, the recent date of our 9o-l 

new military system, and the temporary nature of the 
measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary 
for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our 
neighbours and guarantors should see in this decision our 
strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves. 

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and 
stated that his Government were awaiting this reply before 
continuing negotiations with France and Germany, the result 
of which would be communicated to me. 


{G. 12] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [July 31, 

No. 12. 

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris. 

Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

IN the course of the conversation which the Secretary- 
General of my Department had with Herr von Below this 
morning, he explained to the German Minister the scope of 
''' [See No. the military measures which we had taken, "' and said to 
^•3 him that they were a consequence of our desire to fulfil 
our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied 
an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours. 

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister 
if he knew of the conversation which he had had with his 
predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the 
Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to give. 

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as 
a consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of 
Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the 
case of a Franco-German war Belgian neutrality would be 
violated by Germany. 

The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that 
a declaration in the German Parliament during a debate 
on foreign affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to 
dispel the mistrust which was so regrettable from the point 
of view of the relations between the two countries. 

Herr von Bethmann HoUweg replied that he had fully 
appreciated the feelings which had inspired our representa- 
tions. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating 
Belgian neutrality, but he considered that in making a public 
declaration Germany would weaken her military position 
in regard to France, who, secured on the northern side, 
would concentrate all her energies on the east. 

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly 
understood the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann 
HoUweg to the proposed public declaration, and he recalled 
the fact that since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow had made 


1914] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 12] 

reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the 
Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality. 
Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation 
with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the senti- 
ments expressed at that time had not changed. 

Enclosure in No. 12. 

The Belgian Minister at Berlin to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, May 2, 1913. 

I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice the declara- 
tions respecting Belgian neutrality, as published in the 
semi-ofi&cial Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, made by the 
Secretary of State and the Minister of War, at the Meeting 
of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on April 29th : — 

" A member of the Social Democrat Party said : ' The 
approach of a war between Germany and France is viewed 
with apprehension in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany 
will not respect the neutraUty of Belgium.' 

" Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, rephed : ' Belgian 
neutrality is provided for by International Conventions and 
Germany is determined to respect those Conventions.''" w[cf. Nos. 

"This declaration did not satisfy another member of 20,35.1 
the Social Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he 
had nothing to add to the clear statement he had made 
respecting the relations between Germany and Belgium. 

" In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social 
Democrat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, 
rephed : ' Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify 
the proposed reorganisation of the German mihtary system. 
That proposal is based on the situation in the East. Germany 
will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrahty of Belgium 
is guaranteed by international treaty.' 

"A member of the Progressive Party having once again 
spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declara- 
tion in regard to Belgium was sufficiently clear." 

[G. 13] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August i, 

No. 13. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
\cf Nos (Telegram.) London, August i, 1914. 

14,38.] GREAT BRITAIN has asked France and Germany 

•''[B. 114.] separately if they intend to respect Belgian territory'" in 
the event of its not being violated by their adversary. Ger- 
many's reply is awaited. France has replied in the af&rma- 
'='[B. 125.3 tive.™ 

No. 14. 

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, August i, 1914. 

'''[B. 114.] THE British Ambassador has been instructed"' to inquire 
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of 
war, Germany would respect Belgian neutrality, and I under- 
stand that the Minister replied that he was unable to answer 

'*' [B. 122 ; the question. '*' 


No. 15. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London. 

Brussels, August i, 1914. 

(5) r^/ No. 9 ^ HAVE the honour to inform you that the French Minister 
and note.] has made the following verbal communication"' to me : — 

" I am authorised to declare that, in the event of an 
international war, the French Government, in accordance 
with the declarations they have always made, will respect 
the neutraHty of Belgium. In the event of this neutrahty 
not being respected by another Power, the French Govern- 
ment, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary 
to modify their attitude." 

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side 
[c/. No. 2 had taken without delay all the measures necessary to ensure 
^"^1^) ■' that our independence and our frontiers should be respected. '"' 



No. i6, 

Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Belgian Ministers at 
Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August i, 1914. 

CARRY out instructions contained in my despatch of 
the 24th July. 

(See No. 2.) 

No. 17. 

Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Belgian Ministers at 
Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914. 

CARRY out instructions contained in my despatch of the 
25th July. 

(See No. 3.) 

No. 18. 

Monsieur Eyschen, President of the Luxemburg Government, 
to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign 

(Telegram.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency with [Duplicate 
the following facts : According to information which has of B. 147 
just reached the Grand Ducal Government, early on the ^^^ ^^ 
morning of Sunday, August 2, German troops entered Luxem- ^^^'^ 
burg territory"' by the Wasserbillig and Remich bridges, '"[c/- No. 
proceeding more particularly towards the south and to- 35 ; also 
wards the town of Luxemburg, capital of the Grand Duchy, y' ^1^2 
A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammu- 133 j 
nition have passed along the railway from Wasserbillig to 
Luxemburg, where they are expected at any moment. These 
incidents constitute acts plainly contrary to the neutraUty 
of the Grand Duchy, guaranteed by the Treaty of London 
of 1867."" The Luxemburg Government have not failed to '"'[Seep, 
protest vigorously to the German Representative at Luxem- 489-] 
burg against this act of aggression. An identic protest will 
be telegraphed to the German Secretary of State at Berhn. 


EG. 19] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 2, 

No. 19. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, 
and St. Petersburg. 

Brussels, August 2, 1914. 

I WAS careful to warn the German Minister through 
Monsieur de Bassompierre that an announcement in the 
Brussels press by Monsieur Klobukowski, French Minister, 
would make public the formal declaration which the latter 
"'[No. 15.] had made to me on the ist August."' When I next met 
Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added 
that up to the present he had not been instructed to make 
us an official communication, but that we knew his personal 
opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right 
to entertain towards our eastern neighbours. I at once 
replied that all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated 
in numerous previous conversations, did not allow us to 
doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I added, 
however, that we should attach the greatest importance to 
the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian 
nation would hear of with joy and gratitude. 

No. 20. 

'^' [Pre- Note presented "" by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister 
sentedat ^f Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister 

L^"'no. /^^ Foreign Affairs. 

23.3 Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Belgien. — 

(Tres Confidentiel.) Brussel, den 2. August 1914. 

DER Kaiserlichen Regierung liegen zuverlassige Nach- 
nichten vor iiber den beabsichtigten Aufmarsch franzosischer 
Streitkrafte an der Maas-Strecke Givet-Namur. Sie lassen 
keinen Zweifel iiber die Absicht Frankreichs, durch belgisches 
Gebiet gegen Deutschland vorzugehen. 

Die Kaiserliche Regierung kann sich der Besorgniss nicht 
erwehren, dass Belgien, trotz besten Willens, nicht im Stande 
sein wird, ohne Hiilfe einen franzosischen Vormarsch mit 
so grosser Aussicht auf Erfolg abzuwehren, dass darin eine 
ausreichende Sicherheit gegen die Bedrohung Deutschlands 



gefunden werden kann. Es ist ein Gebot der Selbsterhaltung 
fiir Deutschland, dem feindlichen Angriff zuvorzukommen. 
Mit dem grossten Bedauern wiirde es daher die deutsche 
Regierung erfiillen, wenn Belgien einen Akt der Feindseligkeit 
gegen sich darin erblicken wiirde, dass die Massnahmen 
seiner Gegner Deutschland zwingen, zur Gegenwehr auch 
seinerseits belgisches Gebiet zu betreten. 

Um jede Missdeutung auszuschliessen, erklart die Kaiser- 
liche Regierung das Folgende : 

1. Deutschland beabsichtigt keinerlei Feindseligkeiten 
gegen Belgien. Ist Belgien gewillt, in dem bevorstehenden 
Kriege, Deutschland gegeniiber eine wohlwoUende Neutralitat 
einzunehmen, so verpftichtet sich die deutsche Regierung, 
beim Friedensschluss Besitzstand und Unabhangigkeit des 
Konigreichs in voUem Umfang zu garantieren. 

2. Deutschland verpflichtet sich unter obiger Voraussetz- 
ung, das Gebiet des Konigreichs wieder zu raumen, sobald 
der Friede geschlossen ist. 

3. Bei einer freundschaftlicher Haltung Belgiens ist 
Deutschland bereit, im Einvernehmen mit den Koniglich 
Belgischen Behorden alle Bediirfnisse seiner Truppen gegen 
Barzahlung anzukaufen und jedeh Schaden zu ersetzen, 
der etwa durch deutsche Truppen verursacht werden konnte. 

4. SoUte Belgien den deutschen Truppen feindlich entgegen 
treten, insbesondere ihrem vorgehen durch Widerstand der 
Maas-Befestigungen oder durch Zerstorungen von Eisen- 
bahnen, Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen Kunstbauten 
Schwierigkeiten bereiten, so wird Deutschland zu seinem 
Bedauern gezwungen sein, das Konigreich als Feind zu 
betrachten. In diesem FaUe wiirde Deutschland dem Konig- 
reich gegeniiber keine Verpflichtungen iibernehmen konnen, 
sondern miisste die spatere Regelung des Verhaltnisses beider 
Staaten zu einander der Entscheidung der Waffen iiberlassen. 

Die Kaiserliche Regierung giebt sich der bestimmten 
Hoffnung hin, dass diese Eventualitat nicht eintreten, und 
das die Konigliche Belgische Regierung die geeigneten Mass- 
nahmen zu treffen wissen wird, um zu verhinderen, dass 
Vorkommnisse, wie die vorstehend erwahnten, sich ereignen. 
In diesem Falle wiirden die freundschaftlichen Bande, die 
beide Nachbarstaaten verbinden, eirie weitere und dauemde 
Festigung erfahren. 

EG. 20] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 2, 

(Tres Confidentielle.) 

LE Gouvemement allemand a regu des nouvelles sAres 
d'apres lesquelles les forces frangaises auraient rintention de 
marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur. Ces nouvelles 
ne laissent aucun doute sur rintention de la France de marcher 
sur I'Allemagne par le territoire beige. 

Le Gouvemement Imperial allemand ne peut s'empecher 
de craindre que la Belgique, malgre sa meilleure volonte, 
na sera pas en mesure de repousser sans secours une marche 
frangaise d'un si grand developpement. Dans se fait on 
trouve une certitude suffisante d'une menace dirigee contre 
I'Allemagne. C'est un devoir imperieux de conservation pour 
I'Allemagne de prevenir cette attaque de I'ennemi. Le 
Gouvemement allemand regretterait tres vivement que la 
Belgique regardat comme un acte d'hostilite contre elle le 
fait que les mesures des ennemis de I'Allemagne I'obligent 
de violer de son cote le territoire beige. 

Afin de dissiper tout malentendu le Gouvemement alle- 
mand declare ce qui suit : 

1. L'AUemagne n'a en vue aucun acte d'hostilite contre la 
Belgique. Si la Belgique consent dans la guerre qui va 
commencer a prendre une attitude de neutrahte amicale 
vis-a-vis de I'Allemagne, le Gouvemement allemand de son 
cote s'engage, au moment de la paix, a garantir le Royaume 
et ses possessions dans toute leur etendue. 

2. L'AUemagne s'engage sous la condition enoncee a 
evacuer le territoire beige aussitot la paix conclue. 

3. Si la Belgique observe une attitude amicale, I'Allemagne 
est prete, d'accord avec les autorites du Gouvemement beige, 
a acheter contre argent comptant tout ce qui est necessaire 
a ses troupes et a indemniser pour les dommages causes en 

4. Si la Belgique se comporte d'une fagon hostile contre les 
troupes allemandes et particulierement fait des difficultes a 
leur marche en avant par une opposition des fortifications de 
la Meuse ou par des destructions de routes, chemins de fer, 



tunnels ou autres ouvrages d'art, TAUemagne sera obligee 
de considerer la Belgique en ennemie. 

Dans ce cas I'Allemagne ne prendra aucun engagement 
vis-a-vis du Royaume, mais elle laissera le reglement ulterieur 
des rapports des deux £tats I'un vis-£l-vis de I'autre a la 
decision des armes. 

Le Gouvemement allemand a I'espoir justifie que cette 
Eventuality ne se produira pas et que le Gouvernement beige 
saura prendre les mesures appropri^es pour Tempecher de se 
produire. Dans ce cas les relations d'amitie qui unissent les 
deux Etats voisins deviendront plus etroites et durables. 


Imperial German Legation in Belgium, 

(Very Confidential.) Brussels, August 2, 1914. 

RELIABLE information has been received by the German [cf. B. 153 ; 
Government to the effect that French forces intend to march Y. 141.] 
on the Une of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This informa- 
tion leaves no doubt as to the intention of France"' to march '''[Denied, 
through Belgian territory against Germany. Y. 149 ; 

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, ^'" ^°^: 
in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without ^Iso No! 
assistance, to repel so considerable a French inva.sion with 21.] 
sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee 
against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self- 
defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such 
hostile attack. The German Government would, however, 
feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of 
hostility'" against herself the fact that the measures of ''"[c/. Nos. 
Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protec- 60, 62 
tion, to enter Belgian territory. (end.) 5 

In order to exclude any possibiUty of misunderstanding ' ^^^'^ 
the German Government make the following declaration : 

I. Germany has in view no act of hostiUty against Belgium. 
In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to 
maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, 
the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion 
of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of 
the Belgian Kingdom in full. 


[G. 21] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 2, 

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned con- 
dition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of 

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is pre- 
pared, in co-operation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase 
all necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to 
pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused 
by German troops. 

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in 
particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their 
march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by 
destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, 
Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium 
as an enemy. 

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations 
towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the rela- 
tions between the two States must be left to the decision of 

The German Government, however, entertain the distinct 

hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian 

Government will know how to take the necessary measures 

to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those men- 

[Reply, tioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two 

No. 22.3 neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring. 

-No. 21. 

Memorandum of an Interview asked for at 1.30 a.m., on August 
3, by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, with 
Baron van der Elst, Secretary-General to the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs. 

AT 1.30 a.m. the German Minister asked to see Baron 
van der Elst. He told him that he had been instructed by 
his Government to inform the Belgian Government that 
French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French 
cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of inter- 
national law, seeing that war had not been declared. 

The Secretary-General asked Herr von Below where these 
incidents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. 
Baron van der Elst then observed that in that case he could 
not understand the object of this communication. Herr von 


1914] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 22] 

Below stated that these acts, which were contrary to inter- 
national law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that 
other acts, contrary to international law, would be committed 
by France."' '''[c/. Nos. 

20, 22.] 

No. 22. 

Note communicated by Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German 

[Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 a.m.).] 

PAR sa note du 2 aoftt 1914, le Gouvernement aUemand a 
fait connaitre que d'apres des nouvelles sftres les forces 
frangaises auraient I'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par 
Givet et Namur, et que la Belgique, malgre sa meilleure 
volonte ne serait pas en etat de repousser sans secours une 
marche en avant des troupes frangaises. 

Le Gouvernement allemand s'estimerait dans I'obligation 
de prevenir cette attaque et de violer le territoire beige. 
Dans ces conditions, I'AUemagne propose au Gouvernement 
du Roi de prendre vis-a-vis d'elle une attitude amicale et 
s'engage au moment de la paix a garantir I'integrite du 
Royaume et de ses possessions dans toute leur et endue. La 
note ajoute que si la Belgique fait des difficulties a la marche 
en avant des troupes allemandes, I'AUemagne sera obligee de 
la considerer comme ennemie et de laisser le reglement 
ulterieur des deux Etats I'un vis-^-vis de I'autre a la decision 
des armes. 

Cette note a provoque chez le Gouvernement du Roi un 
profond et douloureux etonnement. 

Les intentions qu'elle attribue a la France sont en con- 
tradiction avec les declarations formelles qui nous ont 6te 
faites le 1" aofit, au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique. 

D'ailleurs, si contrairement a notre attente une violation 
de la neutralite beige venait a etre commise par la France 
la Belgique remplirait tous ses devoirs intemationaux et son 
armee opposerait a I'envahisseur la plus vigoureuse resistance. 

Les traites de 1839 confirmes par les traites de 1870 
consacrent I'independance et la neutralite de la Belgique sous 
la garantie des Puissances et notamment du Gouvernement 
de Sa Majeste le Roi de Prusse. 


[G. 22] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 3, 

La Belgique a toujours ete fidele a ses obligations inter- 
nationales ; elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de 
loyale impartialite ; elle n'a neglige aucun effort pour main- 
tenir ou faire respecter sa neutralite. 

L'atteinte k son independance dont la menace le Gouv- 
ernement allemand constituerait une flagrante violation du 
droit des gens. Aucun interet strategique ne justifie la 
violation du droit. 

Le Gouvernement beige en acceptant les propositions qui 
lui sont notifiees sacrifierait I'honneur de la nation en meme 
temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs vis-a-vis de I'Europe. 

Conscient du role que la Belgique joue depuis plus de 
80 ans dans la civilisation du monde, il se refuse a croire 
que I'independance de la Belgique ne puisse etre conservee 
qu'au prix de la violation de sa neutralite. 

Si cet espoir etait d^fu le Gouvernement beige est ferme- 
ment decide a repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir 
toute atteinte a son droit. 

[c/. Y. 141 ; 
B. 153.3 Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 a.m.) 

"'[No. 20.] THE German Government stated in their note'" of the 
2nd August, 1914, that according to rehable information 
French forces intended to march on the Meuse via Givet and 
Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, 
would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an 
advance of French troops. 

The German Government, therefore, considered themselves 
compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian 
territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the 
Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards 
her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee 
the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their fuU 
extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in 
the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would 
be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the 
ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States 
to the decision of arms. 

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon 
the Belgian Government. 



The intentions attributed to France by Germany'" are '"[Nos. 20, 
in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on ^^-l 

August I, in the name of the French Government.''" ""[No. 15. 

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectations, Belgian neutral- ^^^ ^^° P' 
ity should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil ^^^'^ 
her international obHgations and the Belgian army would 
offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader. '°' "'[c/- Nos. 

The treaties of 1839,"' confirmed by the treaties of 1870,"" ^3. 4o-] 
vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under '^'C'^*^ P- 
the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government (5)rc^ ^ 
of His Majesty the King of Prussia. ^83_]' 

Belgium has always been faithful to her international 
obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal 
impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain 
and enforce respect for her neutrality. 

The attack upon her independence with which the German 
Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of 
international law. No strategic interest justifies such a 
violation of law. 

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the 
proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of 
the nation and betray their duty towards Europe. 

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more 
than eighty years in the civiUsation of the world, they refuse 
to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be pre- 
served at the price of the violation of her neutrality. 

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are 

firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, 

every attack upon their rights.'" '"'["Z- Nos. 

J t- ^ 23,40.] 

No. 23. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
Belgian Ministers at St, Petersburg, Berlin, London, 
Paris, Vienna, The Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 3, 1914. 

AT 7 p.m. last night Germany presented a note'" propos- <')[No. 20.] 
ing friendly neutraUty. This entailed free passage through 
Belgian territory, while guaranteeing the maintenance of the 
independence of Belgium and of her possessions on the con- 
clusion of peace, and threatened, in the event of refusal, to 


[G. 24] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 3 

"'[See No. treat Belgium as an enemy.'" A time limit of twelve hours'*' 

26 ; B. ^as allowed within which to reply. 
,j,^53. I59-] Our answer"" has been that this infringement of our 

24 • see neutrality would be a flagrant violation of international law. 

note on To accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the 

Y. 141. 3 honour of the nation. Conscious of her duty, Belgium is 
"1 [No. 22.] firmly resolved to repel any attack {une agression) by all 
<*' [cf. Nos. means in her power. '" 
22, 40 ; Y. 
152. Also 

P- 42'-5 No. 24. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, 
and St. Petersburg. 

Sir, Brussels, August 3, 1914 (12 noon). 

AS you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an 

1=1 [No. 20.1 ultimatum"* which expires this morning, 3rd August, at 

w[c/. No. 7 a.m.'^' As no act of war has occurred up to the present 

23-3 the Cabinet has decided that there is, for the moment, no 

">[c/. No. need to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers."' 

40.3 Xhe French Minister has made the following statement to 
me upon the subject : 

" Although I have received no instructions to make a 
declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of 
their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian 
Government were to appeal to the French Government as 
one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French 
Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal ; 
if such an appeal were not made it is probable that — ^unless 
of course exceptional measures were rendered necessary in 
self-defence — the French Government would not intervene 
until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance." 
I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for the support which 
the French Government had been good enough to offer us in 
case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Govern- 
ment were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of 
<»• [cf. No. the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to 
40.3 be done. "" 



No. 25. 

His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty King 


(TeMgramme.) Brussels, August 3, 1914. 

ME souvenant des nombreuses marques d'amitie de 
votre Majeste et de ses predecesseurs, de I'attitude amicale 
de TAngleterre en 1870, et de la preuve de sympathie qu'elle 
vient encore de nous donner, je fais un supreme appel a 
I'intervention diplomatique du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 
pour la sauvegarde de la neutralite de la Belgique. 

(Signe) ALBERT. 


MINDFUL of the numerous marks of friendship of your [cf. B. 153 • 
Majesty and of your Majesty's predecessors, as well as the «^so p. 411.3 
friendly attitude of Great Britain in 1870 and of the proofs 
of sympathy which she has once again shown us, I make the 
supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your 
Majesty's Government to safeguard the neutrality of Belgium. 

No. 26. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(T^legramme.) London, August 3, 1914. 

J'AI montre votre telegramme au Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres, que I'a communique au Conseil des Ministres. 
Le Ministre des Affaires fitrangeres m'a dit que si notre 
neutralite etait violee, c'etait la guerre avec I'AUemagne. 


I SHOWED your telegram"' to the Minister for Foreign wsee No. 
Affairs, who has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for 23. 
Foreign Affairs has informed me that if our neutrality is 
violated it means war with Germany. 

n-c 33 

[G. 27] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 4, 

No. 27. 

Herf von Below Saleske, German Minister, to Monsieur Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(The original is in French.) 

[Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 a.m.).'] 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

J'AI ete charge et j'ai I'honneur d'informer votre 
Excellence que par suite du refus oppos6 par le Gouverne- 
ment de Sa Majeste le Roi aux propositions bien intentionnees 
que lui avait soumises le Gouvernement Imperial, celui-ci se 
verra, a son plus vif regret, force d'executer — au besoin par 
la force des armes — les mesures de securite exposees comme 
indispensables vis-a-vis des menaces fran9aises. 

Veuillez agreer, &c. 

(Signe) VON BELOW. 


[Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 a.m.).] 

[cf. B. 154 ; IN accordance with my instructions, I have the honour 
Y. 154.] to inform your Excellency that in consequence of the refusal"* 

'"[No. 20.] of the Belgian Government to entertain the well-intentioned 
proposals made to them by the German Government, the 
latter, to their deep regret, find themselves compelled to take 
— if necessary by force of arms — those measures of defence 
already foreshadowed as indispensable, in view of the menace 
of France. 

No. 28. 

Note communicated by Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister 
at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 


Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

""[B. 155.3 ^ ^^ instructed"" to inform the Belgian Government that 
if Germany brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the 
object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, 


His Britannic Majesty's Government expect Belgium to 
resist with all the means at her disposal. 

In that event. His Britannic Majesty's Government are 
prepared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, 
in tendering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Govern- 
ment with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted 
by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee 
for the maintenance of the future independence and integrity 
of Belgium. 

No. 29. 

Belgian Minister at The Hague to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

The Hague, August 4, 1914. 

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday 
evening that the Netherlands Government would perhaps be 
obliged, owing to the gravity of the present situation, to 
institute war buoying on the Scheldt."' '"[See No. 

M. Loudon read me the draft of the note which would 5o.l 

announce this decision to me. 

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the 
note in question which was communicated to me yesterday 

As you will observe, the Scheldt will only be closed at 
night. By day navigation will be possible, but only with 
Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary 
nautical instructions. In this way both Dutch interests iu 
the defence of their territory, and Belgian interests in the 
navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded. 

You will note that the Netherlands Government further 
ask that in the event of the war buoying being carried out, 
we should cause the lightships " Wielingen " and " Wandelaar" 
to be withdrawn in order to facilitate the maintenance of 
the neutrality of Dutch territory. 

I would point out that the phrase used in this note, " sail- 
ing up the Scheldt," is not sufficiently explicit ; sailing 
down would be permitted under the same conditions. The 
Minister has, however, given me this assurance. 


[G. 30] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 4 

As soon as the Netherlands Government have decided 
upon this exceptional measure I shall be informed of it. 
About six hours are necessary to carry out war buoying. 
I will at once telegraph to you. 

Note Enclosed in No. 29. 

THE Netherlands Government may be compelled, in 
order to maintain the neutrality of Dutch territory, to in- 
stitute war buoying upon the Scheldt, that is to say, to move 
or modify a portion of the actual arrangement of buoys 
and lights. 

At the same time this special arrangement of buoys has 
been so drawn up that when it is brought into force it will 
still be possible to sail up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp by 
day, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished 
with the necessary nautical instructions. In thus acting the 
Netherlands Government are convinced that they will be 
able to serve equally both the Dutch interests in the defence 
of Netherlands territory and Belgian interests in the naviga- 
tion of Antwerp. 

After the estabhshment of war buoying on the Scheldt, 
there would be no further reason to enter the tidal water of 
Flushing at night, and as the presence of the hghtships 
" Wielingen " and " Wandelaar " is not indispensable to naviga- 
tion by day, the Netherlands Government would be much 
obhged if the Belgian Government would be good enough, 
in the event of the estabhshment of war buoying, to withdraw 
these boats in order to facilitate the maintenance of the 
neutrality of Dutch territory. 

No. 30. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to Belgian Ministers at London and Paris. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

159 ;'y. the General Staff announces that Belgian territory has 
151.3 been violated at Gemmenich.'" 


No. 31. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that from 
to-day the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your 
diplomatic status and cease to have official relations with 
you. Your Excellency will find enclosed the passports neces- 
sary for your departure with the Staff of the legation. '" '" [Reply, 

No. 33.] 

No. 32. 

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August 4, 191.4. 

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your 
Excellency's note of the 4th August, "" and to inform you '"' [No. 31.] 
that I have entrusted the custody of the German Legation 
of Brussels to the care of my United States colleague. 

No. 33. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

PLEASE ask the Spanish Government"' if they will be "'[SeeNos. 
good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany, 34. 46 ; cf. 
and whether in that event they will issue the necessary ^- ^49-3 
instructions to their Ambassador at BerHn. 

No. 34. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

THE German Minister is leaving to-night ; you should 
ask for your passports. We are requesting the Spanish 
Government"' to authorise the Spanish Ambassador to be (4)rj^Q ^ 
good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany. 


[G. 35] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 

No. 35. 

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Berlin, August 4, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a transla- 
tion of part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by 
the Imperial Chancellor on the subject of the infamous viola- 
'''[c/. B. tion of Belgian neutrality : — "' 

160. " We are in a state of legitimate defence and necessity 

Fulltrans- knows no law. 

s^ech° " ^^^ troops have occupied Luxemburg"" and have 

P^53-' perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the 

Interview dictates of international law. France has, it is true, declared 

and com- at Brussels that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of 

ments, Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary. But 

(2fr<f vr we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France 

^g^f °' could wait ; we could not. A French attack upon our 

flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been 

fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over 

the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and 

'" [cf. No. Belgium. ''' For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will 

i2(encl.); make reparation so soon as our military object is attained. 

see also " Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is 

(encl')l ^^^^SS^^^g f°^ ^^^ supreme welfare can only be concerned 

with the means of extricating himself ; we stand side by side 

with Austria." 

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann HoUweg recog- 
nises, without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating 
international law by her invasion of Belgian territory and ' 
that she is committing a wrong against us. 

No. 36. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 4, 1914. 
I HAVE the honour to inform you that in the House of 
"• [See p. Commons this afternoon the Prime Minister made a fresh 
418.] statement"' with regard to the European crisis. 


1914] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 36] 

After recalling the principal points set forth yesterday by 
Sir E. Grey,"' the Prime Minister read : — '" [See pp. 

400 sqq.] 

1. A telegram received from Sir F. Villiers this morning 
which gave the substance of the second ultimatum presented 
to the Belgian Government by the German Government, 
which had been sent to you this morning {see No. 27). 

2. Your telegram informing me of the violation of the 
frontier at Gemmenich,"" a copy of which I have given to '^'[No. 30.3 
Sir A. Nicolson. 

3. A telegram which the German Government addressed 

to its Anibassador in London this morning '*' with the evident '"[B. i57-3 
intention of misleading popular opinion as to its attitude. 
Here is the translation as published in one of this evening's 
newspapers : — 

" Please dispel any mistrust which may subsist on the 
part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, 
by repeating most positively the formal assurance that, even 
in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will 
under no pretence whatever annex Belgian territory. 

" Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we 
solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her 

" It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian 
territory without making at the time territorial acquisitions 
at the expense of Holland. 

" Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army 
could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which 
was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable informa- 

" Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutral- 
ity, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent 
French advance." 

Mr. Asquith then informed the House that in answer to 
this note of the German Government the British Government 
had repeated'*' their proposal of last week,"" namely, that "'[B. 159.3 
the German Government should give the same assurances as '^'[B. 114-] 
to Belgian neutrality as France had given last week both to 
England and to Belgium. The British Cabinet allowed the 
Berlin Cabinet till midnight to reply.'"' '"[B. 159.3 


IG. 37] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 4, 

No 37. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914. 

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British 
Ministers in Norway, Holland, and Belgium, that Great 
Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist German 
pressure and observe neutrality. Should they resist they 
will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that 
event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire 
it, to join France and Russia, in offering an alliance to the 
said Governments for the purpose of resisting the use of 
force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain 
'^' [See the future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. '" 
Nos. 39, J observed to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered : This is in case 
her neutrality is violated. 

No. 38. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Belgian Ministers in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the course of recent 
events as regards the relations of Belgium with certain of the 
Powers which guarantee her neutrality and independence. 

On the 31st July the British Minister made me a verbal 

^'•[See No communication"" according to which Sir E. Grey, in anticipa- 

II,] ' tion of a European war, had asked the German and French 

Governments separately if each of them were resolved to 

respect the neutrality of Belgium should that neutrahty not 

be violated by any other Power. 

In view of existing treaties. Sir F. Villiers was instructed 
to bring this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Govern- 
ment, adding that Sir E. Grey presumed that Belgium was 
resolved to maintain her neutrality, and that she expected 
other Powers to respect it. 

I told the British Minister that we highly appreciated this 
communication, which was in accordance with our expectation, 



and I added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers 
who had guaranteed our independence, might rest fuUy 
assured of our firm determination to maintain our neutrality ; 
nor did it seem possible that our neutrality could be threatened 
by any of those States, with whom we enjoyed the most 
cordial and frank relations. The Belgian Government, I 
added, had given proof of this resolution by taking from now 
on all such miUtary measures as seemed to them to be neces- 
sitated by the situation. 

In his turn the French Minister made a verbal communica- 
tion on August 1st"' to the effect that he was authorised to '''[No. 15.3 
inform the Belgian Government that in case of an international 
war the French Government, in conformity with their repeated 
declarations, would respect Belgian territory, and that they 
would not be induced to modify their attitude except in 
the event of the violation of Belgian neutrahty by another 

I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already 
taken aU the necessary precautions to ensure respect of our 
independence and our frontiers. 

On the morning of August 2nd I had a fresh conversa- 
tion with Sir F. Vilhers, in the course of which he told me 
that he had lost no time in telegraphing our conversation of 
July 31st'"' to his Government, and that he had been careful (*i[See No. 
to quote accurately the solemn declaration which he had 11.] 
received of Belgium's intention to defend her frontiers from 
whichever side they might be invaded. He added : " We 
know that France has given you formal assurances, but Great 
Britain has received no reply from Berlin '*' on this subject." '''[c/. Nos. 

The latter fact did not particularly affect me, since a 13. i4-] 
declaration from the German Government might appear 
superfluous in view of existing treaties. Moreover, the Sec- 
retary of State had reaffirmed, at the meeting of the committee 
of the Reichstag of April 29th, 1913, " that the neutrahty of 
Belgium is estabhshed by treaty which Germany intends to 
respect."'*' i^'[No. 12, 

The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minis- (end.)] 

ter, called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 o'clock, and 

handed to me the enclosed note {see No. 20). The German 

Government gave the Belgian Government a time limit of 

twelve hours within which to communicate their decision. *" *°' [-^^f No. 


[G. 39] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 4 

No hesitation was possible as to the reply called for by 
the amazing proposal of the German Government. You will 
find a copy enclosed. {See No. 22.) 

The ultimatum expired at 7 a.m. on August 3rd. As at 
ID o'clock no act of war had been committed, the Belgian 
Cabinet decided that there was no reason for the moment to 
'''[c/. No. appeal to the guaranteeing powers.'" 

24-1 Towards mid-day the French Minister questioned me upon 

<^' [cf. No. this point, and said : — '" 
24-] " Although in view of the rapid march of events I have 

as yet received no instructions to make a declaration from 
my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known 
intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were 
to appeal to the French Government as one of the Powers 
guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would 
at once respond to Belgium's appeal ; if such an appeal 
were not made it is probable that — ^unless, of course, excep- 
tional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence — 
the French Government would not intervene until Belgium 
had taken some effective measure of resistance." 

I thanked Monsieur Klobukowski for the support which 
the French Government had been good enough to offer us 
in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Govern- 
ment were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of 
the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to 
<2' [See No. be done. '^' 
40.] Finally, at 6 a.m. on August 4th, the German Minister 

made the following communication to me. {See No. 27.) 

The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the 
question of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neu- 
'■" [No. 43.] trality. '" 

No. 39. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914. 

GREAT BRITAIN this morning called upon Germany 
'"[B. 159.3 to respect Belgian neutrality."" The ultimatum says that 
whereas the note addressed by Germany to Belgium threatens 


the latter with an appeal to the force of arms if she opposes 
the passage of German troops ; and whereas Belgian territory 
has been violated at Gemmenich ; and whereas Germany 
has refused to give Great Britain a similar assurance to that 
given last week by France ; therefore Great Britain must once 
again demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the respect 
of Belgian neutrality and of the treaty to which Germany, 
no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum 
expires at midnight. 

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the See No. 37, 
British proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for 
the time being. 

No. 40. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
British, French, and Russian Ministers at Brussels. 

Brussels, August 4, 1914. 

THE Belgian Government regret to have to announce 
to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of 
Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty 

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist'" m\cf. No. 
by all the means in their power. 22.I 

Belgium appeals'*' to Great Britain, France, and Russia to 
co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her '^' [pf- No. 
territory."' _ ^^' 

There should be* concerted and joint action (II y aurait jiso^ 
une action concertie et commune) to oppose the forcible measures 421.] 
taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, ^^^ 
to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence Not fo' 
and integrity of Belgium. - ^o^ '^A ' 

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she wiU under- 
take the defence of her fortified places. 

* [In Y. 152, and on p. 421, translated " There would be."] 


IG. 413 BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 5, 

No. 41. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914. 

"'[B. I59-] GERMANY, having rejected the British proposals,"* 
Great Britain has informed her that a state of war existed 
between the two countries as from eleven o'clock. 

No. 42. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

AFTER the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich, 
'"'[No. 40.] Belgium appealed''" to Great Britain, France, and Russia 
through their representatives at Brussels, to co-operate as 
guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory. 

Belgium undertakes the defence of her fortified places. 

No. 43. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. 

Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

IN my despatch of August 4 {see No. 38) I had the honour 
to inform you of the sequence of events which had attended 
the international relations of Belgium from July 31st to 
August 4th. I added that the Cabinet was considering the 
question whether Belgium, whose territory had been invaded 
since the morning, should appeal to the guarantee of the 

The Cabinet had decided in the affirmative when the 
British Minister informed me that the proposal which he 
had communicated to me, and according to which the British 
Government were disposed to respond favourably to our 
appeal to her as a guaranteeing power, was cancelled for the 
time being. {See No. 37.) 



A telegram from London made it clear that this change of 
attitude was caused by an ultimatum from Great Britain"' '"[B. 159.I 
giving Germany a time limit of ten hours within which to 
evacuate Belgian territory and to respect Belgian neutrality. 
(See No. 39.) During the evening, the Belgian Government 
addressed to France, Great Britain, and Russia, through their 
respective representatives at Brussels, a note, of which a copy 
is enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.) 

As you will observe, Belgium appeals to Great Britain, 
France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in 
the defence of her territory and in the maintenance for the 
future of the independence and integrity of her territory. 
She will herself undertake the defence of her fortified places. 

As yet we are not aware how our appeal has been received. 

No. 44. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries having 
Diplomatic Relations with Belgium. 

Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

BY the treaty of April i8th,* 1839, Prussia, France, Great 
Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of 
the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty 
the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the 
Netherlands. The treaty runs : " Belgium shall form a 
State independent and perpetually neutral." Belgium has 
fulfilled all her international obligations, she has accom- 
plished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiahty, she has 
neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause 
that neutrality to be respected. 

In these circumstances the Belgian Government have 
learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a 
Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian 
territory in violation of the obhgations undertaken by treaty. 

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage 
against international law provoked by no act of ours. 

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel 
by all the means in their power the attack thus made upon 

* [The correct date of the treaty is April 19th, 1839. For text see p. 487.J 



[G. 45] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 5, 

their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in virtue of 
"'[Sefi article 10 of The Hague Convention of 1907"' respecting 
P- 509I the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the 
case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force, 
attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be considered as a 
hostile act. 

I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience 
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch 
to his Excellency, handing him a copy, If the interview 
cannot be granted at once you should make the communica- 
tion in question in writing. 

No. 45. 

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 5, 1914. 

I HAVE received my passports and shall leave Berlin 
l'^^* ■^* to-morrow morning for Holland"" with the staff of the 
(vol.1., legation, 
p. 212) ; No. 46. 

y. 155.] Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to Monsieur 

Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) St. Sebastian, August 5, 1914. 

THE Spanish Government undertake the custody of 
^ MZ^° N^ Belgian interests in Germany, and are to-day sending tele- 
^j ^° °' graphic instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin. 

No. 47. 

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Paris, August 5, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the 
notification of a state of war between France and Germany, 
which has been communicated to me to-day. 

Enclosure in No. 47, 

[Text of notification, for which see Y. 157.] 


No. 48. 

Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British 
Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

I AM instructed to inform the Belgian Government"' that "'[•Se« No. 

His Britannic Majesty's Government consider joint action '^°'^ 

with a view to resisting Germany to be in force and to be 

justified by the Treaty of 1839"". ""[Seep. 


No. 49. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914. 

GREAT BRITAIN agrees to take joint action in her 
capacity of guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian 
territory. ''' The British fleet will ensure the free passage of "'[^^^ No. 
the Scheldt for the provisioning of Antwerp. ^'^'^ 

No. 50. 

Belgian Minister at The Hague to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 5, 1914. See No. 29. 

THE war buoying is about to be estabUshed. 

No. 51. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

PLEASE express to the Spanish Government the sincere See No. 46. 
thanks of the Belgian Government. 


£G. 52] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 5, 

No. 52. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. 

Brussels, August 5, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French and 

Russian Ministers made a communication to me this morning 

informing me of the wilhngness of their Governments to 

'^' [No. 40.] respond to our appeal, "' and to co-operate with Great Britain 

in the defence of Belgian territory. 

No. 53. 

Jonkheer de Weede, Netherlands Minister at Brussels, to 
Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign 

Brussels, August 6, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency here- 
with a copy of the special edition of the Staatscourant con- 
taining the declaration of the neutrality of the Netherlands 
in the war between Belgium and Germany, and between Great 
Britain and Germany. 

Enclosure to No. 53. 

Laws, Decrees, Nominations, &c. 

Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice,. Marine, War, and 

the Colonies. 

THE Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, 
and the Colonies, authorised to that effect by Her Majesty 
the Queen, make known to all whom it may concern that the 
Netherlands Government will observe strict neutrality in the 
war which has broken out between Great Britain and Ger- 
many, and Belgium and Germany, Powers friendly to the 


1914] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [G. 58] 

Netherlands, and that, with a view to the observance of this 
neutrality, the following dispositions have been taken : — 

Article i. 

Within the limits of the territory of the State, including 
the territory of the Kingdom in Europe and the colonies and 
possessions in other parts of the world, no hostilities of any 
kind are permitted, neither may this territory serve as a base 
for hostile operations. 

Article 2. 

Neither the occupation of any part of the territory of 
the State by a belligerent nor the passage across this territory 
by land is permitted to the troops or convoys of munitions 
belonging to the belligerents, nor is the passage across the 
territory situated within the territorial waters of the Nether- 
lauds by the warships or ships assimilated thereto of the 
belligerents permitted. 

Article 3. 

Troops or soldiers belonging to the belligerents or destined 
for them arriving in the territory of the State by land will be 
immediately disarmed and interned until the termination of 
the war. 

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a 
belUgerent, who contravenes'" the provisions of articles 2, 4, '" [Should 
or 7 will not be permitted to leave the said territory until the be "which 
end of the war. JJie"-" 

Article 4. "navires 

de guerre 

No warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to any . . . qui 
of the belligerents shall have access to the said territory. contremen- 


Article 5. 

The provisions of Article 4 do not apply to : — 

I. Warships or ships assimilated thereto which are 
forced to enter the ports or roadsteads of the State on account 
of damages or the state of the sea. Such ships may leave 

II— D 49 

|G. 53] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 6, 

the said ports or roadsteads as soon as the circumstances 
which have driven them to take shelter there shall have 
ceased to exist. 

2. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a 
belHgerent which anchor in a port or roadstead in the colonies 
or oversea possessions exclusively with the object of com- 
pleting their provision of foodstuffs or fuel. These ships 
must leave as soon as the circumstances which have forced 
them to anchor shall have ceased to exist, subject to the 
condition that their stay in the roadstead or port shall not 
exceed twenty-four hours. 

3. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a 
belligerent employed exclusively on a religious, scientific, or 
humanitarian mission. 

Article 6. 

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a 
belligerent may only execute such repairs in the ports and 
roadsteads of the State as are indispensable to their sea- 
worthiness, and they may in no way increase their fighting 

Article 7. 

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a 
belligerent who may at the commencement of war be within 
the territory of the State must leave within twenty-four 
hours from the moment of the publication of this declaration. 

Article 8. 

If warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to 
different belligerents find themselves at the same time, in 
the conditions set forth in Article 5, in the same part of the 
world and within the territory of the State, a delay of at least 
twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of 
each respective belHgerent ship. Except in special circum- 
stances, the order of departure shall be determined by the 
order of arrival. A warship or ship assimilated thereto 
belonging to a beUigerent may only leave the territory of 
the State twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant 
ship which flies the flag of another belligerent. 



Article 9. 

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a 
belligerent to which Articles 5 and 7 are applicable may only 
be ,provisioned with foodstuffs in the ports and roadsteads 
of the country to the extent necessary to bring their provisions 
up to the normal limit in time of peace. 

Similarly they can only be supplied with fuel to the extent 
necessary to enable them, with the stock they already have 
on board, to reach the nearest port of their own country. 

The same vessel cannot again be provided with fuel until a 
period of at least three months shall have elapsed since it was 
last provisioned in the territory of the State. 

Article 10. 

A prize may only be brought into Dutch territory if such 
prize is unnavigable, or unseaworthy, or short of fuel or food- 

Such prize must leave as soon as the reasons which caused 
her to enter Dutch territory cease to exist. 

Should such prize fail to do so, immediate orders shall be 
given her to leave. In the event of a refusal, all possible 
means shall be employed to liberate the prize, with her of&cers 
and crew, and to intern the crew placed on board by the 
belligerent who has taken it as prize. 

Article ii. 

It is forbidden, in State territory, to form a corps of 
combatants or to open recruiting offices on behalf of the 

Article 12. 

It is forbidden, in State territory, to take service on board 
warships or ships assimilated thereto. 

Article 13. 

It is forbidden, in State territory, to equip, arm, or man 
vessels intended for miUtary purposes on behalf of a belligerent, 
or to furnish or deliver such vessels to a belligerent. 



Article 14. 

It is forbidden in State territory to supply arms or ammu- 
nition to warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to 
a belhgerent, or to come to their assistance in any manner 
whatsoever with a view to augment their crew or their 

Article 15. 

It is forbidden in State territory failing previous authorisa- 
tion by the competent local authorities, to repair warships 
or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to 
supply them with victuals or fuel. 

Article 16. 

It is forbidden in State territory to take part in the dis- 
mantling or repairing of prizes, except in so far as is necessary 
to make them seaworthy ; also to purchase prizes or con- 
fiscated goods, and to receive them in exchange, in gift, or on 

Article 17. 

The State territory comprises the coastal waters to a 
distance of three nautical miles, reckoning sixty to the degree 
of latitude, from low-water mark. 

As regards inlets, this distance of three nautical miles is 
measured from a straight line drawn across the inlet at the 
point nearest the entrance where the mouth of the inlet is not 
wider than ten nautical miles, reckoning sixty to the degree 
of latitude. 

Article 18. 

Further, attention is called to Articles 100, Section i, and 
205 of the Penal Code ; " Indisch Staatsblad," 1905, No. 62 ; 
Article 7, Section 4, of the Law respecting the status of 
Netherlands nationality, and respecting domicile (" Neder- 
landsch Staatsblad," 1892, No. 268 ; 1910, No. 216) ; Article 
2, No. 3, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands 
nationality (" Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 55 ; 
" Indisch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 296 ; Articles 54 and 55 of 



the Penal Code of Surinam ; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal 
Code of Cura9oa.) 

Similarly, the attention of commanding officers, owners, 
and charterers of ships is called to the dangers and incon- 
veniences to which they would expose themselves by 
disregarding the effective blockade of belligerents, by carrying 
contraband of war, or mihtary despatches for belligerents 
(except in the course of the regular postal service), or by 
rendering them other transport services. 

Any person guilty of the acts aforesaid would expose 
himself to all the consequences of those acts, and would 
not be able, as regards them, to obtain any protection or 
intervention on the part of the Netherlands Government. 

No. 54. 

Monsieur Davimon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 6, 1914. 

PLEASE communicate the following note to the Nether- See No. 50. 
lands Government : — 

The Belgian Government have taken note of the estab- 
lishment of war buoying on the Scheldt and of the fact that 
the Netherlands Government will ensure the maintenance of 

It would be convenient that navigation should be possible 
from 30 minutes before sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset, 
and that the exchange of pilots should take place at Bath. '" ''' [See Nos. 

With every desire to fall in with the requests of the Nether- 53. 56.] 
lands Government, the Belgian Government think that it is 
desirable in the interests of the littoral ports to retain the 
lightships of Wielingen and of Wandelaar, '*' and also the '^'[No. ag 
buoys of the Wielingen Channel. and end.] 

No. 55. 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur 

Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) The Hague, August 6, 1914. 

NAVIGATION on the Scheldt is allowed from daybreak 
and so long as it is Hght.'" The WieUngen buoys will be '"t«/.No. 

53 ^"^'^ 

[G. 56] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 7, 

replaced. The exchange of pilots at Hansweert is easier 
and better organised. Are you particularly anxious to have 
Bath ? 

No. 56. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August y, 1914. 

PLEASE express to the Netherlands Government the 
sincere thanks of the Belgian Government for the measures 
taken to secure navigation on the Scheldt. The Belgian 
Government are in agreement with the Netherlands Govern- 
ment on the subject of the extent of navigation. They had 
proposed Bath, but accept Hansweert, since this port has 
'^'[c/. Nos. better facilities for the exchange of pilots.'" 
54. 55-1 

No. 57. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to 
the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London. 

[Replies : (Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 1914. 

French, BELGIUM trusts that the war will not be extended to 

B°ti^h' Central Africa.'^' The Governor of the Belgian Congo has 

No. 75.3 received instructions to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. 

(2) [c/. Nos. Please ask the French Government [British Government] 

58, 59, 61, whether they intend to proclaim the neutrahty of the French 

74. 75-] Congo [British colonies in the conventional basin of the 

Congo], in accordance with article 11 of the General Act of 

Berlin. A telegram from Boma reports that hostilities are 

probable between the French and Germans in the Ubangi. 

No. 58. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London. 

Brussels, August 7, 1914. 
[No. 57, WITH reference to my telegram of this morning, '" I have 
and note.] ^j^g honour to request you to bring to the notice of the French 
[British] Government the following information : — 

While instructions have been sent to the Governor-General 
of the Congo to take defensive measures on the common 




frontiers of the Belgian colony and of the German colonies 
of East Africa and the Cameroons, the Belgian Government 
have suggested to that officer that he should abstain from all 
offensive action against those colonies. 

In view of the civilising mission common to colonising 
nations, the Belgian Government desire, in effect, for humani- 
tarian reasons, not to extend the field of hostilities to Central 
Africa. They will, therefore, not take the initiative of putting 
such a strain on civilisation in that region, and the miUtary 
forces which they possess there will only go into action in 
the event of their having to repel a direct attack on their 
African possessions. 

I should be glad to learn whether the French [British] 
Government share this view and in that case whether it is 
their intention, during the present conflict, to avail themselves 
of article ii of the General Act of Berlin to neutralise such of 
their colonies as are contained in the conventional basin of 
the Congo. 

I am addressing an identic communication to your col- 
league at London [Paris]."' '" [Replies, 

Nos. 74, 
No. 59. 

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Paris, August 8, 1914. 

I HAVE had the honour of speaking to the President of 
the Republic with respect to your telegram of yesterday."' <='[No. 57.J 
I had received it during the evening and had immediately 
communicated it to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They 
asked for time to consider it before answering. 

Monsieur Poincare has promised me to speak on this 
subject to-day to the Minister of the Colonies. At first sight 
he could see little difficulty in proclaiming the neutrahty of 
the French Congo, but he nevertheless reserves his reply.'" '"[S^eNos. 
He believes that acts of war have already taken place in the 61,74,75.] 
Ubangi. He has taken the opportunity to remind me that 
the protection accorded us by France extends also to our 
colonies and that we have nothing to fear. 


[G. 60] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 9, 

No. 60. 
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur 

Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) The Hague, August 9, 1914. 

[See No. THE Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged 

^2-3 me to convey to you the following information, the United 
States Minister at Brussels having decUned to do so : — 

The fortress of Liege has been taken by assault after a 

brave defence. The German Government most deeply regret 

that bloody encounters should have resulted from the attitude 

of the Belgian Government towards Germany. Germany is 

"'[c/. No. not coming as an enemy"' into Belgium, it is only through 

^°-^ the force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the 
military measures of France, to take the grave decision of 
entering Belgium and occupying Liege as a base for her 
further military operations. Now that the Belgian army 
has upheld the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a 
very superior force, the German Government beg the King of 
the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium 
the further horrors of war. The German Government are 
ready for any compact with Belgium which can be reconciled 
with their arrangements with France. {See No. 70.) Ger- 
many once more gives her solemn assurance that it is not her 
intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and that 
such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still 
ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will 
allow her to do so. 

The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague 
to undertake this attempt at mediation. The Minister for 
Foreign Affairs has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. 
I have undertaken it to oblige him. 

No. 61. 

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur 

Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegram.) Paris, August 9, 1914. 

See No. 59. THE French Government are strongly inclined to proclaim 
the neutrality of the possessions in the conventional basin of 
""[See No. the Congo and are begging Spain''' to make the suggestion at 
74.] Berlin. 



No, 62. 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

The Hague, August 10, 1914. 

IN response to a call on the telephone yesterday evening, [See No. 
at 9 o'clock, I went to the Department for Foreign Affairs. 63.3 

Jonkheer Loudon told me that my German colleague had 
just left his room, and had handed him a document which the 
United States representative at Brussels had decUned to 
forward to you. 

The United States official in charge of the German Lega- 
tion at Brussels stated that he had received no special instruc- 
tions from Washington to intervene officially with the Belgian 
Government in the interest of Germany. 

The United States Minister consequently telegraphed to 
his colleague at The Hague, who informed the German repre- 
sentative of Mr. Whitlock's refusal. 

The German Government, therefore, took the initial step 
by approaching the United States Ambassador at Berlin. 

In these circumstances, and in view of the urgency of these 
matters, Herr von Miiller begged Jonkheer Loudon to act as 
the intermediary of the German Government in this negotia- 
tion with you. 

His Excellency read me the German text of the document. 
I did not hide my astonishment at this attempt at mediation, 
and its poor chance of success in this form ; but, solely in 
order to oblige the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
I promised to telegraph to you immediately ; and this I did 
yesterday."' »)[No. 60.3 

You will find the German document enclosed in original 
and translation. 

Enclosure i in No. 62. 

DIE Festung Liittich ist nach tapfrer Gegenwehr im [Reply, 
Sturm genommen worden. Die Deutsche Regierung bedauert Nos, 71, 
es auf das tiefste, dass es infolge der Stellungnahme der 73-] 
Belgischen Regierung gegen Deutschland zu bliitigen Zusara- 
menstossen gekommen ist. Deutschland kommt nicht als 


[G. 62] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August io, 

Feind nach Belgien. Nur unter dem Zwang der Verhaltnisse 
hat es angesichts der militarischen Massnahmen Frankreichs 
den schweren Entschluss fassen mussen, in Belgien einzurucken 
und Liittich als Stiitzpunkt fur seine weiteren militarischen 
Operationen besetzen zu miissen. Nachdem die Belgische 
Armee in heldenmutigem Widerstand gegen die grosse Uber- 
lengenheit ihre Waffenehre auf das glanzendste gewahrt hat, 
bittet die Deutsche Regierung seine Majestat den Konig und 
die Belgische Regierung, Belgien die weiteren Schrecken des 
Krieges zu ersparen. Die Deutsche Regierung ist zu jedem 
Abkommem mit Belgien bereit das sich irgendwie mit Riick- 
sicht auf seine {voir fihe No. 70) Auseinandersetzung mit 
Frankreich vereinigen lasst. Deutschland versichert noch- 
mals feierlichst, dass es nicht von der Absicht geleitet gewesen 
ist sich Belgisches Gebiet anzueignen, und dass ihm diese 
Absicht durchaus fern liegt. Deutschland is noch immer 
bereit das Belgische Konigreich unverziiglich zu raumen, 
sobald die Kriegslage es ihm gestattet. " Der hiesige Ameri- 
kanische Botschafter ist mit diesem Vermittlungsversuch 
seines Briisseler KoUegen einverstanden." 

Enclosure 2 in No. 62. 


LA forteresse de Liege a ete prise d'assaut apres une 
defense courageuse. Le Gouvernement allemand regrette le 
plus profondement que par suite de I'attitude du Gouverne- 
ment beige contre FAllemagne on en soit arrive a des rencon- 
tres sanglantes. L'AUemagne ne vient pas en ennemie en 
Belgique. C'est seulement par la force des evenements 
qu'elle a du, a cause des mesures mihtaires de la France, 
. prendre la grave determination d'entrer en Belgique et 
d'occuper Liege comme point d'appui pour ses operations 
rriilitaires ulterieures. Apres que I'armee beige a, dans une 
resistance heroique contre une grande superiorite, main- 
tenu I'honneur de ses armes de la fagon la plus brillante, le 
Gouvernement allemand prie Sa Majeste le Roi et le Gouverne- 
ment beige d'eviter a la Belgique les horreurs ulterieures de la 
guerre. Le Gouvernement allemand est pret a tout accord 
avec la Belgique, qui peut se concilier de n'importe quelle 
maniere avec ses arrangements avec la France. L'AUemagne 


assure encore une fois solennellement qu'elle n'a pas et^ 
dirigee par rintention de s'approprier le territoire beige et 
que cette intention est loin d'elle. L'AUemagne est encore 
tou jours prete k ^vacuer la Belgique aussitot que I'etat de la 
guerre le lui permettra. 

L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis ici est d'accord avec cette 
tentative de mediation de son collogue de Bruxelles. 


THE fortress of Liege has been taken by assault after a 
brave defence. The German Government most deeply regrets 
that bloody encounters should have resulted from the Belgian 
Government's attitude towards Germany. Germany is not 
coming as an enemy into Belgium."' It is only through the L^/. Jmo. 
force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the military ^°'^ 

measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering 
Belgium and occupjdng Liege as a base for her further military 
operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the 
honour of its arms in the most brilliant manner by its heroic 
resistance to a very superior force, the German Government 
beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government 
to spare Belgium the horrors of war. The German Govern- 
ment are ready for any compact with Belgium which can in 
any way be reconciled with their arrangements with France. 
Germany gives once more her solemn assurance that she has 
not been animated by the intention of appropriating Belgian 
territory for herself, and that such an intention is far from 
her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium 
as soon as the state of war wiU allow her to do so. 

The United States Ambassador here concurs in this attempt 
at mediation by his colleague in Brussels. 

No. 63. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. 
(Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914. 

THE Belgian Government have received the proposals See No. 62-. 
made to them by the German Government through the inter- and 
mediary of the Netherlands Government. They will forward enclosures^ 
a reply shortly. 


[G. 641 BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August ic, 

No. 64. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. 

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914. 

DOUBT exists as to the meaning of the word " Ausein- 

1^1 [See No. andersetzung," which you translate by "arrangement."'" 

70-1 Please ascertain whether the German Government have in 

mind any arrangements which we may have come to with 

France, or a settlement of the dispute between France and 


No. 65. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to the British, Russian, and French Ministers at 

Brussels, August 10, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the 
Belgian Minister at The Hague, at the request of the Nether- 
lands Minister for Foreign Affairs, has forwarded to us the 
following proposal from the German Government. [See 
No. 62, enclosure 2.) 

The Belgian Government propose to return the following 
'^'[See No. reply"' to this communication : 

7^-3 " The proposal made to us by the German Government 

repeats the proposal formulated in their ultimatum of 

<^' [No. 20.] August 2.'^' Faithful to her international obhgations, Bel- 

'•" [No. 22.3 gium can only reiterate her reply"' to that ultimatum, the 

more so as since August 3 her neutrality has been violated, 

a distressing war has been waged on her territory, and the 

^'' [N OS. 48, guarantors of her neutrality have responded"" loyally and 

5^-3 without delay to her appeal." 

The Belgian Government consider that the Powers 
^5) guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium should have cognizance 

68,69,73 of these documents.'" ' 



No. 66. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to the Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St. 

Brussels, August lo, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the circumstances 
which led to the departure of the Belgian representative 
from Luxemburg.'" "'['^Z- 

The General Ofi&cer commanding the German troops in ^^^g^^'s 
the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg informed the German departure, 
Minister in that town, on August 8, of the desire of the military y. 156.3 
authorities for the departure of the Belgian representative at 
the Grand Ducal Court. 

Herr von Buch addressed to Monsieur Eyschen, President 
of the Government, a note, of which the following is a 
translation : 

" Your Excellency, " Luxemburg, August 8, 1914. 

" In consequence of the completely hostile attitude 
adopted by Belgium towards Germany, the military authori- 
ties find themselves obliged to insist upon the departure of 
the Belgian Minister from Luxemburg. 

" His Excellency the German Officer commanding begs 
Count van den Steen de Jehay to arrange his journey home 
in such a way that he may be able, within twenty-four hours, 
to see General von Ploetz at Coblentz, with a view to settUng 
the details of the further stages of his journey. It is impos- 
sible for him to travel except via Treves-Coblentz. 

(Signed) " VON BUCH." 

Monsieur Eyschen forwarded this note the same day to 
Count van den Steen de Jehay, accompanied by a letter in the 
following terms : 
« gjjj " Luxemburg, August 8, 1914. 

" I greatly regret to have to communicate to you the 
enclosed copy of a note from the German Minister, informing 
me that the German military authorities demand your depar- 


[G. 67] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August u, 

" You will find in it the conditions which they attach 

" Herr von Buch told me that the military authorities 
advise you to travel by railway, as an attempt to carry out 
your journey by motor would expose you to being too frequently 
stopped for reasons connected with the control of the roads. 
But the choice is left to you. 

" The German Minister will come to me for your answer. 

" I cannot tell you how painful it is to me to fulfil my 
present task. I shall never forget the pleasant relations 
which have existed between us, and I hope that your journey 
may be carried out under the best possible conditions. 

(Signed) " EYSCHEN." 

The Belgian Government, considering that the Grand 
Ducal Government had no choice in their attitude, and that 
the course they had been obliged to adopt in no way implied 
any discourteous intention towards the King of the Belgians 
or towards Belgium, decided that there was no reason, in 
these circumstances, for requesting the Luxemburg Charge 
d'Affaires to leave Belgium, 

No. 67. 

Mr. Whitlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August 11, 1914. 

THE United States Legation received a telegram to-day 
from Washington, conveying the information that the United 
States Government had, at the request of the German Govern- 
ment, consented, as a matter of international courtesy, to 
undertake the protection of German subjects in Belgium. 

In accordance with the instructions contained in this 
telegram, we will, therefore, if you see no objection, undertake 
to use our good and friendly offices with the Belgian Govern- 
ment for the protection of German subjects. The pleasant 
relations which we have had with you in this matter up to the 
present convince me that we may continue them with the 
same object on the same pleasant footing. 



No. 68. 

Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, August ii, 1914. 

I HAVE telegraphed to Sir E. Grey the German com- See No. 65 
munication"' and the proposed reply. ">[No. 62, 

I have received instructions to express to your Excellency (end).] 
the entire concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Govern- 
ment. The latter can only declare their approval of the 
terms of the reply which the Belgian Government propose 
to give to this attempt to sow discord between the Powers 
at present united for the defence of the treaties violated by , 

No. 69. 

Monsieur Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to 
Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign 

Brussels, August 11, 1914. 
I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the See No. 65 
French Government give their entire concurrence to the reply 
which the Belgian Government propose to return to the new 
German ultimatum. '"' '" [No. 62, 

The reply is one which was to be expected from a Govern- (end.)] 
ment and a people who have so heroically resisted the hateful 
violation of their territory. 

France will continue to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing 
Power of Belgian neutrality and as a faithful friend of Belgium. 

No. 70. 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 12, 1914. 

THE German text contained a mistake : instead of See No. 64. 
" seine Auseinandersetzung," it should read " ihre," and 
thus be translated " their conflict with France." 


[G. 711 BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 12 

No. 71. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. 
(Telegramme.) [Brussels, August 12, 1914.] 

PRifiRE de remettre le telegramme suivant au Ministre 
des Affaires fitrangeres : 

" La proposition que nous fait le Gouvernement allemand 
reproduit la proposition qui avait et6 formulee dans I'ultima- 
tum du 2 aodt. Fidele a ses devoirs internationaux, la 
Belgique ne pent que reiterer sa reponse a cet ultimatum, 
d'autant plus que depuis le 3 aout sa neutralite a ete violee, 
qu'une guerre douloureuse a ete portee sur son territoire, et 
que les garants de sa neutralite ont loyalement et immediate- 
ment repondu a son appel." 

- (Telegram.) Brussels, August 12, 1914. 

PLEASE communicate'" the following telegram"" to the 
[See No. Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs : 

2'[c/. No. " The proposal ''' made to us by the German Government 

65.3 repeats the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum"' 

[No. 63, of August 2nd. Faithful to her international obligations, 

(end.)] Belgium can only reiterate her reply'^' to that ultimatum, 
^' [No. 20.] ^Yie more so as since August 3rd, her neutrality has been 

' ^^^- ^^'^ violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory, 
'"[Nos 48 ^^^ ^^^ guarantors of her neutrality • have responded'*' 

52.] ' loyally and without delay to her appeal." 

No. 72. 

Monsieur Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign 


(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, August 13, 1914. 

PLEASE thank the Belgian Government for their com- 
«« o- 5- munication, and express to them the pleasure which the 
Russian Government feel at the firm and dignified attitude 
upon which they are heartily to be congratulated. 


No. 73. 

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at the Hague, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

The Hague, August 13, 1914. 

I HAD the honour to receive your telegram of yesterday, See No. 71 
and I at once communicated to the Netherlands Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, the Belgian reply to the second German 

His Excellency undertook to forward the Belgian com- 
munication to the German Minister forthwith. 

No. 74. 

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Paris, August ±6, 1914. 

IN the course of a conversation which I had this morning See Nos. 57 
with Monsieur de Margerie,"' I turned the conversation to and 58. 
colonial affairs and to the action which you had instructed "'[Political 
me to take in your telegram and your despatch of the 7th ^^'^ °^ 

Monsieur de Margerie reminded me that the French 
Government had approached Spain,'" but the latter had not '"[No. 61.3 
answered before knowing the views of Great Britain. It 
seems that the latter has still given no answer. 

Monsieur de Margerie considered that in view of the 
present situation Germany should be attacked wherever 
possible ; he believes that such is also the opinion of 
Great Britain, who certainly has claims to satisfy ; France 
wishes to get back that part of the Congo which she had 
been compelled to give up in consequence of the Agadir 

Monsieur de Margerie added that a success would not be 
difficult to obtain. 

II-E 6s 

[G. 75] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 17, 

No. 75. 

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to Monsieur 
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

London, August 17, 1914. 

See Nos. 57 IN reply to your despatch of August 7th, I have the 
and 58. honour to inform you that the British Government can- 
not agree to the Belgian proposal to respect the neutrality, 
of the belligerent powers in the conventional basin of the 

German troops from German East Africa have already 
taken the offensive against the British Central African Pro- 
tectorate. Furthermore, British troops have already attacked 
the German port of Dar-es-Salaam, where they have des- 
troyed the wireless telegraphy station. 

In these circumstances, the British Government, even if 
they were convinced from the political and strategical point 
of view of the utihty of the Belgian proposal, would be unable 
to adopt it. 

The British Government believe that the forces they are 
sending to Africa will be sufficient to overcome all opposition. 
They will take every step in their power to prevent any 
risings of the native population. 

France is of the same opinion as Great Britain on account 
of German activity which has been noticed near Bonar and 

No. 76. 

Monsieur Tombeur, Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga, to 
Monsieur Renkin, Belgian Minister for the Colonies. 

(Telegram.) Elizabethville, August 26, 1914. 

THE Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tan- 
ganyika and attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd. 
Two of their natives were killed and two wounded. Fresh 
attacks are expected. 



No. 77. 

Count Clary and Aldringen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at 
The Hague, to Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. 

(Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign 


(T61egramme.) \The Hague, August 28, 1914.] 

D'ORDRE de mon Gouvernement, j'ai I'honneur de 
notifier a votre Excellence ce qui suit : 

" Vu que la Belgique, apres avoir refuse d'accepter les 
propositions qui lui avaient ete adressees a plusieurs reprises 
par TAUemagne, prete sa cooperation militaire a la France 
et a la Grande-Bretagne, qui, toutes deux ont declare la 
guerre a I'Autriche-Hongrie, et en presence du fait que, 
comme il vient d'etre constate, les ressortissants autrichiens 
et hongrois se trouvant en Belgique ont, sous les yeux des 
autorites Royales, dfi subir un traitement contraire aux 
exigences les plus primitives de I'humanite et inadmissibles 
meme vis-a-vis des sujets d'un Etat ennemi, I'Autriche- 
Hongrie se voit dans la necessite de rompre les relations 
diplomatiques et se considere des ce moment en etat de 
guerre avec la Belgique. Je quitte le pays avec le personnel 
de la legation et confie la protection de mes administres au 
Ministre des £tats-Unis d'Amerique en Belgique. De la part 
du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal les passeports sont remis 
au Comte Errembault de Dudzeele." 


The Hague, August 28, 1914. 

ON the instructions of my Government, '" I have the honour w [See R. 
.to inform your Excellency as follows : — 67.] 

" Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the pro- 
posals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is 
affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain, 


[G. 783 BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 29' 

both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria- 
Hungary, and whereas, as has just been proved, Austrian and 
Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under 
the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment con- 

''*[5ee No. trary to the njost primitive demands of humanity'" and 
78]- inadmissible even towards subjects of an enemy State, there- 
fore Austria finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic 
relations and considers herself from this moment in a state 
of war with Belgium. I am leaving the country with the 
staff of the Legation and I am entrusting the protection of 
Austrian interests to the United States Minister in Belgium. 
The Austro-Hungarian Government are forwarding his pass- 

'"' [Reply, ports to Count Errembault de Dudzeele."™ 

No. 78.1 

No. 78. 

Monsieur Davignon,, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at the Hague. 

(Telegramme.) \_Antwerp, August 29, 1914.] 

PRI£RE accuser reception a Legation Autriche par 
intermediaire Ministre Affaires Etrangeres declaration de 
guerre Autriche-Hongrie k Belgique et aj outer ce qui suit : 

" La Belgique a toujours entretenu des relations d'amiti6 
avec tous ses voisins sans distinction. Elle a scrupuleusement 
rempli les devoirs que la neutralite lui impose. Si elle n'a 
pas cru pouvoir accepter les propositions de I'AUemagne, 
c'est que celles-ci avaient pour objet la violation des engage- 
ments qu'elle a pris a la face de I'Europe, engagements qui 
ont ete les conditions de la creation du Royaume de Belgique. 
Elle n'a pas cru qu'un peuple, quelque faible qu'il soit, puisse 
meconnaitre ses devoirs et sacrifier son honneur en s'inclinant 
devant la force. Le Gouvernement a attendu, non seulement 
les delais de I'ultimatum, mais la violation de son territoire 
par les troupes allemandes avant de faire appel a la France 
et a I'Angleterre, garantes de sa neutralite au meme titre que 
I'Allemagne et I'Autriche-Hongrie, pour cooperer au nom et 
en vertu des traites a la defense du territoire beige. 

En repoussant par les armes les envahisseurs, elle n'a 
meme pas accompli un acte d'hostilite aux termes de I'article 
10 de la Convention de La Haye sur les droits et devoirs des 
Puissances neutres. 



L'AUemagne a reconnu elle-meme que son agression con- 
stitue une violation du droit des gens et ne pouvant la justifier 
elle a invoque son interet strategique. 

La Belgique oppose un dementi formel a I'affirmation que 
les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois auraient subi en 
Belgique un traitement contraire aux exigences les 'plus 
primitives de I'humanitie. 

Le Gouvernement Royal a donne, des le debut des hos- 
tilites, les ordres les plus stricts quant a la sauvegarde des 
personnes et des proprietes austro-hongroises. 


(Telegram.) Antwerp, August 29, 1914. 

PLEASE inform the Austrian Legation through the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs that I have received Austria- 
Hungary's declaration of war"' against Belgium, and add idtno. 77.] 
the following : — 

" Belgium has always entertained friendly relations with 
all her neighbours without distinction. She had scrupulously 
fulfilled the duties imposed upon her by her neutraUty. If 
she has not been able to accept Germany's proposals, "^' it '^' [Nos. 20, 
is because those proposals cdntemplated the violation of her 62 (end.).] 
engagements toward Europe, engagements which form the 
conditions of the creation of the Belgian Kingdom. She has 
been unable to admit that a people, however weak they may 
be, can fail in their duty and sacrifice their honour by yielding 
to force. The Government have waited, not only until the 
ultimatum'"' had expired, but also until Belgian territory <='[No. 20.3 
had been violated by German troops,'*' before appealing to i^i[No. 30.I 
France and Great Britain, '°' guarantors of her neutrality, (») [No. 40.3 
under the same terms as are Germany and Austria-Hungary, 
to co-operate in the name and in virtue of the treaties in 
defence of Belgian territory. By repelling the invaders by 
force of arms, she has not even committed an hostile act as 
laid down by the provisions of article 10 of The Hague Con- 
vention'*' respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers. <«»[Sefi 

" Germany herself has recognised that her attack con- p. 509.3 
stitutes a violation of international law,"' and, being unable '"[No. 35.] 
to justify it, she has pleaded her strategical interests. 

[G. 79] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 39, 

" Belgium formally denies the allegation that Austrian 

and Hungarian nationals have suffered treatment in Belgium 

<"' [No. contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity.'" 

11^ " The Belgian Government, from the very commencement 
of hostilities, have issued the strictest orders for the pro- 
tection of Austro-Hungarian persons and property." 

No. 79. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Belgian Ministers abroad. 

Antwerp, August 29, 1914. 

UNDER date of the 17th August, I addressed a despatch 
to the Belgian Minister at London, in which I felt bound to 
call attention to certain allegations made by the German 
Government which are mentioned in the Blue-book recently 
published by the British Government. 

I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy 
of the despatch in question and of its enclosures. 

I request that you will bring its contents to the notice of 
the Government to which you are accredited. 

Enclosure i in No. 79. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London. 

Brussels, August 17, 1914. 

THE Blue-book recently published by the British Gov- 
ernment contains [see No. 122, p. 65) the text of a telegram 
despatched from Berlin on the 31st July by Sir E. Goschen 
•2- [SeeB. to Sir E. Grey, in which the following passage occurs'*' : — 

"It appears from what he [his Excellency the Secretary 
of State] said, that the German Government consider that 
certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. 
As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn 
for Germany had been placed under an embargo already." 

The incident to which the German Secretary of State 
alluded in his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which 
he considered as an hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubt- 
less refers to the application of the Royal decree of the 30th 



July, which provisionally prohibited the export from Belgium 
of certain products. As you will see from the explanation 
in the following paragraph, the incident with which we are 
reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has 
wished to attribute to it. 

The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in 
the Moniteur Beige the following day forbade, provisionally, 
the export, both by land and by sea of a series of products, 
more especially of cereals. On the 31st July the German 
Minister at Brussels called my attention to the fact that the 
Antwerp customs were detaining cargoes of grain addressed 
to Germany, which, as they were merely transhipped in our 
port, were in reality only in transit. Herr von Below Saleske 
requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes should be 
allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the Ger- 
man Minister's request was received, the Foreign Office 
brought the matter to the notice of the Ministry of Finance, 
and the following day, the 2nd August, that Department 
informed us that instructions had been forwarded to the 
Belgian Customs giving full and entire satisfaction to Germany. 

I cannot do better than enclose, for your information, 
copies of the correspondence exchanged on this subject with 
Herr [von] Below Saleske. You will observe that nothing in 
our attitude can be taken as showing any hostile dispositions 
towards Germany ; the steps taken by the Belgian Govern- 
ment at that time were nothing more than those simple 
precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to 
adopt in such exceptional circumstances. 

It would be as well that you should address a communica- 
tion to the British Government in order to explain the real 
facts of the case. 

Enclosure 2 in No. 79. 

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to 
Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Brussels, July 31, 1914. 

I AM informed from Antwerp that the Customs have 
forbidden the despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain 
for Germany. 


[G. 79] BELGIAN GREY-BOOK [August 29, 

In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of 
the export of grain, but of grain in transit, the goods in ques- 
tion having been merely transhipped at Antwerp, I have the 
honour to ask your good offices in order that the vessels in 
question may be allov/ed to leave for Germany. 

At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me 
if the port of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods 
specified in the Moniteur of to-day. 

Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible 
convenience, I have, &c. 

Enclosure 3 in No. 79. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels. 

Brussels, August i, 1914. 

IN reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I 
have the honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of 
the 30th July concerns only the export and not the transit 
of the products mentioned. 

I at once communicated your note to the Minister of 
Finance and begged him to issue precise instructions to the 
Customs officials in order that any error in the application 
of the above-named decree might be avoided. 

Enclosure 4 in No. 79. 

Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels. 

Brussels, August 3, 1914. 

WITH reference to the note which your Excellency was 
good enough to address to me on the 31st July, I have the 
honour to inform you that the Minister of Finance has in- 
structed the Customs that the prohibitions estabUshed by 
the Royal decrees of the 30th July last only apply to actual 
exports, and do not, therefore, extend to goods regularly 
declared in transit at the time of import. Moreover, when 


duty-free goods are declared to be for actual consumption, 
although they are really intended for export, they are com- 
monly the object of special declarations of free entry, which 
are considered as transit documents. In short, if it should 
happen that such goods had been declared as for consumption 
without restriction, as though they were to remain in the 
country, the Customs would still allow them to leave the 
country as soon as it had been duly established by despatch 
receipts, bills of lading, &c., that they were to be exported 
forthwith in transit. 

I would add that the export of grain with which your 
note deals was authorised on the ist August. 



(Official Translation from "Collected Diplomatic Documents." 

[Cd. 7860].) 




Place and 

Date of 






M. Yov. M. Yovano- 

vitch to M. Pashitch 


June 29 

Anti-Serbian assertions of 
Vienna Press . . 



ft If 


June 30 

The Serajevo outrage 
ascribed in Vienna to 
conspiracy engineered 
in Serbia 



Dr. M. Yovanovitch to 
M. Pashitch 


June 30 

Berlin Press connects Sera- 
jevo outrage with Serbia 





Growing German hostiUty 
towards Serbia, fostered 
by false reports from 
Vienna and Budapest . . 



M. Yov. M. Yovano- 
vitch to M. Pashitch 

June 30 

Conversation with Baron 
Macchio. Serbian Gov- 
ernment condemn the 
outrage and loyally 
desire good relations . . 



M. Georgevitch to 
M. Pashitch 

June 30 

Conversation with Aus- 
trian Ambassador, who 
understood that Count 
Berchtold was satisfied 
with Serbian attitude . . 


[Supplied by the Editor.] 






Place and 

Date of 




M. Boshkovitch to 
M. Pashitch 




July I 

Enghsh newspapers, on 
information from Aus- 
trian sources, attribute 
the outrage to Serbian 



M. Pashitch to all Ser- 
bian Legations 

July I 

Charges against Serbia 
absurd ; she will re- 
double her vigilance ; 
anti-Serbian Press cam- 
paign to be stopped by 
all available means 



M. Yov. M. Yovano- 

vitch to M. Pashitch 


July I 

Describes anti- Serbian 
demonstrations and 
propaganda. Belgrade 
Press should be moderate 



Dr. Vesnitch to 
M. Pashitch 


July 2 

French Government ad- 
vise Serbia to be calm . . 



M. Yov. M. Yovano- 
vitch to M. Pashitch 



Describes manifestations 
hostile to Serbia, and 
misrepresentations by 
Vienna Press . . 



JJ It 

f J 

Conversation with Baron 
Macchio, who severely 
criticizes the Serbian 
Press and accuses the 
Great Serbian agitators 



Dr. Vesnitch to 
M. Pashitch 

July 4 

Conversation with 
M. Viviani, who advises 
an attitude of calmness 
and dignity . . . . 



Dr. Spalaikovitch to 
M. Pashitch 


July 4 

Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs incul- 
cates calmness 





Place and 

Date of 




M. Yov. M. Yovano- 

vitch to M. Pashitch 





M. Pashitch to all 
Serbian Legations 


Dr.f M. Yovanovitch 
to M. Pashitch 


M. Pashitch to all 
Serbian Legations 




July 6 


July 9 

July 14 

July 14 

Growing excitement against 
Serbia owing to tone of 
Serbian Press . . 

Analysis of articles in 
Vienna Press upon the 
Serajevo outrage 

Excitement undiminished. 
Emperor's appeal for 
calmness. Alternative 
courses between which 
Austria must choose . . 

Crown Prince Alexander 
receives threatening 
letters from Austria- 

German Secretary of State 
says Austria cannot 
tolerate provocative 
attitude of Serbian Press 

Austrian Korrespondenz- 
bureau's misrepresenta- 
tions of Serbian Press. 
The Austrian papers 
originate the contro- 
versy. Serbian public 
opinion relatively calm 

False reports spread by 
Austro-Hungarian news- 
papers to excite pubHc 
opinion against Serbia 













Place and 

Date of 






M. Yov. M. Yovano- 
vitch to M. Pashitch 

July 14 

PubUc opinion again ex- 
cited by Literary Bureau 
of Austrian Foreign 
Office. Official German 
circles especially ill-dis- 
posed. Nette Freie 

■ Presse calls for war. 
Bourse very depressed 



» jj 

July 15 

The Position in Austria- 
Hungary, where secrecy 
is enjoined. Diplomatic 
steps at Belgrade will 
follow magisterial in- 
quiry at Serajevo 



II li 


Serbia will be accused of 
tolerating revolutionary 
elements. German Em- 
bassy encourages anti- 
Serbian policy . . 



it It 


Forecast of Austrian 
action against Serbia . . 



Dr. M. Yovanovitch to 
M. Pashitch 


July 16 

Secretary of State says 
Great Serbian propa- 
ganda should be ener- 
getically suppressed . . 



M. Boschkovitch to 
M. Pashitch 


July 17 

Efforts of Austrian Em- 
bassy to win over 
English Press. Austria 
will probably seek to 
humihate Serbia 



M. Ljub Michailovitch 
to M. Pashitch 


July 17 

Italy desires maintenance 
of complete Serbian 
independence . . 






Place and 

Date of 







Dr. Spalaikovitch to 
M. Pashitch 


M. Pashitch to aU 
Serbian Missions 


M. Yov. M. Yovano- 
vitch to M. Pashitch 

Baron Giesl von GiesUn- 
gen to Dr. Patchou 

Dr. Patchou to all 
Serbian Legations 




M. Pashitch to Dr. 


M. Pashitch to 
M. Boschkovitch 




July 18 

July 19 

July 20 

July 23 

July 23 

July 24 

Conversation with M. 
Sazonof concerning 
provocative attitude of 
Vienna Press . . 

Relates course of events 
since Serajevo outrage. 
Serbia willing to put 
accompUces on trial, but 
cannot accept demands 
directed against her 

Austria's intentions secret, 
but probably prepar- 
ing for war against 
Serbia. MiUtary prepar- 
ations near the frontier 

Transmits the Austrian 

Austrian Minister will 
leave Belgrade unless a 
favourable answer is re- 
ceived within two days. 
No Serbian Government 
could accept all the 
Austrian demands 

Will appeal to friendly 
Powers. If war in- 
evitable, Serbia will 
carry it on 

Hopes British Govenunent 
may induce Austrian 
Government to moder- 
ate their demands 












Place and 

Date of 













Dr. Spalaikovitch to 
M. Pashitch 


Crown Prince Alex- 
ander to the Tsar 


M. Pashitch to all 
Serbian Legations 


Serbian Government 
to Austria 

Baron Giesl 
M. Pashitch 


M. Pashitch to all 
Serbian Legations 

Count Berchtold to 
M. Yov. M. Yovano- 

The Tsar to the Crown 
Prince of Serbia 


The Crown Prince to 
The Tsar 




July 24 

July 24 

July 25 

July 25 

July 27 

July 30 

Conversation with Count 
Pourtales, who declares 
that the matter con- 
cerns Austria and Ser- 
bia only 

Appeals for aid . . 

Serbia will accept the 
demands as far as pos- 
sible. Hopes Austria 
will accept the full 
satisfaction offered 

The Serbian reply to the 
Austrian note . . 

Announces diplomatic 
rupture. Is leaving 
Belgrade to-night 

Has communicated reply 
to Austria. Relations 
broken off. Skupshtina 
summoned for July 27th 
at Nish. Order for 
mobilisation issued 

Announces rupture 
diplomatic relations 


Reply to Crown Prince's 
appeal. (No. 37.) 

Thanks for No. 43 















Place and 

Date of 











Count Berchtold to 
M. Pashitch 


M. Pashitch to all Ser- 
bian Legations 


Dr. Spalaikovitch to 
M. Sazonof 

M. Sazonof to Dr. 

M. Pashitch to Dr. 
M. Yovanovitch 


Serbian Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs to 
German Legation 

Dr. M. Yovanovitch to 
M. Pashitch 

M. Yov. M. Yovano- 
vitch to M. Pashitch 

July 28 

July 28 

July 28 

July 30 

August 4 

August 6 

August 6 

August 16 

Austrian ^ declkration of 
war against Serbia 

Announces Austrian de- 
claration of war 

Informs him of Austrian 
declaration of war, and 
begs him to lay petition 
from Serbian natibn 
before throne of the Tsar 

Will lay before His Majesty 
the Serbian petition . . 

Instructs him to leave 
Germany immediately 

Requests German Lega- 
tion to leave Serbian 

Final interview with Ger- 
man Under-Secretary of 
State, who ascribes 
war to Russian mobi- 
lisation. Austria would 
probably have been 
satisfied with occupa- 
tion of Belgrade 

Narrative of events 










II— F 




No. I. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 16/29, I9I4- 

THE Vienna Press'" asserts that the magisterial enquiry "i[c/. No. 
has already shown that the Serajevo outrage was prepared 3] 

at Belgrade ; '^' further, that the whole conspiracy in its '^' [cf. Nos. 
wider issues was organised at Belgrade among youths inspired 2, 8, 30.] 
with the Great Serbian idea, and that the Belgrade Press 
is exciting public opinion by publishing articles about the 
intolerable conditions prevailing in Bosnia. Press articles 
of this kind, according to the Vienna Press, are exercising a 
strong influence, as Serbian newspapers are being smuggled 
in large quantities into Bosnia. 

No. 2. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 17/30, 1914. 

THE tendency at Vienna ''' to represent, in the eyes of '"[c/. No. 
Europe, the outrage committed upon the Austro-Hungarian 4] 

Crown Prince as the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia 
is becoming more and more apparent. The idea is to use 
this as a political weapon against us. The greatest attention 
ought, therefore, to be paid to the tone adopted by our 
Press'*' in its articles on the Serajevo outrage. '*'[^/- No. 

83 ^°"^ 

[S. 8] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [June i;, 

No. 3. 

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargi A' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 17/30, 1914. 

"i[c/.No. THE Berlin Press,"' in publishing articles based on 
^■■' information from Vienna and Budapest, in which the Serajevo 
outrage is connected with Serbia, is misleading German public 

No. 4. 

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 17/30, 1914. 

THE hostility of public opinion in Germany towards 

us is growing, and is being fostered by false reports coming 

"'I [c/. Nos. from Vienna and Budapest. "" Such reports are being dili- 

2, 21, 30.] gently spread in spite of the contradictions issued by some 

newspapers and news agencies. 

No. 5. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

Vienna, June 17/30, 1914. 
AS Count Berchtold was not able to receive me when I 
called, I spoke to the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs concerning the Serajevo outrage. In 
the course of our conversation I adopted the following line 
of argument : — 

" The Royal Serbian Government condemn most ener- 
getically the Serajevo outrage and on their part will certainly 
most loyally do everything to prove that they will not tolerate 
within their territory the fostering of any agitation or illegal 
proceedings calculated to disturb our already delicate rela- 
tions with Austria-Hungary. I am of opinion that the 


Government are prepared also to submit to trial any persons 
implicated in the plot, in the event of its being proved that 
there are any in Serbia. "* The Royal Serbian Government '^' [c/- No. 
notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto placed in their 3o.] 

way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an inde- 
pendent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the Adriatic, 
demand for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the September 
ultimatum, &c.) remained loyal in their desire to establish 
a sound basis for our good neighbourly relations. You know 
that in this direction something has been done and achieved. 
Serbia intends to continue to work for this object,'^' convinced ""['^Z- Nos. 
that it is practicable and ought to be continued. The Sera- ^- ^- 3o] 
jevo outrage ought not to and cannot stultify this work." 

Baron Macchio has taken note of the above and promised 
to communicate to Count Berchtold all that I said to him. 

On the same day I communicated to the French and 
Russian Ambassadors the substance of this conversation. 

No. 6. 

M. M. Georgevitch, Charge d' Affaires at Constantinople, ta 
M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. 

Constantinople, June 17/30, 1914. 

I HAD to-day a long conversation with the Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador here concerning the Serajevo out- 
rage. I expressed the hope that this regrettable event — 
whatever is said about it in certain diplomatic circles — 
would not unfavourably influence the relations between Serbia 
and Austria-Hungary which lately had shown considerable 
improvement. ''' '''[c/. Nos. 

He replied that such an eventuality was impossible, and 5- 8> 30-] 
ought not to be contemplated. He was also of opinion that 
Serbo-Austro-Hungarian relations had much improved lately. 
He added that the work in that direction ought to be persevered 
in. He informed me that from his latest conversations with 
Count Berchtold he understood that the latter was satisfied 
with the attitude adopted by the Serbian Government, and 
that he, on his part, sincerely desired friendly relations with 


[s. 7] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [June i| 

No. 7. 

M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister in London, to M. N. Pashitch, 

Prime Minister and Minister forJForeign Affairs. 
(Telegraphic.) London, June 18/July 1, 1914. 

BASING their information upon reports coming from 
'" [c/. No. Austrian sources,'" nearly all the Enghsh newspapers'" 
,„, r ,„ ^■" attribute the Serai evo outrage to the work of Serbian 
27.1 revolutionaries. 

No. 8. 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad. 

Belgrade, June 18/July 1, 1914. 

THE Austrian and Hungarian Press are blaming Serbia 
more and more for the Serajevo outrage. Their aim is 
transparent, viz., to destroy that high moral reputation 
which Serbia now enjoys in Europe, and to take the fullest 
advantage politically against Serbia of the act of a young 
and ill-balanced fanatic. But, in Serbia itself, the Serajevo 
outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles 
of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, imme- 
diately recognised that this outrage would be most prejudicial 
not only to our good neighbourly relations with Austria- 
Hungary but also to our co-nationalists in that country, 
as recent occurrences have proved. At a moment when 
Serbia is doing everything in her power to improve her 
'5' [c/. Nos. relations with the neighbouring Monarchy, '" it is absurd 
5. 6, 30.] to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired 
acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest 
interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. 
Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both 
assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been 
careful to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events 
she will redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such 
elements existing within her borders will take the severest 
measures against them. Moreover, Serbia will do everything 
in her power and use all the means at her disposal in order 
to restrain the feelings of ill-balanced people within her 



frontiers. But Serbia can on no account permit the Vienna 
and Hungarian Press to mislead European public opinion, 
and lay the heavy responsibility for a crime committed by 
an Austrian subject at the door of the whole Serbian nation 
and on Serbia, who can only suffer harm from such acts 
and can derive no benefit whatever. 

Please act in the sense of the above views, and use all 
available channels in order to put an end as soon as possible 
to the anti-Serbian campaign in the European Press. 

No. 9. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 

Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

Affairs. ' 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June zS/July i, 1914. 

THERE were demonstrations last night in front of the 
Legation. I may say that the police showed considerable 
energy. Order and peace were maintained. As soon as I 
obtain positive information that the Serbian flag has been 
burned, I wiU lodge a complaint in the proper quarters. 
I will report to you the result. Hatred against Serbians 
and Serbia is being spread among the people, especially by 
the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna Press, and military 
circles. Please do what is possible to prevent demonstrations 
taking place in Serbia, and to induce the Belgrade Press to 
be as moderate as possible in tone. The tendency towards 
us here is still the same. It is expected that the decision 
as to the attitude to be adopted towards Serbia and the 
Serbians wiU be taken after the funeral. 

No. 10. 

Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, June -K^JJuly 2, 1914. 

THE French Government advise us to maintain an mr^i -^^^ 
attitude of the greatest possible calm and composure'" in 13^' j^^ 
official circles as well as in public opinion. 30!] 


IS. 11] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [June 20, 

No. II. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. ' 

Vienna, June 20/ July 3, 1914. 

YESTERDAY being the day on which the remains of 
the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were brought 
from Serajevo to Vienna, I gave instructions that the national 
flag at my residence should be hoisted at half-mast as a sign 
of mourning. 

Yesterday evening, on this account, protests were made 
by the concierge, the other tenants, the landlord's agent, 
and the landlord himself, who demanded the removal of 
the flag. Explanations proved of no avail, and the assistance 
of the police authorities was requested. The latter privately 
asked that the flag should be removed in order to avoid 
further disorders. The flag was not removed, and accordingly 
noisy demonstrations took place last night in front of the 
Legation. The conduct of the police was energetic, and 
nothing happened to the flag or to the building which might 
constitute an insult. At 2 a.m. the crowd dispersed. 
To-day's papers, more particularly the popular clerical 
papers, publish articles under the heading " Provocation by 
the Serbian Minister," in which the whole incident is falsely 

The flag on the Legation building remained flying the 
whole time up to the conclusion of the service at the Court 
Chapel. As soon as this ceremony was concluded, the flag 
was removed. People from all over the quarter in which I 
Hve went to the Prefecture, the Municipality, and the State 
Council to demand the removal of our flag. 

The crowd was harangued by Dr. Funder, director-in-chief 
of the Catholic Reichspost, Hermengild Wagner, and Leopold 
Mandl, all of whom are known as the chief instigators of the 
attacks in the Austrian and German Press against Serbia and 
the Serbians. 


1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 12] 

No. 12. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 

Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 


Vienna, June 20/ July 3, 1914. 

IN the course of a conversation which I had with the 
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office on the subject of the 
Serajevo outrage, Baron Macchio severely criticised the 
Belgrade Press and the tone of its articles. He argued that 
the Belgrade Press was under no control and created die 
Hetzereien gegen die Monarchie. I told him that the Press 
in Serbia was absolutely free/" and that as a result private m[cf. Nos. 
people as well as the Government very often suffered ; there 20, 30.] 
were, however, no means of proceeding against the Press 
except by going to law. I told him that in the present 
instance the fault lay with the Austrian and Hungarian 
Press which was controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment. Was it not true that during the past two years the 
Austrian and Hungarian Press had been attacking Serbia, in 
such a manner as to offend her most sensitive feelings ? The 
anniversary of the unfortunate war with Bulgaria had taken 
place a few days ago. I had myself witnessed the great 
lack of respect with which the Vienna Press had written 
about Serbia and the Serbian army during and after the 
war, as well as in many other matters. The Press in Belgrade 
was much more moderate. For instance, in the present 
case, a terrible crime had been committed and telegrams 
were being sent from Vienna to the whole world accusing 
the entire Serbian nation and Serbia of being accomplices 
of the detestable Serajevo outrage. All the Austrian news- 
papers were writing in that strain. Was it possible to remain 
indifferent ? Even if the criminal was a Serbian, the whole 
Serbian nation and the Kingdom of Serbia could not be held 
guilty, nor could they be accused in such a manner. 

Baron Macchio replied, " Nobody accuses the Kingdom 
of Serbia nor its Government, nor the whole Serbian nation. 
We accuse those who encourage the Great Serbian scheme 
and work for the realisation of its object." 

■ 89 

[S. 13] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [June 21. 

I told him that it appeared to me that from the first the 
nationaUty of the criminal had been deliberately put forward 
in order to involve Belgrade and to create the impression 
that the outrage had been organised by Serbia. This had 
struck me immediately, as I knew that up till now the Serbians 
of Bosnia had been spoken of as die Bosniaken, bosnische 
Sprache, die Orthodoxen aus Bosnien, while now it was being 
said that the assassin was ein Serbe, but not that he was a 
Bosnian nor that he was an Austrian subject. . . . 

" I repeat," said Baron Macchio, " that we do not accuse 
the Serbian Government and the Serbian nation but the 
various agitators. ..." 

I begged him to use his influence in order to induce the 
Vienna Press not to make matters more difficult by its accusa- 
tions in this critical moment, when Serbo-Austrian relations 
were being put to a severe test. 

No. 13. 

Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Paris, June 21/ July 4, 1914. 

I HAD a long conversation on Wednesday last on the 
subject of the Serajevo outrage with M. Viviani, the new 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was somewhat concerned 
at what had occurred. I made use of this opportunity to 
describe to him briefly the causes which had led to the out- 
rage, and which were to be found, in the first place, in the 
irksome system of Government in force in the annexed 
provinces, and especially in the attitude of the officials, as 
well as in the whole policy of the Monarchy towards anything 
orthodox. He understood the situation, but at the same 
time expressed the hope that we should preserve an attitude 

[c/. Nos. of calm and dignity'" in order to avoid giving cause for 

10, 14, fresh accusations in Vienna. 

3°-] After the first moment of excitement public opinion here 

has quieted down to such an extent that the Minister-President 
himself considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to 
soften the expressions used in the statement which he had 
made earlier on the subject in the Senate. 


1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 16] 

No. 14. 

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd* to M. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, June 21/ July 4, 1914. 

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that the out- 
rages committed upon Serbs in Bosnia will increase the 
S5rmpathy of Europe for us. He is of opinion that the accusa- 
tions made against us in Vienna will not obtain credence. 
The chief thing is for public opinion in Serbia to remain 
cahn.'" <''[c//Nos. 

10, 13, 
No. 15. 30.] 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 2'^/ July 6, 1914. 

THE excitement in military and Government circles 
against Serbia is steadily growing owing to the tone of our 
Press, '"' which is diligently exploited by the Austro-Hungarian («' [cf. No.' 
Legation at Belgrade. 19] 

No. 16. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

Vienna, June zz/July 6, 1914. 

THE principal lines and tendencies to be found in the 
articles of the Vienna Press on the subject of the Serajevo 
outrage are as follows : — '" '" [«/• Nos. 

20 21 22 

As long ago as Sunday afternoon, June 15/28 last, when 30'] ' 
the Vienna newspapers issued extra editions regarding the 
outrage upon the Crown Prince, the headlines announced 
that both the perpetrators were Serbians ; moreover, this 
was done in such a manner as to leave the impression that 

* ["His Majesty the Emperor has, this i8th (31st) of August, been 
pleased to ordain that the city of St. Petersburg shall henceforth be called 
the city of Petrograd." — Journal de Petrograd, Aug. 20 (Sept. 2), 1914.] 


[S. 16] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [June 23, 

they were Serbs from Serbia proper. In the later reports, 
which described the outrage, there was a marked tendency 
to connect it with Serbia. Two cijcumstances were especially 
emphasised and were intended to indicate Belgrade as the 
place of origin of the outrage, viz. : (i) the visit to Belgrade 
of both of the perpetrators ; and (2) the origin of the bombs. 
As the third and last link in this chain of evidence, the Vienna 
papers began to publish the evidence given by the assassins 
at the trial. It was characteristic to find that the Hungarian 
Korrespondenzbureau, and the Hungarian newspapers, especi- 
ally the Az Eszt were alone in a position to know all about 
this " evidence." This evidence mainly tends to show : 
(i) that it has been established that the perpetrators, while 
in Belgrade, associated with the comitadji Mihaylo Cigano- 
vitch ; and (2) that the organiser and instigator of the 
outrage was Major Pribitchevitch. 

Another tendency became apparent at the same time, 

viz. : to hold the " Narodna Odbrana " responsible for this 

'^' [cf. No. outrage. '" Further, on Friday last, the latest announcement 

30-] which the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau made to the 

newspapers stated : — ' 

" The enquiries made up to the present prove conclusively 
that this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the 
two perpetrators, a large number of persons have been 
arrested, mostly young men, who are also, like the per- 
petrators, proved to have been employed by the Belgrade 
Narodna Odbrana in order to commit the outrage, and who 
were supplied in Belgrade with bombs and revolvers." 

On the same day, late at night, the Hungarian Korres- 
pondenzbureau sent the following request to the news- 
papers : — 

" We beg the Editor not to publish the report relating 
to the Serajevo outrage, which appeared in our evening's 

At the same time the Vienna Korrespondenzbureau pub- 
lished the following official statement : — 

" We learn from authoritative quarters that the enquiries 
relating to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret. 
All the details, therefore, which have appeared in the pubhc 
Press should be accepted with reserve." 


1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 173 

Nevertheless, the Budapest newspapers continued to 
publish alleged reports on the enquiry. In the last " report " 
of the Budapest newspaper A Nap, which was reprinted 
in yesterday's Vienna papers, the tendency to lay the re- 
sponsibility for the outrage on the Narodna Odbrana is still 
further emphasised. According to this report the accused 
Gabrinovitch had stated that General Yankovitch is the 
chief instigator of the outrage. 

No. 17. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 
Pashifch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

Vienna, June 24/ July 7, 1914. 

IN influential circles the excitement continues undimin- 
ished. Though the Emperor has addressed a letter to the 
Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary respectively,'" and '" [Seep. 
to the Minister of Finance; Herr Bilinski, in which an appeal 483] 

is made for calmness, it is impossible to determine what 
attitude the Government will adopt towards us. For them 
one thing is obvious ; whether it is proved or not that the 
outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they 
must sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great 
Serbian agitation within the Habsburg Monarchy. In what 
manner they will do this and what means they will employ 
to that end has not as yet been decided ; this is being dis- 
cussed especially in high Catholic and military circles. The 
ultimate decision will be taken only after it has been definitely 
ascertained what the enquiry at Serajevo has brought to 
light. The decision will be in accordance with the findings 
of the enquiry. 

In this respect, Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the 
following courses:"" either to regard the Serajevo outrage 'i*' [c/. No. 
as a national misfortune and a crime which ought to be dealt 25.] 

with in accordance with the evidence obtained, in which case 
Serbia's co-operation in the work will be requested in order 
to prevent the perpetrators escaping the extreme penalty ; 
or, to treat the Serajevo outrage as a Pan-Serbian, South- 
Slav and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every manifestation of 
the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom. There are 


[S. 18] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [June 26. 

many indications that influential circles are being urged to 
adopt the latter course : it is therefore advisable to be ready 
for defence. Should the former and wiser course be adopted, 
we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this 

No. 18. 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, June 26/ July 9, 1914. 

THE Crown Prince Alexander is receiving threatening 
letters from Austria-Hungary nearly every day. Make use 
of this in course of conversation with your colleagues and 

No. 19. 

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 1/14, 1914. 

THE Secretary of State has told me that he could not 
understand the provocative attitude of the Serbian Press and 
the attacks made by it against Austria-Hungary, who, as a 
[cj. No. Great Power, could not tolerate such proceedings.'" 

No. 20. 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 1/14, 1914. 

(i) The Austrian Korrespondenzbureau is showing a 
'-' [cf. Nos. marked tendency to excite public opinion in Europe. '^' 
16, < 21, This Biureau interprets neither correctly nor sincerely the 
22, 30.] tone adopted by the Belgrade Press. It selects the strongest 
expressions from such articles as contain replies to insults, 
threats and false news designed to mislead public opinion, 
and submits them to the Austro-Hungarian pubUc. 

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 21] 

(2) The Korrespondenzbureau quotes especially extracts 
from articles from those Serbian newspapers which are not 
the organs of any party or corporation. 

(3) As far back as the annexation crisis, Austria-Hungary 
prohibited the entry into the country of all Serbian political 
and other newspapers, and thus our Press would not be in a 
position to excite public opinion in Austria-Hungary and 
Europe if the Korrespondenzbureau did not lay stress on 
and spread broadcast the items of news which it gathers from 
various Serbian papers, in every instance exaggerating them. 
Six days ago the entry into Austria-Hungary of the Odyek, 
the organ of the Independent Radical Party, was prohibited ; 
thus all our papers are now prevented from entering Austria- 

(4) With us the Press is absolutely free.'" Newspapers '"[c/. Nos. 
can be confiscated only for Ihe-majesU or for revolutionary 12, 30.] 
propaganda ; in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There 

is no censorship of newspapers. 

In these circumstances, you should point out for their 
information, where necessary, that we have no other con- 
stitutional or legal means at our disposal for the control of 
our Press. Nevertheless, when the articles in our papers are 
compared with those of Austria-Hungary, it is evident that 
the Austro-Hungarian papers originate the controversy, "'^ '^' [cf. No. 
while ours merely reply. ^^-^ 

Please also emphasise the fact that public opinion in 
Serbia is relatively calm, and that there is no desire on our 
part to provoke and insult Austria-Hungary. No one in 
Europe would know what our newspapers were writing if the 
Korrespondenzbureau did not publish these items of news 
with the intention of doing as much harm as possible to 

No. 21. 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 1/14, 1914. 

DURING the past few days the Austro-Hungarian news- ^^^ 
papers'" have been spreading reports to the effect that there ''■5'' ^°^" 
have been demonstrations at Belgrade against the Austro- 23.']^°'^^' 


[S. 22] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July i, 

Hungarian Legation, that some Hungarian journalists were 
killed ; that Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade were 
maltreated and are now panic-stricken ; that at the funeral 

'" [cf. No. of the late M. Hartwig"' Serbian students made a demon- 
30 ! R. stration against the Austro-Hungarian Minister, etc. All 

^^^^^j „ these reports are absolutely untrue and imaginary.'" Com- 
4 30 1 ^ plete calm prevails in Belgrade and there were no demonstra- 
tions of any kind this year, nor has there been any question 
of disorder. Not only do the Austro-Hungarian Minister 
and his staff walk about the town without being molested in 
any way, but no Austro-Hungarian subject has been in any 
way insulted, either by word or deed, as is reported by the 
Viennese papers ; still less was any attack made upon the 
house of any Austro-Hungarian subject or were any of their 
windows broken. Not a single Austro-Hungarian subject 
has had the slightest cause for any complaint. All these 
false reports are being purposely spread in order to arouse 
and excite Austro-Hungarian pubhc opinion against Serbia. 
The whole of Belgrade and the entire diplomatic body 
were present to-day at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig ; 
there was not the slightest sign of resentment shown by any- 
body. During the whole ceremony exemplary order was 
maintained ; so much so that foreigners were impressed with 
the good behaviour of the crowd, which was such as does not 
always prevail on similar occasions even in their own countries. 
Be good enough to communicate the above to the Govern- 
ment to which you are accredited and to the Press. 

No. 22. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

Vienna, July 1/14, 1914. 

i^'[c/. Nos. ONCE more public opinion has been excited against us''' 

16, 20, 21" by the Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry 

30-] for Foreign Affairs. With the exception of the Zeit and the 

Arbeiter Zeitung, all the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have 

obtained from that Bureau the material and tone of their 

articles on the subject of the Serajevo outrage. You have 

yourself seen what kind of material and tone this is. 


1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S, 23] 

I am reliably informed that official German circles here 
are especially ill-disposed towards us.'" These circles have '"[c/. No. 
had some influence upon the writings of the Vienna Press, ?4;B.95; 
especially upon those of the Neue Freie Presse. ^- ^°' ^°' 

This latter paper is still anti-Serbian d I'outrance. The 
Neue Freie Presse, which is widely read and has many friends 
in high financial circles, and which — ^if so desired — ^writes in 
accordance with instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau, 
briefly summarises the matter as follows : " We have to 
settle matters with Serbia by war ; "" it is evident that '"' [c/. No. 
peaceable means are of no avail. And if it must come to 52 ; B. 20 ; 
war sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter through ^- ^^^ 

The Bourse'^' is very depressed. There has not been <''[c/. Nos. 
such a fall in prices in Vienna for a long time. Some securities 23, 52.] 
have fallen 45 kronen. 

No. 23. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

Vienna, July 2/15, 1914. 

THE most important question for us is, what, if any, are 
the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government as 
regards the Serajevo outrage. Until now I have been unable 
to find this out, and my other colleagues are in a similar 
position. The word has now been passed round here not 
to tell anybody anything.'" '*'[<^/- Nos. 

The evening before last the Ministers of the Dual Mon- ^^' ^^'^ 
archy held a meeting. It has not been possible to learn 
anything about the object and the result of this meeting. 
The communique issued on the subject was brief and obscure. 
It appears that the consequences of the Serajevo outrage 
were discussed at length, but that nothing was decided. It 
is not clear whether the Chief of Staff and the Naval Com- 
mander-in-Chief were present, as was rumoured. After this 
meeting Count Berchtold travelled to Ischl to report to the 
Emperor,'" who, after the funeral of Franz Ferdinand, had "'[C/.B.20.] 
returned there to recover his health. In the Hungarian 
Parliament Count Tisza has replied to the interpellations of 

II— G 97 

[S. 24] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 2, 

the Opposition concerning the Serajevo incident ; you are 
acquainted with his statements. His speech was not clear, 

"'[c/,No. and I beUeve it was intentionally obscure.'" Some people 
52-] saw in it signs of an intention quietly to await the develop- 
ment of events and of calmness in the attitude of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government, while others saw in it hidden 
intentions for (I should say) an action as yet undecided. 
It was noted that there was no occasion for haste until the 
results of the magisterial enquiry were announced. Some 
time has now elapsed ; the matter has been spoken of, dis- 
cussed, written about and distorted ; then came the death 

""[c/. No. of Hartwig'^' and the alarm of Baron Giesl. In connection 
30 ; R. 6.] Yi/^i^jj ^jjjg again came the interpellations addressed to Count 

"* \pi- No. Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament ; '^' you have read his 
3° J reply. Many hold the opinion here that this second speech 

'" [cf. Y. J5 much more restrained than the first, '" and that this is to 

,5) , .^^'^ be attributed to an order from the Emperor. (The Bourse"' 
22 "52 1^ ^^^ ^°^ recovered ; both the War Minister and the Chief of 
Staff have gone on leave.) I am loath to express an opinion. 
In the above-mentioned speech it is to be noted that the 
possibility of war is not excluded, in the event of the demands 
of Austria-Hungary in regard to the Serajevo outrage not 
being complied with. 

One thing is certain : Austria-Hungary will take diplo- 
matic steps at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial enquiry 
at Serajevo is completed and the matter submitted to the 

No. 24. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

Vienna, July 2/15, 1914. 

IT is thought here that the magisterial enquiries and 
investigations have not produced sufficient evidence to 
justify bringing an official accusation against Serbia, but 
it is believed that the latter will be accused of tolerating 
within her borders certain revolutionary elements. Diplo- 
matic circles here criticise and condemn the mode of procedure 
of the Austro-Hungarian Government, especially the attitude 


1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 251 

throughout of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna 
Press."' There are many who consider our attitude to be '^'[c/. Nos, 
correct and in accordance with the dignity of a nation. They 20, 21, 
find fault only with the views expressed in some of our news- ^^"^ 
papers, though they all admit that it is provoked by the 
Vienna Press. 

In spite of the fact that it appears that the German 
Foreign Office does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy 
of Vienna, the German Embassy here'" is at this very '"[c/- No. 
moment encouraging such a policy. ^^ ; y 

No. 25. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

Vienna, July 2/15, 1914. 

WHAT steps will be taken ? In what form ? What 
demands will Austria-Hungary make of Serbia ? I do not 
beheve that to-day even the Ballplatz itself could answer 
these questions clearly and precisely. I am of opinion that 
its plans are now being laid, and that again Count Forgach 
is the moving spirit. 

In an earUer report'" I mentioned that Austria-Hungary (3)[No. 17.] 
has to choose between two courses : either to make the 
Serajevo outrage a domestic question, inviting us to assist 
her to discover and punish the culprits ; or to make it a case 
against the Serbians and Serbia, and even against the Jugo- 
slavs. After taking into consideration all that is being 
prepared and done, it appears to me that Austria-Hungary 
will choose the latter course. Austria-Hungary will do this 
in the belief that she will have the approval of Europe. Why 
should she not profit by humiliating us, and, to a certain 
extent, justify the Friedjung and Agram trials ? Besides, 
Austria-Hungary desires in this manner to justify in the eyes 
of her own people and of Europe the sharp and reactionary 
measures which she contemplates undertaking internally in 
order to suppress the Great Serbian propaganda and the 
jugo-Slav idea. Finally, for the sake of her prestige, Austria- (4, r^^ j^^g 
Hungary must take some action'*' in the belief that she will 30," 31 • 
thus raise her prestige internally a^ well as externally. . . . Y.'ig.] 


[S. 26] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 3 

Austria-Hungary will, I think, draw up in the form of 
"'[B. 4;R.a memorandum an accusation against Serbia. '" In that 
8, 19.3 accusation will be set forth all the evidence that has been 
collected against us since April, 1909, until to-day ; and I 
believe that this accusation will be fairly lengthy. Austria- 
Hungary will communicate this accusation to the Cabinets 
of the European Powers with the remark that the facts con- 
tained therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps 
at Belgrade, and to demand that Serbia should in the future 
fulfil all the obligations of a loyal neighbour. At the same 
time Austria-Hungary will also hand us a note containing her 
demands, which we shall be requested to accept uncon- 

No. 26. 

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. 

Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 3/16, 1914. 

THE Secretary of State has informed me that the reports 
of the German Minister at Belgrade point to the existence 
of a Great Serbian propaganda, which should be energetically 
suppressed by the Government in the interest of good relations 
with Austria-Hungary. 

No. 27. 

M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister at London, to M. N. Pashitch, 

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
(Telegraphic.) London, July 4/17, 1914. 

THE Austrian Embassy is making very great efforts to 
[cf. No. ^^^ ^^^^ *h^ English Press'" against us, and to induce it to 
7.] favour the idea that Austria must give a good lesson to 
■ [cf. B. 18 Serbia. '" The Embassy is submitting to the news editors 
and note.] cuttings from our newspapers as a proof of the views expressed 
in our Press. The situation may become more acute during 
the next few weeks. No reliance should be placed in the 
ostensibly peaceable statements of Austro-Hungarian official 
circles, as the way is being prepared for diplomatic pressure 
upon Serbia, which may develop into an armed attack. It 




1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 30] 

is probable that as soon as Austria-Hungary has taken 
action at Belgrade she will change her attitude and will seek 

to humUiate Serbia. '" '" iPf- , No. 

30; Y.45 
No. 28. ^riAnote.} 

M. Ljub Michailovitch, Minister at Rome, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 4/17, 1914. 

I HAVE obtained reliable information to the effect that 
the Marquis di San Giuliano has stated to the Austro-Hun- 
garian Ambassador that any step undertaken by Austria 
against Serbia which failed to take into account international 
considerations would meet with the disapproval of public 
opinion in Italy/" and that the Italian Government desire "" [c/. Y. 
to see the complete independence of Serbia maintained. 72] 

No. 29. 

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 5/18, 1914. 

I HAVE spoken to the Assistant Minister for Foreign 
Affairs on the subject of the provocative attitude of the 
Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna Press. '*' '"[c/. Nos. 

M. Sazonof told me a few days ago that he wondered why 20, 34.J 
the Austrian Government were doing nothing to put a stop 
to the futile agitation on the part of the Press in Vienna 
which, after all, frightened nobody, and was only doing harm 
to Austria herself. 

No. 30. 

M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to all Serbian Missions abroad. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade,. July 6/19, 1914. 

IMMEDIATELY after the Serajevo outrage the Austro- 
Hungarian Press began to accuse Serbia of that detestable 
crime, which, in the opinion of that Press, was the direct 
result of the Great Serbian idea. The Austrian Press further 


[s. 30] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 6, 

contended that that idea was spread and propagated by 
'''[c/. No. various associations, such as the " Narodna Odbrana,""' 
^^•3 " Kolo Srpskich Sestara," &c., which were tolerated by the 
Serbian Government. 

On learning of the murder, the Serbian Royal Family, 
as well as the Serbian Government, sent messages of condol- 
ence, and at the same time expressed severe condemnation 
of and horror at the crime that had been committed. All 
festivities which had been fixed to take place on that day in 
Belgrade were immediately cancelled. 

Nevertheless, the Press of the neighbouring Monarchy 

'"' [cf. No. continued to hold Serbia responsible for the Serajevo outrage. "" 

•"■•^ Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian Press began to spread in 

'=' [cf. Nos. connection with it various false reports, '^' designed to mis- 

4. 21.] lead public opinion, which provoked the Belgrade Press 

to reply in self-defence, and sometimes to active hostiUty in 

a spirit of embitterment aroused by the misrepresentation of 

what had occurred. Seeing that the Austro-Hungarian 

Press was intentionally luring the Belgrade Press into an 

awkward and delicate controversy, the Serbian Government 

hastened to warn the Press in Belgrade, and to recommend 

it to remain calm and to confine itself to simple denials and 

i*'[c/. Nos. to the suppression of false and misleading reports.'*' The 

2, 10, 13, action of the Serbian Government was ineffectual in the case 

of some of the less important papers, more especially in view 

of the fact that newly invented stories were daily spread 

abroad with the object of serving political ends not only 

against Serbia but also against the Serbs in Austria-Hungary. 

The Serbian Government were unable to avert these polemics 

between the Serbian and the Austrian Press, seeing that 

Serbian law, and the provisions of the constitution itself, 

w r / N gyi^rantee the complete independence of the Press and pro- 

12, 20 1^' ^i^^^ ^^ measures of control and the seizure of newspapers.'" 

These polemics were further aggravated by the fact that the 

Vienna and Budapest journals selected passages from such 

of the Serbian newspapers as have practically no influence 

upon public opinion, strengthened still further their tone, 

and, having thus manipulated them, passed them on to the 

*"' [cf. Nos. foreign Press with the obvious intention of exciting public 

16, 20, 21, opinion in other European countries and of representing 

22.] Serbia as being guilty. '" 



1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S- 30] 

Those who have followed the course of these polemics 
will know that the Belgrade newspapers merely acted in 
self-defence, confining their activities to denials and to the 
refutation of falsehoods designed to mislead public opinion, 
at the same time attempting to convince foreign Govern- 
ments (which, being occupied with other and more serious 
affairs, had no time to go into the matter themselves) of the 
intention of the Austro-Hungarian Press to excite public 
opinion in its own country and abroad. 

The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness 
to hand over to justice any of their subjects who might be 
proved to have played a part in the Serajevo outrage."" The '"[g/. No. 
Serbian Government further stated that they had prepared 5-] 

a more drastic law against the misuse of explosives. The 
draft of a new law in that sense had already been laid before 
the State Council, but could not be submitted to the Skup- 
shtina, as the latter was not sitting at the time. Finally, 
the Serbian Government stated that they were ready, as hereto- 
fore, to observe all those good neighbourly obligations to 
which Serbia was bound by her position as a European State. 

During the whole of this period, from the date of the per- 
petration of the outrage until to-day, not once did the 
Austro-Hungarian Government apply to the Serbian Govern- 
ment for their assistance in the matter. They did not 
demand that any of the accomplices should be subjected to 
an enquiry, or that they should be handed over to trial. 
In one instance only did the Austrian Government ask for 
information as to the whereabouts of certain students who 
had been expelled from the Pakratz Teachers' Seminary, and 
had crossed over to Serbia to continue their studies. All 
available information on this point was supplied. 

The campaign against Serbia, however, was unremittingly 
pursued in the Austrian Press, and public opinion was excited 
against her in Austria as well as in the rest of Europe. Matters 
went so far that the more prominent leaders of political 
parties in Austria-Hungary began to ask questions in Parlia- 
ment on the subject of the outrage, to which the Hungarian 
Prime Minister replied.'" It is evident from the discussions •"'[No, 23.3 
in this connection that Austria is contemplating some action, "' <" [cf. Nos. 
but it is not clear in what sense. It is not stated whether the 25, 52 ; Y. 
measures which are to be taken — more especially military ^9-^ 


[S. 30] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 6, 

measures — will depend upon the reply and the conciliatory 
attitude of the Serbian Government. But an armed conflict 
is being hinted at in the event of the Serbian Government 
being unable to give a categorically satisfactory reply. 

On the sudden death of the Russian Minister, M. de Hart- 
'''[c/. No. wig,'" at the residence of the Austrian Minister, the polemics 
23 ; R. 6.] in the newspapers became still more acute ; nevertheless 
this sad event did not lead to any disorders even during the 
""[c/. No. funeral'" of M. Hartwig. On the other hand, the Austro- 
^^•3 Hungarian Legation was so perturbed by certain false reports 
that Austrian subjects began to conceal themselves, some 
of them taking refuge in the Semlin and Belgrade hotels, 
and others in the Legation itself. At 5 p.m. on the day of 
the King's birthday, which passed in the most orderly manner, 
I was informed by the Austrian Minister, through the Vice- 
Consul, M. Pomgraz, that preparations were being made for 
an attack that night on the Austrian Legation and on Austro- 
Hungarian subjects in Belgrade. He begged me to take the 
necessary steps for the protection of Austro-Hungarian 
subjects and of the Legation, stating at the same time that 
he held Serbia responsible for all that might occur. I replied 
that the responsible Serbian Government were not aware of 
any preparations of this kind being made, but that I would 
in any case at once inform the Minister of the Interior, and 
beg him at the same time to take such measures as might be 
necessary. The next day showed that the Austrian Legation 
had been misled by false rumours, for neither any attack 
nor any preparations for attack were made. Notwithstanding 
this, the Austro-Hungarian Press took advantage of this 
incident to prove how excited public opinion was in Serbia 
and to what lengths she was ready to go. It went even further 
and tried to allege that something really had been intended to 
happen, since M. Pashitch himself had stated that he had heard 
of such rumours. All this indicates clearly the intention to 
excite public opinion against Serbia whenever occasion arises. 

When all that has been said in the Hungarian Parliament 
is taken into consideration, there is reason for apprehension 
that some step is being prepared against us which may 
produce a disagreeable effect upon the relations between 
Serbia and Austria-Hungary. There is still further ground 
for such apprehension, as it is abundantly evident that the 



enquiry which is being made is not to be Umited to the per- 
petrators and their possible accompUces in the crime, but is most 
probably to be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea. 

By their attitude and the measures they have taken, the 
Serbian Government have irrefutably proved that they are 
working to restrain excitable elements, and in the interests 
of peace and the maintenance of good relations with all their 
neighbours. The Government have given their particular 
attention to the improvement and strengthening of their 
relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,"' which had '''[c/. Nos. 
lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and 5. 6, 8.] 
of the questions which arose therefrom. With that object 
in view, the Serbian Government proceeded to settle the ques- 
tion of the Oriental Railway, the new railway connections, 
and the transit through Serbia of Austro-Hungarian goods 
for Constantinople, Sofia, Salonica, and Athens. 

The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests 
require that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be 
firmly and lastingly established. And for this very reason 
they fear lest the excited state of public opinion in Austria- 
Hungary may induce the Austro-Hungarian Government 
to make a d-marche which may humiliate the dignity of Serbia 
as a State, "' and to put forward demands which could not be <"' [c/. No. 
accepted. 27 ; Y. 

I have the honour therefore to request you to impress upon ^91 
the Government to which you are accredited our desire to 
maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to 
suppress every attempt directed against the peace and public 
safety of the neighbouring Monarchy. We will likewise meet 
the wishes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the event of 
our being requested to subject to trial in our independent 
Courts any accomplices in the outrage who are in Serbia 
— should such, of course, exist. 

But we can never comply with demands which may be 
directed against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be 
inacceptable to any country which respects and maintains 
its independence."' '"[c/. No. 

Actuated by the desire that good neighbourly relations 32 (p. 
may be firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly ^'^^)-\ 
Governments to take note of these declarations and to act 
in a conciliatory sense should occasion or necessity arise. 


[S. 313 SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 7, 

No. 31. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Vienna, July 7/20, 1914. 

IT is very difficult, indeed almost impossible, to ascertain 
here anything positive as to the real intentions of Austria- 
Hungary. The word has been passed round to maintain 
'" [c/. Nos. absolute secrecy about everything that is being done. '" 
23. 52.3 Judging by the articles in our newspapers, Belgrade is taking 
an optimistic view of the questions pending with Austria- 
Hungary. There is, however, no room for optimism. There 
is no doubt that Austria-Hungary is making preparations of a 
serious character. What is chiefly to be feared, and is highly 
probable, is, that Austria is preparing for war against Serbia. 
The general conviction that prevails here is that it would be 
nothing short of suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail 
to take advantage of the opportunity to act against Serbia. 
It is believed that the two opportunities previously missed 
— the annexation of Bosnia and the Balkan war — have been 
extremely injurious to Austria-Hungary. In addition, the 
conviction is steadily growing that Serbia, after her two wars, 
is completely exhausted, and that a war against Serbia would 
in fact merely mean a military expedition to be concluded by a 
speedy occupation. It is also believed that such a war could 
be brought to an end before Europe could intervene. 

The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasised 
by the military preparations which are being made, especially 
in the vicinity of the Serbian frontier. 

No. 32. 

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at 
Belgrade, to Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister 
and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914- 
I HAVE the honour to transmit to Your Excellency 
herewith the enclosed Note which I have received from my 
Government, addressed to the Royal Serbian Government. 
Handed personally at 6 p.m. 

[See B. 4.] 


No. 33. 

Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914- 

THE Austro-Hungarian Minister handed me this afternoon 
at 6 p.m. a note in regard to the Serajevo outrage embodying 
the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and 
insisting on a reply from the Serbian Government within 
two days, i.e., by Saturday, at 6 p.m. He informed me 
orally that he and his staff would leave Belgrade unless a 
favourable answer were forthcoming within the stipulated 

Some of the Ministers being absent from Belgrade the 
Serbian Government have not as yet come to any decision, 
but I am in a position to state now that the demands are 
such that no Serbian Government could accept them in 
their entirety.''' '"[c/. No. 

35 ; B. 10 ; 
No. 34. 0.1,41] 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, I9i4- 

I INFORMED the Russian Charge d' Affairs that I would 
hand in the reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum on 
Saturday at 6 p.m. I told him that the Serbian Government 
would appeal to the Governments of the friendly Powers to 
protect the independence of Serbia. If war was inevitable, 
I added, Serbia would carry it on."' '"[c/- O. 9.3 

No. 35. 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to M. M. Boschkovitch, Minister in London. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914. 

I INFORMED the British Charge d' Affaires to-day that 
the Austro-Hungarian demands were such that no Govern- 
ment of an independent country could accept them in their 


[S. 36] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July ii, 

'1' [cf. No. entirety. '" I expressed the hope that the British Government 
33 and flight possibly see their way to induce the Austro-Hungarian 
note.j Government to moderate them. I did not conceal my 
anxiety as to future developments. 

No. 36- 

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Pefrogrdd, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 11/24, ^9M- 

AS I was leaving M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated 

the contents of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, I met the 

German Ambassador. He seemed to be in very good spirits. 

During the conversation which followed in regard to the 

Austro-Hungarian demarche I asked Count Pourtales to 

indicate to me some way out of the situation created by 

the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. The Ambassador replied 

that this depended on Serbia alone, since the matter in 

'" [c/. B. 9.] question must be settled between Austria and Serbia only,"" 

and did not concern anyone else. In reply I told Count 

Pourtales that he was under a misapprehension, and that he 

would see before long that this was not a question merely 

'" [c/. 0. 10; between Serbia and Austria, but a European question. '*' 

R. 26 ; W. 


No. 37. 

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander to His 
Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, I9I4- 

[See O. 6.] 

No. 38. 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914- 

A BRIEF summary of the reply of the Royal Govern- 
ment was communicated to the representatives of the allied 


Governments at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-day. 
They were informed that the reply would be quite conciliatory 
on all points, and that the Serbian Government would accept 
the Austro-Hungarian demands as far as possible. The 
Serbian Government trust that the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment, unless they are determined to make war at all costs, 
will see their way to accept the full satisfaction offered in 
the Serbian reply. 

No. 39. 

Reply of Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian Note. — 
Belgrade, July 12/25, ^9M- 

[See B. 39.] 

No. 40. 

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at 
Belgrade, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Belgrade, July 12/25, ^9H- 

AS the time limit stipulated in the note, which, by order 
of my Government, I handed to His Excellency M. Patchou, 
on Thursday, the day before yesterday, at 6 p.m., has now 
expired, and as I have received no satisfactory reply,'" I '"[<=/• Nos. 
have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I am leaving ^i. 42 ; R. 
Belgrade to-night together with the staff of the Imperial 
and Royal Legation. 

The protection of the Imperial and Royal Legation, 
together with aU its appurtenances, annexes, and archives, 
as well as the care of the subjects and interests of Austria- 
Hungary in Serbia, is entrusted to the Imperial German 

Finally, I desire to state formally that from the moment 
this letter reaches Your Excellency the rupture in the diplo- 
matic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary will 
have the character of a fait accompli. 




[S. 41] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 12, 

No. 41. 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to all the Serbian Legations abroad. 

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914- 
I COMMUNICATED the reply to the Austro-Hungarian 
[c/. R. 24 Note to-day at 5.45 p.m."' You will receive the full text'"' 
—"two of the reply to-night. From it you will see that we have 
™"?*^fn gone as far as was possible. When I handed the note to 
(^'Ib^^'^ 1 ^^^ Austro-Hungarian Minister he stated that he would 
'■ ■ ^^ have to compare it with his instructions, and that he would 
then give an immediate answer. As soon as I returned to 
[No. 40.3 the Ministry, I was informed in a note'*' from the Austro- 
Hungarian Minister that he was not satisfied with our reply, 
and that he was leaving Belgrade the same evening, with 
the entire staff of the Legation. The protection of the 
Legation and its archives, and the care of Austrian and 
Hungarian interests had been entrusted by him to the German 
Legation. He stated finally that on receipt of the note 
diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary 
must be considered as definitely broken off. 

The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the 

Skupshtina to meet on July 14/27 at Nish, whither all the 

Ministers with their staffs are proceeding this evening. The 

Crown Prince has issued in the name of the King, an order 

'*' [See note, for the mobilisation of the army,'^' while to-morrow or the 

p. 126. cf. ^^y after a proclamation will be made in which it wiU be 

32 ; Y. 75 announced that civilians who are not liable to military 

(2);R.23.3 service should remain peaceably at home, while soldiers should 

proceed to their appointed posts and defend the country 

to the best of their ability, in the event of Serbia being 


No. 42. 

Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, to M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian 
Minister at Vienna. 

Vienna, July 12/25, 1914- 
AS no satisfactory reply has been given to the note which 
the Imperial and Royal Minister Extraordinary and Pleni- 



patentiary handed to the Royal Government on the 10/23 
instant, I have been compelled to instruct Baron Giesl to 
leave the Serbian capital'" and to entrust the protection of "^[See No, 
the subjects of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty 4o-J 
to the German Legation. 

I regret that the relations which I have had the honour 
to maintain with you, M. le Ministre, are thus terminated, 
and I avail myself of this opportunity to place at your disposal 
the enclosed passports for your return to Serbia, as well as 
for the return of the staff of the Royal Legation. 

No. 43. 

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal 
Highness the Crown Prince of Serbia. 

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 14/27, 1914. 

[See O. 40.] 

No. 44. 

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, to His 
Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia. 

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 17/30, 1914. 

[See O. 56.] 

No. 45. 

Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, to M. N. Pashitch, Serbian Prime 
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 15/28, 1914. 

THE Royal Serbian Government not having answered [Duplicate 
in a satisfactory manner the note of July 10/23, ^9M> pre- ofR.37.] 
sented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the 
Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled 
to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, 


[S. 46] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 15, 

with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria- 
Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in 

"I [c/. No. a state of war with Serbia. "' 
46; B. 
50 {note 
verbale).] ^^^ ^^ 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. 
(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 15/28, 1914. 

THE Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on 
Serbia at noon to-day by an open telegram to the Serbian 
'''[No. 45] Government."" 

No. 47. 

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Sazonof, 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Petrograd, July 15/28, 1914. 

I HAVE the honour to inform Your Excellency that I 
have received from M. Pashitch the following urgent telegram 
despatched from Nish at 2.10 p.m. 

" The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on 
Serbia to-day at noon by an open telegram to the Serbian 
"'[No. 45.] Government."*'' 

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of this 
regrettable act, which a Great Power had the courage to 
commit against a small Slav country which only recently 
emerged from a long series of heroic but exhausting battles, 
and I beg leave on this occasion of deep gravity for my country, 
to express the hope that this act, which disturbs the peace 
of Europe and revolts her conscience, will be condemned by 
the whole civilised world and severely punished by Russia, 
'^'[c/. 0. 1.] the protector of Serbia.'^' 

I beg Your Excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition 
from the whole Serbian nation before the throne of His 
"'[See No. Majesty.'"' 
48-3 I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my 

loyalty and respect. 


No. 48. 

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. 
Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd. 

Petrograd, July 17/30, 1914. 
I HAD the honour to receive your note"' of July 15/28, '"[No. 47.] 
No. 527, in which you communicated to me the contents of 
the telegram received by you from His Excellency, M. Pas- 
hitch, in regard to the declaration of war on Serbia by Austria- 
Hungary. I sincerely regret this sad event, and will not 
fail to lay before His Majesty the petition by the Serbian 
nation, whose interpreter you are. 

No. 49. 

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, to Dr. M. Yvvanovitch, ChargS d' Affaires at 

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 22/ August 4, 1914. 

PLEASE inform the Imperial Government that you have 

received instructions to leave Germany, together with the 

staffs of the Legation and Consulate. You should leave 

immediately. '" '"' [cf. No. 

XT . 50.3 

No. 50. 

The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German 

Legation at Nish. 

Nish, July 21 /August 6, 1914. 

THE Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the 
honour to inform the Imperial Legation that, in view of the 
state of war which now exists between Serbia and Austria- 
Hungary, and of that between Russia and Germany, the 
ally of Austria-Hungary, the Royal Serbian Government, 
in view of the solidarity of her interests with Russia and her 
allies, considers the mission of Baron Gieslingen, the Imperial 
German Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary, 
to be at an end. The Royal Serbian Government requests 
His Excellency to leave Serbian territory with the staff of the ^^^ 
Legation. '" The necessary passports are enclosed herewith. ^'^'' , 

II — H 113 

[S. 51] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [July 24, 

No. 51. 

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. 
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign 

Berlin, July 2^/ August 6, 1914. 

ON the occasion of my visit to the Under-Secretary of 

State, M. Zimmermann, for the purpose of breaking off 

diplomatic relations, he stated, in the course of conversation, 

that Germany had always cherished friendly feelings towards 

Serbia, and that he regretted that owing to the political 

groupement our relations had to be broken off. He blames 

'^' [cf. B. Russia only, '" as the instigator of Serbia, for the develop- 

134 ; Y. ments which have occurred, and which wiU have grave con- 

■^■^7 ; O- sequences for all nations. If Russia, at the last moment — 

^ ' •^.' just when it appeared possible that an armed conflict might 

be avoided — ^had not ordered the mobilisation of her whole 

'"'[c/.B. forces, there would have been no war,'^' for Germany had 

t l:^^' -"^38 ; used her whole influence in Austria-Hungary in order to 

• 109.J i^j-^jjg about an understanding with Russia. Austria-Hungary . 

would have probably been satisfied with the occupation of 

*"[c/. B. Belgrade, '*' when negotiations would have begun with a 

88, 98, yigYv to regularising the relations between Serbia and Austria* 

112 ; 0. 


No. 52. 

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, 
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Nish, August 3/16, 1914. 

FROM June 17/30 the Serbian Legation at Vienna was 
practically surrounded by police and gendarmes, while the 
staff were under constant police supervision. Our move- 
ments and our communications with the outer world were, 
as you can imagine, rendered extremely difficult ; the attitude 
of the population towards the Legation and its staff was 
inclined to be menacing. 

After the beginning of July (o.s.) even telegraphic com- 
munication with you became difficult, while matters developed 
with such rapidity that I was unable to report to you some 


1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 521 

of the events which preceded our armed conflict with Austria- 
Hungary. I accordingly do so now. 

Up to the end of June (o.s.) the whole question of the 
Serajevo outrage appeared to be developing normally. At 
the commencement of July, however, a change took place 
as regards the question of the consequences of the Serajevo 
affair. There were no tangible proofs that a radical change 
had taken place, but it was to some extent indicated by 
certain vague signs and sjmaptoms which betrayed the exis- 
tence of some hidden intentions. "' First of all, the Vienna '" [cf. Nos. 
and Budapest Press, in conformity with instructions issued 23, 30, 
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ceased to publish reports 3i-] 
of the magisterial enquiry relating to the Serajevo outrage. 
The Press began also to represent the whole matter as a 
question which must be settled between Serbia and Austria- 
Hungary alone — eventually by war. ''^ <"' [cf. No-. 

Moreover, statements to this effect were communicated 22; R. 6.1 
to the leading Vienna newspapers by the German Embassy. 
Exceptions were : the semi-official Fremdenblatt, which was, 
in general, more moderate in the tone of its articles ; Die 
Zeit : and the Arheiter Zeitung. 

Simultaneously with this new attitude on the part of the 
Press, a very unsettled condition of affairs developed on the 
Bourse,"' such as it had not witnessed during the whole m[cf. Nos. 
course of recent events in the Balkans. In private conversations 22, 23.] 
also and in high financial circles the " settlement with Serbia " 
was declared to be the only way out of the general financial 
and economic crisis prevailing in Austria-Hungary ever since 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under secret 
instructions it was ordered that gold should be gradually 
withdrawn from circulation, and a corresponding rise in 
exchange took place. 

A further indication was the clumsy explanation given 
of the reasons which had induced the Minister for War, 
Krobatin, and the Chief of the General Staff, Hetzendorf, to 
interrupt their leave of absence and return to Vienna. The 
Chief of Staff constantly travelled to the south, east, and 
north of Austria, and at that time had had an interview 
with the Chief of the German General Staff, Count Moltke, 
in Bohemia, I believe, at Carlsbad. 

All the reserves which had been called out for the June 


js, 52] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [August 3, 

manoeuvres in Bosnia and Herzegovina were kept with the 
colours beyond the stipulated period. 

The number of soldiers belonging to the permanent 
establishment in Austria-Hungary allowed to go home on 
short leave of absence in order to gather in the harvest, and 
to attend to other private affairs, was much larger than is 
usually the case ; at the same time those whose duties were 
of a military-administrative nature were called upon in ever 
increasing numbers. 

Another indication was the non-committal nature of the 
answers given to several interpellations in the Hungarian 
""[c/. No. Diet by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza,'" a 
23.] statesman who is very clear as a rule in his political state- 

The attitude of the Ballplatz was especially characteristic. 
None of the usual weekly receptions by Count Berchtold were 
held. They suddenly ceased at the Ballplatz to discuss the 
Serajevo outrage with the representatives of foreign coun- 
"'[c/. Nos. tries ;"" or, if discussion did arise, it seemed as if instructions 
23, 31-1 had been issued on the subject ; that is to say, it was men- 
tioned to everyone in such a manner as to dispel all appre- 
hensions and suspicion that Austria-Hungary was preparing 
some serious step against Serbia. They acknowledged that 
some step would be undertaken at Belgrade as soon as the 
results of the magisterial enquiry should have sufficiently 
established the connection between Belgrade and the Serajevo 
outrage. But, at the same time, it was said that this step 
<"[c/. Y. would not be such as to give rise to any uneasiness. ''' The 
20, 159 Russian Ambassador, who spoke several times on the subject 
(vol. I., ^j^j^ Count Forgach, in the absence of Count Berchtold, 
P- 422).] ^^g unable to discover the true nature of Austria's intentions. 
M. Schebeko told me that Count Szapary, the Austro-Hun- 
garian Ambassador at Petrograd, who, for family reasons, 
was at that time stopping in Vienna, had said to him that the 
step to be taken at Belgrade would be of conciliatory character. 
According to M. Schebeko, Count Szapary had also assured 
M. Sazonof that the intended Austro-Hungarian Note to 
Serbia would not be such as to cause Russia any dissatisfaction. 
The French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, who, under instructions 
from his Government, had drawn the attention of the Ball- 
platz to the complications which might arise should the 

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 52] 

eventual demands which it was intended to make of Serbia 
not be of a moderate nature, was told by the principal Under- 
Secretary, Baron Macchio, '" that the Austro-Hungarian ''' [c/. Y. 
Government, appreciating the friendly and conciliatory action 20.3 

of the French Government, would only put forward such 
demands, embodied in a note to the Serbian Government, 
as Serbia would be able to accept without difficulty. I drew 
the, attention of the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente to 
the fact that such an assurance might well conceal the true 
nature of the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment, and that the powers of the Triple Entente might then 
be confronted by certain faits accomplis which Europe would 
be compelled to accept in order to avoid a general European 

The line followed by the Ballplatz was, moreover, com- 
paratively successful, as all those of my colleagues whom I 
saw during that period were more or less dissuaded from 
believing that Austria-Hungary contemplated any serious 
step which could provoke European complications. Many 
of the members of the diplomatic body were so firmly convinced 
of this that they were preparing at that time to quit Vienna 
on long leave of absence''" at various watering places. '''|[c/. B. 

Nevertheless, it was known that a note was being drawn i6i,voLI., 
up at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which would contain (P-2i4)-] 
the accusations against Serbia, and also the demands of 
Austria-Hungary. This task was entrusted to Count Forgach, 
formerly Austro-Hungarian Minister in Serbia. At the same 
time it was universally believed that of the foreign repre- 
sentatives, the German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, 
was the only one who was kept informed of the note even in 
its minutest details,'" while I had reason to believe that he '^' [cf. B. 
was also co-operating in drafting it. In view of the above, 95;Y. 15.I 
the representatives of the friendly Powers agreed with me 
in thinking that the note would impose very difficult terms 
on Serbia, but that there would be no inacceptable demands. 
When the contents of the note'" were pubUshed all of them '"[B. 4] 
were surprised, not to say dumbfounded. 

In the same way as the contents of the note were kept 
secret, a similar amount of secrecy was observed in regard 
to the date of its presentation. On the very day that the 
note was presented at Belgrade, the French Ambassador had 


[S. 52] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [August 3, 

*''[c/. Y. a prolonged conversation'" with the Principal Under- 
20.] Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs — Count Berchtold 
was again absent at Ischl — on the subject of the note. Yet 
Baron Macchio did not tell M. Dumaine that the note would 
be presented at Belgrade that afternoon, and published in 
the newspapers on the following day. 

On the pubUcation in the Vienna papers on the morning 
of July 11/24 of the contents of the note, which Baron Giesl 
had presented to the Serbian Government, a feehng of de- 
jection came over the friends both of Serbia and of the peace 
of Europe. It was only then realised that serious European 
complications might ensue, though it was. not believed that 
it was the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government 
to provoke them. This feeling of depression was increased 
by the tone of the articles in the Viennese newspapers, with 
the exception of Die Zeit and Arheiter Zeitung, and by demon- 
strations in the streets, which clearly showed that war would 
""f^/- ^- be a most welcome solution"" — a war with Serbia, of course. 
I I (vo . Q^ ^Yy^x day, after having two or three conversations, I 
21^!] realised that an armed conflict between Serbia and the Dual 
(3 Monarchy was inevitable, "" even should Serbia accept all 

y.'jj'githe demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian Note, from 
the first to the last. The attitude of the people in the streets 
towards our Legation was such that I expected even personal 
attacks upon the members of the staff. 

The French Ambassador, the British Ambassador, and 
the Russian Charge d'Affaires held the view that the step 
taken by Austria-Hungary should be considered not as a 
note but as an ultimatum. They disapproved of the form, 
the contents, and the time limit of the note ; they also 
declared it to be inacceptable. 

In the course of conversation with them on the subject 
of the note I pointed out that those passages in it which 
dealt with the order by the King to the Army, with the dis- 
missal of officers and Government officials, and especially 
'"[B. 4, ^^3± which referred to the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian 
stipuia- officials in the " Suppression of the subversive movement 
tion No. in Serbia against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy,""' 
5] would be inacceptable as not being compatible with the 

[c/. No. dignity and sovereignty of Serbia."' Only a victorious war, 
30 <p. I said, could enforce the acceptance of conditions which were 

105).] ,i8 



so humiliating to an independent State, In reply to their 
enquiry whether it would not perhaps be better to accept 
the conditions and avoid war for the present, I said that the 
Austro-Hungarian Note, which amounted in fact to a declara- 
tion of war upon Serbia, was worded in such a way that, 
even if Serbia should accept all the conditions without reserve, 
Austria-Hungary would still find an excuse for her army 
to march into Serbia at any time. It was in the belief that 
the conflict would be limited to Serbia and Austria-Hungary 
that Austria-Hungary had drafted such a note. 

To M. Dumaine, Sir M. de Bunsen, and the Russian 
Charg6 d' Affaires, the unexpected character of the note was 
the cause not only of surprise but also of alarm, in view 
of the complications which they feared might ensue. The 
Russian Ambassador, M. Sch^beko, previously to the presenta- 
tion of the note, had stated on several occasions to his 
colleagues that Russia could not remain indifferent'" to<''[c/. O. 
any step taken by Austria-Hungary, which might have as i''J 

an object the humiliation of Serbia. He also expressed the 
same view at the Ballplatz. Hence the apprehension felt 
by the three Ambassadors, who at once foresaw the possibiUty 
of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary. 

The day after the note was presented. Prince Kudachef 
went to see Count Berchtold to discuss the matter, "" In *" W- R- 
reply to his statement, that the note as it stood was inaccept- ■'^^•J 

able, and that Russia could not watch with indifference the 
humiliation of Serbia, Count Berchtold said that Austria- 
Hungary had been obliged to take this step as her very 
existence was threatened ; that she could not withdraw nor 
alter the demands made in the note, and that he considered 
that the matter in dispute concerned Serbia and Austria- 
Hungary alone and that no other Power had any grounds for 

Count Berchtold's reply did not allow of any further 
doubts as to the intention of Austria-Hungary to chastise 
Serbia by force of arms without the consent of the European 
concert. From conversations which I had at that time 
with the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente — who, during 
the whole of that difficult period showed every kindness and 
attention to me and to the staff of the Legation — it seemed 
quite clear that Austria-Hungary had been assured, and felt 


[S. 52] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [August 3 

convinced, that the Serbo-Austro-Hungarian conflict would 

'" [c/. B. 9 be locaUsed, '^' as she would otherwise not have decided upon 

and note.] g. note which undoubtedly meant war. It was also clear 

that Austria-Hungary was confirmed in this impression 

especially — and perhaps solely — by Herr von Tschirschky, 

the German Ambassador in Vienna. Herr von Tschirschky 

was the only one who thought, and even stated publicly, that 

Russia would remain quiet while Austria-Hungary carried 

<'" [cf. B. out her punitive expedition against Serbia. "" He declared 

32-] that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would easily 

control the Panslavists, in the same way as he had done 

last year, and that Russia was not disposed at the moment 

to begin a discussion of the many vexed questions in Europe 

and Asia which were her main concern. It was necessary, 

'"[c/. B. 18 according to Herr von Tschirschky, to give Serbia a lesson.'*' 

and note.] Russia had no right to interfere. As far as Germany, he 

said, was concerned, she was in the fullest sense of the word 

conscious of what she was doing in giving Austria-Hungary 

her support in the matter. 

These statements of Herr von Tschirschky have induced 
many to hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke 
a European war, on the ground that it was better to have 
war with Russia before the latter had completed her military 
reorganisation, i.e., before the spring of 1917. This point 
of view had formerly been freely discussed and even written 
about in Vienna. " The longer the matter is postponed, 
the smaller will become the chances of success of the Triple 
Alliance." On the other hand, rumours from the most 
authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in 
Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse did not approve 
of Austria's policy on this question, and that Herr von 
Tschirschky has exceeded the instructions given to him. 

The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, on his return 
from Petrograd, did his utmost at the Ballplatz to obtain 
an extension of the brief time limit given to the Serbian 
Government for a reply to the Austro-Hungarian Note, 
and to discover some way which might lead to an exchange 
of views between Vienna and ' Petrograd in regard to the 
whole question, but until July 13/26, when we met, his 
efforts had proved unavailing. From the conversations I 
then had with him, I gathered that the Austro-Hungarian 

1914] SERBIAN BLUE-BOOK [S. 52] 

Note, in its contents and in its form, was regarded as a 
challenge to Russia and not to Serbia, and that Russia would 
not permit the humiliation of Serbia,"' even if war were to '"[c/. Y. 
be the price. 18, 20.3 

On the day of my departure from Vienna, M. Schebeko 
told me that, in spite of the many great difficulties to be 
overcome, there was a prospect of arriving at a solution by 
which an armed conflict might be avoided by means of 
discussion between the Russian Government and Count 
Sz£ipS,ry. "" A feeling of depression, however, prevailed in "" [c/- B. 43 
Vienna as soon as reports began to be spread that the Austro- ^^^^ote.} 
Serbian conflict would bring about a war between Russia and 
the Dual Monarchy. 



(Only authorized translation) 

How Russia and her Ruler betrayed 

Germany's confidence and thereby 

caused the European War* 



[Price 40 pf.] 

* [This sub-title is not in the original German White-book itself, the 
title page of which, literally translated, is simply : " The German Wliite- 
book. Laid before the German Reichstag on August 4th, 1914. Berhn : 
Published by Carl Heymann. 1914. Price 50 pf."] 


Foreign Office, Berlin, August, 1914. 

ON June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the 
throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess 
of Hohenberg, were assassinated by a member of a band 
of Serbian conspirators. The investigation of the crime 
through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the 
fact that the conspiracy against the Ufe of the Archduke and 
successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade 
with the co-operation of Serbian officials, and executed with 
arms from the Serbian State arsenal. This crime must have 
opened the eyes of the entire civilised world, not only in 
regard to the aims of the Serbian policies directed against 
the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which 
the pan-Serb propaganda in Serbia had no hesitation in 
employing for the achievement of these aims. 

The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionising 

and final separation of the south-easterly districts from the 

<^' [cf. R. Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Serbia. '" 

intro., R. This direction of Serbia's policy has not been altered in the 

"' °"] least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of 

Serbia in which it vouchsafed a change in these pohcies 

toward Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good 

'"'[c/. B.4.] and neighbourly relations."" 

In this manner for the third time in the course of the 
last six years Serbia has led Europe to the brink of a world- 

It could only do this because it believed itself supported 
in its intentions by Russia. 

Russia, soon after the events brought about by the 
Turkish revolution of 1908, endeavoured to found a union 
of the Balkan States under Russian patronage and directed 
against the existence of Turkey. This union which succeeded 
in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her 
European possessions, collapsed over the question of the 
distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dis- 
mayed over this failure. According to the idea of the 
Russian statesmen a new Balkan union under Russian patron- 
age should be called into existence, headed no longer against 
Turkey, now dislodged from the Balkan, but against the 
existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the 



idea that Serbia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Mace- 
donia which it had received during the last Balkan war, in 
exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which were to be 
taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this 
plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with 
the aid of French propaganda, and Serbia promised Bosnia 
and the Herzegovina. 

Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that 
it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of 
self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer 
this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal 
Government appraised [sic) [" benachrichtigte "] Germany 
of this conception and asked for our opinion. With all our 
heart we were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the 
situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary 
to end the movement in Serbia directed against the conserva- 
tion of the monarchy would meet with our approval. 

We were perfectly aware that a possible warhke attitude 
of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon 
the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in 
accordance with our duty as allies.'" We could not, however, "'[c/.R.26j 
in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at O. lojS. 
stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not com- 36.] 
patible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these 
trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests 
were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the 
Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace 
the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of 
Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian 
sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable 
the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A 
morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian 
pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could 
count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be 
able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our 
easterly and westerly neighbours. We, therefore, permitted 
Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia 
but have not participated in her preparations. 

Austria chose the method of presenting to the Serbian 
Government a note, "" in which the direct connection between '*' [B. 4.J 
the murder at Sarajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not 



only countenanced but actively supported by the Serbian 
Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation 
of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was 
requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as 
necessary guarantee for the accomplishment of her desire 
the participation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary 
examination on Serbian territory and the final dissolution 
of the pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary. 
The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of forty- 
eight hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands. 

The Serbian Government started the mobilisation of its 
army one day after* the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian 

As after the stipulated datef the Serbian Government 

<''[B. 39.] rendered a reply'" which, though complying in some points 

with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all 

essentials the endeavour through procrastination and new 

negotiations to escape from the just demands of the monarchy, 

<"[B. 23; the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with Serbia*"' 

O. 31 ; without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further 

^- 5-] Serbian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently 


* [This is inconsistent with statements in the Austro-Hungarian docu- 
ments. The Austro-Hungarian note was transmitted on July 23. {See 
B. 4.) An official communique from the Vienna Press Bureau, on July 28, 
recorded in the French Yellow-book [Y. 75 (2) ] states that orders for 
mobilisation were given by the Serbian Government " on the day on which 
their reply was due and before it was in fact submitted " — -i.e., on July 25. 
Similarly, the communication made on July 26 by the Austro-Hungarian 
Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs states that 
Serbian mobilisation was ordered before 3 o'clock on the afternoon of July 25. 
{See G. 5 ; cf. S. 41 ; R. 23, 29.)] 

■]• [This is inconsistent with statements made elsewhere in the diplomatic 
correspondence. The " stipulated date " for the delivery of the Serbian 
reply was Saturday, July 25, at 6 p.m. [see par. 10 of the Austro-Hungarian 
note, B. 4.) A despatch from the Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade on 
July 27 states that the Serbian reply was handed to the Austro-Hungarian 
Minister at Belgrade " before the expiration of the time limit of the ulti- 
matum " (0. 13). The Austro-Hungarian communication at Brussels 
(G. 5) mentioned in the footnote above records that the reply was given 
" before 6 o'clock " on the 25th. The Austrian Minister left Belgrade at 
6.30 the same evening because the reply was not considered satisfactory. 
(G. 5, B. 23.)] 



From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war 
with Serbia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July 
by declaring war."' '"[B. 50 ; 

From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position ^- ^3-1 
that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone* 
which it would have to settle with Serbia. We therefore 
directed our efforts toward the localising of the war, and 
toward convincing the other Powers that Austria-Hungary 
had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon 
her by the conditions. "" We emphatically took the position "" [B. 9.] 
that no civilised country possessed the right to stay the arm 
of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and poUtical crime, 
and to shield the Serbians against their just punishment. In see exhibits 
this sense we instructed our representatives with the foreign ' * ^• 
Powers."' '^'[c/. O. 

Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government com- ^^-^ 

municated to the Russian Government that the step under- 
taken against Serbia implied merely a defensive measure 
against the Serb agitation, but that Austria-Hungary must 
of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly 
behaviour of Serbia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary 
had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in 
the Balkan. see exhibit 3. 

In answer to our declaration that the German Government 
desired, and aimed at, a localisation of the conflict, both the 
French'*' and the Enghsh'^' Governments promised an action <''[c/.Y.28, 
in the same direction. But these endeavours did not succeed 36.] 
in preventing the interposition of Russia in the Austro-Serbian '°' ^^f- ^- . 
disagreement. ^^'' 

The Russian Government submitted an official communi- 
que on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly 
remain indifferent"' in the Serbo- Austrian conflict. The '"[0. 10. 
same was declared by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ^^s date is 
M. Sazonof, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtal^, ^^^ ^^'^ 
in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government see exhibit 4. 
declared again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only 
wished peace at her frontiers. After the official explanation see exhibit 5. 
by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial 

* [In the " authorized translation " pubhshed in Berlin this word is 
emphasised by widely-spaced type.] 



'"'[c/. Y. 

•''[c/. Y. 

see exhibits 
6, 7, 8, 9. 

see exhibits 
10, loa, lob. 


gain in Serbia, the decision concerning the peace of the world 
rested exclusively with St. Petersburg."' 

The same day the first news of Russian mobilisation'^* 
reached Berlin in the evening. 

The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. 
Petersburg were instructed to energetically point out the 
danger of this Russian mobilisation. The Imperial Ambassador 
at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following 
declaration to the Russian Government :* 

" Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us 
to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the 
<^' [c/. R. " But mobilisation means war.'^' 
intro., "As we know the obUgations of France towards Russia, 

p. 180.] ^]^^g mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and 
France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain 
such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch 
the existence of the Serbian kingdom, we are of the opinion that 
Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can 
all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the 
integrity of Serbia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to 
question the latter. It will be easy in the further develop- 
ment of the affair to find a basis for an understanding." 

On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Suchom- 
hnof, gave the German military attache his word of honour 

* Note [to British official reprint]. — ^This passage takes a somewhat 
different form in the German text, a translation of which is as follows : — 

" The same was declared by the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, M. 
Sazonof, to the Imperial Ambassador, Count Pourtales. (See exhibit 4.) 
On the afternoon of July 26 the Imperial and Royal {that is the Austrian) 
Government declared again through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg that 
Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace on her 
frontiers. (See exhibit 5.) In the course of the same day, however, the 
first news of Russian mobilisation reached Berlin. (See exhibits '6, 7, 8, 
and 9.) On the evening of the 26th, the German Amlsassadors at London, 
Paris, and St. Petersburg were instructed energetically to point out the 
danger of this Russian mobihsation. (See exhibits 10, loa, and lob.) After 
the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that she did not claim 
territorial gain in Serbia the decision concerning the peace of the world 
rested exclusively with St. Petersburg. On the same day the Imperial 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also directed to make the following 
declaration to the Russian Government." 



that no order to mobilise had been issued, merely prepara- 
tions were being made, but not a horse mustered, nor reserves 
called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Serbian frontier, 
the military districts directed towards Austria, i.e. Kieff, 
Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilised,"' under no cir- '" [See B. 
cumstances those situated on the German frontier, i.e., St. 70 (i)] 
Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon inquiry into the 
object of the mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, the 
Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders 
and referring to the diplomats. The military attach^ then see exhibit 
pointed to these mobilisation measures against Austria- "• 
Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany. 

In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilisa- 
tion came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about 
preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as for instance 
the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure 
of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexan- 
drovo garrison. 

On July 27th, the first information was received concerning 
preparatory measures taken by France : the 14th Corps dis- 
continued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison. 

In the meantime we had endeavoured to localise the 
conflict by most emphatic steps [" durch nachdrucklichste 
Einwirkung auf die Kabinette."] 

On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal™ '*'[B. 36.J 
to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and 
Serbia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, 
France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in 
regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we 
approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we ,„ r , ^ 
could not call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a .^i 

European tribunal. "' see exhibit 

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, '^■ 
but it foundered upon Austria's declining it,'*' as was to be '*'[B. 61, 
expected. 62.] 

Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend 
to the Austro-Serbian conflict, which is to be considered as a 
purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations 
between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our 
endeavours to bring about an understanding between these =ee exhibits 
two powers. ' '^' '"*' 

ii-i 129 


We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the 

conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward 

see exhibit Grcy's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary 

'^' should decide that either the Serbian reply was sufficient, or 

<^' [cf. B. that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. '" The 

46, 67.] Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full appreciation 

of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities having 

see exhibit already been opened. "" 

w'r f-R "^^ ^^*^^ ^^ ^^'^^ ^^ continued our attempts to the utmost 

^'^'' ' , 1 and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance com- 
patible with the dignity of the monarchy.* 

Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken 
[" iiberholt "] by the military preparations of Russia and 

On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official 

notification in Berlin that four army districts had been 

<*'[B 70 mobilised."' At the same time further news was received 

^y -i ' concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, 

see exhibit ■: both on water and on land. 

11^ On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Peters- 

"> [cf. B. 93 burg had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, '*' 
(2)-] in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows : 

" The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge 
my Government to participate in a quadruple conference! to 
find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those 
demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Serbia. I 
could merely promise to report the conversation and took the 
position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step 
of mobilisation, every exchange of ideas appeared now 
extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now 
was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the 
same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with 
regard to Serbia, i.e., an infraction of sovereignty. Austria- 
Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests 
by disclaiming any territorial aspiration — a great concession 
on the part of a state engaged in war — should therefore be 

* [This passage printed in italics is, in the Berhn " authorized transla- 
tion/' emphasised by more widely-spaced type.] 

t Note [to official British reprint]. — ^The German word translated " con- 
ference" is konversation : the German text also contains the words auf 
freundschaftlichem Wege ("in a friendly manner"). 



permitted to attend to its affair with Serbia alone. There 
would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter 
of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Serbia. 

" I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire 
Austro-Serbian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general 
European conflagration, and I endeavoured to present to the 
Secretary the magnitude of this danger. 

" It was impossible to dissuade Sazonof from the idea 
that Serbia could not now be deserted by Russia." 

On July 29th, the German Military Attach^ at St. Peters- 
burg wired the following report on a conversation with the 
Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army : 

" The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call 
on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His 
Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to 
reiterate once more that everything had remained as the 
Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered con- 
firmation in writing and gave me his word of honour in the 
most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a mobihsa- 
tion, viz., calling in of a single man or horse up to the present 
time, i.e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume 
a guaranty for the future, but he could emphasise that in 
the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired 
no mobihsation. 

" As, however, I had received here many pieces of news 
concerning the calUng in of the reserves in different parts 
of the country also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general 
that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officer's 
word of honour he replied that such news was wrong, but that 
possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given. 

" I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mis- 
lead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken in 
view of the abundant and positive information about the call- 
ing in of reserves." 

In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its 
threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly 
pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no con- 
versation in St. Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Ambas- 
sador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed on July 29th, 
at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with w ^^f, y. 
Sazonof.'" Count Szapary was empowered to explain to 104.] 



the Russian minister the note to Serbia though it had been 
overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion 
on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sazonof all 
questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations. 
Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured inces- 
santly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which 

see exhibit wc hopcd to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of 

^^' the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded 

the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, 
that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Serbia, 

'i'[c/.B.88, i.e., after her march into Serbia.'" We thought that Russia 
98-] would accept this basis. 

During the interval from July 29th to July 31st* there 
appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian 
measures of mobilisation. Accumulation of troops on the 
East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of 
war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier 
allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobiUsation was 
in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such mea- 
sures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg 
on word of honour. 

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the 
Anglo-German mediation whose tendencies and basis must 
have been known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been 

'"I [Y. 118.3 received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobihsation. '" 

During the same days, there took place between His 
Majesty the Kaiser, and Tsar Nicolas an exchange of tele- 
grams in which His Majesty called the attention of the Tsar 
to the menacing character of the Russian mobiUsation during 

l^^2^^^^^^^ the continuance of his own mediating activities. 

23, 23'a. ' ' On July 31st, the Tsar directed the following telegram 

<"[SeeY. to His Majesty the Kaiser :"' 

app. v.,and " I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits 

addition, tj^e hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is 

442-^ 1^^ technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations 
which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobiUsation. 

* Note [to official British reprint]. — The following words appear here 
in the German text : wdhrend diese unsere BemUhungen um Vermittelung, 
von der englischen Diplomatie unterstiitzt, mit steigender Dringlichkeit fort- 
gefiihri wurden (" whilst these endeavours of ours for mediation were being 
continued with increasing energy, supported by EngUsh diplomacy"). 




It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations 
between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will under- 
take no provocative action. I give You my solemn word 
thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and 
I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the 
welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe. 

" Your cordially devoted 


This telegram of the Tsar crossed with the following 
sent by H.M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m. : — 

" Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request 
for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Govern- 
ment and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this 
action was taking place. Your troops were being mobilised 
against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already 
communicated to You, my mediation has become almost 
illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I 
receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are 
going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the 
security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I 
have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts 
for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I 
who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now 
threatens the entire civihsed world. It rests in Your hand 
to avert it. No one threatens the honour and peace 
of Russia, which might well have awaited the success of 
my mediation. The friendship for You and Your coxmtry, 
bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, 
has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully 
by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially 
during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be 
preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue these 
mihtary preparations which menace Germany and Austria- 

Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobi- 
lisation of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against 
us and already ordered during the afternoon* of the 31st of 

* Note [to official British reprint].— The German text says here Vor- 
mittag (morning). 



'^' [cf. Y. July, '" was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of 
^^^•] the Tsar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon. 

After the Russian general mobilisation became known 
in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was 
instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to explain to the 
Russian Government that Germany declared the state of war 
see exhibit as counter-measure against the general mobilisation of the 
^'*" Russian army and navy which must be followed by mobi- 

lisation if Russia did not cease its military measures against 
Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notified 
Germany thereof. 

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris 
was instructed to demand from the French Government a 
""[Y. 117.] declaration within 18 hours, whether it would remain neutral 
see exhibit in a Russo-Gcrmau war. "" 

^^' The Russian Government destroyed through its mobili- 

<"[c/. O. sation, menacing the security of our country,'" the laborious 
70, 76.] action at mediation of the European cabinets.* The Russian 
mobilisation in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian 
Government was never allowed by us to entertain a doubt, 
in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that 
Russia wanted war. 

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered 
his note to M. Sazonof on July 31st at 12 o'clock 
'^'[0. 70.] midnight.'^' 

The reply of the Russian Government has nevef\ reached 

Two hours after the expiration of the time limits the Tsar 
telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser, as follows : — 

" I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that 
You are forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from 
You the same guaranty which I have given You, viz., that 
these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue 
to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the 
universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid 
of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to 

* Note [to official British reprint]. — The German text adds here kurz 
vor dem Erfolge {" just as it was on the point of succeeding" . 

t [Emphasised in the BerHn " authorized translation " by widely-spaced 




prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence 
Your urgent reply." 

To this H.M. the Kaiser replied : — 

" I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yester- 
day to Your Government the way through which alone war 
may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day 
noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with 
the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced 
to mobilise my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable 
reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless 
misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great 
grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must 
ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your 
troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest 
violation of our frontiers." 

As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the 
receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered 
the mobihsation of the entire German Army and Navy"' on "'[B.^s'isS; 
August ist at 5 p.m. Y. 130.] 

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed 
that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a 
satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he should 
declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after gee exhibit 
the refusal of our demands. However, before a confirmation 26. 
of the execution of this order had been received, that is to say, 
already in the afternoon of August ist, i.e., the same after- 
noon on which the telegram of the Tsar, cited above, was 
sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into 
German territory, «' '"' [c/- R- 

Thus Russia began the war against us. 57-] 

Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our 
question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m."" '^ [Y. 117.] 

The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and un- 
satisfactory reply'*' on August ist at i p.m. which gave no '^'[c/. Y. 
clear idea of the position of France, as he limited himself 135.] 

to the explanation that France would do that which her see exhibit 
interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the ^''' 
mobilisation of the entire French army and navy was 
ordered.'" '"[B. 136; 

On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities. ' ^^'^'^ 




[July 23 

text and 


The Note of Austria-Hungary to Serbia,"' 

_. Presented July 2^rd in Belgrade. 

ON March 31st, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister to 
the Court of Vienna made the following statement, by order 
of his Government : 

" Serbia declares that she is not affected in her rights by 
the situation established in Bosnia, and that she will there- 
fore adapt herself to the decisions which the Powers are going 
to arrive at in reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By 
following the councils of the powers, Serbia binds herself to 
cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has 
assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and 
she binds herself further to change the direction of her present 
policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live 
with the latter in friendly and neighbourly relations." 

The history of the last years, and especially the painful 
events of June 28th, have demonstrated the ejdstence of a 
subversive movement in Serbia whose aim it is to separate 
certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This 
movement, which developed under the eyes of the Serbian 
Government, has found expression subsequently beyond the 
territory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a series of 
assassinations and muiders. 

Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in 
the declaration of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Serbian 
■Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. 
She suffered the criminal doings of the various societies and 
associations directed against the monarchy, the unbridled 
language of the Press, the glorification of the originators of 
assassinations, the participation of officers and ofi&cials in 
subversive intrigues ; she suffered the unwholesome propa- 
ganda in pubhc education, and lastly permitted all manifesta- 



tions which would mislead the Serbian people into hatred 
of the monarchy and into contempt for its institutions. 

This sufferance of which the Royal Serbian Government 
made itself guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the 
events of June 28th demonstrated to the entire world the 
ghastly consequences of such sufferance. 

It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of 
the criminal authors of the outrage of June 28th, that the 
murder at Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the 
murderers received the arms and bombs with which they 
were equipped from Serbian officers and officials who belonged 
to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation 
of the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and 
carried out by lealding Serbian frontier officials.* 

The cited results of the investigation do not permit 
the Imperial and Royal Government to observe any longer 
the attitude of waiting, which it has assumed for years to- 
wards those agitations which have their centre in Belgrade, 
and which from there radiate into the territory of the 
monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the 
Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate 
intrigues which constitute a permanent menace for the peace 
of the monarchy. 

In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal 
Government is forced to demand official assurance from the 
Serbian Government that it condemns the propaganda 
directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e., the entirety of the 
machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the 
monarchy which belong to it, and that she binds herself 
to suppress with all means this criminal and terrorizing 

In order to give to these obhgations a solemn character, 
the Royal Serbian Government will pubUsh on the first 
page of its official organ of July 26th, 1914, the following 
declaration : 

" The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propa- 
ganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e., the entirety 
of those machinations whose aim it is to separate from the 

* [The paragraph : " It becomes plain . . . Serbian frontier officials " 
is emphasised in the Berhn " authorized translation " of the German White- 
book by widely-spaced type.] 



Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging thereto, 
and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these 
criminal actions. 

" The Royal Serbian Government regrets that Serbian 
officers and officials have participated in the propaganda cited 
above, and have thus threatened the friendly and neigh- 
bourly relations which the Royal Government was solemnly 
bound to cultivate by its declaration of March 31st, 1909. 

" The Royal Government which disapproves and rejects 
every thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations 
of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers 
it its duty to call most emphatically to the attention of its 
officers and officials, and of the entire population of the king- 
dom, that it will henceforth proceed with the utmost severity 
against any persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and 
suppress which it will make every effort." 

This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the 
cognizance of the Royal Army through an order of H.M. the 
King, and it is to be published in the official organ of the 

The Royal Serbian Government binds itself, in addition, 
as follows : 

1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, 
and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and 
whose general tendency is directed against the latter's terri- 
torial integrity ; 

2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society 
Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propa- 
ganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other 
societies and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves 
with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal 
Government will take the necessary measures, so that the 
dissolved societies may not continue their activities under 
another name or in another form ; 

3. Without delay to ehminate from the pubhc instruction 
in Serbia, so far as the corps of instructors, as well as the 
means of instruction are concerned, that which serves, or 
may serve, to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ; 

4. To remove from military service and the administra- 
tion in general all officers and officials who are guilty of 
propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with 



a communication of the material which the Imperial and 
Royal Government possesses against them, the Imperial 
and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate 
to the Royal Government ; 

5. To consent that in Serbia officials of the Imperial and 
Royal Government co-operate in the suppression of a move- 
ment directed against the territorial integrity of the mon- 
archy ; 

6. To commence a judicial investigation against the 
participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on 
Serbian territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and 
Royal Government will participate in the examinations ; 

7. To proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major 
Voja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Serbian State 
officials, who have been compromised through the result of 
the investigation ; 

8. To prevent through effective measures the participation 
of the Serbian authorities in the smuggling of arms and 
explosives across the frontier and to dismiss those officials 
of Shabatz and Loznica, who assisted the originators of the 
crime of Sarajevo in crossing the frontier ; 

9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government ex- 
planations in regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high 
Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad who have not 
hesitated, in spite of their official position, to express them- 
selves in interviews in a hostile manner against Austria- 
Hungary after the outrage of June 28th. 

10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply 
from the Royal Government at the latest until Saturday 
25th inst., at 6 p.m. A memoir concerning the results of 
the investigations at Sarajevo, so far as they concern points 
7 and 8 is enclosed with this note." 



The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and 
accomplices in the Court of Sarajevo, on account of the 
assassination on June 28th has, so far, yielded the following 
results : 

I. The plan to murder Archduke Franz Ferdinand during 
his stay in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo 



Princip, Nedeliko, Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic 
and Trifko Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic. 

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were 
used by the criminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganowic 
and Major Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabrinowic 
in Belgrade. 

3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the 
arsenal of the Serbian Army in Kragujevac. 

4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciga- 
nowic instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades, 
and gave instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to 
Princip Grabez in a forest near the target practice field of 
Topshider — (outside Belgrade) . 

5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the 
smuggling of their arms, a secret system of transportation 
was organised by Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals 
with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected 
by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and of 
Loznica, as well as by the custom-house official Rudivoy 
Grbic of Loznica with the aid of several other persons. 

"> [C/. the The Serbian Answer."' 

more exact 

British offi- Presented at Vienna, July 2$th, 1914. 

cial transla- 
tion of this (With Austria's commentaries"" [in italics].) 


R. 34; also THE Royal Government has received the communication 
~: ,39 ; Y. q£ ^Yyq Imperial and Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and 
<^'rSee is convinced that its reply will dissipate any misunderstand- 
Italian i^ig which threatens to destroy the friendly and neighbourly 
comment, relations between the Austrian monarchy and the kingdom 
B. 64.] of Serbia. 

The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere there 
have been renewed protests against the great neighbourly 
monarchy like those which at one time were expressed in 
the Skupshtina, as well as in the declaration and actions of 
the responsible representatives of the state at that time, 
and which were terminated by the Serbian declaration of 
March 31st, 1909 ; furthermore that since that time neither 


the different corporations of the kingdom, nor the officials 
have made an attempt to alter the political and judicial 
condition created in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The Royal 
Government states that the I. and R. Government has made 
no protestation in this sense excepting in the case of a text 
book, in regard to which the I. and R. Government has received 
an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has given during 
the time of the Balkan crisis in numerous cases evidence of 
her pacific and moderate policy, and it is only owing to 
Serbia and the sacrifices which she has brought in the interest 
of the peace of Europe that this peace has been preserved. 

The Royal Serbian Government limits itself to establishing 
that since the declaration of March 315^, 1909, there has been 
no attempt on the part of the Serbian Government to alter the 
position of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. 

With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note, 
as we have not insisted that she and her officials have under- 
taken anything official in this direction. Our gravamen is that 
in spite of the obligation assumed in the cited note, she has 
omitted to suppress the movement directed against the territorial 
integrity of the monarchy. 

Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the 
entire direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly 
and neighbourly relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, 
and not only not to interfere with the possession of Bosnia. 

The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for 
expressions of a private character, as for instance newspaper 
articles and the peaceable work of societies, expressions which 
are of very common appearance in other countries, and which 
ordinarily are not under the control of the State. This, all 
the less, as the Royal Government has shown great courtesy 
in the solution of a whole series of questions which have 
arisen between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, whereby it has 
succeeded to solve the greater number thereof, in favour of 
the progress of both countries. 

The assertion of the Royal Serbian Government that the 
expressions of the press and the activity of Serbian associations 
possess a private character and thus escape governmental con- 
trol, stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern states 
and even the most liberal of press and society laws, which nearly 
everywhere subject the press and the societies to a certain control 



of the state. This is also provided for by the Serbian institu- 
tions. The rebuke against the Serbian Government consists in 
the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise its press and 
its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be hostile to 
'^' [c/. the the monarchy. "' 
more jj^e Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised 

accurate ^y ^-^^ assertions that citizens of Serbia had participated in 
t[on^in' ■'^he preparations of the outrage in Sarajevo. The Govern- 
R. 34 ment expected to be invited to co-operate in the investigation 
(pp. 255- of the crime, and it was ready in order to prove its complete 
257-)] correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to whom 
it would receive information. 

This assertion is incorrect^ The Serbian Government was 
accurately informed about the suspicion resting upon quite 
definite personalities and not only in the position, but also 
obliged by its own laws to institute investigations spontaneously. 
The Serbian Government has done nothing in this direction. 

According to the wishes of the I. and R. Government, 
the Royal Government is prepared to surrender to the court, 
without regard to position and rank, every Serbian citizen, 
for whose participation in the crime of Sarajevo it should 
have received proof. It binds itself particularly on the first 
page of the official organ of the 26th of July to publish the 
following enunciation : 

" The Royal Serbian Government condemns every propa- 
ganda which should: be directed against Austria-Hungary, 
i.e., the entirety of such activities as aim towards the separa- 
tion of certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian mon- 
archy, and it regrets sincerely the lamentable consequences 
of these criminal machinations." 

The Austrian demand reads : 

" The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda 
against Austria-Hungary. ..." The alteration of the declara- 
''''[Re- tion as demanded by us,^"'' which has been made by the Royal 
ferredto, Serbian Government, is meant to imply that a propaganda 
■ 4-J directed against Austria-Hungary does not_ exist, and that it is 
not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the Serbian 
Government reserves itself the subterfuge for later occasions 
that it had not disavowed by this declaration the existing propa- 
ganda, nor recognised the same as hostile to the monarchy, 


whence it could deduce further that it is not obliged to suppress 
in the future a propaganda similar to the present one. 

The Royal Government regrets that according to a 
communication of the I. and R. Government certain Serbian 
officers and functionaries have participated in the propaganda 
just referred to, and that these have therefore endangered 
the amicable relations for the observation of which the 
Royal Government had solemnly obliged itself through the 
declaration of March 31st, 1909. 

The Government . . . identical with the demanded text. 

The formula as demanded by Austria reads : 

" The Royal Government regrets that Serbian officers and 
functionaries . . . have participated . . ." 

Also with this formula and the further addition " according to 
the declaration of the I. and R. Government," the Serbian 
Government pursues the object, already indicated above, to 
preserve a free hand for the future. 

The Royal Governnient binds itself further : 

I. During the next regular meeting of the Skupshtina 
to embody in the press laws a clause, to wit, that the incite- 
ment to hatred of, and contempt for, the monarchy is to be 
most severely punished, as well as every publication whose 
general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of 
Austria-Hungary . 

It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the con- 
stitution to embody an amendment into Article 22 of the 
constitutional law which permits the confiscation of such 
publications as is at present impossible according to the 
clear definition of Article 22 of the constitution. 

Austria had demanded : 

I. "To suppress every publication which incites to hatred 
and contempt for the monarchy, and whose tendency is directed 
against the territorial integrity of the monarchy." 

We wanted to bring about the obligation for Serbia to take 
care that such attacks of the press would cease in the future. 

Instead Serbia offers to pass certain laws which are meant 
as means towards this end, viz. : 

[a) A law according to which the expressions of the 
press hostile to the monarchy can be individually punished, 
a matter, which is immaterial to us, all the more so, as 


gw.] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 25, 

the individual prosecution of press intrigues is very rarely 
possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the 
few cases of this nature would not he punished. The 
proposition, therefore, does not meet our demand in any 
way, and it offers not the least guarantee for the desired 

{b) An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which 
would permit confiscation, a proposal, which does not 
satisfy us, as the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no 
use to us. For we want the obligation* of the Government 
to enforce* it and that has not been promised us. 

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and 
evasive, as we are not told within what time these laws will be 
passed, and as in the event of the not passing of these laws by 
the Skupshtina everything would remain as it is, excepting the 
event of a possible resignation of the Government. 

2. The Government possesses no proofs and the note 
of the I. and R. Government does not submit them that the 
society Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have 
committed, up to the present, any criminal actions of this 
manner through anyone of their members. Notwithstanding 
this, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the 
I. and R. Government and dissolve the society Narodna 
Odbrana, as well as every society which should act against 

The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated 
societies hostile to the monarchy fills the entire public life of 
Serbia ; it is therefore an entirely inacceptable reserve if the 
Serbian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it. 
Aside from this, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we 
have asked besides : 

" To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies 
to prevent the reformation of the dissolved societies under another 
name and in another form." 

In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly 
silent, so that through this semi-concession there is offered us 
no guarantee for putting an end to the agitation of the associa- 
tions hostile to the Monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana. 

* [The words " obligation " and " enforce " are emphasised in the Berlin 
" authorized translation " by widely-spaced type.] 



3. The Royal Serbian Government binds itself without 
delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Serbia any 
thing which might further the propaganda directed against 
Austria-Hungary provided the I. and R. Government furnishes 
actual proofs. 

Also in this case the Serbian Government first demands 
proofs for a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public 
instruction of Serbia while it must know that the textbooks 
introduced in the Serbian schools contain objectionable matter in 
this direction and that a large portion of the teachers are in the 
camp of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies. 

Furthermore, the Serbian Government has not fulfilled a 
part of our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its 
text the addition desired by us ; " as far as the body of instructors 
is concerned, as well as the means of instruction " — a sentence 
which shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the Mon- 
archy is to be found in the Serbian schools. 

4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those 
officers and officials from the military and civil services in 
regard to whom it has been proved by judicial investigation 
that they have been guilty of actions against the territorial 
integrity of the monarchy ; it expects that the I. and R. 
Government communicate to it for the purpose of starting 
the investigation the names of these officers and officials, and 
the facts with which they have been charged. 

By promising the dismissal from the military and civil 
services'-^'' of those officers and officials who are found guilty by '"[^eefoot- 
judicial procedure, the Serbian Government limits its assent p°*® *° 
to those cases in which these persons have been charged with a ' ^'^k 
crime according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand 261.] 
the removal of such officers and officials as indulge in a propa- 
ganda hostile to the Monarchy, which is generally not punishable 
in Serbia, our demands have not been ftdfilled in this point. 

5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear 
about the sense and the scope of that demand of the I. and 
R. Government which concerns the obligation on the part 
of the Royal Serbian Government to permit the co-operation 
of officials of the I. and R. Government on Serbian territory, 
but it declares that it is willing to accept every co-operation 
which does not run counter to international law and criminal 
law, as well as to the friendly and neighbourly relations. 

II-K X45 


The international law, as well as the criminal law, has 
nothing to do with this question ; it is 'purely a matter of the 
nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special 
agreement. The reserved attitude of Serbia is therefore incom- 
prehensible and on account of its vague general form it would 
lead to unbridgeable difficulties. 

6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a 
matter of course to begin an investigation against all those 
persons who have participated in the outrage of June 28th 
and who are in its territory. As far as the co-operation in 
this investigation of specially delegated officials of the I. and 
R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as 
this is a violation of the constitution and of criminal pro- 

'1' ["in cedure. Yet in some cases'" the result of the investigation 
einzelnen might be communicated to the Austro-Hungarian officials. 
Fallen," c/. j'/je Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable : 
in^R^^4°'^ I. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants 
p. 262.] ' ^-* i^^ outrage. 

2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in 

the examinations (" Recherche " in contrast with " enquete 


f^'[Re- 3.™ It did not occur to us to let I. and R. Government 

i&rve&to, officials participate in the Serbian court procedure; they were 

^- "4-] to co-operate only in the police researches which had to furnish 

and fix the material for the investigation. 

If the Serbian Government misunderstands us here, this 
is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference 
between " enquete judiciaire " and simple police researches. 
As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation 
which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable 
results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible 
manner the co-operation of our officials {precedents for such 
police intervention exist in great number) it tries to justify its 
refusal by showing up our demands as impossible. 

7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of 
the day on which the note was received the arrest of Major 
Voislar Tankosic. However, as far as Milan Ciganowic is 
concerned, who is a citizen of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
and who has been employed till June 28th with the Railroad 
Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him, 
wherefore a warrant has been issued against him. 



The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, as 
soon as possible, for the purpose of conducting the investiga- 
tion, the existing grounds for suspicion and the proofs of 
guilt, obtained in the investigation at Sarajevo. 

This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, 
Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three 
days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that 
Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, 
it is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Serbian service 
on June 2Sth. In the second place, we add that the prefect of 
police at Belgrade who had himself caused the departure of this 
Ciganowic and who knew his whereabouts, declared in an 
interview that a man by the name of Milan Ciganowic did not 
exist in Belgrade. 

8. The Serbian Government will amplify and render 
more severe the existing measures against the suppression of 
smuggling of arms and explosives. 

It is a matter of course that it wiU proceed at once against, 
and punish severely, those officials of the frontier service ■ 
on the line Shabatz-Loznica who violated, their duty and 
who have permitted the perpetrators of the crime to cross 
the frontier. 

9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations 
about the expressions which its officials in Serbia and abroad 
have made in interviews after the outrage and which, accord- 
ing to the assertion of the I. and R. Government, were hostile 
to the Monarchy. As soon as the I. and R. Government 
points out in detail where those expressions were made, and 
succeeds in proving that those expressions have actually been 
made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government 
itself will take care that the necessary evidences and proofs 
are collected therefor. 

The Royal Serbian Government must he aware of the inter- 
views in question. If it demands of the I. and R. Government 
that it should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews 
and if it reserves for itself the right of a formal investigation, 
it shows that it is not its intention seriously to fulfil the 

10. The Royal_^Government will notify the I. and R. 
Government, so far as this has not been already done by 
the present note, of the execution of the measures in question 


[W. exh. 1] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 23, 

as soon as one of those measures has been ordered and put 
into execution. 

The Royal Serbian Government beheves it to be to the 
common interest not to rush the solution of this affair and 
it is therefore, in case the I. and R. Government should not 
consider itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to 
accept a peaceable solution, be it by referring the decision 
of this question to the International Court at The Hague or 
by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have 
participated in the working out of the declaration given by 
'" ^Seep. the Serbian Government on March 31st, 1909."' 

The Serbian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time.* 

''•[c/.B.g.] Exhibit i.'^' 

The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, 
and St. Petersburg, on July Z'^rd, 1914. 

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government 
concerning the circumstances under which the assassination 
of the Austrian successor to the throne and his consort took 
place, disclose clearly the aims which the pan-Serb propaganda 
. has set itself and the means which it utilises for their realisa- 
tion. Through the published facts the last doubt must 
disappear that the centre of action of the efforts for the 
separation of the south Slavic provinces from the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy and their union with the Serbian 
Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it displays its 
activity with the connivance of members of the Government 
and of the Army. 

The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series 
of years. In a specially marked manner the pan-Serb 
chauvinism showed itself during the Bosnian crisis. Only 
to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the 

* [This sentence is not in the German text of the White-book. In place 
of it appears, with the heading, " Extract from the Austro-Hungarian 
Records," a summary, dated " Vienna, July 27," of the " dossier con- 
cerning the Serbian conflict " (R. 19), which, it states, " was made public 
to-day" (July 27).] 


1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W. exh. 1] 

Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intefcession 
of the powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to 
which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on the 
part of Serbia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance 
of future well-behaviour which the Serbian Government 
gave at that time,'" it has not kept. Under the very eyes, '" [See •p. 
at least with the tacit sufferance of official Serbia, the pan- ^36-1 

Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and 
intensity ; at its door is to be laid the latest crime the threads 
of which lead to Belgrade. It has become evident that it is 
compatible neither with the dignity nor with the self-preserva- 
tion of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view any longer 
idly the doings across the border through which the safety 
and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. 
With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands 
of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as 
justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public 
opinion as well as by the Government in Serbia does not 
preclude the fear that the Serbian Government will decline 
to meet these demands"" and that it will allow itself to be '^'[c/. 
carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria- wording 
Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian "^, ®^"' 
Government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a 
great power, but to press its demands with the Serbian 
Government and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to 
military measures, in regard to which the choice of means 
must be left with it. 

I have the honour to request you to express yourself in 
the sense indicated above to (the present representative "' of '^' [M. 
M. Viviani), (Sir Edward Grey), (M. Sazonof) and therewith ^^'^'^Y^""' 
give special emphasis to the view that in this question there ^''^^'^"°-J 
is concerned an affair which should be settled solely between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the limitation to which it must 
be the earnest endeavour of the powers to insure. We 
anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because every 
intercession of another power on account of the various 
treaty-alliances would precipitate inconceivable consequences. 

I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report 
after the course of your interview. 


[W. exh. 2] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 28, 

Exhibit 2. 
The Chancellor to the Governments of Germany. 
Confidential. Berlin, July 28th, 1914. 

" You will make the following report to the Government 
to which you are accredited : 

In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has 
published in its note to the Serbian Government, the last 
doubt must disappear that the outrage to which the Austro- 
Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen a victim, was 
prepared in Serbia, to say the least with the connivance of 
members of the Serbian government and army. It is a 
product of the pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years 
have become a source of permanent disturbance for the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe. 

The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especiall}' marked 
during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self- 
restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian govern- 
ment and the energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be 
ascribed that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary 
was exposed at that time, did not lead to a conflict. The 
assurance of future well-behaviour, which the Serbian govern- 
<'' [Seep, ment gave at that time,"' it has not kept. Under the very 
136-] eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Serbia, the 
pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to increase 
in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with 
its dignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the Austro- 
Hungarian government persisted to view idly any longer 
the intrigues beyond the frontier, through which the safety 
and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. 
With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands 
of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only 
as justifiable. 

The reply of the Serbian government to the demands 

which the Austro-Hungarian government put on the 23rd inst. 

through its representative in Belgrade, shows that the domina- 

""[c/. ting factors in Serbia are not inclined to cease their former 

iTeSr^ poHcies and agitation.'" There will remain nothing else for 

J.'^j® • the Austro-Hungarian government than to press its demands, 


1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W. exh. 2] 

if need be through miUtary action, unless it renounces for 
good its position as a great power. 

Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter 
of course and a task of Russia's to actively become a party 
to Serbia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and 
Serbia. For the European conflagration which would result 
from a similar step by Russia, the Novoe Vremya believes 
itself justified in making Germany responsible in so far as it 
does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield. 

The Russian Press thus turns conditions upside down. 
It is not Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict 
with Serbia, but it is Serbia which, through unscrupulous 
favour toward pan-Serb aspirations, even in parts of the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, threatens the same in her 
existence and creates conditions, which eventually found 
expression in the wanton outrage at Sarajevo. If Russia 
beheves must champion the cause of Serbia in this 
matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must 
realise that it makes the Serb activities its own, to under- 
mine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility, '" "' [cf. B. 
if out of the Austro-Serbian affair, which all other great i34;Y.56 
powers desire to localise, there arises a European war. This ^^ ^^■^^' 
responsibility of Russia's is evident and it weighs the more j-Qg,, lob, 
heavily as Count Berchtold has ofi&cially declared to Russia below.] 
that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire Serbian 
territory or to touch the existence of the Serbian Kingdom, 
but only desires peace against the Serbian intrigues threatening 
its existence. 

The attitude of the Imperial government in this question 
is clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan- 
Slavs in Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction 
of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the scattering or weaken- 
ing of the triple alliance with a complete isolation of the 
German Empire in consequence. Our own interest therefore 
calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary."" The duty, if at ""[c/.Y.i6, 
all possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points ^°\ ^'/^ 
to the support by ourselves of those endeavours which aim at ^^ note.j 
the localisation of the conflict, faithful to the course of those 
policies which we have carried out successfully for forty-four 
years in the interest of the preservation of the peace of Europe. 


[W. exh. 3] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 24, 

Should, however, against our hope, through the inter- 
ference of Russia the fire be spread, we should have to support, 
faithful to our duty as allies, the neighbour-monarchy with 
all the power at our command. We shall take the sword 
only if forced to it, but then in the clear consciousness that 
we are not guilty of the calamity which war will bring upon 
the peoples of Europe. 

Exhibit 3. 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the 
Chancellor on July 24th, 1914. 

COUNT BERCHTOLD has asked to-day for the Russian 

'" [Prince Charge d'affaires'^' in order to explain to him thoroughly and 

Kuda- cordially Austria-Hungary's point of view toward Serbia. 

•] After recapitulation of the historical development of the past 

few years, he emphasised that the Monarchy entertained 

'^'[c/. 0. no thought of conquest toward Serbia."" Austria-Hungary 

k t^*1 "^o^ld ^'^^ claim Serbian territory. It insisted merely that 

this step was meant as a definite means of checking the 

Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstance, Austria- 

'" [c/. B. 93 Hungary must have a guaranty'^' for continued amicable 

(^)--l relations with Serbia. It was far from him to intend to bring 

about a change in the balance of powers in the Balkan. The 

Charge d'affaires who had received no instructions from St. 

Petersburg, took the discussion of the Secretary ad referendum 

with the promise to submit it immediately to Sazonof. 

Exhibit 4. 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the 
Chancellor on July 24th, 1914. 

I HAVE just utilised the contents of Order 592 in a 

prolonged interview with Sazonof. The Secretary (Sazonof) 

indulged in unmeasured accusations toward Austria-Hungary 

and he was very much agitated. He declared most positively 

that Russia could not permit under any circumstances that 

I*' [c/. 0. the Serbo- Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the 

10.] parties concerned.'* 



Exhibit 5. 

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. 
Telegram of July 26th, 1914. 

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended 
interview with Sazonof this afternoon. '" Both parties had '" [cf. O. 
a satisfactory impression as they told me afterwards. The 25.] 

assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had no 
idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her 
frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary. 

Exhibit 6. 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the 
Chancellor on July z^th, 1914. 

MESSAGE to H.M. from General von Chelius (German 
honorary aide de camp to the Tsar). 

The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were 
suddenly interrupted and the regiments returned to their 
garrisons at once. The manoeuvres have been cancelled. 
The military pupils were raised to-day to the rank of ofl&cers 
instead of next fall. At headquarters there obtains great 
excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the im- 
pression that complete preparations for mobilisation against 
Austria are being made. 

Exhibit 7. 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the 
Chancellor on July 26th, 1914. 

THE military attache requests the following message to 
be sent to the general staff : — 

I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for 
IKieff and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and 
improbable elsewhere. 

Exhibit 8. 

Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor 

on July 2yth, 1914. 

KOVNO has been declared to be in a state of war. 


[W. exh. 9] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 27, 

Exhibit 9. 

Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor ^ 

on July zyth, 1914. 

HAVE learned reliably that French XlVth corps has 
discontinued manoeuvres. 

Exhibit id. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
London. Urgent. July 26th, 1914. 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY has declared in St. Petersburg 

officially and solemnly that it has no desire for territorial 

'^' [c/. 0. gain in Serbia ; '" that it will not touch the existence of the 

28 ; B. 90 Kingdom, but that it desires to establish peaceful conditions. 

and note.] According to news received here, the call for several classes 

of the reserves is expected immediately which is equivalent to 

mobilisation.* If this news proves correct, we shaU be forced 

to countermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our 

desire to localise the conflict and to preserve the peace of 

Europe remains unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at 

St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis. 

Exhibit loa. 

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial 
Ambassador at Paris. July 26th, 1914. 

AFTER officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hun- 

,2 gary has no intention to acquire territorial gain'" and to touch 

28 1 ^^^ existence of the Kingdom, the decision whether there is 

r , Y ,5^0 be a European war rests solely with Russia"' which has to 

and note ; ^^^^ ^^^ entire responsibiUty. We depend upon France with 

also exhs! which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of 

2, lob.] the peace of Europe'^' that it will exercise its influence at 

'■■'[c/. Y. St. Petersburg in favour of peace. 

"57 ] 

* Note [to ©facial British reprint].— The German text adds here auch- 

gegen uns {" also against us"). 



Exhibit lob. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg on July 26th, 1914. 

AFTER Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial 
disinterestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance 
of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests 
solely upon Russia."' We trust still that Russia will under- <"[c/. exh. 
take no steps which will threaten seriously the peace of loa and 
Europe. °ote.] 

Exhibit ii. 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the n) rMaior 
Chancellor on July zjth, 1914. von 

MILITARY Attache «' reports a conversation with the ^^S^^i'^g-I 
Secretary qi War :'" ''' [cf. R. 

Sazonof has requested the latter to enhghten me on the ^^J 
situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word of 
honour that no order to mobilise has as yet been issued. "' '*' {"f- ^• 
Though general preparations are being made, no reserves were 33-] 
called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Serbian 
frontier, such military districts as are directed toward Austria, 
viz., Kieff , Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilised. '*' '^' [See B. 
Under no circumstances those on the German frontier. War- 70 (i)-] 
saw, Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired 
very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilisation 
against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the 
diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the 
friendly intentions, but considered mobilisation even against 
Austria as very menacing. 

Exhibit 12. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
London on July zjth, 1914. 

WE know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward 
Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in London.'" It is "'[B. 36.J 
impossible for us to place our ally in his dispute with Serbia 
before a European tribunal.*" Our mediation must be limited '"[c/. B. 
to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict. 43-] 


[W. exu. 13] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 25, 

Exhibit 13. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
London on July 2$th, 1914. 

THE distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an 

<" [See B. Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian conflict '" is perfectly 

25,] correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any 

more than England, and as heretofore we take the position 

<''[c/.B. 9.] that this question must be localised"" by virtue of all Powers 

refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that 

Russia will refrain from any action in view of her respon- 

sibihty and the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, 

in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart 

from our known duties as allies [" vorbehaltlich unserer 

is)r f T} bekannten Biindnispflichten"], to intercede between Russia 

18 84.1 ^^*^ Austria jointly with the other powers.'" 

Exhibit 14. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg on July 28th, 1914. 

WE continue in our endeavour to induce Vienna to 
elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian 
^^'[c/. B.^ action in Serbia'^' in a manner both convincing and satis 
^Y\ factory to Russia. The declaration of war which has mean- 
while ensued alters nothing in this matter. 


Exhibit 15. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in 
London on July zyth, 1914. 

[cf. B. W-E have at once started the mediation proposal in 

71.] Vienna"' in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We 
<"' [of. B. have communicated besides to Count Berchtold the desire 
45.] of M. Sazonof for a direct parley with Vienna.'*' 



Exhibit i6. 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the 
Chancellor on July 28th, 1914. 

COUNT BERCHTOLD requests me to express to Your 
Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English 
mediation proposal.'" He states, however, that after the (d [b. 36.] 
opening of hostilities by Serbia and the subsequent declara- 
tion of war, the step appears belated."' <^| [c/.B.6i, 


Exhibit 17. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
Paris on July zgth, 1914. 

NEWS received here regarding French preparations of 
war"' multipUes from hour to hour. I request that You call m ^cf. R. 
the attention of the French Government to this and accen- 45.] 
tuate that such measures would call forth counter-measures 
on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening 
state of war {drohende Kriegsgefahr),^*^ and while this would ^^^.f^ ^^_ 
not mean a call for the reserves or mobiUsation, yet the 34; also 
tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for B. iia; 
the preservation of peace. ^- ^^7-1 

Exhibit 18. 

Telegram of the Military Attach^ at St. Petersburg to H.M. the 
Kaiser on July ^oth, 1914. 

PRINCE TROUBETZKI said to me yesterday, after 
causing Your Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to 
Tsar Nicolas : Thank God that a telegram of Your Emperor'" (5)rExh 
has come. He has just told me the telegram has made a 20.] 

deep impression upon the Tsar but as the mobilisation against 
Austria had already been ordered '*' and Sazonof had con- m^^y^ 
vinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat, (i).] 

His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. 
I then told him that the guilt for the measureless conse- 
quences lay at the door of premature mobilisation against 
Austria-Hungary which after all was involved merely in a 


[W. exh. 19] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 31 

local war with Serbia, for Germany's answer was clear and 

"|[c/. O. the responsibility rested upon Russia'" which ignored Austria- 

28 ; B. 90 Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions of territorial 

andnote.] ^^^^ -^ Serbia. Austria-Hungary mobilised against Serbia 

"[c/. O. and not against Russia"" and there was no ground for an 

5I-] immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added 

that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia's 

phrase that " she could not desert her brethren in Serbia," 

after the horrible crime of Sarajevo. I told him finally he 

need not wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilised. 

Exhibit 19. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
Rome on July ■^xst, 1914. 

j3 WE have continued to negotiate between Russia and 

i^2-is^" Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams 

and below.] between His Majesty the Kaiser and His Majesty the Tsar/'' 

as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through 

''•[B. 70 the mobiUsation of Russia'" all our efforts have been greatly 

(i)-] handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite 

of pacifying assurances Russia is* taking such far-reaching 

measures against us that the situation is becoming continually 

more menacing. 

Exhibit 20.| 

I. — His Majesty to the Tsar. 

July 28th, 10.45 P-^- 
I HAVE heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression 
which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against 
Serbia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going 
on for years in Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The 
spirit which made the Serbians murder their own King and 
his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You 

* Note [to official British reprint]. — The German text adds here aUen 
uns zugegangenen Nachrichten zufolge (" according to all the information 
that has reached us "). 

t [See Y. app. V. and note (vol. I., p. 442), for an omitted letter from 
the Tsar to the Emperor William.] 


will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all 
other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all 
those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall 
suffer their deserved punishment. 

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty 
encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide 
of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which 
has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use 
my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a 
frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope 
confidently that You will support me in my efforts to over- 
come all difficulties which may yet arise. 

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin. 

(Signed) WILHELM. 

Exhibit 21. 
II. — The Tsar to His Majesty. 

Peterhof Palace, July 2gth, i p.m. 
I AM glad that You are back in Germany. In this 
serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An igno- 
minious war has been declared against a weak country and 
in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. 
I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure 
exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures 
which wiU lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European 
war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship 
to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going 
too far. 

(Signed) NICOLAS. 

Exhibit 22. 
III. — His Majesty to the Tsar. 

July 2gth, 6.30 p.m. 
I HAVE received Your telegram and I share Your desire 
for the conservation of peace. However, I cannot — as I told 
You in my first telegram — consider the action of Austria- 
Hungary as an " ignominious war." Austria-Hungary knows 


W. exh. 23] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [July 30, 

from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they 
are merely on paper are entirely unreliable. 

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary 
is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty 
that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into 
deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explana- 
tion of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended 
no territorial gain at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore 
of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain 
a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without drawing 
Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe 
that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between 
Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which — as 
I have already telegraphed You — ^my Government endeavours 
to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures 
by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria- 
Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us 
desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator 
which — ^upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid — I 
willingly accepted. 

(Signed) WILHELM. 

Exhibit 23. 

IV. — His Majesty to the Tsar. 

July 30th, I a.m. 

MY Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention 
of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences 
of a mobilisation ; I have told You the same in my last 
telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilised only against Serbia, 
and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be 
the case according to Your advice and that of Your Govern- 
ment, mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the part of the 
mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly 
manner and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, 
is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of 
decision now rests upon Your shoulders. You have to bear 
the responsibility for war or peace. 

(Signed) WILHELM. 


Exhibit 23a. 
v.— The Tsar to His Majesty. 

Peterhof, July ^oth, 1914, 1.20 p.m. 

I THANK You from my heart for Your quick reply. I 
am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the 
Kaiser) with instructions. The mihtary measures now taking 
form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason 
of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with 
all my heart that these measures will not influence in any 
manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very 
highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that 
an understanding can be a.rrived at with us. 


Exhibit 24. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg on July ^zst, 1914. Urgent. 

IN spite of negotiations still pending and although we 
have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilisation, 
Russia has mobilised her entire* army and navy,'" hence ^^ 
also against us. On account of these Russian measures we !y- " "| : 
have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim R^sa.] 
the threatening state of war,"" which does not yet imply w.^/ g^^g 
mobilisation. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow if 17, 25 ; 
Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and also Y. 
against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours and notifies us ii7-] 
definitely to this effect."" Please to communicate this at ojr^j q 
once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of communication. 7o;k.54.] 

Exhibit 25. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in 
Paris on July 3isf, 1914. Urgent. 

RUSSIA has ordered mobilisation of her entire army and 
fleet,'"' therefore also against us in spite of our still pending ,^ 

* [Emphasised in Berlin " authorized translation " by widely -spaced Y. ii8 ; 
type.] R. 52.] 

11— L 161 

[W. exh. 26] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [August i, 

mediation.* We have therefore declared the threatening state 

'^'[c/. exh. of war"' which is bound to be followed by mobilisation 

24 and unless Russia stops within 12 hours all measures of war 

"°*^"^ against us and Austria. Mobilisation inevitably impUes war. 

Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain 

neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 

'*! [See Y. 18 hours. '" Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed 

■'■■'^^-J necessary. 

Exhibit 26. 

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in 
St. Petersburg on August xst, 12.52 p.m. Urgent. 

IF the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to 
our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this after- 
'" [See 0. noon 5 o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement : '" 
7^-3 " Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts 
de la crise de la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant 
a un desir que lui en avait ete exprime par Sa Majeste 
I'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majeste I'Empereur d'AUemagne 
d'accord avec I'Angleterre etait applique a accomplir un role 
mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg, 
lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, proceda a la 
mobilisation de la totaUte de ses forces de terre et de mer. 

" A la suite de cette mesure menagante motivee par aucun 
preparatif militaire de la part de I'AUemagne, I'Empire 
AUemand se trouva vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. 
Si le Gouvernement Imperial eflt manque de parer a ce 
peril il aurait compromis la securite et I'existence meme 
de I'AUemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement AUemand 
se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 
'"[Correc- I'Empereur de toutes les Russies en sistant'^' sur la cessation 
ted into (jes ^its actes miUtaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire 
inTTarer ^^^^^ ^ P^^^^ demande et ayant manifeste par ce refus, que 
issue of the son action etait dirigee contre I'AUemagne, j'ai I'honneur 
document. 3 d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir a Votre Excel- 
lence ce qui suit : 

" Sa Majeste I'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom 

* Note [to official British reprint].— The German text adds here und 
obwohl wir selbsi keinerlei Mohilmachungsmassnahmen geiroffen haben (" and 
although we ourselves have taken no measures towards. mobilisation"). 


1914] GERMAN WHITE-BOOK [W. exh. 27] 

de I'Empire releve le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre 
avec la Russie." 

Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this 
instruction by Russian time. 

Please ask for Your passports and turn over protection 
and affairs to the American Embassy. 

Exhibit 27. 

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor 
on August 1st, 1.05 p.m. 

UPON my repeated definite inquiry whether France 
would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, 
the Prime Minister declared that France would do that which 
her interests dictated. "' '" [c/. Y. 

"7, 125.] 



(Official Translation from "Collected Diplomatic Dociiments." 

Cd. 7860.) 




Place and 

Date of 




Ritter von Storck 
to Count Berch- 



June 29 

Rejoicings at Belgrade over 
news of assassination of 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand 




June 30 

Serbian police have taken no 
steps to follow up clues 
to the crime 



Consul - General 
Jehlitschka to 
Count Berchtold 

July I 

Applause and satisfaction at 
Uskub and Pristina over 
news of the outrage 



Coimt Szecsen to 

Coimt Berchtold 


July 4 

President of French Republic 
is convinced that Serbian 
Government would readily 
meet Austria in the judicial 
investigation and prosecu- 
tion of accomplices 



Herr Hoflehner to 
Count Berchtold 

July 6 

Satisfaction and joy at Nish 
over Serajevo outrage 



Freiherr von Giesl 
to Coimt Berch- 

July 21 

Serbian policy aims at separa- 
tion of Southern Slav 
territories from Austria- 
Hungary' and her destruc- 
tion as a Great Power. Ser- 
bian press campaign of lies 
and hatred. Further injury 
to position of monarchy 
cannot be permitted 


[SuppUed by the Editor.] 




Place and 

Date of 




Count Berchtoldto 
Freiherr v. Giesl 

Count Berchtold to 
Ambassadors in 
Berlin, Rome, 
Paris, London, 
St. Petersburg, 

Count Berchtold to 

Count Mensdorff 


Count Mensdorff to 

Count Berchtold 


Count Szecsen to 

Count Berchtold 




tt }t 


II }i 


July 22 

July 23 

July 24 

July 24 

Austrian note to Serbia. [See 
B. 4] 

Commentary upon Austrian 
note. Serbian machina- 
tions against Austria-Hun- 
gary and Austrian patience 
in face of Serbia's provoca- 
tive attitude 

Serbian Govermnent have 
taken no steps to discover 
traces from the Serajevo 
outrage to Belgrade, but 
have tried to obliterate 
them. The short time 
limit indispensable 

Communication of Austrian 
note. Sir E. Grey regrets 
the short time limit and 
has fears concerning peace 
of Europe^ Statement of 
Austrian point of view . . 

Has communicated Austrian 
note and explained Austrian 
point of view ; the question 
must be brought to an issue 
directly between Austria 
and Serbia. M. Bienvenu- 
Martin does not defend 
Serbia's attitude . . 

Baron Schoen will communi- 
cate the German view that 
the matter concerns only 
Austria and Serbia 

German Ambassador's de- 
marche. French Govern- 
ment hope the controversy 
will find a direct and 
peaceful solution . . 







Place and 

Date of 





Count Szapary to 

Count Berchtold 


St. Peters- 
July 24 

Discussion of Austrian note 
with M. Sazonof and reply 
to his objections . . 



Russian official 


Russia cannot remain in- 
different to the dispute . . 



Count Szapiry to 

Count Berchtold 



Conversation between M. Sa- 
zonof and Count Pourtales: 
Austria does not intend to 
devour Serbia, but would 
not accept interference .. 



Count Berchtold to 

Count Mensdorff 


July 24 

Demarche at Belgrade not a 
formal ultimatum, but a 
demarche with a time limit. 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Szdpary 


Has assured Russian Charge 
d' Affaires that Austria does 
not intend to humiUate 
Serbia, or aim at increase 
of territory 



Count Berchtold to 
Ambassadors at 
Berlin, Rome, 
Paris, London, 
St. Petersbvu-g, 

July 25 

Transmits dossier with refer- 
ence to the Great Serbian 
propaganda and its connec- 
tion with the Serajevo out- 



Count Berchtold to 
Freiherr von 


July 25 

Refuses consent to extension 
of the time limit . . 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Szdpary 

Bad Ischl, 
July 25 

Announces and gives reasons 
for this refusal 



Freiherr von Giesl 
to Count Berch- 
- (Telegraphic) 

July 25 

Administrative and military 
preparations in Serbia 







Place and 

Date of 









Freiherr von Giesl 
to Count Berch- 
told (Telegraphic) 


Serbian Govern- 
ment to Austrian 

Count Berchtold to 
Count Szapary 


Count Szapary to 

Count Berchtold 


Count Berchtold to 

Count Mensdorii 


Count Berchtold to 
Ambassadors at 
BerUn, Rome, 
London, Paris, 
St. Petersburg 

July 25 

July 25 

July 25 

St. Peters- 
July 26 

July 26 

General mobiHsation ordered 
in Serbia 

Rupture of diplomatic rela- 
tions with Serbia . . 

Serbian note in reply 

Austria aware that Serbian 
dispute might develop into 
a coUision with Russia, but 
her action based upon 
fundamental considerations 
of national pohcy . . 

Demand for participation of 
Austrian representatives in 
suppression of subversive 
movement in Serbia to be 
explained " in strict con- 
fidence " to M. Sazonof . . 

Count Pourtales has warned 
M. Sazonof as to conse- 
quences of Russian mobiU- 
sation measures. Russian 
assiurance that no mobihsa- 
tion orders had been issued 

Sir E. Grey's attention to be 
called to Serbian mobilisa- 

Serbia's refusal of Austria's 
demands compels the latter 
to resort to the sharpest 
measures . . 





Place and 

Date of 



31 Count Szapary to 

Count Berchtold 


32 Count Berchtold to 
Count Szapary 


33 Count Szogy^ny to 
Count Berchtold 


34 Count Berchtold to 
Ambassadors in 
Berlin, Rome, 
London, Paris, 
St. Petersburg 

35 Count Szogyeny to 
Count Berchtold 


36 Freiherr von Mtiller 
to Count Berch- 


37 Count Berchtold to 
Serbian Foreign 


38 Count Berchtold to 
Count Szogyeny 


St. Peters- 
July 27 

July 27 

July 27 

July 27 

July 28 

July 28 

July 28 

Conversation with M. Sazonof 
explaining Austria's action ; 
no thought of quarrelling 
with Russia . . . . 251 

As long as the war remains 
locahsed Austria aims at no 
territorial acquisitions . . 252 

Military precautions" in 
Russia 252 

Conveys text of Serbia's reply, 
annotated with remarks 
by Austria . . . . . . 253 

Germany declines British pro- 
posal for mediation through 
conference in London . . 266 

Declaration by Japan Times 
that in case of war Japan 
would maintain strictest 
neutraUty . . . . . . 266 

Declaration of war against 
Serbia. [See S. 45.] . . 267 

It has been explained to Sir E. 
Grey that Austria has in 
view neither territorial ac- 
quisition nor destruction 
of Serbian independence, 
but satisfaction and guaran- 
tees for the future. British 
conference proposal out- 
stripped by events . . 267 





Place and 

Date of 


39 Count Berchtold to 

Count Mensdorff 


40 Count Berchtold to 
Count Szapary 

41 Count Berchtold to 
Count Mensdorff 

42 Count Berchtold to 
Count Szogy^ny 

43 Count Berchtold to 
Count Szogyeny 

44 Count Berchtold to 
Ambassadors at 
St. Petersburg, 
London, Paris, 
and Rome 



July 28 

July 28 

July 29 

Explanation for Sir E. Grey 
of Austrian dossier. Serbian 
reply intended to deceive 
Europe without giving 
guarantee for the futiire 

M. Sazonof's proposal for 
further exchange of ideas 
upon the Austrian de- 
mands refused. Serbia 
had opened hostilities . . 

British Ambassador' s explana- 
tion of Sir E. Grey's 
attitude and conference 
proposal, and Austria's 
reasons for declining 

Requests Germany to warn 
Russia that her partial 
mobilisation would lead to 
most extensive counter 
measures on the part of 
Germany as well as Austria 

Sir E. Grey's appeal to Ger- 
many to induce Austria to 
accept Serbian reply as a 
basis for discussion 

Text of memorandum handed 
to German Ambassador in 
answer to Sir E. Grey's 




Place and 

Date of 



Count Szecsen to 

Count Berchtold 




Count Szogy^ny to 

Count Berchtold 


Count Szapdry to 

Count Berchtold 





Count Berchtold to 
Count Szogyeny 

Count Berchtold to 
Count Szapary 




July 29 

July 29 

St. Peters- 
July 29 

July 29 

July 30 

German Ambassador commis- 
sioned to inform M. Viviani 
that French military pre- 
parations may compel 
Germany to take similar 
measures, which would be 
dangerous ; Germany relies 
on support of France in 
localising the dispute 

German Government has de- 
clared at St. Petersburg 
that Russian mobilisation 
would be followed by Ger- 
man mobilisation . . 

Conversation with M. Sazonof . 
Austria did not desire to 
injure Russian interests or 
intend to annex Serbian 
territory or touch Serbian 
sovereignty. Urgently 

necessary to stop military 

If Russian mobilisation is not 
stopped, Austrian mobilisa- 
tion must follow . . 

Is ready to discuss questions 
affecting directly Austrian 
relations towards Russia . . 

Conversation with Russian 
Ambassador concerning 
M. Sazonof's complaints 
against Austria. Austrian 
attitude explained 










Place and 




Date of 




Count Berchtold to 


Discussion between Sir E. 

Ambassadors at 

July 31 

Grey and Prince Lich- 

London and St. 

nowsky communicated by 


Herr von Tschirschky. At 


request of Russia Sir E. 
Grey has renewed proposal 
for mediation A quatre. 
Austria prepared to enter- 
tain it, on conditions 



Count Szdpary to 

St. Peters- 

General mobiUsation of Rus- 

Count Berchtold 


sian Army and Fleet 



July 31 


Count Berchtold to 


Necessity for defensive miU- 

Austrian Diplo- 

July 31 

tary measures in Gahcia. 

matic Represen- 

Pourparlers with St. Peters- 


burg continue 




Count Szecsen to 


German declaration that, if 

Count Berchtold 

July 31 

Russian general mobilisa- 


tion is not stopped within 
twelve hours, Germany will 
mobiUse. Inquiry as to 
French neutrality in war 
between Germany and 
Russia ; answer requested 
within eighteen hours 



Count Szapary to 

St. Peters- 

Russia, dissatisfied with 

Count Berchtold 


Austria's declaration as to 


July 31 

her intentions, has ordered 
general mobihsation 



tt 1} 

St. Peters- 

Conversation with M. Sazonof. 


August I 

Austria prepared to dis- 
cuss with Russia interpre- 
tation of her note to 







Place and 

Date of 





Count Szogy^ny to 

Count Berchtold 




August 2 

Russian troops have crossed 
German frontier. Ger- 
many at war with Russia 



Count Mensdorif to 

Count Berchtold 


August 4 

British ultimatum to Ger- 
many. Sir E. Grey says 
that while Austria is not at 
war with France there is 
no cause for conflict with 
Great Britain 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Szapary 

August 5 

Austria's declaration of war 
against Russia 



Count Berchtold to 

Count Mensdorff 


August 6 

Austria will not open hostiU- 
ties against Great Britain 
without previous declara- 
tion of war 



Count Szecsen to 

Count Berchtold 


August 8 

French inquiry whether Inns- 
bruck Army Corps has been 
brought to French frontier 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Szdcsen 

August 9 

News of Austrian participa- 
tion in Franco-German war 
a complete invention 



Count Sz6csen to 

Count Berchtold 


August 10 

French Foreign Minister has 
information that an Aus- 
trian Army corps has 
been brought to Germany, 
French Ambassador in- 
structed to leave Vienna . . 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Mensdorff 

August II 

Assertion that Austrian army 
corps has been sent to 
Germany is unfounded . . 



Count Mensdorff 
to Count Berch- 


August 12 

Declciration of war by France 
and Great Britain against 







Place and 

Date of 




The Japanese Am- 
bassador to 
Count Berchtold 



August 20 

Transmits a copy of Japan's 
ultimatum to Germany . . 



Count Berchtold to 
Count Clary 

August 22 

Austria's declaration of war 
against Belgium . . 



Prince Hohenlohe 
to Count Berch- 


August 23 

Germany will not answer 
Japanese ultimatum; pass- 
ports sent to Japanese 
Charge d' Affaires . . 



Count Berchtold to 
Freiherr von 


August 24 

Austrian ship Elisabeth 
to take part in fighting at 
Tsingtau. Representatives 
recalled from Japan 


Serbian names are spelt as in the German original according 
to the Croatian system. The following is the signification of 
the sounds : 

s = sh in the English " ship." 

c ch ,, „ " church." 

c (the same, softer), 

c ts in the English " mats." 

\ y „ „ "yeu." 

gj dj „ „ " adjourn." 

z j in the French " jour." 




SINCE the dynasty of the Kargeorgevic ascended the 
blood-stained throne of Serbia, and surrounded itself with 
those who had conspired against the life of King Alexander, 
the Kingdom has continually, though by different paths and 
with varied intensity, pursued the aim of undermining by 
hostile propaganda and revolutionary plots, those territories 
of Austria-Hungary which are inhabited by the Southern 
Slavs, in order to tear them away from the Monarchy,'" '"[c/. B. 4 
whenever the general political condition might be favoui'able (vol. I., 
to the reahsatidn of the Great-Serbian claims.'" P- ^^) ' 

To what a pitch the hopes of the kingdom on the Save ,3, . ', ^'1^ 
had been raised, and how near she thought herself to the g .' g g j 
attainment of their aspirations, appeared in the embittered 
animosity and the deep disappointment which were created 
in this crazy and deluded country by the annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and which brought her to the verge 
of war. 

Left in the lurch by Russia, the protecting Power, who 
did not at the moment consider herself sufficiently prepared, 
in the spring of 1909 the Serbian Government found them- 
selves compelled to give a solemn declaration before Europe, '" '" [B. 4 
that they recognised the new political and international con- (vol- I-. 
ditions which had been created by the annexation, and to P" ^^^^ 
acknowledge that the interests of Serbia had not been affected 
thereby. They were also compelled to dissolve the gangs of 
armed men which had been raised against the Monarchy, 
and to undertake for the future to maintain friendly relations 
with Austria-Hungary. 

The expectations were not fulfilled that it would now be 
possible for the Monarchy to live in peace and good neigh- 
bourly relations with Serbia,'*' as she had lived during the '*'[c/. No. 
rule of the Obrenovic, and, as was then the case, to show 8 ; B. 4 
goodwill to, and further the interests of this State, which (^°^ ^■' 
owes to Austria-Hungary the recognition of her independence ^' ^^^'^ 
at the Berlin Congress. The Serbian Government who, by 



their promise, were under an obligation to maintain friendly 
and neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, permitted 
their press to foment hatred against the Monarchy in an 
unprecedented way ; they permitted associations formed on 
Serbian territory under the leadership of high officers, civil 
servants, teachers and judges, pubUcly to pursue their aims 
with the object of stirring up revolution in the territories 
of Austria-Hungary ; they did not prevent prominent mem- 
bers of their military and civil administration from poisoning 
the public conscience in such a way that common assassina- 
tion was regarded as the best weapon in the struggle against 
the Monarchy. From the atmosphere created by this 
malicious agitation there sprang up a whole series of murderous 
attacks on high functionaries of the Monarchy, which ended 
in the execrable crime against the exalted person of the heir 
to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand^ which had 
been carefully prepared in Serbia. However, the sacrifice of 
his life for the Fatherland, by which our enemies in their 
mad folly expected that the downfall of the Monarchy 
would be accelerated, brought all the peoples of Austria- 
Hungary together in fiery unanimity around the dynasty. 
The whole world learned how unshakable were the founda^ 
tions on which the Monarchy rests, and how firmly and 
loyally her sons cling to one another. All felt it ; there was 
no room for any doubt that our honour, our self-respect and 
our deepest interest peremptorily demanded that we should 
deal with the criminal conspiracies of Serbia and obtain 
guarantees for the security of Austria-Hungary. 

The unhappy experience which the Imperial and Royal 
Government had had with this dishonest neighbour showed 
us the only way by which our interests could be secured. 

It was necessary to present to Serbia all such demands 
"' [c/. B. 93 and to require from her such guarantees*" as would ensure 
(i) and the punishment of the accomplices in this shameful outrage 
note.J and the suppression of the Great-Serbian projects. Since 
the unparalleled patience of Austria-Hungary had been 
interpreted as weakness by Serbia, the Belgrade Government 
must be made to understand that the Monarchy was deter- 
mined if necessary to. go to the utmost limit in order to 
maintain her prestige and the integrity of her territories ; 
and that she could not tolerate any longer the intrigues of 



the Save Kingdom, which were meant to deceive the Powers,'" '''W- No. 
by an apparent agreement to the demands of Austria-Hungary, 39 '^-3*' 
while at the same time she kept open the possibiUty of con- ^^ ^^''' 
tinuing her underhand attack against the Monarchy as she 
had done after the solemn promise of 1909. Against the 
usual Serbian tactics of using the most reprehensible means 
to work for the separation of the Southern-Slav territories 
of Austria-Hungary, and then, when the Monarchy called her 
to account, of seeking protection and impunity from the 
Powers, there was only one way open to the Imperial and 
Royal Government of protecting their territory, and making 
an end of the injury done to their commercial life by the 
constant repetition of the intolerable attacks engendered by 
Serbian aspirations, if they- were to avoid endangering the 
peace of Europe. From the beginning, the Imperial and 
Royal Government met the apprehensions of the Powers with 
the assurance that the Monarchy would not go beyond what 
was necessary for the protection of her own interests, and 
did not propose any annexation of territory. '"' Within these '*' [c/. B. 90 
limits, which she had imposed upon herself, she must, how- and note.] 
ever, insist that the controversy with Serbia should be carried 
through as a question directly concerning Austria-Hungary 
and this State. The request made by Russia"' for an "'[B. 13; 
extension of the time given to Serbia for answering our O- 4-3 
demands would have given the Belgrade Government an 
opportunity for new subterfuges and for further procrastina- 
tion, and would have opened the door to the interference of 
single Powers in the interests of Serbia. It was therefore 
necessary to refuse any prolongation of the time limit. '^' '*'[No. 20.3 
Although before sending her crafty and evasive answer,'"' ""[B. 39.3 
Serbia had ordered general mobilisation,'*' and thereby '"'[No. 23. 
publicly proclaimed her hostility, the Monarchy waited two ^^ ^ote, 
days before proceeding to a declaration of war.'" The ,j,^^^^'^ 
suggestion of the British Government '°' that the settlement of ? '. A°' ' 
the Serbian controversy should be entrusted to a conference (s) rg ^'i 3 
of the Powers did not reach Vienna until after the opening 
of hostilities, and was therefore outstripped by events. This 
proposal was, however, in itself, not well suited to securing 
the interests of the Monarchy. Nothing but the integral 
acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian demands on the part 
of the Belgrade Government would have given a guarantee 

II— M X77 



for a tolerable relationship with Serbia. The Entente Powers, 
however, were guided by the desire of substituting for the 
effective demands of Austria-Hungary, which were painful 
to Serbia, a method of compromise, by which every security 
for a future correct attitude on the part of the Save Kingdom 
would have been lost, and Serbia would have been encouraged 
to continue her endeavours to bring about a separation of 
the Southern territories of Austria-Hungary. 

When the Imperial and Royal Government demanded 
P- 4-] from Serbia"' that she should punish those accomphces in 
the crime of Serajevo who were in Serbian territory, and 
fulfil the duties which are a necessary condition for friendly 
relationship between neighbouring States, their only object 
was to protect our dynasty from outrage and the territory 
of the Monarchy from criminal intrigues. They were repre- 
senting the common interest of the civilised world that 
murder and outrage should not be used with impunity as a 
weapon in political controversy, and that Serbia should not 
continue incessantly to menace the peace of Europe by her 

The Entente Powers were guilty of a serious wrong when, 
under the spell of their own political interests, they closed 
their ears to these postulates of public morality and humanity, 
and ranged themselves beside the Kingdom with its load 
of guilt. Had they listened to the assurances of the Monarchy 
which, by her conservative policy and her love of peace 
during the violent changes which had taken place in the 
Balkan Peninsula, had gained full right to their confidence, 
and had they maintained a waiting attitude towards the 
Serbian conflict, the world-war would have been avoided. 
It is they who must be made answerable before history for 
the immeasurable suffering which has come upon the human 

There can be no doubt that the small Serbian State would 
never have ventured, with an animosity which was scarcely 
concealed, to work for the separation from the great neigh- 
bouring Monarchy of the territories which were inhabited by 
Southern Slavs, if she had not been sure of the secret approval 
and protection of Russia, and if she had not been able to 
depend on the powerful pan-Slavist tendency in the Empire 
of the Tsar forcing the Russian Government, if necessary, to 


come to the aid of the Kingdom in her struggle for the 
reaUsation of the Great-Serbian projects. 

In the course of the two last centuries the Russian Empire 
has extended over gigantic areas with the elementary force 
of a glacier, and has, again and again, subdued fresh races 
under the Muscovite rule, suppressing their culture, religion 
and language. As the supreme and inflexible aim of this 
restless pressure towards universal dominion there stands 
before her the possession of the Dardanelles, which would 
secure to the Russian Empire predominance in the Near 
East and in Asia Minor, and gain for Russian exports an 
opening independent of the will of other countries. 

As the realisation of these plans would injure important 
interests of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and as it was 
therefore bound to encoimter the inevitable opposition of 
these Powers, it was the endeavour of Russian policy to 
weaken their power of resistance. The powerful central 
European union which barred the way to the universal 
dominion of Russia must be shattered, and Germany must 
be isolated. The first step was to hem in the Hapsburg 
Monarchy by the creation of the Balkan Union, and to 
undermine its authority by the pan-Slavist and Serbian 
intrigues in its frontier territories. A necessary condition for 
carrying out this plan was the overthrow and expulsion of 
the Turks in order that the increased power of the Christian 
Balkan States should be available against the two central 

When the Balkan Union broke up owing to the quarrel 
over the territory which had been torn from Turkey, and 
the Russian plans were threatened with failure, " the Pro- 
tector of the Slavs" allowed Bulgaria to be overthrown, 
humiliated and deprived of the largest share of the territory 
which she had won. The Balkan Union which, after the 
overthrow of the Turks, could now be directed rather against 
Austria-Hungary and Germany, and could be used by Russia 
and France for changing the relations of the European Powers, 
was to be set on foot again by the prospect of the acquisition 
of fresh territories, planned at the cost of the Monarchy, 
through a successive pushing forward of frontier from east 
to west. In this criminal game of Russian diplomacy, which 
threatened the existence of the Monarchy and the peace of 



the world, Serbia was a catspaw which Russia would not 
give up even in order to avoid general war. 

The Imperial and Royal Government — and the documents 
provided in this collection give ample evidence of this — 
again and again almost up to the outbreak of war assured 
the Cabinet of St. Petersburg that they would not violate 

<i'[c/. B. 90 any Russian interest, would not annex any Serbian territory,'^' 
and note.] and would not touch the sovereignty of Serbia, and that 
they were ready to enter into negotiations with the Russian 
Government on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests. 
Russia, however, had not expressed herself as satisfied with 
the solemn declarations of the Imperial and Royal Govern* 
ment ; as early as the 24th July, in the communique of that 

(s) ng J. ^ date, "" she assumed a threatening tone, and on the 29th July, 
although Austria-Hungary had not mobilised a single iiian 
against Russia, she ordered the mobilisation of the military 

"'' [B. 70 districts of Odessa, Kieff , Moscow and Kazan ; ''' this was 
(i).] a threat to the Monarchy ; on the 31st July she ordered general 

*^'[No. 52.] mobilisation,'*' disregarding the repeated warnings of the 
Imperial and Royal Ambassador, and the declaration of 
the German Government, which had been made on the 26th, 
that preparatory military measures on the part of Russia 
would force Germany to counter measures which must con- 
sist in the mobilisation of the army, and that mobilisation 

w[W., meant war.'^' 
p. 128.] On the 24th July the Imperial and Royal Ambassador, in 

""[No. 14.] conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,'" 
laid stress on the peaceful disposition of the Monarchy. Her 
only object was to make an end to the menace to our dynasty 
from Serbian bombs, and to our territory from the revolution- 
ary machinations of Serbia. 

The attainment of this end was a vital question to the 
Monarchy. She could not, therefore, allow herself to be 
terrorised by the possibility of a conflict with Russia, in the 
event of that country taking Serbia under her protection ; 
she must make an end of the intolerable situation, that a 
Russian charter should give the Serbian Kingdom continued 
impunity in her hostility to Austria-Hungary. 

On the 30th July the British Secretary of State again 

'"[c/. B. suggested that Austria-Hungary, in her conflict with Serbia, 
103.3 should avail herself of the mediation of the Powers.'" Guided 


by their desire to do the utmost in their power to maintain 
general peace, the Imperial and Royal Government declared 
themselves ready to accept this mediation.'" The honour i^' [No. 51.] 
and the interest of Austria-Hungary, however, required that 
this should not take place under the pressure of the threatening 
measures of Russia. It was, therefore, a paramount necessity 
for her to require that the hostile measures of mobilisation 
in the Empire of the Tsar should, first of all, be revoked. This 
demand the St. Petersburg Cabinet answered by mobilising 
the whole of the Russian forces. 

In alliance with the self-seeking policy of Great Britain, 
and the desire for revanche of the French Republic, the St. 
Petersburg Government disdained no means of securing pre- 
dominance in Europe to the Triple Entente and paving the 
way for their boldest schemes. 

Russia's unscrupulous hands tried to weave the threads 
of her poUcy into a snare to be cast over the head of the 
Monarchy. When Austria-Hungary, following the dictates 
of self-preservation, determined to tear the web to pieces, 
Russia attempted to stay the hand of the Imperial and Royal 
Government and to humiliate the Monarchy. 

Exposed to the greatest danger in their vital interests, 
Austria-Hungary and Germany saw themselves confronted 
with the choice of protecting their rights and their safety, 
or of giving way before the threats of Russia. 

They took the road pointed out by honour and duty. 


No. I. 

Ritter von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold. 

Belgrade, June 29, 1914. 

UNDER the terrible shock of yesterday's catastrophe it 
is difficult for me to give any satisfactory judgment on the 
bloody drama of Serajevo with the necessary composure and 
judicial calm. I must ask you, therefore, to allow me for 
the moment to limit myself to putting on record certain 

Yesterday, the 15/28, the anniversary of the battle of 

'"[A.D. the Amselfeld,"' was celebrated with greater ceremony than 

1389] usual, and there were celebrations in honour of the Serbian 

patriot, Milos Obilic, who in 1389 with two companions 

treacherously stabbed the victorious Murad. 

Among all Serbians, Obilic is regarded as the national 
hero. In place of the Turks, however, we are now looked 
on as the hereditary enemy, thanks to the propaganda which 
has been nourished under the aegis of the Royal Government 
and the agitation which has for many years been carried 
on in the press. 

A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems, 
therefore, to have hovered before the minds of the three 
young criminals of Serajevo, Princip, Cabrinovic and the 
third person still unknown, who also threw a bomb. They 
also shot down an innocent woman, and may therefore think 
that they have surpassed their model. 

For many years hatred against the Monarchy has been 
sown in Serbia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is 

The news arrived at about 5 o'clock ; the Serbian Govern- 
ment at about 10 o'clock caused the Obilid festivities to be 
officially stopped. They continued, however, unofficially for 
a considerable time after it was dark. The accounts of eye- 
witnesses say that people fell into one another's arms in 
'''[c/. Nos. delight,"" and remarks were heard, such as : " It serves them 
3, 5l right, we have been expecting this for a long time," or " This 
is revenge for the annexation." 



No. 2. 
Ritter von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, June 30, 1914. 

TO-DAY I sent an inquiry to Herr Gruic, General Secretary 
of the Foreign Office, to ask the obvious question what 
measures the Royal police had taken, or proposed to take, 
in order to follow up the clues to the crime which notoriously 
are partly to be found in Serbia. 

The answer was that the matter has not yet engaged the 
attention of the Serbian police. '" '"[<=/• No. 

No. 3. 
M. Jehlitschka, Consul-General, to Count Berchtold, 

ilskub, July I, 1914. 

ON the 15/28 June the Feast of St. Vitus (Corpus Christi 
Day), which on this occasion coincided with the 525th anni- 
versary of the battle of the Amselfeld (1389), was for the first 
time officially celebrated as the " Festival of the Liberation " 
of the Serbian nation. 

For four months a special committee had worked at making 
this celebration an especially solemn and magnificent demon- 
stration of Serbian nationality. 

The propaganda connected with this at the same time 
extended to Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia, but especially to 
Hungary ; those who took part in it received free passes on 
the Serbian State railways ; food and lodging at low prices, 
maintenance by public bodies, &c., were promised. 

The agitation was carried on with energy, and was with a 
definite end in view. 

The visitors to the celebration at Pristina were brought 
in special trains. 

The various speeches ran riot in historical reminiscences, 
which were connected with the scene of the celebration, and 
dealt under different aspects with the well-known theme of 
the union of all Serbia and the " liberation of our brethren 
in bondage " beyond the Danube and the Save, even as far as 
Bosnia and Dalmatia. 



When, during the course of the evening, the news of the 
horrible crime of which Serajevo had been the scene was 
circulated, the feeling which animated the fanatical crowd 
was, to judge by the numerous expressions of applause reported 
to me by authorities in whom I have absolute confidence, 
'"[c/. Nos, one that I can only characterise as inhuman."' 
1.5-3 In view of this attitude of the population, which was 

also displayed at Uskub, all attempts of the Serbian press to 
divest Serbia of the moral responsibility for a deed which was 
received by a representative gathering with such unvarnished 
satisfaction, collapse miserably. 

No. 4. 
Count Szicsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 4, 1914. 

TO-DAY I communicated to M. Poincare the thanks of 
the Imperial and Royal Government for their sympathy. 

In referring to the hostile demonstrations against Serbia 
among us, he mentioned that after the murder of President 
Camot, all Italians throughout France were exposed to the 
worst persecutions on the part of the people. 

I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no 
connection with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while 
in the present case it must be admitted that for years past 
there has been an agitation in Serbia against the Monarchy 
fomented by every means, legitimate and illegitimate. 

In conclusion, M. Poincare expressed his conviction that 
the Serbian Government would meet us with the greatest 
willingness in the judicial investigation and the prosecution of 
the accomphces. No State could divest itself of this duty, 

No. 5. 
Herr Hoflehner, Consular Agent, to Count Berchtold. 

Nish, July 6, 1914. 

THE news of the terrible crime at Serajevo, which had 
been only too successful, created here a sensation in the fullest 
sense of the word. There was practically no sign of conster- 
nation or indignation ; the predominant mood was one of 



satisfaction and even joy, and this was often quite open with- 
out any reserve, and even found expression in a brutal way.'" '"[c/. Nos. 
This is especially the case with the so-called leading circles ^' 3-3 
^ — the intellectuals, such as professional politicians, those 
occupied in education, officials, officers and the students. 
Commercial circles adopted a rather more reserved attitude. 

All explanations made by official Serbian circles or indi- 
vidual higher personalities purporting to give expression to 
indignation at the crime and condemnation of it, must have 
the effect of the bitterest irony on anyone who has had an 
opportunity, during the last few days, of gaining an insight 
at first hand into the feelings of the educated Serbian people. 

On the day of the crime the undersigned had gone to a 
coffee garden at about 9 o'clock in the evening without any 
suspicion of what had happened, and here received from an 
acquaintance his first information as to the very definite 
rumour which was being circulated. It was painful in the 
highest degree to see and hear what a feeling of real deUght 
seized the numerous visitors who were present, with what 
obvious satisfaction the deed was discussed, and what cries 
of joy, scorn and contempt burst out — even one who has 
long been accustomed to the expression of political fanaticism 
which obtains here, must feel the greatest depression at what 
he observed. 

No. 6. 

Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold. 

Belgrade, July 21, 1914. 

AFTER the lamentable crime of June 28th, I have now 
been back at my post for some tinie, and I am able to give 
some judgment as to the tone which prevails here. 

After the annexation crisis the relations between the 
Monarchy and Serbia were poisoned on the Serbian side by 
national chauvinism, animosity and an effective propaganda 
of Great-Serbian aspirations'* carried on in that part of our «-i|i/. b. 9.] 
territory where there is a Serbian population ; since the last 
two Balkan Wars, the success of Serbia has increased this 
chauvinism to a paroxysm, the expression of which in some 
cases bears the mark of insanity. 



I may be excused from bringing proof and evidence of 
this ; they can be had easily everjrwhere among all parties, 
in political circles as well as among the lower classes. I put 
it forward as a well-known axiom that the policy of Serbia 
is built up on the separation of the territories inhabited by 
Southern Slavs, and as a corollary to this on the abohtion of the 
Monarchy as a Great Power ; this is its only object. 

No one who has taken the trouble to move and take part 
in political circles here for a week can be blind to this truth. 

The hatred against the Monarchy has been further in- 
tensified as a result of the latest events which influence political 
opinion here ; among them I count the crime of Serajevo, 
<"[c/. S. 21, the death of Hartwig"' and the electoral campaign. 
23. 30J The crime at Serajevo has aroused among the Serbians 

an expectation that in the immediate future the Hapsburg 
States will fall to pieces ; it was this on which they had set 
their hopes even before ; there has been dangled before their 
eyes the cession of those territories in the Monarchy which 
are inhabited by the Southern Slavs, a revolution in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the unreliability of the Slav regiments 
— this is regarded as ascertained fact and had brought system 
and apparent justification into their nationalist madness. 

Austria-Hungary, hated as she is, now appears to the 
Serbians as powerless, and as scarcely worthy of waging war 
with ; contempt is mingled with hatred ; she is ripe for 
destruction, and she is to fall without trouble into the lap 
of the Great-Serbian Empire, which is to be realised in the 
immediate future. 

Newspapers, not among the most extreme, discuss the 
powerlessness and decrepitude of the neighbouring Monarchy 
in daily articles, and insult its officials without reserve and 
without fear of reprimand. They do not even stop short of 
the exalted person of our ruler. Even the official organ 
refers to the internal condition of Austria-Hungary as the true 
cause of this wicked crime. There is no longer any fear of 
being called to account. For decades the people of Serbia 
has been educated by the press, and the policy at any given 
time is dependent on the party press ; the Great-Serbian 
propaganda and its monstrous offspring the crime of 
June 28th, are a fruit of this education. 

I pass over the suspicions and accusations with regard to 



the death of Hartwig, which are on the verge of insanity, and 
were characterised by The Times as " ravings " * ; I do not 
mention the lying campaign in the press which, however, 
might strengthen Serbians in the conviction that the Govern- 
ment and the representatives of Austria-Hungary are out- 
laws, and that appellations such as murderer, rogue, cursed 
Austrian, &c., are suitable stock epithets for us. 

The death of Hartwig and the recognition of the gravity 
of this loss to the Serbian political world, have let loose a 
fanatical cult of the deceased ; in this people were influenced 
not only by gratitude for the past, but also by anxiety 
for the future, and outbid one another in servile submis- 
siveness to Russia in order to secure her goodwill in time to 

As a third factor the electoral campaign has united all 
parties on a platform of hostility against Austria-Hungary. 
None of the parties which aspire to ofifice will incur the 
suspicion of being held capable of weak compliance towards 
the Monarchy. The campaign, therefore, is conducted under 
the catchword of hostility towards Austria-Hungary, 

For both internal and external reasons the Monarchy 
is held to be powerless and incapable of any energetic action, 
and it is believed that the serious words which were spoken 
by leading men among us are only " bluff." 

The leave of absence of the Imperial and Royal Minister 
of War and Chief of the Staff have strengthened the conviction 
that the weakness of Austria-Hungary is now obvious. 

I have allowed myself to trespass too long on the patience 
of Your Excellency, not because I thought that in what 
I have said I could tell you anything new, but because I con- 
sidered this picture led up to the conclusion which forces 
itself upon me that a reckoning with Serbia, a war for the 
position of the Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its 
existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided."' '"[^/- S. 52 

If we delay in clearing up our relations with Serbia, we (P- ^^5)1 
shall share the responsibiUty for the difiiculties and the 

* " The latest suggestion made in one of them (the Serbian newspapers) is 
that M. de Hartwig' s sudden death in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at 
Belgrade the other day was due to poison. Ravings of that kind move the 
contempt as well as the disgust of cultivated people[s], whatever their poUtical 
sympathies may be." — The Times, July 16, [1914]. 



vinfavourable situation in any future war which must, how- 
ever, sooner or later be carried through. 

For any observer on the spot, and for the representative 
of Austro-Hungarian interests in Serbia, the question takes 
the form that we cannot any longer put up with any further 
injury to our prestige. 

Should we therefore be determined to put forward far- 
reaching requirements joined to effective control — for this 
alone could clear the Augean stable of Great-Serbian intrigues 
— ^then all possible consequences must be considered, and 
from the beginning there must be a strong and firm deter- 
|«[c/. Y. 45 mination to carry through the matter to the end.'" 
and note.] Half measures, the presentation of demands, followed 
by long discussions and ending only in an unsound com- 
promise, would be the hardest blow which could be directed 
against Austria-Hungary's reputation in Serbia and her 
position in Europe. 

No. 7. 
Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Giesl in Belgrade. 

Vienna, July 22, 1914. 
Austrian Note to Serbia. 

[See B. 4.] 

No. 8. 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in 
Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and 

<«i[c/.B.9.] . Constantinople.''' 

13) rg . Vienna, July 22, 1914, 

From (Translated from the French.) 

tMs^'"^ THE Imperial and Royal Government felt compelled to 
despatch address the following note to the Royal Serbian Government 
is a on Thursday, the 23rd instant, through the medium of the 
duplicate Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade (see instructions 
of the to the Imperial and Royal Envoy in Belgrade of July 22nd, 

in B. 4 ^^ *^® 3^st March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government 

(vol. I., p. addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the 
85).] text is reproduced above, 


On the very day after this declaration Serbia embarked 
on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb 
subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing 
for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the 
Serbian frontier. 

Serbia became the centre of a criminal agitation. 

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, 
whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of 
disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies 
and groups count among their members generals and diplo- 
matists. Government officials and judges — ^in short, men at 
the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom. 

Serbian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this 
propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and 
not a day passes without the organs of the Serbian press 
stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neigh- 
bouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less 
openly against its security and integrity. 

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on 
by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary 
and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces. 

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudes- 
cence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Serbian politicians, 
which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of 
the kingdom ; individuals belonging formerly to bands 
employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at 
the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria- 

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary 
has been exposed for years, the Serbian Government have 
not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest 
step. The Serbian Government have thus failed in, the duty 
imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 
1909,"'. and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the w^see B. 4, 
undertaking given to Austria-Hungary. voL I., p.' 

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in 81.] 
the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia was inspired 
by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy and the hope that the Serbian Government would 
end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's 
friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent 



attitude towards the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial 
and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would 
finally decide to follow an analogous Une of conduct on its 
own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a develop- 
ment of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after 
the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, 
by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a 
considerable aggrandisement of Serbia possible. 

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards 
the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the 
proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate 
on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal conse- 
quences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 
28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy 
and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at 

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and 
Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and 
urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Serbian 
Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threaten- 
ing the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian 

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that 
in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement 
with the sentiments of all civilised nations; who cannot 
permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed 
with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe 
to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from 

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment hold at the disposal of the . . . .* Government a 
"'[No. 19.1 dossier ^^^ elucidating the Serbian intrigues and the connection 
between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June. 

An identical communication has been addressed to the 
Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other 
signatory Powers. 

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in 
the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

* [This blank, left vacant in the original Austrian text, is filled up by th(! 
word " British" in the official British translation.] 


No. 9. 

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 23, 1914. 

AS among the Entente Powers, Great Britain might be 
most easily led to form an impartial judgment on the step 
which we are to-day taking at Belgrade, I request Your 
Excellency in the conversation'" which you will have on the '"[SeeB. 
24th instant on the occasion when you hand in our circular 5-] 

note at the Foreign Office, to point out among other matters 
that it would have been within the power of Serbia to render 
less acute the serious steps which she must expect from us, 
by spontaneously doing what is necessary'^' in order to '*"[<;/. B. 3, 
start an inquiry on Serbian soil against the Serbian accom- 5] 
plices in the crime of the 28th June, and by bringing to light 
the threads, which, as has, been proved, lead from Belgrade 
to Serbia [s/c].''' '"[Should 

Up to the present time, although a number of notorious ^ ".*° „ 
indications point to Belgrade, the Serbian Government have so^m^Ger- 
not taken any steps in this direction ;"' on the contrary, they man text.] 
have attempted to wipe out the existing traces. w [c/. no. 

Thus, from a telegraphic despatch from our Legation at 2.] 

Belgrade, it is to be gathered that the Serbian civil servant 
Ciganovic, who is compromised by the independent testimony 
of the affidavits of both criminals, on the day of the outrage 
was still in Belgrade, and three days afterwards, when his 
name was mentioned in the papers, had already left the town. 
As is well known also, the director of the Serbian press declared 
that Ciganovic is completely unknown in Belgrade. 

With regard to the short time limit attached to our de- 
mand, this must be attributed to our long experience of the 
dilatory arts of Serbia. 

The requirements which we demand that Serbia shotdd 
fulfil, and which indeed contain nothing which is not a matter 
of course in the intercourse between States which are to live 
in peace and friendship, cannot be made the subject of negotia- 
tions and compromise ; and, having regard to our economic 
interests, we cannot take the risk of a method of political 
action by which it would be open to Serbia at pleasure to 
prolong the crisis which has arisen. 



No. 10. 

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) London, July 24, 1914. 

'''[B.4] HAVE just handed the circular note'" to Sir Edward 

'"i^c/. B. 5.] Grey,'*' who read it carefully. At the fifth heading, he asked 
what it meant ; to introduce officials of our Government in 
Serbia would be equivalent to the end of Serbian political 
independence. I answered that co-operation of, e.g., police 
officials, in no way affected the sovereignty of the State. 

He regretted the time limit, as in this way we should 
be deprived of the possibility of quieting the first outbreak 
of excitement and bringing pressure to bear upon Belgrade 
to give us a satisfactory answer. It was always possible to 
send an ultimatum if answer not satisfactory. 

I developed our point of view at length. (Necessity of 
defence against continued revolutionary undertakings which 
threaten the territory of the Monarchy, protection of our 
most vital interests, complete failure of the concihatory 
attitude which we had hitherto often shown to Serbia, who had 
had more than three weeks to set on foot of her own accord 
investigations as to accomplices in outrage, &c.) 

The Secretary of State repeated his objections to the short 
time limit, but recognised that what was said as to com- 
plicity in the crime of Serajevo, as well as many of our other 
requirements, was justified. 

He would be quite ready to look on the affair as one which 
only concerned Austria-Hungary and Serbia. He is, how- 
ever, very " apprehensive " that several Great Powers might 
be involved in a war. Speaking of Russia, Germany and 
France, he observed that the terms of the Franco-Russian 
AUiance might be more or less to the same effect as those of 
the Triple Alliance. 

I fully explained to him our point of view, and repeated 

with emphasis that in this case we must stand firm so as to 

<'' [c/. B. 93 gain for ourselves some sort of guarantees,'" as hitherto 

(i) and Serbian promises have never been kept. I understood that in 

note.] ^jjg fj^j-g^ place he considered the question only as it influences 

the position of Europe. He must, however, in order to be 

fair to our point of view, put himself in our situation. 



He would not go into any more detailed discussion on this 
subject, said he must have time to study the note more 
carefully. He was to see the German and the French Ambas- 
sadors, as he must first of all exchange ideas with the Powers 
who are allies of Austria-Hungary and Russia respectively, 
but have themselves no direct interest in Serbia. 

No. II. 

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic) Paris, July 24, 1914. 

I HAVE just read instructions of the 22nd instant"' to the' "'[No. 8. ; 
Minister of Justice, who is entrusted with the representation '^i- ^- ^S-l 
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his absence, and left 

M. Bienvenu-Martin, who had received information as to 
the contents of our d&marche at Belgrade through this morn- 
ing's papers, seemed to be considerably impressed by my 
communication. Without entering on any more detailed 
discussion of the text, he readily agreed that recent events 
and the attitude of the Serbian Government made energetic 
action on our side quite comprehensible. 

Point 5 in the note handed in at Belgrade seemed to make 
a special impression on the Minister as he asked me to read 
it to him twice. 

The Minister thanked me for my communication which, 
he said, would be carefuUy examined. I took the opportunity 
to impress on him that the question was one which must be 
brought to an issue directly between Serbia and us, but that 
it was in the general interests of Europe that the trouble 
which for years past had been kept up by Serbian intrigues 
against us should at last make way for a clear situation. 

All friends of peace and order, and I placed France in the 
first rank of these, should therefore give serious advice to 
Serbia completely to change her attitude, and to satisfy our 
just demands. 

The Minister said that it was the duty of Serbia to proceed 
energetically against any accomplices of the murderers of 
Sarajevo, a duty which she could not escape. While lajdng 
special stress on the sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary, 

n-N 193 


and on the good relations which existed between our two 
countries, he expressed the hope that the controversy would 
be brought to an end peacefully in a manner corresponding 
to our wishes. 

The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend 
in any way the attitude of Serbia. 

No. 12. 

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 24, 1914. 

BARON SCHOEN will, in accordance with instructions, 
'"[SeeY. make a communication here to-day'" that according to the 
28.3 view of the Berlin Cabinet, our controversy with Serbia is a 
matter which concerns only Austria-Hungary and Serbia. 

In this connection, he would give them to understand that 
in case third States should wish to intervene, Germany, true 

'"' [c/. Nos. to the obligations of her alliance, would be on our side. "' 

16, 26 ; 

W. exh. 2 ; 

also -.T 

German No. I3. 

Chancellor, (j^^^^^ Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 24, 1914. 

BARON SCHOEN has just made the demarche as he was 
<^'[Y.28; instructed."' 

c/. O. 8.] ]y[ Bienvenu-Martin said to him he could not yet express 

himself definitely. He could, however, already say this, that 
the French Government are also of opinion that our con- 
troversy with Serbia concerns Belgrade and Vienna alone, and 
that it was hoped here that the question would find a direct 
and peaceful solution. 

The Serbian Minister here had already been advised that 
his Government should give way in every point so far as it 
was possible, with the limitation, however, " so far as their 
sovereign rights were not affected." 

Baron Schoen laid stress on the European necessity that 
the focus of constant disturbance at Belgrade must at last be 
done away with. 



No. 14. 

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) 5^. Petersburg, July 24, 1914. 

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs on receiving me, said 
that he knew what brought me to him, and he would at once 
explain to me that he could not take up any definite attitude 
towards my demarche. I began by reading out my instruc- 
tions. The Minister interrupted me for the first time on the 
mention of the series of outrages, and, on my explanation, 
asked if then it had been proved that they all had originated 
at Belgrade. I laid stress on the fact that they all sprang 
from Serbian instigation. In the further course of the reading 
he said that he knew what it was all about : we wanted to 
make war on Serbia, and this was to serve as a pretext. I 
replied that our attitude during recent years was a sufficient 
proof that we neither sought nor required pretexts against 
Serbia. The formal declaration which is required did not 
eUcit any objection from the Minister ; he only continued to 
maintain that Pasid had already expressed himself to this 
effect. This I corrected. " II dira cela 2$ fois si vous voulez," 
said he. I said to him that no one among us was attacking 
the integrity of Serbia or the dynasty. M. Sazonof expressed 
himself most vigorously against the dissolution of the Narodna 
Odbrana, which Serbia would never undertake. The partici- 
pation of Imperial and Royal of&cials in the suppression of 
the revolutionary movements elicited further protest on the 
part of the Minister. Serbia then will no longer be master in 
her own house. " You will always be wanting to intervene 
again, and what a life you will lead Europe." I answered 
that if Serbia shows goodwill it will be a quieter life than 

The commentary'" added to the communication of the "'[No. 8.] 
note was listened to by the Minister with fair composure ; at 
the passage that our feelings were shared by those of all 
civilised nations, he observed that this was a mistake. With 
all the emphasis I could command, I pointed out how regret- 
table it would be if we could not come to an imderstanding 
with Russia on this question, in which everything which is 



most sacred to us was at stake and, whatever the Minister 
might say, everything which is sacred in Russia. The 
Minister attempted to minimise the Monarchical side of the 
•"[No. 19.3 With regard to the dossier'^' which was put at the disposal 
of the Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we 
had given ourselves this trouble, as we had already delivered 
the ultimatum. This was the best proof that we did not 
really desire an impartial examination of the matter. I said 
to him that the results which had been attained by our own 
investigations were quite sufficient for our procedure in this 
matter, which had to do with Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and 
that we were only ready to give the Powers further informa- 
tion if it interested them, as we had nothing to keep secret. 

M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been 
issued he was not in the least curious. He represented the 
matter as if we only wanted to make war with Serbia whatever 
happened. I answered that we were the most peace-loving 
Power in the world, but what we wanted was security for our 
territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues, and the pro- 
tection of our djmasty from bombs. 

In the course of the further discussion, M. Sazonof again 
made the observation that we certainly had created a serious 

In spite of his relative calm, the attitude of the Minister 
was throughout unaccommodating and hostile. 

No. 15. 
Communique of the Russian Official Gazette. 

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914. 
THE St. Petersburg telegraphic agency announces : — 
The official journal publishes the following commu- 
•"'Pupli- nique :^''' 
io*1but°' Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to 

date Serbia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian 

differs.] Government the greatest anxiety. The Government 

are closely following the course of the dispute between 
the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain 


No. 16. 
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914. 

AFTER a Council of Ministers which lasted for five hours, 
M. Sazonof this evening received the German Ambassador, 
and had a long conversation with him. 

The Minister took the point of view^ which is probably to 
be considered as the outcome of the Council of Ministers, that 
the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian conflict was not a matter con- 
fined to these States, but a European affair, as the settlement 
arrived at in the year 1909 by the Serbian declaration had 
been made under the auspices of the whole of Europe. "' <i| [c/. B. 

The Minister pointed out particularly that he had been 17] 

disagreeably affected by the circumstance that Austria- 
Hungary had offered a dossier"" for investigation when an (»'[No. 19.3 
ultimatum had already been presented. Russia would require 
an international investigation of the dossier, which had been 
put at her disposal. My German colleague at once brought 
to M. Sazonof's notice that Austria-Hungary would not 
accept interference in her difference with Serbia, and that 
Germany also on her side could not accept a suggestion which 
would be contrary to the dignity of her ally as a Great Power. 

In the further course of the conversation, the Minister 
explained that that which Russia could not accept with 
indifference was the eventual intention of Austria-Hungary 
" de divorer la Serbie." Count Pourtales answered that he 
did not accept any such intention on the part of Austria- 
Hungary, as this would be contrary to the most special in- 
terest of the Monarchy. The only object of Austria-Hungary 
was " d'infliger d la Serbie le chdtiment justement meriti."^"^ '''[c/.B. 18, 
M. Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether Austria- 32.] 
Hungary would allow herself to be contented with this, even 
if explanations on this point had been made. 

The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof 
that Germany should work with Russia at the maintenance 
of peace. The German Ambassador assured the Russian 
Minister that Germany certainly had no wish to bring about wr^f ^^ 
a war, but that she naturally fully represented the interests xz and 
of her ally. '** note.] 



No. 17. 

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 24, 1914. 

IN answer to Your Excellency's telegram of yesterday : 
"'[c/. B. I beg you to explain at once to Sir Edward Grey'^' that 

14-3 our demarche of yesterday at Belgrade is not to be considered 
as a formal ultimatum, but that it is merely a demarche with 
a time limit, which, as Your Excellency will be good enough 
to explain to Sir Edward Grey in strict confidence, will — ^if 
the time limit expires without result — for the time be followed 
only by the breaking off of diplomatic relations, and by the 
beginning of the necessary military preparations, as we are 
absolutely resolved to carry through our just demands. 

Your Excellency is empowered to add that if Serbia, after 

the expiration of the time limit, were only to give way under 

the pressure of our military preparations, we should indeed 

have to demand that she should make good the expenses which 

'^'[c/. No. we had incurred ;"• as is well known, we have already had 

20.] twice (1908 and 1912) to mobilise because of Serbia. 

No. 18. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szdp&ry at St. Petersburg. 

Vienna, July 24, 1914. 

I RECEIVED the Russian Charge d' Affaires on the 

[c/. B. morning of the 24th,'" and assured him that I attached 

18 ; S. 52 special importance to bringing to his knowledge as soon as 

(P- ii9)-l possible the steps we were taking in Belgrade, and explaining 

to him our point of view as regards them. 

Prince Kudachef, while thanking me for this courtesy, 
did not hide his anxiety as to our categorical procedure against 
Serbia, and he observed that there had always been appre- 
hension at St. Petersburg that out demarche might take the 
form of a humiUation of Serbia, which must have an echo in 

I took the opportunity of reassuring ihe Russian Charge 
d'Affaires as to this. Our aim was to clear up the untenable 



position of Serbia as regards the Monarchy, and with this 
object to cause the Government of that State on the one hand 
pubUcly to disavow the tendencies directed against the present 
position of the Monarchy, and to suppress them by adminis- 
trative measures, and on the other hand to make it possible 
for us to satisfy ourselves that these measures were honestly 
carried out. I explained at greater length the danger, not 
only to the integrity of the Monarchy, but also to the balance 
of power and the peace of Europe, which would be involved 
in giving further scope to the Great-Serbian propaganda, 
and how all the dynasties and, not least, the Russian, would 
apparently be threatened, if the idea took root that a move- 
ment which made use of murder as a national weapon could be 
continued with impunity. 

In conclusion, I pointed out that we did not aim at any 
increase of territory, '" but only at the maintenance of what *^' [c/. B. 90 
we possess, a point of view which could not fail to be under- ^^^ note.] 
stood by the Russian Government. 

Prince Kudachef remarked on this that he did not know 
the view of his own Government, and also did not know what 
position Serbia would take towards individual demands. 

At the conclusion of our interview the Charge d' Affaires 
expressly said that he would not fail to bring to the notice of 
his Government the explanation which I had given him of 
the step we had taken, especially to the effect that no humilia- 
tion of Serbia was intended by us. '^' '^' [See Y. 

45 and 

No. 19. 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at 
Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and Con- 

Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

YOUR EXCELLENCY will find herewith the dossier 
mentioned in the circular note to the Powers'" with reference '"[No. 8 ; 
to the Great-Serbian propaganda, and its connection with '^f- ^- ^Sl 
the Serajevo murder. 

Your Excellency is instructed to bring this dossier to the 
notice of the Government to which you are accredited. 



"' [Dupli- Enclosure. '" 

Y. 75 THE Serbian agitation, which has as its object the separation from 

(end.), the Austrian Monarchy of the Southern Slav districts in order to unite 
but a them with the Serbian State, dates from far back, 
different This propaganda on Serbian soil, always the same in its ultimate 
transla- object, although varying in its means and intensity, reached one of its 
tion. culminating points at the time of the annexation crisis. Throwing 
This dos- Qg ^jig protecting cloak of secrecy, it then revealed its purpose openly 
ster was g^jjjj undisguisedly, and attempted, under the patronage of the Serbian 
Dublic in Government, to attain its ends by every means in its power. 
Vienna While the whole of the Serbian press was calling for war against 

on July the Monarchy by malicious invectives in which facts were perverted, 
27 ; see apart from other means of propaganda, associations were being formed 
footnote, to prepare for this war. 

p. 148.] The Narodna Odbrana stood out as the most important of these 
associations. Having its origin in an already existing revolutionary 
committee, it was constituted as a private society, although in fact 
it took the form of an organisation of Serbian military and civil of&cials 
wholly dependent on the Foreign Office at Belgrade. Amongst its 
founders one may mention : General Bozo Jankovic, ex-ministers Ljuba 
Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic, and Velislav Vulovic, Zivojin Dacic 
(Director of the Government printing establishment), and Majors (then 
Captains) Voja Tankosic and Milan Pribicevic. This association 
aimed at the creation and equipment of free companies for use in 
the impending war against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. (See 
Appendix 2.) 

A convincing description of the activity at that time of the Narodna 
Odbrana will be found amongst others in the deposition of Trifko 
Krstanovic, a Bosnia-Herzegovinian subject, in the course of his 
evidence before the district court at Serajevo ; he was then at Belgrade, 
and had been accepted by the Narodna Odbrana, with other subjects 
of the Monarchy, as a komitadji. At the beginning of 1909, Krstanovic 
had arrived with about 140 fellow-members at a school established 
for the formation of new bands at Cuprija (in the district of Jagodina), 
managed by Captains Voja Tankosic and Dusan Putnik. The only 
instructors at this school were Serbian officers. General Bozo Jankovic 
and Captain Milan Pribicevic inspected the three-monthly courses of 
these bands at regular intervals. 

The new komitadjis received their training in musketry, bomb 
throwing, mine laying, blowing up of railways, tunnels and bridges, 
and the destruction of telegraph wires. According to the instructions 
of their leaders, it was their duty to put into practice in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina the knowledge they had recently acquired. 


By this action, carried on in the most open manner and encouraged 
by the Serbian Government, the Narodna Odbrana was thus prepared 
for guerrilla warfare against Austria-Hungary. In this way subjects 
of the Monarchy were led into treason against their country, and 
induced, as Serbian emissaries, systematically to practice under- 
hand attacks against the means of defence of their country. 

This period of aggressive aspirations ended with the declaration 
made by the Serbian Government on the 31st March, 1909, <i' in which *^'[S«fiB. 4, 
the Government of Belgrade announced that they were prepared to ^°^- '^•> P- 
accept the new situation created in municipal and international law •^•J 
by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and solemnly promised 
to maintain in future friendly relations with the Austro-Hungarian 

With this declaration, the agitation, which constituted a source 
of constant trouble to Austria-Hungary, seemed to have come to an 
end, and the road to an amicable rapprochement between Serbia and the 
Monarchy to have been entered on. Deprived of the encouragement 
of the Serbian Government, and combated by that Government in 
accordance with their engagements, the propaganda hostile to the 
Monarchy could only have continued a shadowy existence and would 
^ have been condemned to early destruction. On the other hand, the 
ties of language, race and culture existing between the Southern Slav 
districts of the Monarchy and Serbia ought to have resulted in the 
realisation of a task of common development inspired by mutual 
friendship and parallel interests. 

These hopes, however, have not been realised. 

Aspirations hostile to the Monarchy have continued, and under 
the eyes of the Serbian Government, who have done nothing to sup- 
press this movement, the anti-Austro-Hungarian propaganda has 
only increased in extent and volume. Hatred against the Monarchy 
has been fanned and kindled into an irreconcilable feeling. The Serbian 
people alike by adapting their former course of action to the new 
situation and by supplementing it by fresh methods were summoned 
to the " inevitable death struggle " against Austria-Hungary. Secret 
ramifications have been systematically spread towards the Slav dis- 
tricts in the south of the Monarchy whose subjects have been incited 
to treason against their country. 

Above all, the Serbian press has since then worked incessantly 
in this spirit. 

Up to the present time no fewer than eighty-one newspapers 
appearing in Serbia have had to forfeit their right to delivery through 
the post on account- of their contents faUing within the scope of the 
penal law. 

There is hardly a clause in the penal code protecting the sacred 
person of the Monarch and the members of the Imperial Family, or 



the integrity of the State, that has not been violated by Serbian 

A few examples of these press views, selected from the great mass 
of material published by the press at various dates, are contained in 
Appendix I. 

Without entering into a detailed account of these expressions of 
Serbian public opinion, it is necessary to note that in spite of the 
formal recognition accorded by Serbia, it has never ceased to consider 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both before and after 
the event, as a robbery committed against Serbia for which repara- 
tion is due. This idea not only constantly recurs with every modula- 
tion of its coarse language in the papers professing most advanced 
views, but also finds expression in hardly veiled terms in the Samou- 
frava, which is in such close touch with the Foreign Office of Belgrade. 
(See Appendix I (&).) 

Nor can one omit to draw attention to the manner in which the 
attempt made on the 15th June, 1910, at Serajevo, by Bogdan Zerajic 
against the Feldzeugmeister von Vareianin, Governor of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, was turned to account by the press. 

As is known, Zerajic had killed himself immediately after his deed, 
and before committing it had burnt all his papers. Under these 
circumstances, it was impossible to throw full light upon the motives 
of his crime. It could, however, be inferred from a document found 
on his person that he was a follower of the views of Krapotkin. Evi- 
dence collected leads likewise to the conclusion that the crime was 
of an anarchist type. 

This, however, did not prevent the Serbian press from celebrating 
the criminal as a national Serbian hero and from glorifying his 
deed. Indeed, the Politika protested strongly against the idea 
that Zerajic was an anarchist, and declared him to be " a 
Serbian hero whose name all Serbians will repeat with respect and 

The Politika considers the i8th August* of the same year as 
a suitable opportunity on which to return to the crime of Zerajic, 
" whose name will be sacred to the people," and to celebrate the 
outrage in verse. (See Appendix I [a].) 

In this way this crime, which had nothing to do with the territorial 
aspirations against the Monarchy, was exploited for the furtherance 
of these ideas and by the glorifying of Zerajic, murder was hailed 
in the most explicit way as a glorious means towards the realisation 
of this aim and one worthy to be imitated in the struggle. This 
approbation of murder as a weapon fully admissible in the struggle 
against the Monarchy reappears later in the press in. discussing the 

* Birthday of His Imperial and Apostolic Majesty. 


attempt made by Jukic against the Royal Commissioner von Cuvaj. 
(See Appendix I (c).) 

These newspapers, which were circulated not only in Serbia but 
also, as we shall show later, illicitly smuggled into the Monarchy by 
well-organised secret methods, have awakened and kept alive this 
mood in the masses, a mood which has provided a fruitful field for 
the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy. 

The Narodna Odbrana became the centre of the agitation 
carried on by the associations. The same persons who were at its 
head at the time of the annexation still control it. Now as then, they 
still control it in the capacity of the most active and energetic organisers, 
the most violent opponents of the Monarchy ; General Bozo Jankovic, 
Zivojin Dacic (Director of the Government printing establishment), 
and Majors Milan Pribicevic and Voja Tankosic. Organised on a 
broad and far-reaching scale and constituted on a strict hierarchical 
basis (see Appendix 2, " Organisation "), the Narodna Odbrana 
counted soon some 400 committees which developed a very active 

Moreover, the Narodna Odbrana became closely allied with the 
" shooting federation " (Schiiizenbund) , (762 societies), the great 
Sokol* Association " Dusan " (2,500 members), the Olympian Club, 
the association of horsemen {Reiterverein) , " Prince Michael," the 
society of sportsmen (Jagerbund), and the league of development 
[KuUurliga) , as well as numerous other associations all of which, 
subordinate to it, were under the guidance and protection of the 
Narodna Odbrana, and worked on the same lines. Becoming more 
and more closely intermingled, these associations arrived at a com- 
plete amalgamation in such a way that to-day they are nothing but 
members of the single body of the Narodna Odbrana. 

Thus the Narodna Odbrana has set up all over Serbia a close 
network of agitation, and has attracted to its principles all those 
who were receptive of its ideas. 

The official publications of the Narodna Odbrana demonstrate 
sufficiently clearly the spirit which animates it. 

While in its statutes, it represents itself as an " educational society " 
{Kulturverein) concerning itself only with the spiritual and physical 
improvement of the Serbian population and its material progress, the 
Narodna Odbrana discloses in its official pubhcation (see Appendix 2) 
the true and single motive of its existence in that which it calls its 
"reorganised programme": to preach to the Serbian people the 
sacred truth by " fanatical and indefatigable work " under the 

* Sokol = falcon. The name given to gymnastic associations throughout 
Slav countries which have adopted the falcon as their emblem. [Note 
added in official English translation.] 



pretence that the Monarchy wishes to " take away Serbian hberty and 
language and even to destroy her " ; that it is an essential necessity 
to wage against Austria-Hungary, her " first and greatest enemy," 
' ' a war of extermination with rifle and cannon, ' ' and ' ' by every means ' ' 
to prepare the people for this war, which is "to liberate the con- 
quered territories," in which " seven million brothers are suffering 
in bondage." 

All the efforts " at an educational programme " (Kulturbestrebungen) 
of the Narodna Odbrana are exclusively concerned with this idea 
simply as a means for the organisation and education of the people 
for the longed-for death struggle against the Monarchy. 

All the associations affiliated to the Narodna Odbrana work in the 
same spirit ; the Sokol Association at Kragujevac will serve as an 
example (see Appendix 3). 

As in the case of the Narodna Odbrana, of&cers, professors and 
civil servants are at its head. 

The speech in which its President, Major Kovacevic, opened the 
annual meeting of 1914, made absolutely no mention of physical 
training, which is supposed to be the real object of a Sokol association, 
and confined itself solely to " the preparations for war " against the 
" dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the 
north " who " robs millions of Serbian brothers of their liberty and 
rights, and holds them in bondage and chains." 

In the administrative reports of this association the technical 
work is placed entirely in the background, and only serves as headlines 
for the avowal of the real " objects of the activities of the adminis- 
tration," namely, the preparation of national development and the 
strengthening of the " oppressed nation " with the object of enabling 
it to carry out its " incomplete programme and its unfinished task," 
and to accomplish that " great action " " which is to be carried out 
in the near future," " the liberation of those brothers who live across 
±he Drina, who are suffering the martyrdom of the crucified." 

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial reports to send forth 
the appeal that " falcons must be reared " capable " of bringing 
freedom to the brothers still in bondage." 

As in the case of the " educational programme " of the Narodna 
Odbrana, the gymnastic activity of the Sokols is not the real object 
but merely a means at the service of the same propaganda carried 
on in the same spirit, and even with the very same words. 

When the Narodna Odbrana appeals to the " people " for a death 
struggle against the Monarchy, it does not address itself only to the 
Serbian people, but to all Southern Slav nationaUties. In the eyes . 
of the Narodna Odbrana, the Slav regions in the south of the Monarchy 
are regarded as " our subjected Serbian territories." (See Appendix 4.) 
The^ Southern Slav subjects of the Monarchy are further also 


expected to take part in this " national work." This " healthy 
and necessary work " is, therefore, to be carried on beyond the Serbian 
frontier. The Narodna Odbrana recruits its " heroes for this holy 
war " even on the soil of the Monarchy, and among them Obilic, the 
murderer of Murad, is to light them on their way as an example of 
sacrifice for one's country worthy of imitation. 

But in order to incite " brothers outside Serbia " to share in " the 
work of private effort," the Narodna Odbrana keeps in close touch 
with the " brothers beyond the frontier." It is not said in the publi- 
cations of the society, how this intimate association is carried out, 
no doubt because it appertains to that part of the " common work " 
which " for many reasons cannot, or ought not to be divulged." 

How comprehensive this branch of its activity is, can be seen by 
the fact that not only the central committee of the Narodna Odbrana, 
but also certain of its local committees contain special sections for 
" foreign affairs." 

This " foreign " activity of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated 
branches is extremely varied. 

What is relatively less dangerous inasmuch as it can be officially 
controlled, consists of lecture tours undertaken by distinguished 
members of the Narodna Odbrana in the south-eastern parts of the 
Monarchy where they speak before various societies on national or 
educational subjects. These tours give the speakers the desired 
opportunity, which is indeed the chief object of these journeys, of 
explaining the true aims of the associations in language more or less 
veUed, which is intelligible to those who are already initiated. 

Amongst these emissaries, one of the best known is Zivojin Dacic 
(Director of the Government printing establishment), already several 
times alluded to ; it was he who, on the 8th August, 1909, issued an 
" appeal " to the Serbian people in which he called Austria-Hungary 
the enemy of Serbia, and exhorted them to prepare for the war against 
the Monarchy. On numerous occasions, Dacic undertook tours 
of this nature in the south-eastern districts of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. During one of these lectures at Karlovci in 1912, he 
flung his accustomed prudence to the winds and spoke openly of the 
" union of all Serbs against the common foe," by which he designated 
Austria-Hungary in unmistakable language. 

More dangerous are the relations with associations in the Monarchy 
formed by Serbian associations imbued with the spirit of the Narodna 
Odbrana under the cloak of community of interests and of culture ; 
for the mutual visits of these associations, whether by delegates or 
in bodies, which escape all official control, are utilised by the 
Serbians for all sorts of plots against the Monarchy. 

Thus, for instance, at the weU-known feast of the Prosvjeta Asso- 
ciation at Serajevo, in September, 1912, an envoy of the Narodna 



Odbrana had the effrontery secretly to recruit Bosnian adherents to 
his society. (See Appendix 6.) The message which the representative 
of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac brought to the " brothers in 
Bosnia " at this feast was : " We have not forgotten you ; the wings 
of the falcon of Sumadija are still powerful " — a thought which in 
confidential intercourse would no doubt have found quite a different 
■expression and one better corresponding to the tendencies of this 
society which we have already explained. (See Appendix 3.) As to 
the events that take place at meetings of the same kind in Serbia, 
the Itnperial and Royal authorities cannot have any information 
founded on unimpeachable authority, as they only possess on this 
matter confidential information which it is dif&cult to check. In this 
■connection, one may mention the visit of Agram students to Serbia 
in April, 1912, who received from the Serbians an ofiicial military 
reception accompanied even by a review of troops in their honour, 
and that in a manner so suggestive that the administrative report of 
the Sokol Association at Kragujevac could say : " This event marks 
the beginning and germ of a great deed which will be accomplished 
in the near future, it is a germ which will ripen when the soul of the 
people bursts its bonds and until there is no barrier that has not been 

It is only recently that it has come to the knowledge of the Austro- 
Hungarian authorities that the Serbian Sokol associations have 
succeeded in inducing similar societies in the Monarchy to estabhsh 
a connection with them which is up to the present secret, and the 
character of which is not yet quite clear, for the inquiries on this 
point are still in progress. Up to the present, however, the informa- 
tion obtained permits the conclusion that traces have been dis- 
covered of one of the ways by which the subversive aims of the Serbian 
Sokols and their friends have poisoned the minds of certain groups 
of mistaken and misled persons in the Monarchy. 

This propaganda which is aimed at wider circles, and is rather of 
a preparatory nature, assumes minor importance compared with 
that of the " foreign work " which is conducted by the Narodna 
Odbrana and its friends in the form^ of personal agitation among 
individuals. It is in this field that the most melancholy results are 

By means of confidential and secret emissaries, it carries the 
poison of rebellion to the circles of men of mature age as well as those 
of irresponsible youth. 

It is thus, for example, that the late officers of the Honved V.B., 
D.K., V.M., and the heutenant of Croatian- Slavonian Gendarmerie 
V.K., led astray by Milan Privicevic, left the service of the army of 
the Monarchy under most suspicious circumstances and turned to 
Serbia ; they have seen in the meanwhile most of their dreams 



unrealised and some of them, at any rate, are thinking of returning 
to the Fatherland they have betrayed. 

The agitation introduced from Serbia into the middle schools of 
Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily too well known to need illustration ; 
what is less known is that people who have been expelled from 
Croatian and Bosnian schools owing to grave breaches of discipline, 
are received in Serbia with open arms, and often even protected by the 
State and educated as enemies of the Monarchy. The Serbian schools 
with their anti-Austrian staffs, and their large number of professors 
and teachers who are members of the Narodna Odbrana, are clearly 
establishments thoroughly adapted for training experts of this kind. 
A very notable case of this sort may be quoted here. In March, 1914, 
several pupils of the Training College of Pakrac (Croatia) were dismissed 
on account of a strike. They went to Serbia, where some of them 
immediately obtained situations as schoolmasters, while others were 
admitted to a college for teachers. One of those who had been thus 
dismissed, and who was connected with anti-Austrian circles, declared 
publicly that he and his people would give a proof, during the sojourn 
of the hereditary Archduke in Bosnia, that this province was Serbian 
territory. It is, as we may add, highly significant that during the 
stay of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia, the Royal Serbian 
Prefect of the district of Krajna gave to the three training college 
students, who were thus gravely implicated, Serbian passports in 
which he falsely described them as Serbian subjects, although he 
must have known that they were Croatians. With these pass- 
ports, the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy without 
being noticed, where, however, they were eventually recognised and 

All this is not, by a long way, enough to give a complete repre- 
sentation of the " foreign " activity of the Narodna Odbrana. 

The Imperial and Royal Government had been informed for a 
long time past by confidential reports that the Narodna Odbrana 
had made military preparations for the war which it desired to make 
against the Monarchy, inasmuch as it kept emissaries in Austria- 
Hungary, who, as soon as hostiUties broke out, would attempt in the 
usual guerrilla manner to destroy means of transport and equipment 
and stir up revolt or panic. (See Appendix 7.) 

The criminal proceedings taken in 1913 by the District Court at 
Serajevo against Jovo Jaglicic and his associates for espionage 
(Appendix 6), confirm this confidential information. As at the time 
of its foundation, the preparation for guerrilla warfare still figures in 
the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, to which must now be 
further added a complete system of espionage. 

It is for this reason that the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, 
described as " reorganised," is in reality an extended programme 



which includes the preparation for a " war of extermination " against 
the Monarchy, and even its realisation, and finally the unfurling of 
the " ancient red flag of the Narodna Odbrana." 

Acts of terrorism must finally result from this atmosphere of hatred 
against the Monarchy, which is pubhcly and secretly provoked, and 
from an agitation which considers itself free from all responsibility ; 
in order to bring them about, all means are regarded as permissible 
in the struggle against Austria-Hungary, including even without 
any sense of shame common acts of murder. 

On the 8th June, 1912, a man named Lukas Jukic shot von Cuvaj, 
the Royal Commissioner at Agram, with the result that the Councillor 
(Banalrat) Von Hervoic, who was seated in the same carriage, was 
mortally wounded. Jukic, in his flight, shot a policeman who was 
pursuing him, and wounded two others. 

From the subsequent public investigation it appeared that Jukic 
was saturated with the ideas and plans propagated by the Narodna 
Odbrana, and that although Jukic had for some time past been 
devoting himself to criminal schemes, these schemes were only 
matured after he had made an excursion to Belgrade, together with 
the Agram students on the i8th of April, 1912. At the noisy celebra- 
tions in honour of the visitors, Jukic had entered into relations with 
several people belonging to the circle of the Narodna Odbrana, with 
whom he had had political discussions. A few days afterwards he 
returned to Belgrade, and there received from a Serbian major a bomb, 
and from a comrade the Browning pistol with which he carried out 
his crime. 

In the opinion of experts, the bomb found at Agram was made 
in an arsenal for military purposes. 

Jukic's attempt had not been forgotten, when on the 18th of 
August, 1913, Stephen Dojcic, who had returned from America, 
made an attempt on the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron 
Skerlecz, at Agram — an attempt which was the outcome of action 
organised by the Serbians among the Southern Slavs living in America, 
and which was also the work of the " foreign " propaganda of the 
Narodna Odbrana and its confederates. 

A pamphlet by the Serbian, T. Dimitrijevic, printed in Chicago, 
and entitled " Natrag u staro ognjiste vase," with its unbridled 
attacks against His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, and its 
appeal to the Serbians of the Monarchy with reference to their impend- 
ing " deUverance," and urging them to migrate home to Serbia, 
demonstrates the fact that the propaganda carried out unchecked 
in America from Serbia, and that carried on from Serbia in the territory 
of the Monarchy, worked on parallel lines. 

And again, scarcely a year later, Agram was the scene of a new 
outrage, this time unsuccessful. 



On the 20th of May, 1914, Jakob Schafer made an attempt at the 
Agram Theatre on the Ufa of the Ban, Freiherr von Skerlecz, an 
attempt which was frustrated at the last moment by a poUce official. 
The subsequent investigation revealed the existence of a plot inspired 
by Rudolf Hercigonja. From the depositions of Hercigonja and his 
five accomplices, it is manifest that this crime also originated in Serbia. 

Having taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate Jukic, 
Hercigonja fled to Serbia (October, 1912), where together with his 
accomplice Marojan Jaksic, he consorted with the komitadjis and 
members of the Narodna Odbrana. As frequently happens when 
immature minds are excited by occupying themselves too early with 
poUtical questions, the result of this corrupting company was here 
also disastrous. Hercigonja returned home impressed by the dogma 
learnt in Belgrade that the Southern Slav territories of Austria-Hungary 
must be separated from it and re-united to the Serbian kingdom. He 
had further been pursuaded by the teachings of the friends with 
whom he associated there, that this object should be pursued by 
means of attempts on the lives of persons holding high office and 
leading politicians of the Monarchy as the only means of obtaining 
this end. 

This is the spirit in which Hercigonja influenced his friends at 
Agram and converted some of them to his ideas. Foremost among his 
plans was the carrjdng out of an attempt on the life of the heir to the 
throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. 

A few months before proceedings had been taken against Luka 
Aljinovic for treasonable agitation. In the course of these proceed- 
ings three witnesses declared that Aljinovic had told him that in 
the year 1913 he had received at Belgrade 100 dinar from the Narodna 
Odbrana, and a similar sum from a secret association of students, 
for purposes of agitation, but especially to carry out an attempt on 
the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. 

It is clear how far the criminal agitation of the Narodna Odbrana 
and those who shared in its views, has of late been primarily directed 
against the person of the hereditary Archduke. From these facts, 
the conclusion may be drawn that the Narodna Odbrana, as well 
as the associations hostile to the Monarchy in Serbia, which were 
grouped round it, recently decided that the hour had struck to trans- 
late theory into practice. 

It is noteworthy, however, that the Narodna hmits itself in this 
way to inciting, and where the incitement has fallen on fertile soil 
to providing means of material assistance for the realisation of its 
plans, but that it has confided the only dangerous part of this propa- 
ganda of action to the youth of the Monarchy, which it has excited 
and corrupted, and which alone has to bear the burden of this miserable 
" heroism." 

II— o 209 


All the characteristics of this procedure are found in the history 

and origin of the profoundly regrettable outrage of the 28th of June 

(see Appendix 8) . 

I'' [c/ B 4 Princip "^' and Grabez ''' are characteristic examples of young men 

annex.] ' who have been poisoned from their school days by the doctrines of 

the Narodna Odbrana. 

At Belgrade, where he frequented the society of students imbued 
with these ideas, Princip busied himself with criminal plans against 
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, against whom the hatred of the 
Serbian element hostile to the Monarchy was particularly acute on 
the occasion of his tour in the annexed territories. 

He was joined, by Cabrinovic, who moved in the same circles, and 
whose shifting and radically revolutionary views, as he himself admits, 
as well as the influence of his surroundings in Belgrade and the reading 
of the Serbian papers, inspired him with the same sense of hostility 
to the Monarchy, and brought him into the propaganda of action. 

Thanks to the state of mind in which he already was, Grabez 
succumbed very quickly to this milieu, which he now entered. 

But however far this plot may have prospered, and however 
determined the conspirators may have been to carry out the attempt, 
it would never have been effected, if people had not been found, as 
in the case of Jukic, to provide the accomplices with means of com- 
mitting their crime. For, as Princip and Cabrinovic have expressly 
admitted, they lacked the necessary arms, as well as the money to 
purchase them. 

It is interesting to see where^ the accomplices tried to procure 
their arms. Milan Pribicevic and Zivojin Dacic, the two principal men 
in the Narodna Odbrana, were the first accomplices thought of as 
a sure source of help in their need, doubtless because it had already 
become a tradition amongst those ready to commit crimes, that they 
could obtain instruments for murder from these representatives of 
the Narodna Odbrana. The accidental circumstance that these 
two men were not at Belgrade at the critical moment doubtless baulked 
this plan. However, Princip and Cabrinovic were not at a loss in 
finding other help, that of Milan Ciganovic, an ex-komitadji, and now 
a railway official at Belgrade, and at the same time an active member 
of the Narodna Odbrana, who, in 1909, first appeared as a pupil 
at the school (Bandenschule) at Cuprija (see Appendix 5). Princip 
and Cabrinovic were not deceived in^ their expectations, as they at 
once received the necessary help from Ciganovic. 
12) r / R A ^^^ latter, and at his instigation, his friend Major Voja Tankosic, '"' 
annex 1 °^ '*^® Royal Serbian Army, also one of the leaders of the Narodna 
Odbrana, who has already been mentioned several times, and who, 
in 1908, was at the head of the school of armed bands at Cuprija 
(see Appendix 5), now appear as moving spirits and active furtherers 


in the plot ; the repulsive manner in which they approved as a matter 
of course, is significant of the moral qualities of the whole anti- 
Austrian movement. They had at first only one doubt, and that but 
a fleeting one, as to whether the three conspirators were really resolved 
to commit this act. This doubt, however, soon disappeared, thanks 
to their insidious counsels. Thenceforth they were prepared to give 
every assistance. Tankosic produced four Browning pistols, ammuni- 
tion and money for the journey ; six hand-grenades from the Serbian 
army supplies completed the equipment, of which the composition 
and origin recalls the case of Jukic. Anxious about the success of 
the attempt, Tankosic had the conspirators instructed in shooting, 
a task which Ciganovic carried out with a success which has since 
been fully proved. Tankosic and Ciganovic were further anxious to 
ensure secrecy for the plot by special means which had not been bar- 
gained for by the assassins. They therefore supplied cyanide of 
potassium, telling the two culprits to commit suicide after the crime, 
a precaution which was to be specially advantageous to themselves, 
as secrecy would thus relieve them of the slight danger which they 
were incurring in the enterprise. Sure death for the victims of their 
corruption, perfect security for themselves, this is the motto of the 
Narodna Odbrana, as was already known. 

In order to render the execution of the crime possible, it was 
necessary that the bombs and arms should be secretly smuggled into 
Bosnia. There again Ciganovic gave all the assistance in his power ; 
he wrote out for the conspirators the exact route to be followed, and 
assured them of the collusion of the Serbian Customs of&cials for 
getting them into Bosnia. The way in which this journey, described 
by Princip as " mysterious," was organised and carried out can leave 
no doubt but that this route was a secret one, prepared in advance, 
and already often used for the mysterious designs of the Narodna 
Odbrana. With an assurance and a certainty which could only 
result from long habit, the frontier guards at Sabac and Loznica lent 
their administrative organisation for the purpose. The secret trans- 
port with its complicated system of ever-changing guides, who were 
summoned as if by magic, and who were always on the spot when 
wanted, was effected without a hitch. Without inquiring into the 
object of this strange journey of some immature students, the Serbian 
authorities set this smooth machinery into motion at a word from 
the ex-komitadji and minor railway official, Ciganovic. However, 
they had no need to ask any questions, as from the instructions they 
had received, it was perfectly clear that a new " mission " of the 
Narodna Odbrana was being carried out. The sight of the arsenal 
of bombs and revolvers caused the exciseman Grbic merely to smile 
good-naturedly and approvingly — sufficient proof of how accustomed 
they were on this " route " to find contraband of this nature. 


[R.l9,app.i3 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25. 

The Royal Serbian Government have taken a grave responsibility 
on their shoulders, in allowing all this to take place. 

Though bound to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria- 
Hungary, they have allowed their press to disseminate hatred against 
the Monarchy ; they have allowed associations established on their 
own territory under the leadership of high officers, of public officials, 
of professors and of judges, to carry on openly a campaign against 
the Monarchy, with the ultimate object of inciting its citizens to 
revolution ; they have not prevented men devoid of all moral scruples, 
who share in the direction of its military and civil administration 
from poisoning the public conscience, so that in this struggle low 
murder appears as the best weapon. 

Opinions of the Serbian Press. 

{a) The Politika on the i8th August, 1910, on the occasion of 
the eightieth birthday of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, 
published a large portrait of Bogdan Zerajic, who, two months 
earlier, had made a murderous attack on the Governor of Bosnia, 
Freiherr Von Varesanin. In the article dealing with this, the 
following observations were made : — " Two months ago, on the 2nd 
of June (old style), on the opening day of the Diet of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, a young Serbian, the student Bogdan Zerajic, made 
an attempt in Serajevo to kill the Governor of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina, General Marian Varesanin. Zerajic fired five shots at this 
renegade, who had assured his career by pouring out the blood of 
his brothers in the famous insurrection in Rakovica, but, owing to 
a remarkable accident, did not succeed in killing him. Whereon 
the brave and composed Zerajic fired the sixth and last bullet through 
his own head, and immediately fell dead. In Vienna, they knew very 
well that it was not the reading of Russian and revolutionary writings 
which had induced Zerajic to make his attempt, but that he acted 
thus as the noble scion of a race which wished to protest against 
foreign rule in this bloody way. Therefore, they sought to hush up 
the whole matter as quickly as possible, and — contrary to their custom 
— to avoid an affair which would have still more compromised the 
Austrian Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Vienna, it 
was desired that every memory of Zerajic should be extinguished, and 
that no importance should be attached to his attempt ; but just this 
fear of the dead Zerajic, and the prohibition against mentioning his 
name throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought it about that his 
name is spoken among the people as something sacred to-day, on 
the i8th of August, perhaps more than ever. 



" To-day, we too light a candle at his grave and cry ' Honour to 
Zerajic ! '" 

To this is added a poem, the translation of which is as follows : — 

" Bosnia lives and is not dead yet. 
In vain have you buried her corpse ; 
Still the chained victim spits fire. 
Nor is it yet time to sing the dirge. 
With devil's hand you have scratched a grave for her 
But the living dead will not descend into the vault ; 
Emperor, dost thou hear ? 
In the flash of the revolver the leaden bullets hiss about 

thy throne ! 
These are not slaves ; this is glorious freedom 
Which flashes from the bold hand of the oppressed ! 
Why does this horrible Golgotha shudder ? 
Peter drew the sword in Christ's defence. 
His hand fell, but out of the blood 
A thousand brave hands wiU rise ; 
That shot was only the first herald 
Of the glorious Easter after Golgotha's torments." 

(6) On the 8th October, 1910, on the occasion of the anniversary 
of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Politika and 
the Mali Journal, the last of which appeared with a black border, 
pubhshed articles in which they indulged in violent attacks against 
Austria-Hungary. Europe must convince herself that the Serbian 
people still think always of the " revanche." The day of the " revanche " 
must come ; for this the feverish exertions of Serbia to organise her 
military power as well as the feeling of the Serbian people and their 
hatred of the neighbouring kingdom were a guarantee. 

On the same occasion the Samouprava wrote on the 9th October, 
1910, " Abuse and excesses are no fit means to express true patriotism ; 
quiet, steady and honest work alone leads to the goal." 

(c) On the i8th April, 1911, the Politika said : " Except for 
a few cynics, no one in Serbia would be glad to see King Peter 
proceeding to Vienna or Budapest. By the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the possibility of friendship between Serbia and 
Austria-Hungary was once for all destroyed. Every Serbian feels 

(d) The Beogradske Novine wrote on the 18th April, 1911 : — 
" Even in Government circles the projected journey of King Peter 
to the Emperor Francis Joseph is disapproved. The storm of indig- 
nation which has seized the whole of the Serbian race on account of 
the King's proposed journey is entirely comprehensible." 


[R. 19, app. 1] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25, 

{e) The Mali Journal of the 19th April, 1911, says : " A visit 
of King Peter to the ruler of Austria-Hungary would be an insult 
to all Serbs. By this visit, Serbia would forfeit the right to play the 
part of Piedmont. The interests of Serbia can never coincide with 
the interests of Austria." 

(/) On the 23rd April, 1911, the Politika, the Mali Journal, the 
Tribuna, the Beogradske Novine, and the Vecernje Novosti, commented 
on the projected visit of King Peter to the Court of Vienna : " Between 
Serbia and Austria, friendship can never exist. The projected visit 
of King Peter would, therefore, be for Serbia a ' shameful capitula- 
tion,' ' a humiliation of Serbia,' ' a solemn sanctioning of all the crimes 
and misdeeds that Austria-Hungary has committed against Serbia 
and the Serbian people.' " 

(g) On the i8th April, 1912, the Trgovinski Glasnik wrote in an 
article headed, " The decay of Austria " : — 

"In Austria-Hungary decay prevails on all sides. What is now 
happening beyond the Danube and the Save is no longer a German, 
Magyar, Bohemian or Croatian crisis, it is a universal Austrian crisis, 
a crisis of the dynasty itself. We Serbians can observe such a develop- 
ment of affairs in Austria with satisfaction." 

{h) The Balkan, in an article entitled " The Borders of Albania," 
in attacking Austria-Hungary, expressed itself to this effect : "If 
Europe is too weak to call a halt to Austria-Hungary, Montenegro 
and Serbia will do it, saying to Austria, ' Halt ! no further ! ' A war 
between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is inevitable. We have dis- 
membered the Turkish Empire, we will dismember Austria too. We 
have finished one war, we are now facing a second." 

{i) The Vecernje Novosti, of the 22nd April, 1913, appeals to the 
Serbian travelling pubHc and to Serbian traders to boycott the 
Donau Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft (The Danube Steam Navigation 
Company). " No one should travel or consign goods by ships of this 
Austrian Company. All who do this should be punished with fines by a 
committee. The monies would flow to the funds of the Komitadjis 
which are to be applied for the purpose of the coming war with Austria." 

{k) The Tribuna of the 26th May, 1913, on the occasion of 
the seizure of Ada Kaleh by Austria, writes : " The criminal black and 
yellow Austria has again carried out a piratical trick. It is a thief 
who, when he cannot steal a whole sack of gold, contents himself with 
one dinar." 

(l) On the loth June, 1913, on the occasion of the recurrence of 
the anniversary of the murderous attack on the Royal Commissary 
in Agram by the student Luka Jukic, the Serbian newspapers published 
memorial articles. An article in the Pragda stated that : " It 
must grieve us to the bottom of our hearts that everyone has not 



acted like our Jukic. We have no longer a Jukic, but we have the 
hatred, we have the anger, we have to-day ten million Jukics. We 
are convinced that soon Jukic, through his prison window, will hear 
the last cannon shot of freedom." 

(m) The Mali Journal of the 7th October, 1913, gives a leading 
place to an article in which Austria-Hungary is denied the right of 
existence, and the Slavonic peoples are invited to support the offensive 
campaign contemplated by Serbia. 

{n) The Piemont writes on the commemoration day of the 
annexation : " Five years ago to-day an imperial decree extended the 
sovereignty of the Hapsburg sceptre over Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Serbian people will feel for decades yet the grief which was that 
day inflicted on them. Shamed and shattered, the Serbian people 
groaned in despair. The people vow to take vengeance in attaining 
freedom by an heroic step. This day has aroused the energy which had 
already sunk to sleep, and soon the refreshed hero will strive for freedom. 
To-day when Serbian graves adorn the ancient Serbian territories, when 
the Serbian cavalry has trod the battlefields of Macedonia and old 
Serbia, the Serbian people having ended their task in the South turn 
to the other side, whence the groans and tears of the Serbian brother 
are heard, and where the gallows has its home. The Serbian soldiers 
who to-day in Dusan's kingdom fight those Albanians who were 
provoked against us by the state which took Bosnia and Herzegovina 
from us, vowed to march against the ' second Turkey ' even as with 
God's help they had marched against the Balkan Turkey. They 
make this vow and hope that the day of revenge is drawing near. 
One Turkey vanished. The good Serbian God will grant that the 
' second Turkey ' will vanish too." 

(0) The Mali Journal of the 4th November, 1913, writes : " Every 
effort towards a rapprochement with Austria-Hungary is equivalent 
to a betrayal of the Serbian people. Serbia must understand the 
facts and always hold before her eyes that she has in Austria-Hungary 
her most dangerous enemy, and that it must be the sacred obligation 
of every Serbian Government to fight this enemy." 

(p) On the 14th January, 1914, the Pragda said : " Our new 
year's wishes are first of all for our still unfreed brothers sighing under 
a foreign yoke. Let the Serbians endure ; after Kossovo came 
Kumanovo, and our victorious career is not yet ended." 

{q) The Novosti of the i8th January, 1914, published a picture 
of " The Blessing of the Water in Bosnia " with the following text r 
" Even in places which lie under the foreign yoke, the Serbians preserve 
their customs against the day when in glorious joy the day of freedom 

(r) The Zastava confesses in January, 1914 : " Serbia incites 
the Austro-Hungarian Serbians to revolution." 


[R. 19, app. 2] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25. 

(s) The Mali Journal of the 9th March, 1914, writes : " Serbia can 
never forget Franz Ferdinand's sabre-rattUng in the Skutari affair." 

[t) On the 4th April, 1914, the Zastava writes : " The Austrian 
statesmen who only conduct a policy of hatred, a bureaucratic policy, 
not a policy inspired by broad vision, are themselves preparing the 
ruin of their State." 

(m) The Pravda of the 8th April, 1914, says : " Austria has now 
lost her right to exist." 

{v) In their Easter numbers (April, 1914) all the Serbian newspapers 
expressed the hope that soon their unfreed, oppressed brothers under 
the yoke would celebrate a joyous resurrection. 

(w) In the Tribuna of the 23rd April, 1914, it is stated that : " The 
pacifists have invented a new catchword, that of the ' patriotism 
of Europe.' This programme can only be realised, however, when 
Austria is partitioned." 

{x) The Mali Journal of the 12th May, 1914, writes : " What 
are called crimes in private life are called, in Austria, politics. History 
knows a monster, and that monster is called Austria." 


Extract from the " Narodna Odbrana," an organ published by 
THE Central Committee of the Narodna Odbrana Society. 
(Narodna odbrana izdanje stredisnog odbora narodne 
odbrane. Beograd, 1911. " Nova stamparija " Davidovk^, 
Decanska ulica BR. 14, LjUB. Davidovica.) 

In a short introduction it is first of all remarked that this pamphlet 
" does not completely or exhaustively reproduce the whole work of 
the Narodna Odbrana because, for many reasons, it is neither per- 
missible nor possible to do this." 

The document is divided into three parts of which the first consists 
of fourteen chapters and is in the nature of a programme, while the 
second contains a report of the activities of the Society, and in the 
third examples are given for the organisation of similar societies 

In the first chapter, " Origin and activity of the first Narodna 
Odbrana," it is remarked that the Society was founded as a conse- 
quence of the popular movement arising in Serbia on the annexation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that it had the following objects : — 

(i) Raising, inspiring and strengthening the sentiment of nation- 

(2) Registration and enlistment of volunteers. 

(3) Formation of volunteer units and their preparation for armed 



(4) Collection of voluntary contributions, including money and 
other things necessary for the realisation of its task. 

(5) Organisation, equipment and training of a special revolutionary 
band (Komitee), destined for special and independent military action. 

(6) Development of activity for the defence of the Serbian people 
in all other directions. In this connection, it is remarked that owing 
to the recognition of the annexation by the Great Powers an end 
had been made to all this work of the Society on which, while retaining 
its existing constitution, the Society had taken measures to reorganise 
its programme and to undertake new work, so that, on the recurrence 
of a similar occasion, " the old red War Flag of the Narodna Odbrana 
would again be unfurled." 

At the beginning of the second chapter, " The new Narodna 
Odbrana of to-day," it is stated that " at the time of the annexation, 
experience had shown that Serbia was not ready for the struggle 
which circumstances imposed upon her, and that this struggle, which 
Serbia must take up, is much more serious and more difficult than it 
was thought to be ; the annexation was only one of the blows which 
the enemies of Serbia have aimed at this land, many blows have 
preceded it, and many will follow it. Work and preparation are 
necessary so that a new attack may not find Serbia equally unpre- 
pared." The object assigned to the work to be done by people of 
every class is stated to be " the preparation of the people for war in all 
forms of national work, corresponding to the requirements of the 
present day," and the means suggested to effect this object are 
" strengthening of the national consciousness, bodily exercises, increase 
of material and bodily well-being, cultural improvement, &c. ... so 
far as individuals and societies can and should assist the State in these 

The third chapter, " The three principal tasks," begins with a 
hint that the annexation has taught that national consciousness in 
Serbia is not so strong as it should be in a country which, as a small 
fraction of three millions, forms a hope of support for seven millions of 
the oppressed Serbian people. The first task of the Society, therefore, 
consists in strengthening the national consciousness. The second 
task is the cultivation of bodily exercises, the third the proper utilisa- 
tion of these activities learned in the field of sport. 

In the fourth chapter (Musketry) prominence is given to the value 
of good training in musketry, especially having regard to the circum- 
stances of Serbia, where the military training only lasts six months. 
These observations conclude with the sentence : 

" A new blow, like that of the annexation, must be met by a new 
Serbia, in which every Serbian, from child to greybeard is a rifle- 


[R. 19, app. 21 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25, 

The fifth chapter, which treats of " The relations of the Narodna 
Odbrana to the Sokol societies," begins with a social and political 
excursus as to the conditions on which the powers of States depend. 
In this connection the fall of Turkey is referred to, and it is said : 

" The old Turks of the South gradually disappear and only a part 
of our people suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the 
North, more fearful and dangerous than the old ; stronger in civilisation 
and more advanced economically, our northern enemies come against 
us. They want to take our freedom and our language from us and to 
crush us. We can already feel the presages of the struggle which 
approaches in that quarter. The Serbian people are faced by the 
question ' to be or not to be ? ' " 

" 'What is the object of the Lectures' is the title of the seventh 
chapter, the principal contents of which are covered by the following 
sentences : 

" The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were largely 
propaganda lectures. The programme of our new work was devel- 
oped. Every lecture referred to the annexation, the work of the 
old Narodna Odbrana and the task of the new. The lectures will 
never cease to be propaganda lectures, but they will develop special 
branches more and more and concern themselves with all questions 
of our social and national life." 

In the eighth chapter, " Women's Activities in the Narodna 
Odbrana," the ninth " Detail and Lesser Work," and the tenth, 
" Renaissance of the Society," the preparation and deepening of the 
Society's work and the necessity of a regeneration of the individual, 
the nation and the State are treated in reference to the tasks of the 
Narodna Odbrana. 

The Introduction to the eleventh chapter (" New Obilice and 
Singjelice "*) runs as follows : — 

" It is an error to assert that Kossovo is past and gone. We find 
ourselves in the midst of Kossovo. Our Kossovo of to-day is the gloom 
and ignorance in which our people live. The other causes of the new 
Kossovo live on the frontiers to the North and West : the Germans, 
Austrians and ' Schwabas,' with their onward pressure against our 
Serbian and Slavonic South." In conjunction with the reference to 

* MiloS Obili(5e (or Kobilid) crept— according to Serbian tradition — into 
the Turkish Camp, after the battle on the Amselfeld, and there murdered the 
Sultan Murad (Von K^Ilay " Geschichte Der Serben," Vol. I). Stephan 
Singjelid, Prince of Resara, played a part during the Serbian Revolution, 
1807-1810. In 1809, Singjelic defended the redoubt of Tschagar against 
the Turks, and is said to have blown himself into the air, with some of his 
followers and many Turks, when outnumbered. (Von Kallay " Die Geschichte 
des serbischen Aufstandes.") 


the heroic deeds of Obilice and SingjeUce, the necessity of sacrifice 
in the service of the nation is alluded to, and it is declared that 
" national work is interwoven with sacrifice, particularly in Turkey 
and in Austria, where such workers are persecuted by the authorities 
and dragged to prison and the gallows. For this struggle, also, against 
gloom and ignorance there is need of such heroes. The Narodna 
Odbrana does not doubt that in the fight with gun and cannon against 
the ' Schwabas ' and the other enemies with whom we stand face to 
face, our people will provide a succession of heroes. However, the 
Narodna Odbrana is not content with this, for it regards the so-called 
peaceful present day conditions as war, and demands heroes too for 
this struggle of to-day which we are carrying on in Serbia and beyond 
the frontier." 

The twelfth chapter treats of " Union with our brothers and 
friends," and its principal contents are concentrated in the following 
sentences : — 

" The maintenance of union with our brothers near and far across 
the frontier, and our other friends in the world, is one of the chief 
tasks of the Narodna Odbrana. In using the word ' people ' the 
Narodna Odbrana means our whole people, not only those in Serbia. 
It hopes that the work done by it in Serbia will spur the brothers 
outside Serbia to take a more energetic share in the work of private 
initiative, so that the new present day movement for the creation of 
a powerful Serbian Narodna Odbrana will go forward in unison in all 
Serbian territories." 

The thirteenth chapter, which is headed " Two Important Tasks," 
proceeds as follows : — 

"As we take up the standpoint that the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has completely brought into the light of day the 
pressure against our countries from the North, the Narodna Odbrana 
proclaims to the people that Austria is our first and greatest enemy." 
This work (that is to say, to depict Austria to the Serbian people 
as their greatest enemy) is regarded by the Society, according to- 
the following expressions of opinion, as a healthy and necessary task, 
in fact, as its principal obligation. For the pamphlet goes on as 
follows : — 

" Just as once the Turks attacked us from the south, so Austria, 
attacks us to-day from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches 
the necessity of fighting Austria, she preaches a sacred truth of our 
national position." 

The hatred against Austria brought about by this propaganda 
is, of course, not the aim but the natural consequence of this work, 
the object of which is independence and freedom. If on this account 
hatred of Austria germinates, it is Austria who sows it by her advance, 


JR. 19, app. 2] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25, 

which conduct " makfes obhgatory a war of extermination against 

After some praise of the modern conception of nationaUsm the 
remark is made that in speaking of " freedom and unity," too much is 
mere talk. The people must be told that : — 

" For the sake of bread and room, for the sake of the fundamental 
essentials of culture and trade, the freeing of the conquered Serbian terri- J 

tories and their union with Serbia is necessary to gentlemen, tradesmen, ' 

and peasants alike. ' ' Perceiving this the people will tackle the national 
work with greater self-sacrifice. Our people must be told that the 
freedom of Bosnia is necessary for her, not only out of pity for the 
brothers suffering there, but also for the sake of trade and the connec- 
tion with the sea. 

The " two tasks " of the Narodna Odbrana are then again brought 
together in the following concluding sentence : — j 

"In addition to the task of explaining to the people the danger- 
threatening it from Austria, the Narodna Odbrana has the important 
duty, while preserving intact the sacred national memories, of giving ' 

to the people this new, wholesome and, in its consequences, mighty 
conception of nationalism and of work in the cause of freedom and 

The fourteenth and final chapter begins with an appeal to the 
Government and people of Serbia to prepare themselves in all ways 
for the struggle " which the annexation has foreshadowed " 

Hereon the activities of the Narodna Odbrana are again retapitu- 
lated in the following sentences : — 

" While the Narodna Odbrana works in conformity with the times 
according to the altered conditions, it also maintains all the connections 
made at the time of the annexation ; to-day therefore it is the same 
as it was at the time of the annexation. To-day, too, it is Odbrana 
(defence) ; to-day, too, Narodna (of the people) ; to-day, too, it gathers 
Tinder its standard the citizens of Serbia as it gathered them at the time 
of the annexation. Then the cry was for war, now the cry is for work. 
Then meetings, demonstrations, voluntary clubs (Komitees), weapons 
and bombs were asked for ; to-day steady, fanatical, tireless work and 
again work is required to fulfil the tasks and duties to which we have 
drawn attention by way of present preparation for the fight with gun 
and cannon which will come." 

The pamphlet and the annual report contain the following inform- 
ation as to the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana : — 

A Central Committee at Belgrade directs all proceedings of the 
JSIarodna Odbrana. All other committees of the Narodna Odbrana are 



subject to this. The Central Committee is divided into four sections : — 
for cultural work, for bodily training, for financial policy, and for 
foreign affairs. 

District Committees, with their centre at the seat of the offices 
of the District Government, conduct the affairs of the Society in the 
corresponding districts. Every District Comhiittee divides itself 
into sections for culture (the President being the Chairman of the local 
branch of the " Culture League"), for bodily training (the President 
being a local member of the Riflemen's, Sokol, Sportsmen's and 
Horsemen's clubs) and for financial affairs ; some District Committees 
have also a section for Foreign Affairs. 

Divisional Committees located at the seat of the local authorities 
conduct the affairs of the Society in the various divisions. 

Local Committees conduct the Society's affairs in the various towns 
and villages. 

Confidential men are located in those places in the interior of the 
country where the constitution of a Committee is not necessary. 

Societies " which work in close connection with the organisation 
of the Narodna Odbrana " and are supported by the latter in every 
respect are the following : — 

The Riflemen's Association with 762 societies, the Sokol Association 
" Dusan the Strong " with 2,500 members, the Olympic Club, the 
Horsemen's Society " Prince Michael," the Sportsmen's Association 
and the Culture League. 

All these societies are organised on similar lines to those of the 
Narodna Odbrana and use their premises, including club houses, 
libraries, &c. Distinguished members of these societies are chairmen 
of sections in the Committees of the Narodna Odbrana. 


Extracts from the " Report of the Activities of the Sokol 
Society Dusan the Strong in Kragujevac in the years 
1912-13." (Kragujevac Printing Office " Buducnost " Tm. 
Lekic 1914.) 

At the head of this report is printed the speech with which the 
President, Major Kovacevic of the Serbian Army, greeted the annual 
meeting in January, 1914. 

" It is known to you," the President began, " that Sokolism, 
which arose in the struggle against Germanism, is a purely Slavonic 
institution, which has for its aim to unite and to inspire all the 
Slavonic brothers, and to give physical and intellectual training for 
the struggle against the enemy of Slavism. 

[R. 19, app, 3] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25 

" We Serbians, as a part of the great Slavonic community, have 
taken up the Sokol idea and have agreed to the common work for our 
own and our brothers' welfare and happiness. 

" We Serbians, too, will live and work in the spirit of the Sokols, 
for we wish to revive the weary and the feeble, to strengthen the weak 
and the troubled, t6 free the imprisoned and the enchained. We 
have done this now and in earlier wars. We have rescued part of 
our brothers from the insolence of the enemy in the South. We have 
struck off their fetters, we have rid them of their sufferings and given 
them freedom, so that they enjoy happiness, equality and brother- 

After giving a few words of praise to this " noble work " which 
" realised a part of the great Sokol idea," Major Kovacevic proceeded : 

" Oh, my brothers and sisters, our enemy in the North is more 
dangerous and pitiless, because he is stronger in respect of his civilisa- 
tion and his economic position. 

" This enemy is insatiable in his lusts ; he holds millions of our 
brothers in slavery and chains. He took law and freedom from them 
and subjected them all to his service. The brothers murmur, call 
and beg for still quicker help. 

" We must not leave them to the mercy of this fearful and greedy 
enemy. We must hurry to their help the sooner because it is our 
duty to do so. Could we in any event be happy when so many brothers 
live in slavery, suffer and murmur ? 

" Brothers and sisters ! 

" The enemy is dangerous, greedy and troublesome. Let us ever 
be on our guard. 

" Let us go to work with still greater willingness and self-sacrifice. 
Let us be scrupulous according to the sacred Sokol obligation, true 
and enduring. 

" Let us prepare ourselves for the struggle and for the just Sokol 

" Let us unite and ally ourselves with innumerable Sokol hosts, 
and let us always remember that truth which the Serbian Sokols 
wrote upon their flag : That only a healthy, powerful, well-organised 
people, conscious of its nationality, is fit to defend itself, to struggle, 
and to conquer." 

The report of the Committee of Management follows the speech 
of the President. After a description of the successes in the last wars, 
which interfered with the activities of the Society for two years, it is 
stated that " the day arrived when we returned to our work, because 
our programme was not yet fulfilled, because our task was not yet 
ended. A great part of our people still endure the pains of the crucified 
Christ ; we have still to visit our brothers beyond the Drina ; we 
have still to seek out the town of Serajevo and the inheritance of 


St. Sava* ; we must behold the home of Marina Novak, of Deli Radivoj 
and of the old Vujadin ; we must cross the mountains of Romanija 
and see why Travnik is veiled in mist. That song must end at last : 
' Ah ! Bosnia, thou orphan child before God, hast thou nowhere people 
of thy race ....'" 

After a discussion of various undertakings of the Society, emphasis 
is laid on the fact that the Society maintains relations with the brother 
societies beyond the Save and the Drina, and special emphasis is laid 
on the dispatch of delegates to the Jubilee of the Prosvjeta held in 
Serajevo. On this the report remarks : " By sending representatives 
to the brothers in Bosnia the Committee intended to say to them — 
we have not forgotten you, the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are 
still mighty." After a detailed description of a visit of the Agram 
students to Serbiaf and of the dedication of the flag of " the Young 
People's Temperance Association," the report of the executive 
concludes with the following sentences : — 

" These manifestations — the coming of the brother Croats to 
Sumadija and the meeting of the ' temperate youth ' from all Serbian 
regions are correctly appreciated by our leaders, and one would not 
exaggerate if one said that these events indicate the beginning and 
the germ of a great deed to be done in the near future. 

" They are the expression of a great and, till now, silent awakening 
of the national consciousness and of the strength of an oppressed 
nation which is not allowed to arise and unite. In a little time this 
germ will ripen, and when the soul of the people arises still more, 
there will be no barrier which it cannot break, and no obstacle which 
it cannot tear down upon its way. The work of strengthening this 
power, the assistance and acceleration of the progress of this national 
development, the preparation and the support of this idea, was always 
the aim of the actions of our leaders." 

The treasurer's report enumerates first of all those who have 
supported the society. In addition to a number of members of the 
Kragujevac District Committee, the following are mentioned and 
thanked : — 

The District Committee of the " Narodna Odbrana " at Kragujevac, 
particularly its " Ritter " section, which often assisted the Sokol 

* St. Sava (ob. 1236) is the patron saint of the Serbians. Herzegovina 
is the name of Ducatus Sanii Save. The "inheritance of St. Sava" is, 
therefore, equivalent in meaning to Herzegovina. 

t This visit of the Agram students (April, 1912) to Belgrade, Nish, 
Semendria, &c., was used in Serbia as the pretext for a great demonstration 
of hostility to the Monarchy. The excursionists were accorded military 
honours, and lunches and balls took place in the Military Academy and the 
Officers' Club. In Nish, indeed, a military parade was held in honour of the 


IR. 19, app. 4] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25, 

Society with substantial support ; the Headmaster of the Gymnasium 
at Kragujevac, who " always showed his fatherly care " to the Sokols ; 
the Divisional Commandant of Sumadija, who had substantially sup- 
ported the society ; the President of the District Court at Kragujevac ; 
the District Chairman and the Parish Chairman at Kragujevac. 

After referring to the members of the society who have fallen in 
war, the treasurer closes his report with the following words : — 

" After so brilliant a victory over a portion of our enemies, those 
who control our society hope that you all, from now onwards, will 
devote yourselves still more, more unitedly and more entirely, to 
the activities of Sokolism so that you may rear falcons in our falcon's 
eyrie who, at the given moment, will one day be ready to fly aloft, 
and in their mighty flight bring freedom, love and brotherhood to all 
our brothers who are not yet free." 

The annual report is signed by Major M. J. Kovacevic, President, 
by the secretary of the Law Courts, D. V. Brzakovic, as secretary, and 
by ten members of the executive, among whom are included two 
professors (EmU Lukic and Milan Jankovic), as well as a further 
officer (Major of Infantry, Michael Vasic). 

It is clear from this annual report, and from a schedule also signed 
by Major M. J. Kovacevic and Brzakovic, Secretary of the Law Courts, 
and sent to the Kragujevac Sokol Society by the " Srpski Soko " in 
Tuzla for completion, that the Sokol Societies in Serbia stand in close 
relation with various similar societies in the Monarchy to an extent 
not hitherto known. 


The Serbian Official Gazette in the Service of the Narodna 


An appeal by the Narodna Odbrana appears as a supplement to 
the Serbian Official Gazette, Srpski Novine, of 28th June, 1914 
(new style), and was supplied to all subscribers to the paper. 

The following passages occur in this appeal : — 

" Brothers and sisters ! Kossovo was only partly avenged, the day 
of St. Vitus (Vidovdan) was only partly expiated. Just as far as the 
territories reach where our people's speech is heard — the Serbian, 
Croatian, and Slovenian — from Kikinda to Monastir, from Trieste to 
Carevo-Solo, just as far and wide does the meaning of St. Vitus' Day 
and of Kossovo extend. So many souls of our race weep on this terri- 
tory ; so many fetters of our brothers clank ; so much work is yet 
to be done ; so much have we still to sacrifice. St. Vitus' Day could 
formerly mean a day of mourning for us, but to-day, when we have 
already gone so far in the new history of the people ; when behind 



us stand great and glorious national events, and before us still greater 
and more glorious events await us ; to-day when we stand in the 
midst of the creation of a great national State ; to-day St. Vitus' 
Day must be for us a day of great joy and pride, because of that which 
has happened, and sprung from it, and still more because of that 
which will come. Men and women of Serbia ! MUHons of our 
brothers, Slovenes, Croats, and Serbians beyond our frontiers, look 
to-day to us, the Children of the Kingdom, and joy and hope fill their 
breast as they now behold to-day's majestic manifestations for the 
national cause. God helps the brave ! Forward all ! That part of 
our sacred task which is as yet unreaUsed calls us. Belgrade, St. Vitus' 
Day, 1914." 


Deposition of Trifko KRSXANOvid, Concerning the Narodna 


The baker's assistant, Trifko Krstanovic, of Zavadonici, was 
arrested by a gendarmerie patrol on the night of the 6th-7th July, 
1914, because he had been heard to remark shortly after the murderous 
attack on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, that this attack was to 
be expected, and because this remark brought him under suspicion of 
having had knowledge of the plot. 

He was, on this account, brought up before the District Court at 
Serajevo. The examination of the prisoner revealed that his remark 
did not justify the suspicion which had arisen against him, since it, 
founded entirely on his earlier knowledge of the activities of the 
Narodna, was merely the expression of his conviction that, on 
account of the agitation developing in Serbia against the Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy, and especially against the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, a deed of that kind was to be expected. In the absence 
of any material facts in support of the charge, the proceedings against 
Krstanovic were accordingly withdrawn, and, having regard to his 
knowledge of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which had an 
important bearing on the inquiry, he was subpoenaed as a witness. 

An extract from his depositions taken on the 19th July, 1914, 
which is relevant to the matters here in question, is as follows : — 

" In the autumn of the year 1908, I crossed the frontier to Serbia 
on the Mokra Gora, near Visegrad, to seek work. I first came to 
Bagina Balta in the district of Uzice, and as I found no work there, 
I went to Belgrade, where I arrived just at the time when the annexa- 
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced. As I saw that the 
annexation had caused great popular commotion and excitement, 
and that I should not be able to find any work, I went to the Imperial 

ii-p 225 

[R.l9,app.5] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25, 

and Royal Consulate and tried to][get myself sent home. There I was 
told to come back in the afternoon, and that I should then be sent 
home. However, as I came out of the Consulate, a gendarme seized 
me on the street, and asked me where I came from ; under the im- 
pression that I was a spy, he conducted me to a tower [Karaula). 
Here I was questioned, and when I said to them that I wanted to go 
home, a non-commissioned officer began to abuse me : Why should I 
now want to go out of Serbia which now needed more people because 
a war with Austria would come ? When I said to him that I had 
nothing to live on, he answered me that I would find full maintenance 
if I would register myself in the Komitee. In my need I agreed, 
and a gendarme took me to the inn ' Zelenom Vijencu ' (' The Green 
Wreath '), and introduced me there to Voja Tankosic, the leader of 
the Komitee and a captain in the regular army. Here, at the ' Green 
Wreath ' I was provided with food and lodging, and, as I saw, other 
members of the Komitee lived here. Voja Tankosic told me that 
the business of the Komitee was to learn bomb-throwing, the destruc- 
tion of bridges, tunnels, telegraphs and railways, because a war between 
Serbia and Austria could easily arise. - On this a man took me to a 
small building belonging to the Royal Demesne next to the Treasury, 
where the offices of the Komitee were situated, and in the office I met 
Milan Pribicevic, who enrolled me in the Komitee. At this enrolment, 
Milan Pribicevic asked me whether Voja Tankosic had told me the 
obligations which I had as a member of the Komitee. To this I 
answered ' Yes.' He said that those enrolled must be efficient, strong, 
and self-sacrificing. ' There were then about 70 of us enrolled. In 
Belgrade we did nothing. After about six weeks our leader Tankosic 
informed us that the Great Powers had prohibited our Komitee, and 
that we must leave Belgrade and hide ourselves somewhere in an out- 
of-the-way place not visited by foreigners. In this way they sent us 
to the town of Cuprija. Here we were drilled by the officers Voja 
Tankosic, Dusan Putnik, Zivko Gvosdic and Mitar Djinovic, who was 
involved in the Montenegrin bomb outrage, and was shot in Montenegro. 
In order that no one should become aware of our objects, or know 
anything of our numbers, we were forbidden to have intercourse with 
outsiders. We practised the throwing of bombs, the construction of 
mines, and the destruction of telegraphs, railways, tunnels and bridges. 
Every fortnight we were visited by Milan Pribicevic, General Bozo 
Jankovic, the pharmacist Skaric, the deputy Zivko Rafajlovic, and a 
certain Glisic Milutin, a Treasury official, who watched our drill and 
paid for our board on each occasion. Our instructors told us that, 
when war was declared, we Komitees would go in advance, then the 
volunteers, and then the regular army. There were about 140 men at 
Cuprija. Besides board, we had lodging and clothes and 25 para a day 
for tobacco. The school lasted about three months, that is until 

1914] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [R. 19, app. 5] 

March, 1909. Then the members of the committee told us that we 
were dismissed, that we could all go wherever we wished, for the annexa- 
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised by the Great 
Powers, and that our Komitee had become useless. On the dissolution 
of the Komitee, General Bozo Jankovic told me to enter the service of 
Bozo Milanovic at Sabac, where I should receive wages of 50 dinar a 
month. He did not tell me what the nature of the service would be. 
I accepted, because, as a member of the Komitee, I regarded myself 
as bound to obey General Jankovic, and also because I had nothing 
to live on, and had to earn my livelihood. In this way I came to Sabac 
in March, 1909, and reported myself to Bozo Milanovic, a tradesman 
of Sabac. General Jankovic had told me that Bozo Milanovic was 
chairman of the Narodna Odbrana in Sabac, and that I should assist 
him in connection with this Narodna Odbrana. When I had given 
Bozo Milanovic the General's letter and he had read it, he told me that 
I must serve him faithfully and carry out his orders. My chief duty 
would be to carry his letters wheresoever they were addressed. It 
would cost me my life if I failed to carry a letter to its destination, and 
if any one else got hold of it. On the next day. Bozo Milanovic gave 
me a closed letter which I was to take to Cedo Lukic, Superintendent 
of Excise at Serbisch-Raca. On the road to Raca, at the village of 
Bogatic, the District Captain stopped me, took the letter from me, 
opened it and read it. In the letter it said that Lukic should immedi- 
ately buy three boats so that they should be ready if they were required. 
100 dinar were enclosed in the letter. On this occasion the Captain 
told me that the Ministry had given strict orders that the Komitadji 
were to do nothing without orders, so that international diplomatic 
intervention should not be provoked. I returned to Sabac and told 
Bozo Milanovic what had happened to me. Bozo Milanovic applied 
to the District Prefect, who gave orders that the revolver, which the 
Captain at Bogatic had taken from me, should be returned. He also 
gave orders that the Captain should send the letter to Cedo Lukic to 
whom it was addressed. I carried letters of this sort from March, 
1909, until October, 1910, and in that time I took 43 letters to Serbisch- 
Raca, 55 to Loznica, 5 to Zvornik, 2 to Ljubivija, and I don't know 
how many to Koviljaca. I noticed how often L was in each place 
because these places are a very long way from Sabac. I took the 
letters to the chiefs of the Customs houses in the various places, and 
from them I received letters in reply and took them to Bozo Milanovic. 
I recollect that on a few occasions I took letters to Sepacka Ada. My 
assistant in letter carrjdng was one Vaso Eric, a native of Srebrenica. 
Every week I took letters from Bozo Milanovic to Belgrade, and 
delivered them to Milan Pribicevic and Bozo Jankovic. I knew 
nothing of the contents of these letters, and no one told me anything 
about them. So far as I could see, the letters despatched by Bozo 


[R. I9,app.53 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25, 

Milanovic were not in cipher, but the letters sent by the chiefs of the 
Customs houses were written in special characters, a fact which I 
observed when Bozo Milanovic opened them. Once I brought one of 
these cipher letters to Bozo Milanovic, I think it was from Zvornik, 
and he sent me with the letter to Mika Atanasijevic, Professor at 
Sabac, to decipher. He did this, as he usually did ; but perhaps he 
forgot to close the letter, so that I could read it. The letter stated, 
that it was reported from a reliable source, that money was to be 
stamped with the likeness of the heir to the throne, and this was an 
indication that the Emperor Francis Joseph was about to abdicate. 
After about eight months of my service with Bozo Milanovic, Bozo 
gave me his visiting-card with a death's head drawn upon it ; on it 
was written that I was designated an initiate {povjerenik) of the 
Narodna Odbrana. On this occasion he told me, that the business 
was spying. . . . 

" On one occasion, I learnt from the officer Dusan Opterkic, member 
of the Narodna Odbrana, that the Narodna Odbrana had 23 branches 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Beyond this, I do not know what organ- 
isation, if any, the Narodna Odbrana has in Bosnia. From time to 
time, Milan Pribicevic gave me a revolver, or money for the purchase 
of a revolver, for me to give to the Customs officers on the frontier 
who served as Komitadjis who had no revolver nor any money to buy 
a revolver themselves. It appeared to me that Milan Pribicevic gave 
them these things as an honour, just because they were Komitadjis. 
I had nothing else to do with arms. 

" On one occasion, during my service with Bozo Milanovic, I was 
ordered to accompany a man to a peasant in Lijasnica on the Drina, 
who would give us all necessary information and show us everything, 
so that we two could kill Ljubo Stanaricic, a Serbian officer of Reserve, 
who had fled to Bijeljina. For the Committee of the Narodna Odbrana 
had learnt that Ljubo Stanaricic was dangerous to the Serbian State, 
and had resolved that he should be put to death. 

" That man and I received instructions from Bozo Milanovic to 
go to a certain place across the Drina, and to kill Ljubo Stanaricic, 
who lives just on the bank of the Drina on the Bosnian side in the 
district of Bijeljin. I and that man had descended into the Drina, 
but because the water was deep, and we saw that Ljubo was walking 
round his house with a gun on his shoulder, we returned to that pea- 
sant's house. As I saw that we could not kill him with the knife, I 
sent that man to Sabac to tell Bozo Milanovic that it was not possible 
to kill Stanaricic in the manner he desired, namely, with the knife. 
On this, I received orders from Bozo Milanovic that we should kill 
him in any case. We then determined to shoot him with a gun. 
According to Bozo's instructions, the man who was with me was to 
shoot and kill him, and I was to confirm whether these instructions 



were carried out. In the meantime, however, a mounted gendarme 
brought us instructions from the District Prefect of Sabac that we 
were to return, and to abandon the original project. And so we 
returned to Sabac. • 

" In October, 1910, I demanded an increase of pay from Bozo 
Milanovic, and, on his refusal, I left his service. From Sabac I went 
to Belgrade, where I met General Jankovic, and he had me arrested 
for refusing obedience. They took me through various prisons for 
about two months, and all because I had refused to obey them, and 
they feared I would betray their secrets. Finally, the authorities 
decided to send me to Bosnia. In Sabac a prisoner told me that my 
life was at stake. The gendarmes accompanied me to Zvornik, where 
they handed me over to the Bosnian gendarmes. In this way I came 
to Bosnia in December, 1910. 

" I know nothing of any ' Black Hand,' with the exception of 
what I have read of it in Serbian newspapers. I can't remember now 
what was written in the newspapers about the ' Black Hand.' Nor 
do I know anjrthing of the ' Black List.' After the annexation there 
prevailed in Serbia universal anger and hatred against the person 
of the Heir to the Austrian Throne, who was regarded as the sworn 
enemy of the Serbians." 

Beyond this, Krstanovic referred to his earlier statements, of which 
only the following are of interest as supplementing the foregoing 

The Komitee into which Milan Pribicevic introduced Krstanovic 
was set up by the Narodna Odbrana. In the school at Cuprija there 
were 20 to 22 Austrian subjects. Milan Ciganovic was also one of the 

In the school at Cuprija it was inculcated that the Komitee must 
be ready to proceed to Bosnia, on the command of the Narodna 
Odbrana, and there act according to the orders of their commanders. 


Extract from the Proceedings of the District Court of 
Serajevo in the Prosecution of Jovo jAGLicid and others 
ii-OR Espionage. 

In the year 1913, it was discovered that Jovo Jaglicic and several 
accomplices were carrjdng on espionage in Bosnia in the interests of 
Serbia. The criminal proceedings instituted in the matter afforded 
inter alia opportunities for obtaining an insight into the methods of 
the Great-Serbian progaganda, and more especially of the Narodna 


:[R. 19, app. 6] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25, 

Jovo Jaglicic made a statement that in the month of August or 
September, 1912, he for the first time met Peter Klaric, knovra as 
Pesut, formerly a cattle inspector in Foca, who had fled to Montenegro 
in 1912 and then became a Komitadji. 

At their first meeting Klaric asked Jaglicic whether he knew Rade 
Milosevic of Kalinovik, and, on his answering, said that Milosevic was 
l5dng very ill in hospital : "It would be a pity if he were to die, we 
have spoken of great matters, has he never said anything to you about 
them ? " On receiving a negative answer Klaric went on : "I had 
something important to tell you, we are Serbians, and must do some- 
thing important for Serbia. Come to my office." There the following 
conversation ensued between them : — 

" Jovan, I will tell you something ; I don't know you yet and 
whether you will betray me. I teU you, nevertheless, and if you have 
the heart, betray me ! " 

On Jaglicic asking him what it was aU about, Klaric answered, 
" Brother, in Serbia there is a society called the ' Narodna Odbrana.' 
Many people must join this society ; many have been enrolled already 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the whole Monarchy ; among 
them are people of intelligence and means, long-headed people, and if 
they can do it why should we not do it too, so that we too may help 
a bit ? " 

To the question, what was the object of this society, Klaric 
answered : — 

" The Society has this object : for instance, you are in Kalinovik ; 
you let me know what the news is there, how many soldiers, how many 
guns, how much ammunition, different arms, who comes, who leaves, 
and so on. We have a secret writing, ' cipher,' and use it for corre- 
spondence. If you are loyal, you will get it too." 

Jaglicic was frightened that Klaric was merely sounding him for 
the purpose of denouncing him, and therefore asked him to tell him 
the names of some of the members, on which Klaric reflected for some 
time and then told him a name, which gave him confidence. 

Hereon Klaric said to him : " Shall I give you the ' cipher ' ? " 
Jaglicic agreed. Klaric, who knew the cipher by heart, wrote it out 
on a slip and gave it to Jaglicic. 

On another occasion Klaric gave an account of his stay at Banja- 
Koviljaca (near Loznica) where he was instructed by the Serbian 
captain Todorovic* in bomb-throwing, and when asked by the accused 
why he learnt this he answered : "If anything such as I have spoken 
of to you comes to pass, it is necessary that I should know how to 

* Captain Kosta Todorovic was then in fact Boundary Commissioner 
and Director of the Serbian Intelligence Service for the frontier line from 
Raca to Ljuboija. 



handle bombs, and that I should teach you and you should teach others, 
so that powder magazines and other important objects should be 
blown up, for in that case we should receive bombs from Serbia." 

Klaric then described the appearance of the bombs, and said that 
he had already enrolled people who, in case of war, would cut telegraph 
and telephone wires. 

At these meetings Jaghcic learnt from Klaric that it also apper- 
tained to the duties of members of the Narodna Odbrana to induce 
Austro-Hungarian soldiers to desert, to enlist voltmteers (Komitadjis), 
to organise bands, to blow up objects and depots, and so on. Klaric 
also informed him that even cipher correspondence between Bosnian 
and Serbian members would not be entrusted to the post, but des- 
patched across the frontier by reliable messengers. 

Klaric further told Jaglicic that on the occasion of the Prosvjeta 
celebration (in September, 1912) a Serbian major had stayed in the 
Hotel " Europe " with the Serbian deputation which was sent to it,* 
that Klaric had taken members of the Narodna Odbrana to him, and 
that he had sworn them in. 

From a spy Jaglicic learnt that bombs would arrive in Serajevo, 
or had already arrived, that these had the appearance of pieces of 
soap.f and that two or three would either be sent to this spy or that 
he would fetch them. 

From Confidential Reports on the Narodna Odbrana. 

The control of the Narodna Odbrana is in the hands of representa- 
tives of all parties, so as to win over both the progressives and those 
who are hostile to the conspirators. Its actual guiding spirit is 
Pribicevic, now Major. The position of secretary is always filled by 
an officer on leave. 

The object of the Narodna Odbrana is to develop effective pro- 
paganda in military and civiUan circles in the Southern-Slav portions 
of Austria-Hungary, with the object of preparing for a revolution, 
interference with any mobilisation that may take place, and the initia- 
tion of panics, revolts, etc. 

The organisation has many trusted representatives and emissaries 
in the Monarchy, who carry on an unostentatious personal progaganda. 

* The Serbian major, Mika Jankovic, appeared as a delegate at the 
Prosvjeta celebration. 

t The bombs used in the Serajevo attack on the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, as well as those found in the Save, near Brcko, in the year 1913, 
which came from the Royal Serbian Arsenal at Kragujevac, can in fact be 
compared with pieces of soap. 


[R. 19,app.8] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25, 

Some are sent specially — to enlist a few men — preferably railway 
officials — in the neighbourhood of important bridges, junctions, etc., 
whose duty it is at the appropriate moment to carry out the directions 
they have received, or to get them carried out. 

Intercourse between the members of the Narodna Odbrana is, 
so far as possible, effected by keeping in personal touch with each 

Young people, workmen and railwaymen chiefly are enrolled as 


Extract from the Records of the District Court of Bosnia 
AND Herzegovina at Serajevo, touching the proceedings 


THE 28TH June, 1914, on His Imperial and Royal Highness 
THE Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Este and Her 
Highness the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg. 

I. The deed and the -perpetrators. 

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, Trifko Grabez, Vaso Cubri- 
lovic and Cetres Popovic confess that in common with the fugitive 
Mehemed Mehmedbasic they contrived a plot for the murder of the 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and, armed with bombs and in the case 
of some of them with Browning pistols, laid w^it for him on the 
28th June, 1914, on his progress through Serajevo for the purpose of 
carrying out the planned attack. 

Nedeljko Cabrinovic confesses that he was the first of the con- 
spirators to hurl a bomb against the Archduke's carriage, which missed • 
its mark and which on exploding injured only the occupants of the 
carriage following the Archducal motor car. 

Gavrilo Princip confesses that he fired two shots from a Browning 
pistol against the Archducal motor car, by which the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand and the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg received fatal 

Both perpetrators confess that the act was done with intent to 

These confessions have been fully verified by means of the investi- 
gations which have taken place, and it is established that the deceased 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the deceased Duchess Sophie of 
Hohenberg died as a result of the revolver shots fired at them by 
Gavrilo Princip. 



//. Origin of the plot. 

The accused have made the following declarations, which are 
essentially consistent, before the examining magistrate : — 

In April, 1914, Princip, during his stay at Belgrade, where he 
associated with a number of Serbian students in the cafes of the town, 
conceived the plan for the execution of an attempt on the life of the 
late Archduke Franz Ferdinand. He communicated this intention 
to his acquaintance Cabrinovic, who also was in Belgrade at the time. 
The latter had already conceived a similar idea and was ready at 
once to participate in the attempt. The execution of an attempt on 
the Archduke's hfe was^ a frequent topic of conversation in the circle 
in which Princip and Cabrinovic moved, because the Archduke was 
considered to be a dangerous enemy of the Serbian people. 

Princip and Cabrinovic desired at first to procure the bombs and 
weapons necessary for the execution of the deed from the Serbian 
Major Milan Pribicevic or from the Narodna Odbrana, as they them- 
selves did not possess the means for their purchase. As, however. 
Major Pribicevic and the authoritative member of the said association, 
Zivojin Dacic, were absent from Belgrade at that time, they decided 
to try to obtain the weapons from their acquaintance Milan Ciganovic, 
who had formerly been a Komitadji and was at that time in the 
employment of the State railways. 

Princip, through the instrumentality of an intimate friend of 
Ciganovic, now got into communication with the latter. Thereupon 
Ciganovic called on Princip and discussed the planned attempt with 
him. He entirely approved it, and thereupon declared that he would 
like to consider further whether he should provide the weapons for 
the attempt. Cabrinovic also talked with Ciganovic on the subject 
of the weapons. 

At Easter Princip took Trifko Grabez, who also was in Belgrade, 
into his confidence. The latter is also shown by his own confession to 
have declared himself ready to take part in the attempt. 

In the following weeks Princip had repeated conversations with 
Ciganovic about the execution of the attempt. 

Meanwhile Ciganovic had reached an understanding on the subject 
of the planned attack with the Serbian Major Voja Tankosic, who was 
a close friend of his and who then placed at his disposal for this object 
the Browning pistols. 

Grabez confesses in conformity with the depositions of Princip 
and Cabrinovic that on the 24th May he, accompanied by Ciganovic, 
visited Major Tankosic at the latter's request at his rooms. He says 
that after he had been introduced Tankosic said to him : " Are you 
the man ? Are you determined ? " Whereupon Grabez answered : 


[R. 19, app. 8] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25, 

" I am." Tankosic next asked : " Do you know how to shoot with a 
revolver ? " and when Grabez answered in the negative Tankosic 
said to Ciganovic : "I will give you a revolver, go and teach them 
how to shoot. "^ 

Hereupon Ciganovic conducted Princip and Grabez to the military 
rifle range at Topcider and instructed them in a wood adjoining the 
range in shooting with a Browning pistol at a target. Princip proved 
himself the better shot of the two. Ciganovic also familiarised Princip, 
Grabez and Cabrinovic with the use of the bombs which were later 
given to them. 

On the 27th May, 1914, Ciganovic handed over to Princip, Cabri- 
novic and Grabez, as their confessions agree in stating, six bombs, 
four Browning revolvers and a sufficient quantity of ammunition as 
well as a glass tube of cyanide of potassium with which to poison 
themselves after the accomplishment of the deed in order that the 
secret might be kept. Moreover, Ciganovic gave them some money. 

Princip had previously informed Danilo Ilic, at Easter, of his plan 
of assassination. He now begged the latter on his return to Serajevo 
to enlist certain additional persons, in order to ensure the success of 
the attempt.^ Hereupon Ilic according to his confession enlisted Jaso 
Cubrilovic, Cetro Popovic and Mehemed Mehmedbasic in the plot. 

///. Origin of the bombs. 

Only one of the bombs was made use of in the execution of the 
attempt. The remaining five bombs came later into the possession 
of the police at Serajevo. 

In the opinion of the judicial experts these bombs are Serbian 
hand-grenades which were factory-made and intended for military 
purposes. They are identical with the 21 bombs which were found in 
the Save at Brcko in the year 1913 and which were partly in their 
original packing, which proved without a doubt that they came from 
the Serbian arsenal of Kragujevac. 

It is thus proved that the grenades which were used in the attempt 
against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand also came from the stores of 
the Army Depot at Kragujevac. 

Grabez quite spontaneously calls the grenades which were handed 
over to him and his accomplices " Kragujevac bombs." 

IV. Transport of the three assailants, and of the weapons frQtn Serbia 

to Bosnia. 

With regard to this Princip makes the following statement : — 

Ciganovic told Cabrinovic, Grabez and Princip that they were to 
make their way via Sabac and Loznica to Tuzla and there to betake 



themselves to Misko Jovanovic who would take over the weapons. 
Next they were to go to Sabac and report themselves to the frontier 
captain, Major Rade Popovic, to whom he gave them a note, of which 
Princip took charge. On the 28th May the three accomplices left 
Belgrade with the weapons. At Sabac Princip handed over the note 
which he had received from Ciganovic to Major Popovic, who there- 
upon conducted all three to the orderly room and drew them up a pass 
in which it was stated that one of them was an exciseman and the 
other two his colleagues. The pass contained also the name of this 
alleged exciseman, but he had forgotten the name. At the same time 
Major Popovic handed over a closed letter for the frontier captain at 
Loznica, whose name was Pravanovic, Prdanovic or Predojevic. 

Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez passed the night at Sabac and went 
by train the next morning to Loznica, with a half-price ticket, it may 
be remarked, on the strength of the pass which Major Popovic had 
drawn up for them. They reached Loznica at noon and delivered to 
the frontier captain at that place Major Popovic's letter, in which were 
the words : " See that you receive these people and bring them on 
their way, you know where." The frontier captain said he would 
summon his excisemen from the frontier and give the three into the 
charge of the most reliable man. Thereupon he telephoned, and made 
an appointment with the chree accomplices for 7 o'clock the next 
morning in his oflSce.' 

Next morning the three conspirators agreed that Cabrinovic should 
take Grafeez's pass and make his way openly to Zvornik, but that 
Princip and Grabez should cross the frontier secretly. This plan was 
discussed with the frontier captain and it was decided that an excise- 
man from Ljesnica called Grbic was to take Princip and Grabez with 
him to his tower [karaula) and bring them over the frontier. Cabrinovic 
accordingly walked to Banja Koviljaca in the direction of Zvornik. 
Princip and Grabez drove with the exciseman Grbic to Ljesnica, where 
they deposited the bombs and the revolver in a room in a hotel. 
While they were doing so the exciseman Grbic caught sight of these 
objects. Princip himself described this journey as mysterious. 

Grabez's statement conformed in essentials with Princip's and was 
supplemented by an addition to the effect that Grbic laughed when he 
saw the bombs and the revolver and merely asked to what part of Bosnia 
they were going with those bombs. The excisemen certainly thought 
that Grabez and Princip were travelling on a mission. 

Grbic and a second exciseman brought Princip and Grabez in a boat 
to an island in the Drina. There Grbic instructed them to wait for a 
peasant who would come to fetch them. They passed the night on 
the island in a peasant's hut to which Grbic had directed them ; next 
day came a peasant who conducted them during the night first through 
a bog and then over the mountains to the neighbourhood of Priboj, 


[R. 19, app. 8] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25, 

where he handed them over to the local teacher Cubrilovic, who seemed 
to have been already waiting for them, to see them further on their 

He took them on to Misko Jovanovic at Tuzla. 

Cabrinovic's statement about the events of the journey up to the 
point at which he parted with Princip and Grabez conformed in 
essentials with those of the latter, and only added by way of supplement 
that Major Popovic told them that he did not reach Sabac from 
Belgrade till the day before their arrival. 

In Loznica, Cabrinovic, Princip and Grabez decided to separate, 
as it was too dangerous to go about all three together. The frontier 
captain at Loznica, whom they informed of this, applauded their 
plan and gave Cabrinovic^ a letter for M. Jaklojevic, the teacher at 
Mali-Zvornik. Hereupon Cabrinovic handed over the bombs. Browning 
pistol and ammunition which he had been carrjdng, to Princip and 
Grabez, and went to Mali-Zvomik with an exciseman who had been told 
off to accompany him. 

There he found the teacher Jaklojevic, to whom he handed the 
letter from the frontier captain of Loznica. Hereupon the former 
notified the Serbian frontier guard. When Cabrinovic, with the teacher, 
reached this frontier post, a man was already waiting there for them, 
who brought them in a boat over the Drina to Gross-Zvornik in Bosnia. 

Cabrinovic then proceeded to Misko Jovanovic at Tuzla. 


Just before this memoir was closed, minutes of evidence were 
published by the District Court at Serajevo from which it appears 
that a subject of the Monarchy some days before the 28th June last 
desired to make a report to the Imperial and Royal Consulate at 
Belgrade to the effect that he suspected that a plan existed for the 
execution of an attempt on the life of Archduke Franz Ferdinand 
during his presence in Bosnia. It seems that the man was prevented 
from making this report by members of the Belgrade police force, 
who arrested him on trivial grounds just as he was about to enter 
the Imperial and Royal Consulate. The conclusion to be drawn from 
the statements contained in the evidence in question would seem 
to be that the police officials concerned had knowledge of the planned 
attempt, and only arrested this man in order to prevent him from 
laying the information. 

As these statements have not yet been verified, no opinion can 
be expressed at the present stage on their reliability. In view of the 
investigations into the matter now pending, the more minute details 
of the evidence cannot be published more exactly at present. 




The Serbian Press on the Assassination. 

(a) The Belgrade newspaper Balkan writes on the 29th June, with 
regard to the two perpetrators : — 

" Nedeljko Cabrinovic, a compositor by profession, was full of 
anarchical ideas, and well known as a restless spirit. Until twenty- 
days ago, he lived in Belgrade, whither he came after the war and 
was employed in the State printing works. Before his departure he 
announced that he was going to Trieste, where he would get work 
in a new printing works. Gavrilo Princip also was living at Belgrade 
until a short time ago. During the war he offered his services as a 
volunteer, but was not accepted, and therefore he left Belgrade. 
He returned, however, at Christmas last year to Belgrade, attended 
the gymnasium for a time, and left Belgrade almost at the same time 
as Cabrinovic, though in a different direction. Princip was a silent, 
nervous, hard-working student, and associated with some fellow 
students who canie, like himself, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well 
as latterly with Cabrinovic. He inclined towards socialistic ideas, 
although he had originally belonged to the Young Men Progressive 
Party. Princip, like Cabrinovic, was brought up at Serajevo ; the 
two have been bound by ties of the closest friendship since their 

(&) The Piemont, of the ist July, points out that Princip's pro- 
test was a sequel to the public protest of the assassin Zerajic. The 
explanation of the former's, as of the latter's activities, is to be found 
in the system of government in Bosnia. The circumstance that 
Princip executed the deed of vengeance on the national festival of 
St. Vitus, the day which had been chosen for the manoeuvres, made 
the desperate act of the young martjn: more intelligible and more 
natural, (The newspaper was confiscated by the police on account 
of this article ; the confiscation was, however, annulled the day 
after by the Court of First Instance at Belgrade.) 

(c) The Young Radical Odjek, of the 3rd July, says : — " The 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand was sent to Serajevo on the day of 
national enthusiasm in order to celebrate a brutal manifestation of 
violence and domination. This brutal act was bound to evoke brutal 
feelings of resistance, hatred and revenge." 

{d) The organ of the Nationalist Party, Srpska Zastava, of the 
3rd July, says in an article entitled " Suspicions and Threats " : — • 
" The assassination comes to be regarded more and more as the out- 
come of the unsound state of affairs in the Monarchy. On the other 


0l.l9,app.9] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25, 

hand, the savage persecution of the Serbian people in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina evokes the horror of the whole civilised world." 

(e) The Progressive newspaper, Pravda, of the 3rd July, writes : — 
The policy of Vienna is a cynical one. It exploits the death of the 
unfortunate couple for its abominable aims against the Serbian 

(/) The Agence des Balkans, of the 3rd July, says : — " The crimes 
which have been perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina against 
the Serbians have been carried out under the auspices and at the 
direct instigation of the Austro-Hungarian civil and military 

ig) The Pravda, of the 4th July, says : — " All the murders and 
assassinations which have been carried out up to the present time 
in Austria have arisen from one and the same source. The oppressed 
peoples of the Monarchy were obliged to have recourse to this method 
of protest, because no other way was open to them. In the chaos of 
a reign of terror, it is natural and quite intelligible that the era of 
assassinations should have firmly established itself." 

{h) The Balkan, of the 5th July, remarks that Austria-Hungary 
" must be placed under international control, because of its persecution 
of the innocent " ; for Austria-Hungary has less cohesion than Turkey. 

{i) The Mali Journal, of the 7th July, writes : — " A sprig of the 
Middle Ages has been murdered at Serajevo within the last few days. 
He has been murdered by a lad whose grief for the enslavement of 
his immediate Fatherland {engeres Vaterland) amounted to a par- 
oxysm, that grief which the robbers of the land of his fathers had 
brought upon him. What has been the contribution of official Austria- 
Hungary to this ? It has answered with general massacres, plunderings 
and destruction of Serbian life and property. Only the worthless 
distinguish themselves by such heroism. Cowards are always mighty 
heroes when they are sure that nothing will happen to them. Only 
compare Princip and Cabrinovic with these heroes, and you will at 
once see the great difference between them. Civilisation and justice 
are a huge lie in Austria-Hungary." 

(/) The Tribuna, of the 7th July, says : — " We are of the opinion 
that the Serajevo murder was arranged to facilitate the extermination 
of the Serbians at one blow." 

{k) The Piemont, of the 8th July, reports from Bajina Baschka 
that the Austrian officials in Bosnia are preparing a massacre of the 

(/) The Balkan, of the 8th, publishes a report from Bosnia, under 
the title " St. Bartholomew's Day at Serajevo," and pleads for a 
general boycott against all the Austrians living in Serbia. 

[m) The Mali Journal, of the 8th, appeals to its readers to boycott 
the Danube Steamship Company. 



(«) Under the title " Nothing from Austria-Hungary ! " the 
Tribuna, of the 8th, writes that it would be best to order nothing 
from Austria-Hungary, to abstain from visiting the Austrian and 
Hungarian Spas, and from calUng in doctors from Austria-Hungary. 
It says that private initiative can accomplish a great deal in the direc- 
tion suggested. The State and the Government offices must not mix 
themselves up in this movement. It is enough to appeal to the citizens. 

(0) The Stampa, of the 8th, asserts that the Serajevo police are 
exposing the arrested assassins to the most inhuman and brutal torture 
in order to extort from them untrue confessions on which it is intended 
to base complaints against the Serbian people. 

[p) The Agence des Balkans, of the gth, reports from Belgrade : 
— " Absolutely trustworthy private reports announce that a general 
massacre of Serbians is on the point of breaking out in Bosnia and 

{q) The Balkan, of the gth July, taking as its text Mr. Asquith's 
statement on the announcement of the news of the death of Arch- 
duke Franz Ferdinand, that he was full of anxiety for the fate of 
humanity,* publishes a historical survey of the events of the last 40 
years, from which it deduces that the Serbian people during this 
period have been exposed to the cruel persecutions of Austria-Hungary's 
Jesuitical policy. Archduke Franz Ferdinand, like all the sons of 
Loyola, who only work in human blood, and who do homage to the 
principle, " The end justifies the means," was bound to be overtaken 
by fate and to fall a victim to Jesuitism, as the whole of Austria- 
Hungary will also fall. . But by the downfall of Austria-Hungary, 
peace and tranquillity would ensue to mankind. The sum of all these 
truths emerges in the conclusion that Asquith might with a calm mind 
have accompanied the news of the murder with the words, " I am 
no longer anxious for the fate of humanity." 

[r) The Politika, of the gth July, expresses itself in a leading 
article under the heading, " Shameless Lies," as follows : — " The 
manner in which the inquiries into the Serajevo murder are being 
carried on shows quite clearly what objects Austria is aiming at in 
those inquiries. When the assassins, regardless of all the tortures to 
which they were exposed, refused to say what was demanded of them, 
other individuals were unearthed who expressed themselves ready on 
certain conditions to confess a certain degree of complicity in the 
murder, but at the same time to implicate aU those persons who were 
objectionable to Austria. This method has succeeded for the moment 

* "We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes 
which almost make us despair of the progress of mankind." 

Mr. Asquith's Speech, Times, July i, 1914. [Note added in official 
English translation.] 


[R. 19, app. 9] AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED-BOOK [July 25, 

because the hired individuals state whatever they are asked to 
state, and the Austrian police take care that these lies are at once 
spread to all the points of the compass. Austria has no sense of 
shame, and thinks that somebody will be found to believe lies of 
this sort." 

(s) The Stampa, of the 9th, says that not everything which has 
happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet been revealed and 
attained publicity. Strict secrecy is being maintained. But the truth 
will sooner or later come to the surface ; blood-thirsty Austria will 
drink, nay, is drinking, Serbian blood, till she can drink no more. It 
is reported that there are to-day about ten thousand wounded and 
dead in Bosnia. 

[t) The Politika, of the loth July, hurls extravagant abuse against 
the members of the Imperial House. 

(m) The Commercial journal, Trgovinski Glasnik, of the loth 
July, talks about the corruption and unscrupulousness of the Austro- 
Hungarian policy, which it calls Jesuitical, reckless and dishonour- 
able. It is a warning to the Serbian people in Austria-Hungary that 
they are not living in a civilised State which guarantees life and 
property, but that they must hold themselves armed and ever ready 
to defend themselves against the robbery of the officials and the 
Government. After the latest occurrences, the Serbian people ought 
no longer to wait like a lamb, which any day might be led to the 
slaughter, but like a lion ready for a bloody resistance. 

[v) In the Stampa, of the loth July, we find : — " Nothing lasts 
for ever, nor will Austria-Hungary remain for ever in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The time is not far off when the Serbians who broke 
the power of the Turks and punished the Bulgarians, will circle round 
the Ivan Planina on the Trebevic." 

{w) The Pravda, of the loth July, under the title " Boycott 
against Good-for-nothings," appeals for a boycott of Austrian firms 
in Belgrade, as well as of Austrian wares, and says that it is the duty 
of the Narodna Odbrana to see that the boycott is strictly carried 

(x) The Zvono; of the i6th July, declares Princip to be the son 
of Countess Lonyay, to whom the charge was given that he should 
avenge the death of Crown Prince Rudolf on his murderer. Arch- 
duke Franz Ferdinand. 

(y) The Mali Journal, of the 19th July, publishes a report 
which says : — " Princip was instigated to make the attempt by an 
Austro-Hungarian agent. It is said in Vienna that it is only in the 
Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade that the real culprit is to be 

(2) The leading Young Radical organ, Odjek, of the 20th July, 
writes : — " Austria-Hungary offers a hundred proofs that it will 



inherit the title of the ' sick man ' of Europe. While in Serbia not 
a single Austrian citizen has been molested, villages and towns have 
been plundered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact is one more 
proof on how much higher a cultural and moral level Serbia stands 
than Austria-Hungary." 

The Local Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, on the 



A confidential communication has come to the ears of the Imperial 
and Royal Foreign Office from a reliable correspondent, whose name 
will be published at the proper time, according to which the Local 
Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, recently held a 
meeting at which the president of this Committee, Jasa Nenadovic, 
director of the Nish prison, touched on the subject of the assassination 
of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, using the following words : " Serbia 
was absolutely bound this time to have recourse to a measure like the 
assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, because the Archduke, 
on account of his aggressive and eccentric character, was a prominent 
and deadly danger for Serbia, and possibly for wider Slavonic circles 
also. Had he remained alive, he would have soon challenged Serbia 
to war or attacked it, in which case Serbia, which was now so much 
weakened materially, and had not yet completed her army re-organisa- 
tion, would certainly have been lost. But now Serbia had been rescued 
by the Serajevo murder, and one of the dangers which threatened 
Serbia in the person of the victim had been swept out of the way. 
Serbia would now have rest for several years, as the new heir to 
the throne would consider well before walking in the steps of his 

"Though he was aware," continued the speaker, "that the murder 
of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand would be a heavy blow and a great 
grief to Austria-Hungary, and that it would be followed by the torture 
of those of our nation who were living in that country, yet he would 
not have thought that his suppositions would have been so completely 
fulfilled, and that the Croatians would have behaved as they had. 
Yet his friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina had assured him that 
the Austro-Hungarian officials were cowards and would not dare 
to overstep the mark in the measures they took ; unfortunately 
however, these friends, and through them, we too had been disap- 
pointed. If things went on much longer as they were going at present, 
revolvers and bombs would at last have to play their real i61e. 

ii-Q 241 


Whatever the God of Serbia has in store, things cannot go on as at 

The remarks of the speaker were received with complete approval 
by his hearers. 

Supplements after going to Press. 

I. — To Appendix 8. 

The teacher, Cubrilovic, who undertook the guidance of Princip 
and Grabez at Priboj, has made a complete confession, from which 
the following important facts emerge : — 

In the year 1911, Cubrilovic, on the occasion of a Sokol expedition 
to Sabac, was initiated by Bozo Fovic, a member of the managing 
committee of the Narodna Odbrana, into the objects of that 
association, and was then appointed representative of the Narodna 
Odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnia). At his invitation, Misko Jovanovic 
was later nominated representative of the Narodna Odbrana for 

A peasant acted as go-between in the communications with the 
Narodna Odbrana, in fact, the same peasant who brought Princip 
and Grabez to Cubrilovic, with the information that he was bringing 
two Serbian students with weapons to him. When he learned this, 
he knew that it was a " mission " from the Narodna Odbrana. Princip 
and Grabez told him that they had bombs and revolvers with them, 
with a view to making an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz 

2. — Pictures in the Belgrade War Office of a nature hostile to the 


There are four allegorical pictures on the wall outside the reception 
hall of the Royal Serbian War Office, of which three are representations 
of Serbian victories, while the fourth symbolises the realisation of the 
anti-Monarchial tendencies of Serbia. 

Over a landscape, partly mountains (Bosnia) , partly plains (South 
Hungary), rises the " Zora," the rosy dawn of Serbian hopes. In the 
foreground stands a woman in armour, whose shield bears the names 
of all the " provinces still awaiting liberation " : Bosnia, Herze- 
govina, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, &c. 



No. 20. 

Count Berchiold to the Under Secretary, Freiherr von Macchio 

at Vienna. 

(Telegraphic.) Lambach, July 25, 1914. 

RUSSIAN Charge d' Affaires telegraphs to me"' that he "'[0. 11. 
has received urgent instructions from his Government to 12.I 

press for a prolongation of time-limit fixed for the ultimatum 
to Serbia. I request Your Excellency to reply to him in 
my name that we cannot consent to a prolongation of time- 
limit."" Your Excellency will add, that Serbia, even after ""[c/. No. 
breaking off of diplomatic relations, can bring about friendly 9-1 

solution by unconditional acceptance of our demands, although 
we shall be obliged in such an event to demand reimburse- 
ment by Serbia of all costs and damage incurred by us through 
our mihtary measures. "* '" [c/. No. 

No. 21. 

Count Berchiold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg. 

(Telegraphic.) Bad Ischl, July 25, 1914. 

FOR Your Excellency's information and guidance : — 

The Russian Charge d' Affaires called this morning on the 
Under Secretary, '*' in order to express in the name of his w fcf. O. 
Government the wish that the time-limit fixed in our note 11.] 

to Serbia might be prolonged. 

This request was based on the grounds that the Powers 
had been taken by surprise by our move, and that the Russian 
Government would regard it merely as natural consideration 
for the other Cabinets, on the part of the Vienna Cabinet, if 
an opportunity were given to the former to examine the 
data on which our communication to the Powers was based 
and to study our prospective dossier."' '^'[No. ig.J 

The Under Secretary replied to the Charge d' Affaires 
that he would immediately bring his explanation to my 
knowledge ; but that he could tell him at once that there 
was no prospect of a prolongation of the time-limit fixed 
being granted by us. As to the grounds which the Russian 
Government had advanced in support of the wish they had 



expressed, they appeared to rest upon a mistaken h37pothesis. 
Our note to the Powers was in no way intended to invite 
them to make known their own views on the subject, but 
merely bore the character of a statement for information, 
the communication of which we regarded as a duty laid on 
us by international courtesy. For the rest, we regarded our 
action as a matter concerning us and Serbia alone, which 
action, notwithstanding the patience and longsuffering we 
had exhibited for years past, we had been forced by the 
development of circumstances to take, much against our own 
wish, for the defence of our most vital interests. 

No. 22. 
Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. 

CABINET Council met yesterday evening and early this 
morning ; form of answer to our note was settled after 
several drafts, and is to be delivered to me before the time- 
limit expires. I hear that Royal train is being made up ; 
gold belonging to the National Bank and to the railway, as 
well as the Foreign Office records, are being taken into the 
interior of the country. Some of my colleagues are of the 
opinion that they must follow the Government ; packing-up 
is proceeding at the Russian Legation in particular. 

Garrison has left town in field order. Ammunition 

depots in the fortress were evacuated. Railway station 

thronged with soldiers. The ambulance trains have left 

Belgrade, proceeding towards the south. In pursuance of 

the instructions which have reached me while I write, we 

intend, in the event of a rupture, to leave Belgrade by the 

"'[c/. No 6.30 train."' 

No. 23. 

,2, r^gg fQQ^_ Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold. 

note, p. (Telegraphic.) Semlin, July 25, 1914. 

c/. G. 5 J ORDERS for general mobilisation were issued in Serbia 
S.41.] at 3 p.m."' 


No. 24. 

Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Semlin, July 25, 1914. 

AS a result of the Royal Serbian Government's unsatis- 
factory answer to our demands of the 23rd inst., I have 
announced"' that diplomatic relations are broken off with (i)[S. 40.] 
Serbia, and have left Belgrade'"' with the staff of the Legation, w^^f^ j^tq. 
The reply was delivered to me at two minutes to six p.m."' 22 ; B. 


No. 25. -"/* 


Note of the Royal Serbian Government of 12/25 J^ly> ^9^A- 

[See No. 34, enclosure, p. 254, et seq.] 

No. 26. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szapdry at St. Petersburg. 

Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

WE were, of course, aware, when we decided to take 
serious measures against Serbia, of the possibility that the 
Serbian dispute might develop into a coUision with Russia.'*' (4(1-^/ ^^ 
We could not, however, allow ourselves to be diverted by p. 125 i' 
this eventuality from the position we took up towards Serbia, also S. 36 • 
because fundamental considerations of national policy brought O- ^o.J 
us face to face with the necessity of putting an end to the 
state of affairs in which a Russian charter made it possible 
for Serbia to threaten the Monarchy continuously without 
punishment and without the possibility of punishment. 

Should events prove that Russia considered the moment 
for the great settlement with the central European Powers 
to have already arrived, and was therefore determined on 
war from the beginning, the following instructions to your 
Excellency appear indeed superfluous. 



It might, however, be conceivable that Russia, in the 
event of the refusal of our demands by Serbia, and in face 
of the resulting necessity for us of military measures, might 
think better of it, and might even be willing not to allow 
herself to be swept away by the bellicose elements. It is to 
meet this situation that the following explanations have been 
drawn up, which your Excellency -will use with M. Sazonof 
and the President of the Council, at the right moment, in the 
manner which you think best, and when the opportunity, in 
your opinion, presents itself. 

I assume, generally, that your Excellency in the existing 

circumstances, has established a close understanding with 

your German colleague, who will certainly have been enjoined 

by his Government to leave the Russian Government no 

room for doubt that Austria-Hungary, in the event of a 

'"[c/. No. conflict with Russia, would not stand alone.'" 

12 and I am under no illusion that it will be easy to make M. 

note.] Sazonof understand the step taken by us at Belgrade, which 

had become inevitable. 

There is, however, one factor which cannot fail to impress 
the Russian Foreign Minister, and that is the emphasising 
of the circumstance that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
in conformity with the principle to which it has adhered 
for decades past, is actuated in the present crisis by no selfish 
motives in appealing to arms in order to reach a settlement 
of her differences with Serbia. 

The Monarchy possesses territory to repletion and has no 
desire for Serbian possessions. If a conflict with Serbia is 
forced upon us, it will be for us not a conflict for territorial 
gain, but merely a means of self-defence and self-preservation. 
'"'[No. 8.J The contents of the circular note,"" which in itself is 
sufficiently eloquent, are placed in their proper light by the 
*''[No. 19.] dossier"' relating to the Serbian propaganda against the 
Monarchy, and the various points of connection between 
this propaganda and the crime of June 28th. 

Your Excellency will draw the Russian Minister's very 
particular attention to this dossier and impress upon him 
that it is an unique event in history that a Great Power 
should have borne with the seditious intrigues of an adjoining 
small State for so long a time and with such unparalleled 
patience as Austria-Hungary has borne with those of Serbia. 



We had no wish to pursue a poUcy adverse to the ambitions 
of the Christian Balkan States, and we have therefore — 
notwithstanding that we well knew how little value was to 
be attached to Serbian promises — suffered Serbia to increase 
her territory after the annexation crisis of 1908 to nearly 
double its former extent. 

Since that time the subversive movement which has been 
fostered in Serbia against the Monarchy has assumed such 
excessive proportions that the vital interests of Austria- 
Hungary, and even of our Dynasty itself, appear to be 
threatened by the revolutionary activities of Serbia. 

We must assume that to conservative loyal Russia energetic 
measures on our part against this menace to all public order 
will appear intelligible and indeed necessary. 

When Your Excellency reaches this point in your conver- 
sation with M. Sazonof, the moment will have arrived to add 
to your explanation of our motives and intentions the hint 
that we — as your Excellency will have already been in a 
position to explain — aim at no territorial gains, and also did 
not wish to infringe the sovereignty of the Kingdom, but 
that, on the other hand, we will proceed to extreme measures 
for the enforcement of our demands. 

That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to 
preserve the peace which we considered to be the most 
precious possession of nations, was shown by the course of 
events during the last 40 years, and by the historical fact 
that our gracious Emperor has won for himself the glorious 
title of " Protector of the Peace." 

We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturb- 
ance of the European peace, because we also were of the 
opinion that the strengthening of the Balkan States in a, 
position of political and national independence would prove 
to the advantage of our relations with Russia, and would 
also remove all possibility of antagonism between us and 
Russia ; also because we have always been ready, in the 
shaping of our own policy, to take into consideration the 
dominant political interests of Russia. 

Any further toleration of Serbian intrigues would under- 
mine our existence as a State and our position as a Great 
Power, thus also threatening the balance of power in Europe. 
We are, however, convinced that it is to Russia's own interests, 



asj.her peaceful leaders will clearly see, that the existing 
European balance of power which is of such importance for 
the peace of the world, should be maintained. Our action 
against Serbia, whatever form it takes, is conservative from 
first to last, and its object is the necessary preservation of our 
position in Europe. 

No. 27. 

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at Si. Petersburg. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. 

"I [See B. 4, AS point 5 of our demands,"' namely, the participation 
voL I., of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government 
p. 84. jin the suppression of the subversive movement in Serbia has 
^i • iso g^^^^ ^^s^ ^^ special objection on the part of M. Sazonof, 
No! 34 yo^r Excellency will explain in strict confidence with regard 
(end.), to this point that this clause was interpolated merely out of 
pp. 262- practical considerations, and was in no way intended to 
263.] infringe on the sovereignty of Serbia. 

By " collaboration " in point 5, we are thinking of the 
establishment of a private " Bureau de Surete " at Belgrade, 
which would operate in the same way as the analogous 
Russian establishments in Paris and in co-operation with the 
Serbian police and administration. 

No. 28. ; ■ 

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914. 

I"! [See W. AS the result of reports'" about measures taken for 
exhs. 6, 7.] mobihsation of Russian troops. Count Pourtales has called 
the Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner 
to the fact that nowadays measures of mobilisation would 
be a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure. For, in 
that event, the purely military consideration of the question 


by the general staffs would find expression, and if that 
button were once touched in Germany, the situation would 
get out of control.'" "'[c/- No. 

M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word 4o-J 

of honour that the reports on the subject were incorrect ; 
that up to that time not a single horse and not a single 
reservist had been called up, and that all the measures that 
were being taken were merely measures of preparation in the 
military districts of Kieff, Odessa, and perhaps Kasan and 
Moscow.™ '"'[MobiU- 

Immediately afterwards the Imperial German MiUtary sation in 
Attach^ received by courier late in the evening an invitation these 
from Suchomlinof, the Minister for War, who explained that g l"fif j 
Count Pourtales had spoken with the Foreign Minister about 
the Russian military preparations, and as the Ambassador 
might have misunderstood certain military details, he was 
taking the opportunity of giving him more detailed informa- 
tion. In the following telegram from Count Pourtales to 
Berlin which has been placed at my disposal, the pertinent 
communications from Major von Eggeling are collected : 

" The Military Attache reports with regard to a conversa- 
tion with the Russian Minister of War.'" M. Sazonof had (3i[c/. w. 
asked him to make the military position clear to me. The exh. ii ; 
Minister for War gave me his word of honour that as yet ^^o Nos. 
no orders for mobilisation of any kind had been issued. For 33. 42j 
the present merely preparatory measures would be taken, 
not a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If 
Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, the military districts 
of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan, which face Austria, 
would be mobilised. In no circumstances will mobilisation 
take place on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, and St. 
Petersburg. Peace with Germany is earnestly desired. My 
question what was the object of the mobilisation against 
Austria, was met with a shrug of the shoulders and a reference 
to the diplomatists. I gave the Minister for War to under- 
stand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by 
us, but that we should also consider mobilisation against 
Austria to be in itself extremely threatening. The Minister 
emphasised repeatedly, and with great stress Russia's urgent 
need of and earnest wish for peace." 



No, 29. 
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

HERR VON TSCHIRSCHKY informed me to-day in 
pursuance of his instructions that, according to a telegram 
from Prince Lichnowsky which had been despatched in 
London on the 25th of July at 3 p.m., Sir E, Grey had trans- 
mitted to the latter the sketch of an answer from Serbia, 
and had remarked in the private letter accompanying it, that 
he hoped that the Berlin Cabinet in view of the conciliatory 
tenor of this answer would support its acceptance in Vienna. 

I consider it desirable that your Excellency should again 
approach the matter with the Secretary of State, and call 
his attention to the fact that almost simultaneously with the 
transmission by him of this letter to Prince Lichnowsky, 
namely at 3 p.m. yesterday, Serbia had already ordered the 
'"[No. 23.] general mobilisation of her army,'" which proves that no 
inclination for a peaceful solution existed in Belgrade. It 
was not till six o'clock, after mobilisation had been pro- 
claimed, that the answer, which had apparently been pre- 
viously telegraphed to London and the contents of which 
were not reconcilable with our demands, was delivered to 
the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade. 

No. 30. 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at 
Berlin,' Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. 

WE have broken off diplomatic relations with Serbia after 
ro , she had refused the demands we had addressed to her."" I 
*" ' ^° beg your Excellency now to proceed at once to the Foreign 
Minister or his deputy, and to express yourself to him approxi- 
mately to the following effect : 

The Royal Serbian Government have refused to accept 
the demands which we were forced to address to them in 
order to secure permanently our most vital interests which 



were menaced by them, and have thereby made it clear that 
they do not intend to abandon their subversive aims, tending 
towards continuous disorder in some of our frontier provinces 
and their final disruption from the Monarchy. 

Reluctantly, therefore, and very much against our wish, 
we find ourselves obliged to compel Serbia by the sharpest 
measures to make a fundamental change in the attitude of 
enmity she has up to now pursued. 

No. 31. 

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914. 

JUST had a long conversation with M. Sazonof.'" Told ("[c/. O. 
the Minister I was under the impression that mistaken ideas 25 (dated 
were prevalent in Russia with regard to the character of our July26).l 
action. We were credited with wishing to push forward into 
Balkan territory, and to begin a march to Salonica or even 
to Constantinople. Others, again, went so far as to describe 
our action merely as the starting point of a preventive war 
against Russia. I said that all this was erroneous, and that 
parts of it were absolutely unreasonable. The goal of our 
action was self-preservation and self-defence against hostile 
propaganda by word, in writing, and in action, which 
threatened our integrity. It would occur to no one in Austria- 
Hungary to threaten Russian interests, or indeed to pick a 
quarrel with Russia. And yet we were absolutely determined 
to reach the goal which we had set before us, and the path 
which we had chosen seemed to us the most suitable. As, 
however, the action under discussion was action in self- 
defence, I could not conceal from him that we could not 
allow ourselves to be diverted from it by any consequences, 
of whatever kind they might be. 

M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described 
it to him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered 
that the path which we were pursuing with a view to attain- 
ing it was not the surest. He said that the note which we 
had delivered was not happy in its form. He had since been 



studying it, and if I had time, he would like to look it through 

once more with me. I remarked that I was at his service, 

but was not authorised either to discuss the text of the note 

with him or to interpret it. Of course, however, his remarks 

were of interest. The Minister then took all the points of 

the note in order, and on this occasion found seven of the 

ten points admissible without very great difficulty ; only the 

two points dealing with the collaboration of the Imperial and 

Royal Officials in Serbia and the point dealing with the 

•"[See foot- removal of officers and civil servants'" to be designated by us 

note to seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present form. 

No. 34, With regard to the first two points, I was in a position to 

pp. 260-1.] g^^g g^j^ authentic interpretation in the sense of your 

<'"[No. 27.] Excellency's telegram of the 25th. instant ;'"' with regard to 

the third, I expressed the opinion that it was a necessary 

demand. Moreover, matters had already been set in motion. 

<''[They The Serbians had mobilised on the previous day'** and I did 

issued not know what had happened since then. 

orders for 


*^0" XT 

on July No. 32. 

25 ; see 

No. 23.] Count BercMold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. 

I EMPOWER your Excellency to declare to M. Sazonof 
that, so long as the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia 
remains locahsed, the Monarchy does not aim in any way 

'*' [cf. B. 90 at territorial acquisitions of any sort. '^' 

and note.] 

No. 33. 
Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 27, 1914. 

M. SAZONOF explained to the German Ambassador that 


28' ^?' ^^ ^°"^^ " guarantee " to him " that on the Russian side no 
w! exh! mobilisation had been begun ; though it was true that certain 
II.] necessary military precautions were being taken."'" 



The German military attache at St. Petersburg reports'" "'[5ee No. 
that " the Russian Minister of War has given him his word ^^-^ 
of honour that not a man or a horse has been mobUised ; 
however, naturally, certain military precautions have been 
taken " ; precautions which, as the German military attache 
adds, apparently spontaneously, to his report, " are to be 
sure pretty far-reaching." 

No. 34. 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in 
Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg. 

Vienna, July 27, 1914. 

ANNEXED you will find the text, annotated with our 
remarks, of the note which the Royal Serbian Government 
on the 25th of June transmitted to the Imperial and Royal 
Minister at Belgrade. 

{See next page.) 




Reply of the Royal Serbian Government to the Imperial and 
Royal Government of the 12/25 J^^JV. 1914- 

<i>[For the TRANSLATION. Q 

FiMich THE Royal Serbian Government have received the 

text see communication''" of the Imperial and Royal Government of 

B. 39.] the loth instant, t and are convinced that their reply will 

"TB 4 1 remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair 

the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian 

Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia. 

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made 
both from the tribune of the national SkupshtinaJ and in 
the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives 
of the State — protests which were cut short by the declarations 
made by the Serbian Government on the i8th t March, 1909 
— ^have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the 
great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has 
been made since that time, either by the successive Royal 
Governments or by their agents, to change the political and 
legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this 
connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made 
no representation except one concerning a school book, and 
that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government 
received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has 
several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy 
during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to 
the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of 
European peace that that peace has been preserved. 

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for mani- 
festations of a private character, such as articles in the press 
and the peaceable work of societies — manifestations which take 
place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, 

* [cf. the same document in W. (p. 140), where the English translation 
is made by the German authorities.] 
t Old style, 
j The Serbian Parliament. 




[R. 84] 




B. 64.] 

THE Royal Serbian Government confine themselves to 
asserting that, since the declarations on the i8th March, 1909, 
no attempt has been made by the Serbian Government and 
their agents to change the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Thereby they deliberately and arbitrarily shift the ground 
on which our d-marche was based, as we did not maintain that 
they and their agents have taken any official action in this 

Our charge, on the contrary, is to the effect that the 
Serbian Government, notwithstanding the obligations under- 
taken in the above-quoted note, have neglected to suppress 
the movement directed against the territorial integrity of 
the Monarchy. 

Their obligation, that is to say, was that they should 
change the whole direction of their policy and adopt a friendly 
and neighbourly attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, and not merely that they should refrain from 
officially attacking the incorporation of Bosnia in the Monarchy. 

The proposition of the Royal Serbian Government that 
utterances in the press and the activities of societies are of a 
private character and are not subject to of&cial control is 
absolutely antagonistic to the institutions of modern States, 
even those which have the most Hberal law with regard to 
press and associations ; this law has a public character and 
subjects the press, as well as associations, to State control. 
Moreover, Serbian institutions themselves contemplate some 



and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal 
Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact 
that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which 
arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof 
of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling 
the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two 
neighbouring countries. 

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained 
and surprised at the statements, according to which members 
of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated 
in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo ; 
the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate 
in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they 
were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their 
attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning 
whom representations were made to them. 

Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and 
Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial 
any Serbian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, 
of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are 
forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to 
be published on the first page of the Journal officiel, on the 
date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration : — 

" The Royal Government of Serbia condemn all propa- 
ganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary — ^i.e., 
the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, 
and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these 
criminal proceedings. 

" The Royal Government regret that, according to the com- 
munication from the Imperial and Royal Government, 
certain Serbian officers and functionaries participated in the 


such control. The complaint against the Serbian Govern- 
ment is in fact that they have entirely omitted to control their 
press and their associations, of whose activities in a sense 
hostile to the Monarchy they were well aware. 

This proposition is incorrect ; the Serbian Government 
were accurately informed of the suspicions v/hich were enter- 
tained against quite definite persons and were not only in a 
position but also bound by their internal laws to initiate 
spontaneous enquiries. They have done nothing in this 

Our demand ran : — 

" The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propa- 
ganda directed against Austria-Hungary. ..." 

The alteration made by the Royal Serbian Government 
in the declaration demanded by us implies that no such 
propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary exists, or that 
they are cognisant of no such propaganda. This formula is 
insincere and disingenuous, as by it the Serbian Government 
reserve for themselves for later use the evasion that they had 
not by this declaration disavowed the then existing propa- 
ganda, and had not admitted that it was hostile to the 
Monarchy, from which they could further deduce that they 
had not bound themselves to suppress propaganda similar to 
that now being carried on. 

The wording demanded by us ran : — 
" The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers and 
functionaries . . . participated. ..." 

II— R 257 



above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the 
good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Serbian 

'^'[SeeB. 4, Government was solemnly pledged by the declaration'" of the 

vol. I., p. 31st March, 1909.* 

"The Government, &c " (identical with the text as 

demanded) . 

The Royal Government further undertake : — 
I. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the 
Skupshtinaf a provision into the press law providing for 
the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and 
contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking 
action against any publication the general tendency of which 
is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. 
The Government engage at the approaching revision of the 
Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into 
article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such 
publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present 
impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the 

* New style. | The Serbian Parliament. 




By the adoption of this wording with the addition " accord- 
ing to the communication from the Imperial and Royal 
Government " the Serbian Government are pursuing the 
object that has already been referred to above, namely, that 
of preserving a free hand for the future. 

We had demanded of them : — 

I. "To suppress any publication which incites to hatred 
and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the 
general tendency of which is directed against the territorial 
integrity of the Monarchy." 

We wished therefore to ensure that Serbia should be 
obliged to see to it that press attacks of that nature should 
be discontinued in future ; we wished therefore to know that 
a definite result in this connection was assured. 

Instead of this Serbia offers us the enactment of certain 
laws which would be calculated to serve as means towards 
this residt, viz. : — 

{a) A law under which the press publications in question 
which are hostile to the Monarchy are to be punished on 
their merits {subjectiv) a matter which is of complete indiffer- 
ence to us, all the more as it is well known that the prosecution 
of press offences on their merits {subjectiv) is only very rarely 
possible, and, if any law of the sort is laxly administered, even 
in the few cases of this nature a conviction would not be 
obtained ; this, therefore, is a proposal which in no way meets 
our demand as it does not offer us the slightest guarantee for 
the result which we wish to obtain. 

(&) A law supplementary to Article 22 of the constitution 
which would permit confiscation — a proposal which is equally 
imsatisfactory to us, as the existence of such a law in Serbia 
is of no use to us, but only the obligation of the Government 
to apply it ; this, however, is not promised us. 

These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory — all 
the more so as they are evasive in that we are not told within 
what period of time these laws would be enacted, and that in 
the event of the rejection of the Bills by the Skupshtina — 
apart from the possible resignation of the Government — 
everything would be as it was before. 




2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note 
of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with 
any, that the Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies 
have committed up to the present any criminal act of this 
nature through the proceedings of any of their members. 
Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand 
of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the 
Narodna Odbrana Society and every other society which 
may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary. 

3. The Royal Serbian Government undertake to eliminate 
without delay from public instruction in Serbia everything 
that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against 
Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda. 

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from the 
military service* all such persons as the judicial enquiry may 
have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity 

* [The German version in the Austro-Hungarian Red-book reads " aus 
and civil services" — and this reading is copied in the German White-book 
for the insertion of the words " and civil " in the Serbian reply — see B. 39, 

see B. 4, 




The whole of the pubHc hfe of Serbia teems with the 
propaganda against the Monarchy, of the Narodna Odbrana 
and of societies affiliated to it ; it is therefore quite impossible 
to admit the reservation made by the Serbian Government 
when they say that they know nothing about them. 

Quite apart from this the demand we have made is not 
entirely complied with, as we further required : — 

That the means of propaganda possessed by these associa- 
tions should be confiscated. 

That the re-establishment of the dissolved associations 
under another name and in another form should be prevented. 

The Belgrade Cabinet maintains complete silence in both 
these directions, so that the half consent which has been given 
us offers no guarantee that it is contemplated to put a definite 
end to the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy, 
especially of the Narodna Odbrana, by their dissolution. 

In this case also the Serbian Government first ask for 
proofs that propaganda against the Monarchy is fomented 
in public educational establishments in Serbia, when they 
must know that the school books which have been introduced 
into the Serbian schools contain matter of an objectionable 
nature in this respect, and that a large proportion of the 
Serbian teachers are enrolled in the ranks of the Narodna 
Odbrana and the societies affiliated with it. 

Moreover, here, too, the Serbian Government have not 
complied with a portion of our demand as fully as we required, 
inasmuch as in their text they have omitted the addition 
which we desired " both as regards the teaching body and also 
as regards the methods of instruction " — an addition which 
quite clearly shows in what directions the propaganda against 
the Monarchy in the Serbian schools is to be looked for. 

Inasmuch as the Royal Serbian Government attach to 
their consent to the removal of the officers and functionaries 
in question from military and civil service* the condition that 

dem Militar- und Zivildienste zu entlassen" — "to remove from the military 
(p. 145) — see also R. 31. But the French text appears to give no warrant 
vol. I., p.114 — although they were included in the Austrian demand — 
vol. I., p. 77.] 





of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they 
expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate 
to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers 
and functionaries for the purposes of the proceedings which 
are to be taken against them. 

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not 
clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made 
by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall 

[See No, undertake to accept the collaboration '" of the representatives 

27.3 of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, 

but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as 

agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal 

procedure, and with good neighbourly relations. 

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government 
consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such 
persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of 
the 15th* June, and who happen to be within the territory 
of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry 
of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this 
purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal 
Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would 
be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal 
procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases {"dans des cas con- 
crets " communications as to the results of the investigation in 
question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents. 

* Old style. 



these persons should have been convicted by judicial enquiry, 
their consent is confined to those cases in which these persons 
are charged with a crime punishable by law. As we, how- 
ever, demand the removal of those officers and functionaries 
who foment propaganda agkinst the Monarchy, a proceeding 
which is not generally punishable by law in Serbia, it appears 
that our demand under this head also is not complied with. 

International Law has just as little to do with this question 
as has criminal procedure. This is purely a matter of State 
police, which must be settled by way of a separate agreement. 
Serbia's reservation is therefore unintelligible, and would be 
calculated, owing to the vague general form in which it is 
couched, to lead to unsurmountable difficulties when the, 
time comes for concluding the prospective agreement. 

Our demand was quite clear and did not admit of mis- 
representation. "' We desired : — '" [of- No. 

(i) The opening of a judicial enquiry {enqu&te judiciaire) ^-3 
against accessories to the plot. 

(2) The collaboration"' of representatives of the Imperial 
and Royal Government in the investigations relating thereto 
(" recherches " as opposed to " enquHe judiciaire "). 

It never occurred to us that representatives of the Imperial 
and Royal Government should take part in the Serbian judicial 
proceedings ; it was intended that they should collaborate 
only in the preliminary police investigations, directed to the 
collection and verification of the material for the enquiry. 

If the Serbian Government misunderstand us on this point 
they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between 
" enquHe judiciaire " and simple " recherches " must be 
familiar to them. 

In desiring to be exempted from all control in the proceedings 
which are to be initiated,which if properly carried through would 
have results of a very undesirable kind for themselves, and in 
view of the fact that they have no handle for a plausible 
refusal of the collaboration of our representatives in the pre- 
liminary police investigations (numberless precedents exist for 
such police intervention) , they have adopted a standpoint which 




7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening 
of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja 
Tankosic. As regards Milan Ziganovic, who is a subject of 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th* 
June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of rail- 
ways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him. 

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be 
so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary 
form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual 
proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, 
at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry. 

8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the 
measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit 
traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes 
without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry 
and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz- 
Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the 
authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of 
the remarks made by their officials whether in Serbia or 
abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the 
statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were 
hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and 
Royal Government have communicated to them the passages 
in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown 
that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, 
although the Royal Government will themselves take steps 
to collect evidence and proofs. 

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and 
Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised 
under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been 
done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been 
ordered and carried out. 

• Old style. 



is intended to invest their refusal with an appearance of justifica- 
tion and to impress on our demand the stamp of impracticability. 

This answer is disingenuous. 

The enquiries set on foot by us show that three days after 
the crime, when it became known that Ciganovie was im- 
plicated in the plot, he went on leave and travelled to Ribari 
on a commission from the Prefecture of Police at Belgrade. 
It is, therefore, in the first place incorrect to say that Ciganovic 
had left the Serbian State Service on the 25th/28th June. 
To this must be added the fact that the Prefect of Police at 
Belgrade, who had himself contrived the departure of Ciganovic 
and who knew where he was stopping, declared in an inter- 
view that no man of the name of Milan Ciganovid existed in 

The interviews in question must be quite well known to the 
Royal Serbian Government. By requesting the Imperial and 
Royal Government to communicate to them all kinds of details 
about these interviews, and keeping in reserve the holding of 
a formal enquiry into them, they show that they are not 
willing to comply seriously with this demand either. 



If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied 
with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it 
is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of 
this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific under- 
standing, either by referring this question to the decision of the 
International Tribunal of the Hague, or to the Great Powers 
which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made 

'i'[5eeB. 4, by the Serbian Government on the i8th (31st) March, igog.*" 
vol. I., p. 


No. 35. 
Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. 

'"[B. 36.] THE proposal for mediation made by Great Britain,"" 
that Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France should meet 
at a conference at London, is declined so far as Germany 

'^'[c/- B. is concerned"" on the ground that it is impossible for Ger- 
43-3 many to bring her Ally before a European Court in her 
settlement with Serbia. 

No. 36. 
Freiherr Von Miiller to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) Tokio, July 28, 1914. 

TO-DAY'S semi-official Japan Times contains a leading 
article which concludes by saying that Japan is on the best 
possible terms with the three Great Powers concerned — 
Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia — while it is in no 
way interested in Serbia. In the case of war, the Imperial 
Government would, as a matter of course, maintain the 
strictest neutrality. 



No. 37. 

Count Berchtold to the Royal Serbian Foreign Office at 

Belgrade:^' '''[c/- B 

{Translated from the French.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

[See S. 45.] 

No. 38. 

Count Berchtold to Count Szogyiny in Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

FOR Your Excellency's information and for communica- 
tion to the Secretary of State : — 

I have received the following telegram from Count Mens- 
dorff, dated the 27th inst. : — 

" I have to-day had the opportunity of explaining at 
length to Sir Edward Grey/'' that our action is not one of ""[c/- B. 
aggression but of self-defence and of self-preservation, and 48] 

that we have no intention of making any territorial acquisition, 
or of destrojdng Serbian independence. What we desire 
is to obtain a certain measure of satisfaction for what has 
passed, and guarantees for the future. 

For this purpose I availed myself of some of the points 
out of Your Excellency's communications to Count Szap&,ry. "' '" i^f- No. 

Sir E. Grey said to me that he was very much disappointed ■'^ 
that we were treating the Serbian answer as if it were a 
complete refusal. 

He had believed that this answer would furnish a basis 
on which the four other Governments could arrive at a 
peaceful solution. 

This was his idea when he proposed a conference. '^' '^'[B. 36.1 

The conference • would meet on the assumption that 
Austria-Hungary as well as Russia would refrain from every 
military operation during the attempt of the other Powers 
to find a peaceful issue. 



(The declaration of Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons 

<''[Sei3 to-day'" ampUfies the project of a conference.) When he 

P- 397 spoke of our refraining from mihtary operations against 

et seq.\ Serbia, I observed that I feared that it was perhaps already 

too late. The Secretary of State expressed the view that 

if we were resolved under any circumstances to go to war 

with Serbia, and if we assumed that Russia would remain 

quiet, we were taking a great risk. If we could induce 

Russia to remain quiet, he had nothing more to say on the 

question. If we could not, the possibilities and the dangers 

were incalculable. 

As a symptom of the feeUng of unrest he told me that 
the British Grand Fleet, which was concentrated in Ports- 
mouth after the manoeuvres, and which should have dispersed 
to-day, would for the present remain there. ' We had not 
called up any Reserves, but as they are assembled, we cannot 
at this moment send them home again.' 

His idea of a conference had the aim of preventing, if 
possible, a collision between the Great Powers, and he also 
aimed at the isolation of the conflict. If, therefore, Russia 
mobilises and Germany takes action, the conference neces- 
sarily breaks down." 

I believe that I need not specially point out to Your 
Excellency that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far 
as it relates to our conflict with Serbia, appears, in view of 
the state of war which has arisen, to have been outstripped 
by events. 

No. 39. 
Cotmt Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

WE attach the greatest importance to the point that 

Sir E. Grey should appreciate in an impartial manner our 

action against Serbia in general, and in particular our refusal 

to accept the Serbian answer, and I therefore ask Your 

Excellency to take the opportunity of explaining to the 

'"'[See B. Secretary of State'^''in detail the dossier '*' which is being 

i')rM ^^1 ^^^^ ^° y°^ ^^ post, and that you will emphasise the specially _ 

[i o. 19.J gg^ijgj^-j- passages ; in the same sense Your Excellency should 

discuss with Sir E. Grey the critical observations on the 



Serbian note (the text of the note with our observations'" '"[No. 34.I 
has been sent to Your Excellency by post yesterday), and 
you should make clear to him that the offer of Serbia to 
meet points in our note was only an apparent one, intended 
to deceive"' Europe without giving any guarantee for the <'i[c/. Intro. 
future. P- '^1T> 

As the Serbian Government knew that only an uncon- ^- 32. 
ditional acceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the ^3 \ )-l 
Serbian tactics can easily be seen through : Serbia accepted 
a number of our demands, with all sorts of reservations, in 
order to impress public opinion in Europe, trusting that 
she would not be required to fulfil her promises. In con- 
versing with Sir E. Grey your Excellency should lay special 
emphasis on the circumstance that the general mobilisation 
of the Serbian army was ordered for the afternoon of the 
25th July at 3 o'clock,'" while the ansv/er to our note was "'P^o- 23; 
delivered just before the expiration of the time fixed, that is ^^^ ^^ 
to say, a few minutes before 6 o'clock.'^' Up to then we ^'■)xsee Yio. 
had made no military preparations, but by the Serbian 24 and 
mobilisation we were compelled to do so. note, aZso 

p. 126. 

No. 40. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

FOR your Excellency's information and guidance : 

The Imperial Russian Ambassador spoke to me to-day"' («i[c/. B. 93 
in order to inform me of his return from short leave in Russia, (i)l 
and at the same time to execute a telegraphic instruction of 
M. Sazonof. The latter had informed him that he had had 
a lengthy and friendly discussion with your Excellency (your 
Excellency's telegram of the 27th instant),'" in the course '^'[No. 31.] 
of which he had discussed with great readiness the various 
points of the Serbian answer. M. Sazonof was of the opinion 
that Serbia had gone far in meeting our wishes, but that 
some of the demands appeared to him entirely unacceptable, 
a fact which he had not concealed from your Excellency. 
It appeared to him under these circumstances that the 



Serbian reply might properly be regarded as furnishing a 
starting point for an understanding to attain which the 
Russian Government would gladly lend a hand. M. Sazonof 
therefore desired to propose to me that the exchange of 
ideas with your Excellency should be continued, and that 
your Excellency should receive instructions with this end 
in view. 

In reply, I emphasised my inability to concur in such a 
proposal. No one in our country could understand, nor could 
anyone approve negotiations with reference to the wording 
used in the answer which we had designated as unsatisfactory. 
This was all the more impossible because, as the Ambassador 
knew, there was a deep feeling of general excitement which 
had already mastered public opinion. Moreover, on our 
side war had to-day been declared against Serbia. 

In reply to the explanations of the Ambassador, which 
culminated in asserting that we should not in any way sup- 
press the admitted hostile opinion in Serbia by a warlike 
action, but that, on the contrary we should only increase it, 
I gave him some insight into our present relations towards 
Serbia which made it necessary, quite against our will, and 
without any selfish secondary object, for us to show our 
restless neighbour, with the necessary emphasis, our firm 
intention not to permit any longer a movement which was 
allowed to exist by the Government, and which was directed 
against the existence of the Monarchy. The attitude of 
Serbia after the receipt of our note had further not been 
calculated to make a peaceful solution possible, because 
'^' [No. 23 ; Serbia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory 
S. 41 and reply, had ordered a general mobilisation,'" and in so doing 
i°^t'ot° ^^^ already committed a hostile act against us. In spite 
p.°i26.3 °^ ^^^^' however, we had waited for three days. Yesterday 
'^'[c/. N0.41] hostilities were opened against us on the Hungarian frontier "" 
on the part of Serbia. By this act we were deprived of the 
possibility of maintaining any longer the patience which we 
had shown towards Serbia. The establishment of a funda- 
mental but peaceful amelioration of our relations towards 
Serbia had now been made impossible, and we were compelled 
to meet the Serbian provocation in the only form which in 
the given circumstances was consistent with the dignity of 
the Monarchy. 


No. 41. 
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, J^dy 28, 1914. 

THE British Ambassador, who discussed matters with 
me to-day"' has, in accordance with his instructions, explained w[cf. B. 
the attitude of Sir E. Grey withjregard to our conflict with 62.I 

Serbia as follows : — 

The British Government have followed the previous course 
of events during the crisis with lively interest, and they 
attach importance to giving us an assurance that they enter- 
tain sympathy for us in the point of view we have adopted, 
and that they completely understand the grievances which 
we have against Serbia. 

If England has no ground for making our dispute with 
Serbia in itself an object of special consideration, nevertheless 
this question cannot escape the attention of the Cabinet at 
London, because this conflict may affect wider circles and 
thereby imperil the peace of Europe. 

To this extent England is affected by the question, and 
it is only on this ground that Sir E. Grey has been led to 
send an invitation"" to the Governments of those countries (2)[b. 36.] 
which are not directly interested in this conflict (Germany, 
Italy and France), in order to test in common with them 
by means of a continuous exchange of ideas the possibilities 
of the situation, and to discuss how the differences may be 
most quickly settled. Following the precedent of the London 
conference during the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of 
the various States mentioned resident at London should, 
according to the view of the British Secretary of State, keep 
themselves in continual -contact with him for the purpose 
indicated. Sir E. Grey had already received answers expressed 
in very friendly terms from the Governments concerned, 
in which they concurred in the suggestion put forward. 
At present it was also the wish of the Secretary of 
State, if possible, to prevent even at the eleventh hour 
the outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary 
and Serbia, and if this were not possible at least to pre- 
vent the conflict from causing a collision involving blood- 
shed ; if necessary, by the Serbians withdrawing without 



accepting battle. The reply which had reached us from 
Serbia appeared to offer the possibility that it might provide 
the basis of an understanding. England would willingly be 
prepared in this matter to make her influence felt according 
to our ideas and wishes. 

I thanked the Ambassador for the communication of 
Sir E. Grey, and I answered him that I fully appreciated the 
view of the Secretary of State. His point of view was, 
however, naturally different from mine, as England was not 
directly interested in the dispute between us and Serbia, 
and the Secretary of State could not be fully informed con- 
cerning the serious significance which the questions at issue 
had for the Monarchy. If Sir E. Grey spoke of the possibility 
of preventing the outbreak of hostilities, this suggestion 
came too late, since our soldiers were yesterday fired at by 
''' [c/. No. soldiers from over the Serbian frontier, "' and to-day war has 
,2 j^ 4^-] been declared by us against Serbia.'^' I had to decline to 
'■ ■ "^^'^ entertain the idea of a discussion based on the Serbian answer. 
What we asked was the integral acceptance of the ultimatum. 
Serbia had endeavoured to get out of her difficulty by sub- 
terfuges. We knew these Serbian methods only too well. 

Through the local knowledge which he has gained here. 
Sir Maurice de Bunsen was in a position to appreciate fully 
our point of view, and he would be in a position to give 
Sir E. Grey an accurate representation of the facts. 

In so far as Sir E. Grey desired to be of service to the 
cause of European peace, he would certainly not find any 
opposition from us. He must, however, reflect that the peace 
of Europe would not be saved by Great Powers placing them- 
selves behind Serbia, and directing their efforts to securing 
that she should escape punishment. 

For, even if we consented to entertain such an attempt 
at an agreement, Serbia would be all the more encouraged 
to continue on the path she has formerly followed, and this 
would, in a very short time, again imperil the cause of 

The British Ambassador assured me in conclusion that he 
fully understood our point of view but, on the other hand, 
he regretted that, under these circumstances, the desire of 
the British Government to arrive at an agreement had, for 
the time being, no prospect of being realised. He hoped to 



remain in constant communication with me as that appeared 
to him, on account of the great danger of a European con- 
flagration, to be of special value. 

I assured the Ambassador that I was at all times at his 
disposal, and thereupon our conversation came to an end. 

No. 42. 

Count Berchtold to Count Sz'dgySny at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

I REQUEST your Excellency to go at once to the Chan- 
cellor or the Secretary of State and communicate to him the 
following"' in my name : '^'[c/. Nos. 

" According to mutually consistent reports, received from ^' ^^^^ 
St. Petersburg, Kieff, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia n'^ 
is making extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has 
indeed given an assurance on his word of honour, as has also 
the Russian Minister of War, that mobilisation has not up to 
now been ordered ; the latter has, however, told the German 
Military Attache that the military districts which border on 
Austria-Hungary — Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan — ^will 
be mobilised, should our troops cross the Serbian frontier. 

" Under these circumstances, I would urgently ask the 
Cabinet at Berlin to take into immediate consideration the 
question whether the attention of Russia should not be 
drawn, in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilisation 
of the above districts amounts to a threat against Austria- 
Hungary, and that, therefore, should these measures be 
carried out, they would be answered by the most extensive 
military counter measures, not only by the Monarchy but by 
our Ally, the German Empire." 

In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it 
appears to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first 
place, be taken by Germany alone ; nevertheless we are ready 
to take this step in conjunction with Germany. 

Unambiguous language appears to me at the present 
moment to be the most effective method of making Russia 
fully conscious of all that is involved in a threatening 

II-S 273 


No. 43. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny at Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. 

INFORMATION has been received from the Imperial 
German Ambassador that Sir E. Grey has appealed to 
'''[B. 24.] the German Government'^' to use their influence with the 
Imperial and Royal Government, in order to induce them 
either to regard the reply received from Belgrade as satis- 
factory, or to accept it as a basis for discussion between the 

Herr von Tschirschky was commissioned to bring the 
British proposal before the Vienna Cabinet for their con- 
'^' [Austrian sideration. "• 
No. 44.] 

No. 44. 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at 
St. Petersburg, London, Paris and Rome. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

FOR your Excellency's information. 
I have to-day handed to the Imperial German Ambassador 
the following memorandum in answer to a d-marche made 
'^'[See No. here by him : '=' 


The Imperial and Royal Government have received with 
deep gratitude information of the communication which the 
Imperial German Ambassador made to them on the 28th 
inst. with regard to the request of the British Cabinet that 
the Imperial German Government should use their influence 
with the Vienna Cabinet that they might regard the answer 
from Belgrade either as satisfactory, or as a basis for dis- 
cussion. So far as concerns what was said by the British 
[B 46.] Secretary of State to Prince Lichnowsky, '" the Imperial 
and Royal Government desire in the first place to draw 
attention to the fact that the Serbian answer in no way 



contains an acceptance of all our demands with one single 
exception, as Sir E. Grey appears to assume, but rather 
that on most points reservations are formulated, which 
materially detract from the value of the concessions which 
are made. The points which are not accepted are, however, 
precisely those which contain some guarantee for the real 
attainment of the end in view. 

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal their 
astonishment at the assumption that their action against 
Serbia was directed against Russia and Russian influence 
in the Balkans, for this implies the supposition that the 
propaganda directed against the Monarchy has not merely 
a Serbian but a Russian origin. The basis of our consideration 
has hitherto been rather that official Russia has no connection 
with these tendencies, which are hostile to the Monarchy, 
and that our present action is directed exclusively against 
Serbia, while our feelings for Russia, as we can assure Sir 
E. Grey, are entirely friendly. 

Further, the Imperial and Royal Government must point 
out that to their great regret they are no longer in a 
position to adopt an attitude towards the Serbian reply 
in the sense of the British suggestion, since at the time 
of the d&marche made by Germany a state of war between 
the Monarchy and Serbia had already arisen,'" and the "'[S. 45.] 
Serbian reply has accordingly already been outstripped by 

The Imperial and Royal Government take this opportunity 
of observing that the Royal Serbian Government, even before 
they communicated their reply, had taken steps towards 
the mobilisation of the Serbian forces,"" and thereafter ''"[No. 23 • 
they allowed three days to elapse without showing any S. 41 and 
inclination to abandon the point of view contained in their "°te-] 
reply, whereupon the declaration of war '^' followed on our i" [S. 45.] 

If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on 
the Russian Government with a view to the maintenance of 
peace between the Great Powers, and with a view to the 
localisation of the war which has been forced upon us by 
many years of Serbian intrigues, the Imperial and Royal 
Government could only welcome this. 



No. 45. 

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 29, 1914. 

FRANCE is unmistakably making certain military prepara- 
"'[c/. W. lions'" as is announced by the newspapers, perhaps with a 
exh. II.] certain exaggeration. 

As I learn in strictest confidence, Baron Schoen is com- 
missioned to discuss these preparations with M. Viviani 
'"'[c/. Y. to-day,'" and to point out that in these circumstances 
loi] Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which 
necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not 
fail to cause great public excitement when they became known. 
In this way the two countries, although they are only striving 
for peace, will be compelled to at least a partial mobilisation, 
which would be dangerous. 

Further, in accordance with these instructions. Baron 
Schoen will declare that Germany has a lively desire that 
the conflict between us and Serbia should remain localised, 
and that in this Germany relies on the support of France. 

No. 46. 

Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. 

*2'[July26.] AS early as Sunday'*' the German Government declared 
at St. Petersburg that Russian mobilisation would have as a 
'*'[c/. No. consequence German mobilisation.'*' 

28-3 Thereupon there followed on the part of Russia the reply 

'"'[No. 33.] announced in my telegram of the 27th inst.'^' Following this 

a telegram has to-day been sent to St. Petersburg, stating 

that owing to the further progress of the Russian measures 

'°'[c/. Y. of mobilisation Germany might be brought to mobUise.'^' 

100 ; 0. 

58-3 No. 47. 

"' [Reply, Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. '" 

No. 49.] (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914. 

AS I have learned from the German Ambassador that 
M. Sazonof is showing himself greatly excited over your 



Excellency's alleged disinclination to continue the exchange 
of ideas with Russia, and over the mobilisation of Austria- 
Hungary, which is supposed to be much more extensive 
than is necessary, and, therefore, directed against Russia, 
I visited the Minister in order to remove certain misunder- 
standings which seemed to me to exist. 

The Minister began by making the point that Austria- 
Hungary categorically refused to continue an exchange of 
ideas. I agreed in view of your Excellency's telegram of 
the 28th July"' that your Excellency had indeed declined, '" [No. 40.] 
after all that had occurred, to discuss the wording of the 
note, and in general the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian conflict, 
but said that I must make it clear that I was in a position 
±0 suggest a much broader basis of discussion in declaring 
that we had no desire to injure any Russian interests, that we 
had no intention, naturally on the assumption that the 
conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia remained 
localised, of annexing Serbian territory, and that we also had 
no idea of touching the sovereignty of Serbia. I was con- 
vinced that your Excellency would always be ready to keep 
in touch with St. Petersburg with regard to Austro-Hungarian 
and Russian interests. 

M. Sazonof gave me to understand that he had been con- 
vinced of this so far as territory was concerned, but so far 
as the sovereignty of the country was in question he must 
continue to hold the opinion that to force on Serbia our 
conditions would result in Serbia becoming a vassal State."" (^1 [cf. b. 
This, however, would upset the equilibrium in the Balkans, 97 ; also 
and this was how Russian interests became involved. He ^^ar to 
returned to the question of a discussion of the note, the action ^^^^ 
of Sir E. Grey, &c., and he desired again to point out to me p^'^xo.} 
-that Russia recognised our legitimate interest, and desired 
to give it full satisfaction, but that this should be clothed 
in a form which would be acceptable to Serbia. I expressed 
ihe view that this was not a Russian but a Serbian interest, 
whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests were 
in this case Serbian interests, so that I was obUged to make 
an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic. 

I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of 
anxiety in Russia, because we had mobilised eight corps for 
action against Serbia."' M. Sazonof assured me that it was <5i[c/.o.24, 

!»77 47-] 


not he (who knew nothing about this) but the Chief of the 
General Staff who had expressed this anxiety. I endeavoured 
to convince the Minister that any unprejudiced person could 
easily be persuaded that our southern corps could not con- 
stitute a menace for Russia. 

I indicated to the Minister that it would be well if his 
Imperial Master were informed of the true situation, more 
especially as it was urgently necessary, if it was desired 
to maintain peace, that a speedy end should be put to the 
military competition [Lizitieren) which now threatened to 
ensue on account of false news. M. Sazonof very character- 
istically expressed the view that he could communicate this 

•'' {i.e., the to the Chief of the General Staff, for he''^' saw His Majesty every 

Chief of the ^^y^ 

cf ^i -1 The Minister further informed me that a Ukase would be 

signed to-day, which would give orders for a mobihsation 
"" [See B. in a somewhat extended form. "" He was able, however, to 
70 (i).] assure me in the most official way that these troops were not 
intended to attack us. They would only stand to arms in 
case Russian interests in the Balkans should be in danger. 
An explanatory note would make this clear, for the question 
here was one of a measure of precaution which the Emperor 
Nicholas had found to be justified, since we, who in any 
case have the advantage of quicker mobilisation, have now 
also already so great a start. In earnest words I drew 
M. Sazonof's attention to the impression which such a measure 
would make in our country. I went on to express doubt 
whether the explanatory note would be calculated to soften 
the impression, whereupon the Minister again gave expression 
to assurances regarding the harmlessness(!) of this measure. 

No. 48. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szbgyeny at Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. 

I HAVE just heard from Herr von Tschirschky, that the 

Russian Ambassador has told him that he has been notified 

by his Government that the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, 

'''[Sfie B. Moscow and Kasan are being mobilised. ''' He said that 

70 (i).] Russia was outraged in her honour as a Great Power, and 



was obliged to take corresponding measures. The Russian 
mobilisation is confirmed by the commanders of our Galician 
forces, and, according to a communication from the Imperial 
and Royal Military Attach6, in a conversation which 
M. Sazonof had to-day with the German Ambassador it 
was no longer denied. 

I request your Excellency to bring the above without 
delay to the knowledge of the German Government, and at 
the same time to emphasise that if the Russian measures of 
mobilisation are not stopped without delay, our general 
mobilisation would have, on military grounds, to follow at 
once."' - "'[C/.O.24, 

As a last effort to maintain the peace of Europe, I con- 47-] 
sidered it desirable that our representative and the representa- 
tive of Germany at St. Petersburg, and, if necessary, at Paris, 
should at once be instructed to declare to the Governments 
to whom they are accredited in a friendly manner, that the 
continuance of the Russian mobilisation would have as a 
result counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary, 
which must lead to serious consequences. 

Your Excellency will add that, as can be understood, 
in our military operations against Serbia we will not allow 
ourselves to be diverted from our path. 

The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburg 
and Paris are receiving identical instructions to make the 
above declaration as soon as their German colleague receives 
similar instructions. 

No. 49. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

IN answer to your Excellency's telegram of the 2Qth 
July.'^' _ '"'[No 47.] 

I am of course sttU ready to explain to M. Sazonof, through 
your Excellency, the various points contained in our note 
addressed to Serbia which however has already been out- 
stripped by recent events. I should also attach special 
importance, in accordance with the suggestion made to me 
through M. Schebeko, also to discussing on this occasion 
in a confidential and friendly manner the questions which 



'^'[c/. Nos. affect directly our relations towards Russia.'" From this 
50. 56 ; it might be hoped that it would be possible to remove the 
Q ll^i ' ambiguities which have arisen and to secure the development 

in a friendly manner of our relations towards our neighbours, 

which is so desirable an object. 

No. 50. 

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg. 
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. 

FOR Your Excellency's information and guidance : — 

(ir , Q I have to-day explained to M. Schebeko'"' that I have 

66.3 been informed that M. Sazonof has been hurt by my flat 
•'TNo 40 1 refusal'^' of his proposal as to a discussion with your Excel- 
lency, and that he is not less hurt that no exchange of ideas 
has taken place between myself and M. Schebeko. 

With reference to the first point, I had already permitted 
'"'[No. 40.] yoiii^ Excellency by telegram'^' to give M. Sazonof any explan- 
tions he desired with regard to the note — which in any case 
appears to be outstripped by the outbreak of war. In any 
case this could only take the form of subsequent explanations, 
as it was never our intention to depart in any way from the 
points contained in the note. I had also authorised your 
Excellency to discuss in a friendly manner with M. Sazonof 
our special relations towards Russia. 

That M. Sazonof should complain that no exchange of 

ideas had taken place between M. Schebeko and myself must 

[c/. No. ^^^t ^^ ^ misunderstanding, '" as M. Schebeko and myself 

56*; B. ' had discussed the practical questions two days before, '" a 

137.] fact which the Ambassador confirmed with the observation 

*' [See No. that he had fully informed M. Sazonof of this conversation. 

40-] M. Schebeko then explained why our action against 

Serbia was regarded with such anxiety at St. Petersburg. 

He said that we were a Great Power which was proceeding 

against the small Serbian State, and it was not known at St. 

Petersburg what our intentions in the matter were ; whether 

we desired to encroach on its sovereignty, whether we desired 

completely to overthrow it, or even to crush it to the ground. 




Russia could not be indifferent towards the future fate ot 
Serbia,'" which was linked to Russia by historical and other '"[c/- 0. 
bonds. At St. Petersburg they had taken the trouble to use ^^J 

all their influence at Belgrade to induce them to accept all 
our conditions, though this was indeed at a time when the 
conditions afterwards imposed by us could not yet be known. 
But even with reference to these demands they would do 
everything they could in order to accomplish at any rate 
all that was possible. 

I reminded the Ambassador that we had repeatedly 
emphasised the fact that we did not desire to follow any 
policy of conquest in Serbia, also that we would not infringe 
her sovereignty, but we only desired to establish a condition 
of affairs which would offer us a guarantee against being 
disturbed by Serbia. To this I added a somewhat lengthy 
discussion of our intolerable relations with Serbia. I also 
gave. M. Schebeko clearly to understand to how large an 
extent Russian diplomacy was responsible for these circum- 
stances, even though this result might be contrary to the 
wishes of the responsible authorities. 

In the further course of our discussion I referred to the 
Russian mobilisation which had then come to my knowledge. 
Since this was limited to the military districts of Odessa, 
Kieff, Moscow and Kasan it had an appearance of hostility 
against the Monarchy. I did not know what the grounds 
for this might be, as there was no dispute between us and 
Russia. Austria-Hungary had mobilised exclusively against 
Serbia ; against Russia not a single man ; and this would be 
observed from the single fact that the first, tenth and eleventh 
corps had not been mobilised. In view, however, of the fact 
that Russia was openly mobilising against us, we should 
have to extend our mobilisation too, and in this case I desired 
to mention expressly that this measure did not, of course, 
imply any attitude of hostility towards Russia, and that it 
was exclusively a necessary counter-measure against the 
Russian mobilisation. 

I asked M. Schebeko to announce this to his Government, 
and this he promised to do. 



No. 51. 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at 
London and St. Petersburg. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. 

I AM telegraphing as follows to Berlin : — 

Herr von Tschirschky has in accordance with his instruc- 
tions yesterday communicated a discussion between Sir E. 
"'[c/. B. Grey and Prince Lichnowsky'" in which the British Secretary 
103.] of State made the following announcement to the German 
Ambassador : — 

Sazonof has informed the British Government that after 
the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, 
he is no longer in a position to deal directly with Austria- 
Hungary, and he therefore requests that Great Britain will 
again take up her work of mediation. The Russian Govern- 
ment regarded the preliminary stoppage of hostilities as a 
condition precedent to this. 

To this Russian declaration, Sir E. Grey remarked to 
>''*[c/. B. Prince Lichnowsky"" that Great Britain thought of a rnedia- 
S4] tion d, quatre, and that she regarded this as urgently necessary 
if a general war was to be prevented. 

I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to the 
Secretary of State for the communications made to us through 
Herr von Tschirschky, and to declare to him that in spite of 
the change in the situation which has since arisen through 
the mobilisation of Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain 
the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and 

The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that 
our military action against Serbia should continue to take 
its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the 
Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian 
mobilisation which is directed against us, in which case, of 
course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military 
counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the 
Russian attitude. 



No. 52. 

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914. 

THE order for the general mobilisation of the entire Army 
and Fleet was issued early to-day. '" '" [cf. B. 

113; Y. 

No "i-? ^^^' ^• 

^^°- 53- exh.24.] 

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic 


(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. 

FOR your information and for use in your dealings with 
the Government to which you are accredited. 

As mobilisation has been ordered by the Russian Govern- 
ment on our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military 
measures in GaUcia. 

These measures are purely of a defensive character and arise 
exclusively under the pressure of the Russian measures, 
which we regret exceedingly, as we ourselves have no aggres- 
sive intentions of any kind against Russia, and desire the 
continuation of the former neighbourly relations. 

Pourparlers between the Cabinets at Vienna and St. 
Petersburg appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being 
continued,"" and from these we hope that things will quieten m[cf. b. 
down all round. no ; O. 

No. 54- ^^-^ 

Count Szicsen to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. 

GERMAN Ambassador in pursuance of the instructions 
of his Government has declared here that if the general 
mobilisation ordered by the Russian Government is not 
stopped within 12 hours, Germany also will mobiUse.''' At '''[c/. O. 
the same time Baron Schoen has asked whether France will 7° ^^^ 
remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and ^°^ > ^■ 
Russia.'^' An answer to this is requested within eighteen ,4,^^, ' ^'^ 
hours. The time-limit expires to-morrow (Saturday) at jjl' j^^^ i 
I o'clock in the afternoon. 



No. 55. 

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914. 

|"[Nos. 49, YOUR Excellency's telegram of the 30th July'" has been 
5°-3 received. 

You will have gathered from my telegram of the 29th 

<^'[No. 47.] July,"* that without waiting for instructions I again resumed 

<"[c/. B. conversations with M. Sazonof" more or less on the basis 

iio ; O. -wrhich has now been indicated to me, but that the points of 

' view on the two sides had not materially approximated to 

each other. 

Meanwhile, however, it has appeared from the conversa- 
tions between the German Ambassador and the Russian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia will not accept as 
satisfactory the formal declaration that Austria-Hungary 
will neither diminish the territory of the Serbian Kingdom 
nor infringe on Serbian sovereignty, nor injure Russian 
interests in the Balkans or elsewhere ; since then moreover 
■<*' [No. 52.] a general mobilisation has been ordered on the part of Russia 


No. 56. 

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, August i, 1914. 

I VISITED M. Sazonof to-day, and told him that I had 
received instructions, but that I must premise that I was 
entirely ignorant of the present condition of affairs created in 
Vienna by the general Russian mobilisation, and that in 
interpreting the instructions which I had received previously, 
I must leave this condition out of account. I said that the 
[Nos. 49, two instructions of Your Excellency"" dealt with the mis- 
50-1 understanding that we had declined further negotiations with 
Russia. This was a mistake, as I had already, without in- 
structions, assured him. Your Excellency was not only quite 
(61 r^,, g prepared to deal with Russia on the broadest basis possible, 
137, 161 ; but was also especially inclined to subject the text of our note 
y. 120.] to a discussion so far as its interpretation was concerned. '" 



I emphasised how much the instructions of Your Excellency 
afforded me a further proof of goodwill, although I had to 
remind him that the situation created since then by the general 
mobiUsation was unknown to me ; but I could only hope 
that the course of events had not already taken us too far ; 
in any case, I regarded it as my duty in the present moment 
of extreme anxiety to prove once again the goodwill of the 
Imperial and Royal Government. M. Sazonof replied that 
he took note with satisfaction of this proof of goodwill, but 
he desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations 
at St. Petersburg for obvious reasons appeared to promise 
less prospect of success than negotiations on the neutral 
terrain of London. '" I replied that Your Excellency, as I "' [cf. Y. 98 
had already observed, started from the point of view that and note. 1 
direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburg, so 
that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to 
his suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the 
subject with your Excellency. 

No. 57. 
Count Szogyiny to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914. 

THE Secretary of State has just informed me that no 
answer has been received from Russia to the German de- 
mand.'"' '"'[c/. No. 

The Russian troops have crossed the German frontier at 54 ; O- 
Schwidden (south-east of Bialla). 7o.] 

Russia has thus attacked Germany.'" '^'[c/. W. 

Germany, therefore, regards herself as at war with P- ^35] 
Russia."' <^'[Declar- 

The Russian Ambassador has this morning received his ^tion of 
passports ; he intends to leave to-day. ^^' ^• 

No. 58. 
Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) London, August 4, 1914. 

I HAVE just seen Sir E. Grey. The British Government 
have sent to Germany an ultimatum on account of Belgium. "" '" [B. 159.3 
They expect a reply at 12 o'clock to-night. 



Sir E. Grey said to me that at present there was no reason 
why he should make any communication to the Imperial and 
Royal Government, and there was no cause why a conflict 
should arise between us, so long as we were not in a condition 
of war with France. In any case, he hoped that we would 
not begin hostihties without the formality of a previous 
"'[Reply, declaration of war.'" He does not intend to recall Sir M. de 
No. 60.] Bunsen. 

Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be 
difficult for Great Britain, as the ally of France, to co-operate 
with her in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean. 

No. 59. 

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg. 
{Translated from the French.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 5, 1914. 

""[Pre- I ASK Your Excellency to hand over the following note"' 

sented ^q ^^g Minister for Foreign Affairs : — 

Aug. 6 — ° 

see 0.79.3 " On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, 
the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform 
His ,|^Excellency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as 
follows : — 

" In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia 
in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and 
Serbia ; and of the fact that, according to a communication 
from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that 
conflict, to open hostilities against Germany ; and whereas 
Germany is consequently at war with Russia ; Austria- 
Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia 
from the present moment." 

After handing over this note Your Excellency will ask 
that passports may be prepared, and you will leave without 
delay with the entire staff of the Embassy with the exception 
of any members who are to be left behind. At the same time 
M. Scheb6ko is being furnished with his passport by us. 



No. 60. 
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 6, 1914. 

I HAVE received Your Excellency's telegram of the 
4th August."' '^' [No. 58.1 

I ask you to assure Sir E. Grey that we will in no case open 
hostilities against Great Britain without a previous formal 
declaration of war, but that we also expect that Great Britain 
will observe towards us a similar attitude, and that she will 
not undertake any hostile act against us before formally 
declaring war. 

No. 61. 
Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold J'^ '"[Reply, 

{Translated from the French.) °' ^'* 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 8, 1914. 

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to go and see • 
him in order to communicate to me that, according to positive 
information which has reached him, the Innsbruck Army Corps 
has been brought to the French frontier. M. Doumergue 
wishes to know without delay if this information is correct, 
and if it is so, what is the intention of the Imperial and Royal 
Government. As France is at war with Germany the despatch 
of our troops to the French frontier is, according to the 
views held by the Minister, not consistent with the existing 
condition of peace between Austria-Hungary and France. 
M. Dumaine is commissioned to make a similar communi- 
cation to Your Excellency. 

No. 62. 
Count Berchtold to Count Szicsen at Paris. '" "' [Reply, 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 9, 1914. 

WITH reference to Your Excellency's telegram of tbe 
8th instant. "' w [No. 61.J 



After conferring with the General Staff I authorise Your 
Excellency to inform the French Government that the infor- 
mation regarding the participation of our troops in the 
'"*[c/. No. Franco-German war is a complete invention.'" I have 
64-] expressed myself in a similar manner to M, Dumaine. 

No. 63. 

Count SzScsen to Count Berchtold. 
{Translated from the French.) 

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 10, 1914. 

'"[No. 62.3 I HAVE received your telegram of the 9th August"" and 
communicated at once the contents to M. Doumergue. The 
Minister, who had received a similar telegraphic report from 
M. Dumaine concerning his conversation with Your Excel- 
lency, admitted that our troops are not on the French frontier, 
but he maintains that he has positive information that an 
Austro-Hungarian army corps has been brought to Germany, 
and that this makes it possible for that Empire to withdraw 
her troops from those districts which are occupied by our 
soldiers, and that in the opinion of the Minister this amounts 
to a facilitation of German military operations. I repeatedly 
drew the attention of the Minister to the wording of the 
answer of Your Excellency, and he has admitted that it is 
not possible to speak of an effective participation of our troops 
in the Franco-German war, but he insisted that it is undeniable 
that our troops are present on German territory, and that 
this is equivalent to the provision of military assistance to 

'" [See No. Germany. '" In these circumstances he has authorised the 
^4-] French Ambassador at Vienna to ask for his passports without 
delay, and to leave Vienna to-day with the entire staff of the 
Embassy. The Minister informed me that in view of this 
position, my presence here can be of no use ; indeed in view 
of the excitement of the populace it might give occasion 
to regrettable occurrences which he desired to avoid. He 
offered to place a train at my disposal from to-night onwards 
in order that I might leave France. I answered that it was 
impossible for me to receive instructions from Your Excel- 

<"[c/. No. lency before the evening, but that in view of the recall of 
64.] M. Dumaine, I asked him to have my passport prepared. '*' 


No. 64. 

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. 

Vienna, August 11, 1914. 

THE French Government have commissioned their Am- 
bassador here to ask for his passports'" on the ground that an '"[c/. No. 
Austro-Hungarian army corps has been sent to Germany, 63.] 

whereby it has been possible for the German army staff to 
withdraw their troops from those German districts which are 
occupied by ovir contingents. This measure of our general 
staff indicates in his view the grant of military assistance to 

Your Excellency should bring to the knowledge of the 
British Government that according to information obtained 
from a reliable source the assertion made by the French 
Government is unfounded. "" "" [cf. No. 


No. 65. 

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold. 

[Translated from the French.) 

(Telegraphic.) London, August 12, 1914. 

I HAVE just received from Sir E. Grey the following 
communication : — 

At the request of the French Government, who are not in 
a position to communicate direct with your Government, I 
have to make to you the following communication : — 

The Austro-Hungarian Government, after declaring war 
on Serbia, and thus taking the first initiative to the hostilities 
in Europe, have, without any provocation on the part of the 
Government of the French Republic, extended the war to 
France : — 

(i) After Germany had in succession declared war on 
Russia and France, the Austro-Hungarian Government have 
joined in the conflict by declaring war against Russia, which 
was already fighting on the side of France. 

n-T aSg 


(2) According to information from numerous trustworthy 
sources Austria has sent troops to the German frontier 
under circumstances which amounted to a direct menace to 

I In view of these facts the French Government are obhged 
to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government that they will 
take all measures which make it possible for them to answer 
these actions and these threats. 

Sir E. Grey adds : — 

As a breach with France has been brought about in this 
way the British Government feel themselves obliged to 
announce that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary will be in 
»'[c/. B. a state of war as from 12 o'clock to-night.'" 
161.3 ^ 

No. 66. 

The Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold. 
(Translated from the English.) 

My Lord, Vienna, August 20, 1914. 

YOUR Excellency will doubtless have already received 
information from his Excellency Baron Miiller of the com- 
munication which was addressed to the German Government 
'*' [cf. Nos. by my Government on the 15th inst. "" Nevertheless I take 
68, 69. the liberty, although I have not received any instructions 
J'^^ , to do so, to enclose herewith for your Excellency's personal 
Japanese information, a copy of a telegram bearing on the matter which 
ultima- I have received from Tokio. 
turn as 
given in 

DO.W., Enclosure, 

see p. 

295il jj^g Japanese Government, who have taken the present 

situation into their earnest consideration, have, in accord- 
ance with a complete understanding made with the British 
Government, for the purpose of strengthening and main- 
taining general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, which 
is one of the aims of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, decided to 


take common action with Great Britain in giving effect 
to the necessary measures for this purpose. Nevertheless, 
before proceeding with measures of this kind, the Japanese 
Government have thought it proper to address a friendly 
request to the German Government, which was communi- 
cated to them on the 15th August, 1914, in the following 
words : — 

" (i) All German warships must be withdrawn at once 
from the waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. 
The ships that cannot be withdrawn must be disarmed. 

(2) The German Government must unconditionally and 
without compensation hand over to the Japanese authorities 
the whole of the leased territory of Kiao-chau before the i6th 
September, 1914, for the purpose of handing this territory 
back to China. 

The Japanese Government have informed the German 
Government that, in case an answer intimating unconditional 
compliance with the above-mentioned demands is not received 
before Sunday, the 23rd, at mid-day, they will proceed as 
appears necessary to them. 

It is earnestly to be hoped that the above-mentioned 
demands, for a reply to which so ample time is given, will be 
agreed to by the German Government ; should they, however, 
not comply with this demand, a course of action which would 
be deplored, the Japanese Government wUl be obliged to take 
the necessary measures to attain their end." 

The grounds on which the Imperial Government base their 
present attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to 
maintain the common interests of Japan and Great Britain, 
which are set out in the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, by estab- 
lishing a basis of a lasting peace in the territory of Eastern 
Asia. The Japanese Government have in no respect the 
intention of embarking upon a policy of territorial expansion, 
nor do they entertain any other selfish designs. For this 
reason the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to 
respect with the greatest care the interests of third Powers 
in Eastern Asia and to refrain from injuring them in any 



No. 67. 

Count Berchtold to Count Clary at Brussels. 
(Translated from the French.) 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 22, 1914. 

I ASK your Excellency to communicate the following 

'''[C/.G.77. to the Royal Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at once : — '" 

Reply " J have the honour to bring the following to the know- 

* 7 ■•' ledge of your Excellency in accordance with the instructions 

of our Government : — 

Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals 
made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording 
her military assistance to France and Great Britain, both of 
which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and 
whereas as has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian 
nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under the very eyes 
of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most 
'^'[Denied, primitive demands of humanity,"* and inadmissible even 
G. 78.] towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria-Hun- 
gary finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations, 
and considers herself, from this moment, in a state of war 
with Belgium. 

I am leaving the country with the staff of the Legation, 
and I am entrusting the protection of my countrymen to the 
Minister of the United States in Belgium. 

Count Errembault de Dudzeele has received his passports 
from the Imperial and Royal Government. 

No. 68. 

Prince Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 23, 1914. 

THE Foreign Office has informed the Japanese Charge 

d' Affaires that the Imperial German Government do not 

<" [See No. intend to send an answer to the Japanese ultimatum. '*' The 

66.3 German Government have instructed their Ambassador at 

Tokio, after the expiration of the time allowed by Japan, at 



12 o'clock to-day, to leave Japan, and they will, at the same 
time, furnish the Japanese Charge d' Affaires here with his 

At mid-day the Charge d' Affaires was furnished with his 
passports, and he will leave Berlin early to-morrow morning 
with the staff of the Embassy. 

No. 69. 

Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Mutter at Tokio. 

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 24, 1914. 

THE Commander of S.M.S. " EUsabeth " has been in- 
structed to take part in the fighting at Tsingtau.'" I ask '"[c/. Nos. 
your Excellency, in view of the action taken by Japan against ^^' ^7 ; 
our Ally, the German Empire, to ask for your passports. 00*1^02! 
You should inform the Consulates, and you should travel to 
America with the colony and the staff of the Embassy and 
of the Consulates. Your Excellency should entrust the 
protection of our countrymen and their interests to the 
American Ambassador. The Japanese Ambassador here is 
being furnished with his passports. 



Japanese Foreign Office Statement J^' 

Tokio, August 5. 

THE Imperial Government entertains the deepest anxiety 
regarding the poUtical and economic situation arising from 
the latest developments of European politics. It hopes that 
peace will be quickly restored and that the war will not 
extend and that Japan wiU be able to maintain an attitude 
of strict neutrality. It is necessary, however, that the closest 
attention be paid to future developments. 

In the event of Great Britain becoming involved, the 
terms of the Japanese AUiance '*' will be affected and Japan 
will take the necessary measures to discharge her obligations 
under the treaty. The Imperial Government, however, 
sincerely trusts that this contingency may never arise. 


Telegram from the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 
to the German Ambassador in Tokio, August 12, 1914. 

EAST Asiatic Squadron instructed to avoid hostUe acts 
against England in case Japan remains neutral. Please 
inform Japanese Government. No answer to this has been 
received from Japan. 


Ultimatum^^^ presented to the German Government by the Japanese 
Chargi d' Affaires, Baron Funakoshi, on August 17,'*' 1914. 

CONSIDERING it highly important and necessary in 
the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of 
disturbance to the peace of the Far East, and to safeguard 
the general interest contemplated by the Agreement of 
Alliance between Japan and Great Britain in order to secure 


<''[c/. fuUer 
quoted by 
p. 298.] 

P- 504-] 

"'[For de- 
the ulti- 
R. 66.] 

ed over 
to the 
ment on 
the 15th 
— Baron 
Kato, see 
p. 300 ; c/. 
R. 66.] 


a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, establishment of 
which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese 
Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to 
the Imperial German Government to carry out the following 
two propositions : — 

(i) To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and 
Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all 
kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so with- 

(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15th, 
1914, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition 
or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau, with 
a view to eventual restoration of the same to China. 

The Imperial Japanese Government announce at the 
same time that in the event of their not receiving by noon 
August 23rd, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German 
Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above 
advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, they 
will be compelled to take such action as they may deem 
necessary to meet the situation. 


Speech by the Japanese Prime Minister. 

'"[Count THE Japanese Prime Minister'" in a speech last night"" 

Okuma.] said : 

Japan's object is to eliminate from continental China the 

root of German influence, which constitutes a constant menace 
to the peace of the Far East, and thus to secure the aim of 
the alliance with Great Britain. She harbours no design for 
territorial aggrandisement and entertains no desire to promote 
any other selfish end. 

Japan's warlike operations will not, therefore, extend 
beyond the limits necessary for the attainment of that object 
and for the defence of her own legitimate interests. Accord- 
ingly the Imperial Government has no hesitation in announc- 
ing to the world that it will take no action such as to give to 
the Powers any cause for anxiety or uneasiness regarding the 
safety of their territories or possessions. 

{Press Bureau, August 20, 1914.) 


Japanese Imperial Rescript declaring War upon Germany, 

August 23, 1914. 

WE, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, on the 
throne occupied by the same Dynasty from time immemorial, 
do hereby make the following proclamation to all Our loyal 
and brave subjects : — 

We, hereby, declare war against Germany and We com- 
mand Our Army and Navy to carry on hostilities against 
that Empire with all their strength, and We also command 
all Our competent authorities to make every effort in pur- 
suance of their respective duties to attain the national aim 
within the limit of the law of nations. 

Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the 
calamitous effect of which We view with grave concern, We, 
on our part, have entertained hopes of preserving the peace 
of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutraUty, but 
the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, 
Our Ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Ger- 
many is at Kiao-chau, its leased territory in China, busy with 
warUke preparations, while her armed vessels, cruising the 
seas of Eastern Asia, are threatening Our commerce and that 
of Our Ally. The peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy. 

Accordingly, Our Government, and that of His Britannic 
Majesty, after a full and frank communication with each other, 
agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the 
protection of the general interests contemplated in the Agree- 
ment of AUiance,'" and We on Otu: part, being desirous to attain "' [See 
that object by peaceful means, commanded Our Government P- 504-] 
to offer, with sincerity, an advice to the Imperial German 
Government."" By the last day appointed for the purpose, "" [See 
however. Our Government failed to receive an answer accept- p- 295.] 
ing their advice. 

It is with profound regret that We, in spite of Our ardent 
devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare 
war, especially at this early period of Our reign and while 
we are still in mourning for Our lamented Mother. 

' ^ It is Our earnest wish that, by the loyalty and valour of 
Our^faithful subjects, peace may soon be restored and the 
glory of the Empire be enhanced. 

{The Times, August 24, 1914.) 



[September 5, 

''» [Minister Speech of Baron Kato"' in the Imperial Diet, Tokio, on 

Foreign SEPTEMBER 5TH, I914. 

Affairs 1 

'' (Translation from Japanese Official Gazette. Courteously 

supplied by H.E. the Marquis InouyS, Japanese Ambassador 

in London.) 

AFTER a brief survey of the multifarious circumstances 
which led up to the present war. Baron Kato said : 

Thus finding the peace of Europe hanging in the balance, 
the Imperial Government could not view, but with grave 
concern, the further developments of the situation. Deeming 
it necessary in these circumstances to make their attitude 
clear to the public, the Imperial Foreign Office issued a state- 
ment couched in the following terms'" on the 4th August. 

" The Imperial Government can hardly view the recent 
developments of the European situation but with grave 
anxiety both out of political, and economical considerations. 
It is needless to say that it is the most earnest wish of the 
Imperial Government to see the present conflict brought to a 
happy conclusion and peace restored at the earliest possible 
moment. In case, however, the present war is to be pro- 
tracted against our desire, the Imperial Government sincerely 
hope that the conflagration could in all probability be confined 
to the localities now affected by it and that they could main- 
tain strict neutrality. As to the further developments of the 
situation, however, we feel it our duty to follow them with 
the closest possible attention. If England were forced to 
enter into the rank of combatants and the aims of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance"" were jeopardised in consequence, the 
Imperial Government might be obliged to resort to a measure 
they deem fit for discharging the obligations laid upon them 
by the agreement of the Alliance. It can scarcely be pre- 
dicted at the present moment whether the events would take 
such a course as to bring about such a contingency. While 
entertaining the most ardent wish that things of this kind may 
never happen, the Imperial Government are nevertheless 
following the development of events with the closest attention." 

As clearly stated in this statement, the Imperial Govern- 
ment desired from the outset that the European conflagration 


"''[c/. con- 

p. 295.] 

p. 504-] 


should never spread so widely as to involve the Far East in 
its calamities. Great Britain, however, having been compelled 
to participate in this war, at the beginning of August requested 
the Imperial Government under the agreement of the AUiance 
to render them assistance in the matter. At that time, the 
British trade in the Far East was exposed to great danger 
owing to the presence of the German war vessels in the Eastern 
Seas, and our oversea trade was also impeded to no small 
extent, while at the same time, in Kiau-chao, the German 
leased territory in the Far East, every possible effort was 
made, day in and day out, to complete the warlike prepara- 
tions, with a view to making it the basis of Germany's military 
operations in the Orient. The maintenance of peace was 
thus rendered very difficult. As you are well aware, the 
agreement of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance has for its object 
the consolidation and maintenance of general peace in Eastern 
Asia, the preservation of the independence and territorial 
integrity of China, the consecration of the principle of equal 
opportunity in China, and, further, the maintenance of the 
territorial rights of Great Britain and Japan in the regions of 
Eastern Asia and India, and the defence of their special 
interests in these regions. Now owing to the fact that her 
trade and commerce in the Orient — to which great importance 
is attached by her as one of her special interests in common 
with Japan — ^were menaced by her enemies. Great Britain 
addressed her request to us to render her such assistance as 
was in our power, and the Imperial Government, whose 
foreign policy is based upon the Alliance, had no alternative 
but to accede to this request and lend her their helping hand 
in her hour of need. Moreover, the Imperial Government 
deemed it not only a great impediment to the consohdation of 
general peace in the Far East, but also prejudicial to the 
interest of this Empire, that Germany, whose policy is prone 
to be at variance with the aims of the AUiance, should possess 
a base for her influence in the Far East. In these circumstances 
the Imperial Government could not escape from the con- 
clusion that it was inevitable that they should draw the sword 
against Germany in compHance with the demand of Great 
Britain. After having laid their view before His Majesty the 
Emperor, and having obtained the Imperial approval thereof, 
the Cabinet made a communication to this effect to the British 



[September 5, 

Government. Following upon the heels of this communication, 
a frank and full exchange of views took place between 
the two Governments, which confirmed the Imperial Govern- 
ment in the view that it was a matter of supreme importance 
that they should at once take suitable measures for the pro- 
tection and defence of general interests as contemplated in 
the agreement of the Alliance. It need hardly be said at this 
juncture that the Imperial Government had not the slightest 
idea of plunging themselves into the turmoil of the present 
struggle, but they deemed it their duty that they should en- 
deavour to ensure permanent peace in the Orient, safeguard 
the special interests of our Ally, and uphold the spirit of the 
Alliance, thereby consolidating its strength. The Imperial 
Government, actuated as they were by the idea that it was 
best calculated to realise the object in view if the settlement 
of the matter were achieved by peaceful means even at the 
eleventh hour, decided to offer sincere advice to the Imperial 
German Government. Accordingly the note, couched in the 
<"[c/. text following terms'" was handed over to the German Government 

in on the 15th August"" : 

D.O.W., . . 

Considermg it highly important and necessary m 

the present situation to take measures to remove all 
causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and 
to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the 
agreement of the Alliance between Japan and Great 
Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in 
Eastern Asia, the establishment of which is the aim 
of the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Govern- 
ment sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the 
Imperial German Government to carry out the following 
two propositions : 

(i) To withdraw immediately from the Japanese 
and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed 
vessels of all kinds and to disarm at once those which 
cannot be withdrawn. 

(2) To deliver, on a date not later than 15th Sep- 
tember, to the Imperial Japanese Authorities, without 
condition or compensation, the entire leased -territory 
of Kiau-chao, with a view to eventual restoration of the 
same to China. 

see p. 295.] 

(2) [Pre- 
sented to 

ment by 
koshi on 
Aug. 17, 

see p. 295; 
cf. R. 66.] 


The Imperial Government announce at the same 
time that in the event of their not receiving by noon of 
August 23rd, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German 
Government signif5dng the unconditional acceptance of 
the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese 
Government, they will be compelled to take such action 
as they may deem necessary to meet the situation. 

The date prescribed in the above note, namely, 23rd August, 
passed, but no reply was received from the German Govern- 
ment. The result was the rupture of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries and the state of war was brought 
into existence. As is still fresh in your minds, the Imperial 
Rescript declaring war against Germany"' was issued in the miSee 
afternoon of 23rd August. p. 297.3 

In regard to Austria-Hungary, her interests in the Orient 
are, so to speak, infinitesimal. Besides, the Imperial Govern- 
ment, having no interest in the Austro-Serbian dispute, 
which, as you know, is the genesis of the present European 
conflict, had entertained the hope that they could continue 
peaceful relations with the Dual Monarchy, and they were 
given to understand that this hope was reciprocated on the 
part of the latter, as is illustrated in the following instance. 
On the eve of the outbreak of war against Germany, the 
Government of Austria-Hungary, pointing out the presence 
of her cruiser Kaiserin Elizabeth ^^^ in the Far East, which she ''"[^/•R-69. 
feared might constitute the only and sole chance of creating ^' ^^^'^ 
hostile relations between the two countries, signified her 
willingness to instruct the said cruiser to proceed to Shanghai, 
a neutral port, and remain there entirely dismantled for the 
duration of war between Japan and Germany, and expressed 
the hope, at the same time, that the Imperial Government 
would give the said cruiser suitable guarantee, so as to enable 
her to sail from Kiau-chao to Shanghai in peace. Having no 
occasion whatever to wage war against Austria-Hungary, 
still less any necessity therefor, the Imperial Government 
had the intention to let the Kaiserin Elizabeth sail to Shanghai 
in peace as desired by Austria-Hungary, but just at that 
moment the British men-of-war, placed under the Commander- 
in-Chief of our Fleet, were already afloat for action in certain 
seas. We feared, therefore, that, even though our warships 


GERMANY AND JAPAN [September 5, 

did nothing towards the Austrian cruiser, a British war vessel 
might open action against her and frustrate our plan of letting 
her ply her course to Shanghai. Under these circumstances, 
before giving consent to the Austrian request, the Imperial 
Government brought their desire to the notice of the British 
Government and obtained the reply from that quarter to the 
effect that, in deference to the wishes of the Imperial Govern- 
ment, they were ready to accede to the request of the Austrian 
Government under certain conditions. Having thus pro- 
cured a satisfactory answer from our Ally, I was just on the 
point of intimating our decision in regard to this matter to 
the Austrian Ambassador here, when he informed me that he 
was in receipt of instructions from his Government charging 
him to leave Tokio and return home forthwith, and applied 
"' [See R. to me for the passports. '" It was much against my liking, but 
69-] in these circumstances I had no alternative but to meet his 
■ request by handing him over the required passports. Simul- 
taneously, I sent instructions to our Ambassador at Vienna 
to address a similar request to the Government to which he 
was accredited and return home. These are the circum- 
stances which led up to the outbreak of war against Germany 
and the rupture of diplomatic relations between Japan and 

Availing myself of this opportunity, I should like to make 
reference to the courtesy shown by the Government of the 
United States of America towards the Imperial Government 
in connection with the present crisis. No sooner had the 
diplomatic relations with Germany entered upon a very 
acute and critical stage than the Imperial Government 
requested the American Government that, in the event of 
the outbreak of war between Japan and Germany, they 
would have the goodness to place all our public establish- 
ments and our countrymen in Germany under their pro- 
tection. Later on, upon the rupture of diplomatic relations 
with Austria-Hungary, we addressed a similar request to 
that Government. On both occasions they readily acceded 
to our request with willingness, and since then they have 
spared no pains in looking after the welfare of our country- 
men remaining in the enemy countries. I feel sure I am giving 
a voice to the sentiments of the House when I express, in the 
name of the Imperial Government, the deep sense of gratitude 



for'these acts of courtesy and good will manifested by the 
Government of the United States of America. It is a cause 
of profound regret on my part that our Empire was forced 
to employ her arms against Germany, but I am fully convinced 
His August Majesty's Army and Navy will in no circum- 
stance fail to achieve acts of bravery and loyalty, as they 
have done on the previous occasions, and I pray with you all 
that a day may soon come when peace will be restored. 


[July 31, 



{Published officially in Great Britain on February 20, 1915.) 

No. I. 

'" [Men- The President of the French Republic to the Kine^^ 

tioned in r o , 

JvohX Cher et grand Ami, ^«''"' ^' 3i i^^Met, 1914- 

P- 376).] DANS les circonstances graves que traverse I'Europe, 
je crois devoir communiquer a votre Majeste les renseigne- 
ments que le Gouvernement de la R^publique a regus d'AUe- 
magne. Les preparatifs militaires auxquels se livre le Gou- 
vernement Imperial, notamment dans le voisinage immediat 
de la frontiere franfaise, prennent chaque jour une intensite 
et une acceleration nouvelles. La France, resolue a faire 
jusqu'au bout tout ce qui dependra d'eUe pour maintenir 
la paix, s'est bornee jusqu'ici aux mesures de precaution 
les plus indispensables. Mais il ne semble pas que sa prudence 
et sa moderation ralentisse'nt les dispositions de I'Allemagne ; 
loin de la. Nous sommes done, peut-etre, malgre la sagesse 
du Gouvernement de la Republique et le calme de I'opinion, 
a la veille des evenements les plus redoutables. 

De toutes les informations qui nous arrivent, il resulte 
que si I'Allemagne avait la certitude que le Gouvernement. 
anglais n'interviendrait pas dans un conflit 011 la France serait 
engagee, la guerre serait inevitable, et qu'en revanche, si 
I'Allemagne avait la certitude que I'entente cordiale s'af&rme- 
rait, le cas echeant, jusque sur les champs de bataille, il y 
aurait les plus grandes chances pour que la paix ne. fut pas 

Sans doute nos accords militaires et navals laissent entiere 
la liberte du Gouvernement de votre Majeste, et, dans les 
lettres ^changees en 1912 entre Sir Edward Grey et M. Paul 


Cambon, I'Angleterre et la France se sont simplement 
engagees. Tune vis-a-vis de I'autre, a causer entre elles en cas 
de tension europ6enne et a examiner ensemble s'il y avait 
lieu a une action commune. Mais le caractere d'intimite 
que le sentiment public a donne, dans les deux pays, a I'entente 
de I'Angleterre et de la France, la coniiance ave? laquelle 
nos deux Gouvernements n'ont cesse de travailler au maintien 
de la paix, les sympathies que votre Majeste a toujours 
tdmoignees a la France, m'autorisent a lui faire connaitre, 
en toute franchise, mes impressions, qui sont celles du Gou- 
vernement de la Republique et de la France entiere. 

C'est, je crois, du langage et de la conduite du Gouverne- 
ment anglais que dependent desormais les dernieres possi- 
bilites d'une solution pacifique. 

Nous avons nous-memes, des le debut de la crise, recom- 
mande a nos Allies une moderation, dont ils ne se sont pas 
departis. D'accord avec le Gouvernement Royal et con- 
formement aux dernieres suggestions de Sir E. Grey, nous 
continuerons a agir dans le merae sens. 

Mais si tous les efforts de conciliation partent du meme 
cote, et si I'AUemagne et I'Autriche peuvent speculer sur 
I'abstention de I'Angleterre, les exigences de I'Autriche 
demeureront inflexibles et un accord deviendra impossible 
entre la Russie et elle. J'ai la conviction profonde qu'a 
I'heure actuelle, plus I'Angleterre, la France et la Russie 
donneront une forte impression d'unite dans leur action 
diplomatique, plus il sera encore permis de compter sur la 
conservation de la paix. 

Votre Majeste voudra bien excuser une demarche qui 
n'est inspiree que par le desir de voir I'equihbre europeen 
definitivement raffermi. 

Je prie votre Majeste de croire a mes sentiments les plus 



Paris, July 31, 1914. 
Dear and Great Friend, 

IN the grave events through which Europe is passing, I 
feel bound to convey to your Majesty the information which 

II— u 305 


the Government of the Republic have received from Germany. 
The miUtary preparations which are being undertaken by 
the Imperial Government, especially in the immediate neigh- 
bourhood of the French frontier, are being pushed forward 
every day with fresh vigour and speed. France, resolved to 
continue to the very end to do all that lies within her power 
to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself 
solely to the most indispensable precautionary measures. 
But it does not appear that her prudence and moderation 
serve to check Germany's action ; indeed, quite the reverse. 
We are, perhaps, then, in spite of the moderation of the 
Government of the Republic and the calm of pubUc opinion, 
on the eve of the most terrible events. 

From all the information which reaches us, it would seem 
that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that 
the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in 
'"[c/. B. which France might be engaged "'; if, on the other hand, 
17; Y. 63.] Germany were convinced that the entente cordiale would be 
affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the 
field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that 
peace would remain unbroken. 

It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave 
complete Uberty to your Majesty's Government, and that, in 
the letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and 
1^1 [See B. j^ pa^^j Cambon,"" Great Britain and France entered into 
[enclos )l iiothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another 
in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert 
whether common action were advisable. 

But the character of close friendship which public feehng 
has given in both countries to the entente between Great 
Britain and France, the confidence with which our two 
Governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance 
of peace, and the signs of sympathy which your Majesty has 
ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite 
frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Govern- 
ment of the Republic and of all France. 

It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the 
British Government that henceforward the last chances of a 
peaceful settlement depend. 

We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have 
enjoined upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which 



they have not swerved. In concert with Your Majesty's 
Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest 
suggestion, we will continue to act on the same Unes. 

But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, 
and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention 
of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, 
and an agreement between her and Russia wiU become im- 
possible. I am profoundly convinced that at the present 
moment the more Great Britain, France, and Russia can 
give a deep impression that they are united in their diplo- 
matic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the 
preservation of peace. 

I beg that your Majesty will excuse a step which is only 
inspired by the hope of seeing the European balance of power 
definitely reaffirmed. 

Pray accept the expression of my most cordial senti- 


No. 2. 
The King to the President of the French Republic. 

Buckingham Palace, August i, 1914. 

Dear and Great Friend, 

I MOST highly appreciate the sentiments which moved 
you to write to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I 
am grateful to you for having stated your views so fully and 

You may be assured that the present situation in Europe 
has been the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to 
me, and I am glad to think that our two Governments have 
worked so amicably together in endeavouring- to find a peace- 
ful solution of the questions at issue. 

It would be a source of real satisfaction to me if our 
united efforts were to meet with success, and I am still not 
without hope that the terrible events which seem so near 
may be averted. 

I admire the restraint which you and your Government 
are exercising in refraining from taking undue military 



. measures on the frontier, and not adopting an attitude which 
could in any wise be interpreted as a provocative one. 

I am personally using my best endeavours with the 
'" [See p. Emperors of Russia '" and of Germany '" towards finding some 
,j, r c ^■^°-' solution by which actual military operations may at any 
Lq^^io] ^^*® ^^ postponed, and time be thus given for calm dis- 
cussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute these 
efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of 
an amicable settlement. 

As to the attitude of my country, events are changing 
so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments ; 
but you may be assured that my Government will continue 
to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of 
interest to our two nations with M. Cambon. 

Believe me, 

M. le President, 

(Signed) GEORGE R.I. 

{British White-paper, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1915) Cd. 7812.) 





(Published officially in Great Britain on August 5, 1914-) 

No. I. 
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan {St. Petersburg.) 

Foreign Office, August i, 1914. 

YOU should at once apply for an audience with His 
Majesty the Emperor, and convey to him the following per- 
sonal message from the King : — 

" My Government has received the following statement 
from the German Government : — 

" ' On July 29th the Russian Emperor requested the 
German Emperor by telegraph to mediate between Russia 
and Austria.'" The Emperor immediately declared his ("[W. exh. 
readiness to do so. ''' He informed the Russian Emperor of 21 ; Y. 
this by telegraph, and took the required action at Vienna. jW- V. 
Without waiting for the result of this action Russia mobilised (siL^ j^ 
against Austria. By telegraph the German Emperor pointed 22 • ^Y. 
out to the Russian Emperor'" that hereby his attempt at app. V. 
mediation would be rendered illusory. The Emperor further (III.).] 
asked the Russian Emperor to suspend the military opera- '"[W., 
tions against Austria. This, however, did not happen. In P- ^33 ; Y. 
spite of this the German Government continued its mediation ^P^'j 7; 
at Vienna. In this matter the German Government have ^ '''^ 
gone to the farthest limit of what can be suggested to a 
Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany. The pro- 
posals made by the German Government at Vienna were 
conceived entirely on the lines suggested by Great Britain, 
and the German Government recommended them at Vienna 
for their serious consideration. They were taken into con- 
sideration at Vienna this morning.'" During the delibera- (4)j-^^ g 
tions of the (? Austrian) Cabinet, and before they were con- no.] 

eluded, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported 



"'[c/. w. the mobilisation of the entire Russian army and fleet.'" 
<jxh. 24.] Owing to this action on the part of Russia the Austrian answer 
to the German proposals for mediation, which were still under 
consideration, was not given. This action on the part of 
Russia is also directed against Germany — ^that is to say, the 
Power whose mediation had been invoked by the Russian 
Emperor. We were bound to reply with serious counter 
measures to this action, which we were obhged to consider as 
hostile, unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our 
country. We are unable to remain inactive in face of the 
Russian mobilisation on our frontier. We have therefore 

'"'{O. 70 ; informed Russia"" that, unless she were prepared to suspend 

R- 54] within twelve hours the warlike measure against Germany 

and Austria, we should be obliged to mobilise, and this would 

mean war. We have asked France if she would remain 

'"[Y. 117.] neutral during a German- Russian war.'"' 

" I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has 
produced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any 
possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present 
threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal 
appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel 
must have occurred, and to leave stiU open grounds for nego- 
tiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way 
contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do ever5^hing 
in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted conversa- 
tions between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that 
you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be 
done to secure the peace of the world." 

No. 2. 
His Majesty the Tsar to His Majesty King George. 

August I, 1914. 

I WOULD gladly have accepted your proposals had not 

'*'[" at 7.10 German Ambassador this afternoon'*' presented a note to 

Q^^Q~ niy Government declaring war. Ever since presentation of 

■ ^ '■' the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has devoted all her efforts 

(5) |-j.y g 22_ to finding some pacific solution of the question raised by 

97 ; R, ' Austria's action. Object of that action was to crush Serbia 

47] and make her a vassal"' of Austria. Effect of this would 



have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of 
such vital interest to my Empire. Every proposal, including 
that of your Government, was rejected by Germany and 
Austria, and it was only when favourable moment for bring- 
ing pressure to bear on Austria had passed that Germany 
showed any disposition to mediate. Even then she did not 
put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declaration of 
war on Serbia forced me to order a partial mobilisation,'" '"P- 7o^ 
though, in view of threatening situation, my military advisers ^^''-^ 

strongly advised a general mobilisation owing to quickness 
with which Germany can mobilise in comparison with Russia. 
I was eventually compelled to take this course in consequence 
of complete Austrian mobilisation,"" of the bombardment ''''[O- 47-] 
of Belgrade, ''' of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, '" [Y. 113] 
and of secret military preparations being made in Germany. 
That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's 
sudden declaration of war,'*' which was quite unexpected "^[O- 76] 
by me, as I have given most categorical assurances to the 
Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as 
mediation negotiations continued. ''' ' ^- ^PP- 

In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that ' ^ '' 
I have done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has 
been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support 
France and Russia. God bless and protect you. 


[August 4, 




A State of War. 

HIS Majesty's Government informed the German Govern- 
ment on August 4th, 1914, that, unless a satisfactory reply 
to the request of His Majesty's Government for an assurance 
that Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium was 
II. received by midnight of that day, His Majesty's Government 
would feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold 
that neutrality and the observance of a treaty to which Ger- .0]' many was as much a party as Great Britain. 

The result of this communication having been that His 

P^ajesty's Ambassador at Berlin had to ask for his passports, 

Kjj: ./]! His Majesty's Government have accordingly formally notified 

'''^' ■'- ^^p German Government that a state of war exists between 

1^)^ two countries as from 11 p.m. to-day. 

ti Foreign Office, 

August 4th, 1914. 

{London Gazette, August 5, 1914.) 



DIPLOMATIC relations between France and Austria 
being broken off, the French Government have requested His 
Majesty's Government to communicate to the Austro-Hun- 
garian Ambassador in London the following Declaration : 

" Apres avoir declare la guerre a la Serbie et pris ainsi 
la premiere initiative des hostilites en Europe, le Gouverne- 
ment austro-hongrois s'est mis, sans aucune provocation du 
Gouvernement de la Republique Frangaise, en etat de guerre 
avec la France ; 



1°. — ^Apres que TAlleinagne avait successivement declare 
la guerre a la Russie et a la France, il est intervenu dans ce 
coiSflit en declarant la guerre a la Russie qui combattait deja 
aux cotes de la France. 

2°. — ^D'apres de nombreuses informations dignes de foi, 
I'Autriche a envoye des troupes sur la frontiere allemande, 
dans des conditions qui constituent une menace directe a 
regard de la France. 

En presence de cet ensemble de faits, le Gouvernement 
frangais se voit oblige de declarer au Gouvernement austro- 
hongrois qu'il va prendre toutes les mesures qui lui permettront 
de repondre a ces actes et a ces menaces." 

In communicating this Declaration accordingly to the 
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, His Majesty's Government 
have declared to His Excellency that the rupture with France 
having been brought about in this way, they feel themselves 
obliged to announce that a state of war exists between Great 
Britain and Austria-Hungary as from midnight. 

Foreign Office, 

August 12th, 1914. 

{London Gazette, August 13, 1914.) 


[October 13, 




headed in 

p-^-^- {North German Gazette* October 13, 1914.) 

Teolvsee THE assertion of the British Government that the viola- 

p 229 ; tion of Belgian neutraUty by Germany was the cause of 

Belgian England's participation in the present war, has already been 

reply, proved untenable by Sir Edward Grey's own declaration. 

P- 350. Certain documents discovered by the German military 

° 1 authorities in the archives of the Belgian General Staff in 

Brussels throw a new and somewhat peculiar light upon the 

pathetic moral indignation at the German invasion of Belgium, 

with which the English tried to stir up the feeling in neutral 

countries against Germany. 

From the contents of a portfolio bearing the inscription, 

" Intervention anglaise en Belgique," it is evident that the 

despatch of an English expeditionary corps to Belgium in the 

event of a Franco-German war was already contemplated 

as far back as the year 1906. According to a report of April 

<^'[For text loth, 1906,''' addressed to the Belgian Minister of War, which 

of this -^as found there, the chief of the Belgian General Staff, after 

report see repeatedly conferring with Lieutenant-Colonel Bamardiston, 

fFseg'^ then English Military Attache in Brussels, worked out upon 

the latter 's initiative and in conjunction with him, a detailed 

plan for joint operations against Germany of the Belgian 

• Army and an English expeditionary force of 100,000 men. 

This plan met with the approval of Major-General Grierson, 

Chief of the British General Staff. Full informationfas to 

the strength and organisation of the British troops, as to the 

composition of the expeditionary corps, as to the places 

of disembarkation and the exact time of the despatch of the 

troops, &c., was communicated to the Belgian General Staff. 

On the ground of this information, the Belgian General Staff 

* [Norddeufsche Allgemeine Zeitung.'] 


thoroughly prepared, for the transport of the British troops to 
the basis of their strategical operations against Germany, and 
also for the housing and feeding of the troops. All the details 
/of the co-operation of the latter with the Belgians were carefully 
worked out. Thus a large number of interpreters and Belgian 
gendarmes were to be placed at the disposal of the British 
Army, and the necessary maps were to be supplied to them. 
Provisions were even made for the care of the British wounded. 

Dunkerque, Calais and Boulogne were selected as ports 
of disembarkation for the British troops. From these places 
they were to be transported by Belgian trains into the fighting 
zone. The fact that the disembarkation at French ports and 
the transport through French territory were planned, proves 
that the Anglo-Belgian arrangements were preceded by 
arrangements with the French General Staff. These three 
Powers drew up the exact plans for the co-operation of the 
" allied armies," as the document says. This is further 
substantiated by the fact that among the secret documents 
there was also found a map showing the French lines of 

The report mentioned above contains some remarks of 
special interest. It is said there that Lieutenant-Colonel 
Barnardiston had remarked that Holland's support could not 
be relied upon at the time (1906), and that he had further 
given the confidential information that the British Govern- 
ment intended to transfer to Antwerp the basis for provision- 
ing the British Army, as soon as the North Sea had been 
cleared of aU German warships. The British Military Attache 
also suggested the establishment of a spy service in the 
Prussian Rhine Province. 

A valuable supplement to the military documents dis- 
covered, was found amongst the secret papers in the shape 
of a report by Baron Greindl, for many years Belgian Minister 
in Berlin, addressed to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
In it Baron Greindl reveals with great acumen the real reasons 
which prompted England to make her offer, and he points out 
the dangerous situation in which Belgium had placed herself 
by taking sides with the Entente Powers. In this very 
detailed report, dated December 23rd, 1911, the full text 
of which may at the Government's discretion be published 
in due course, Baron Greindl points out that the plan, drawn 



up by the Belgian General Staff for the defence of Belgian 
neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war and com- 
municated to him (the Minister), had bearing only on the 
question of what military measures should be taken in the 
event of Germany violating Belgian neutrality, whereas the 
hypothesis of a French attack upon Germany through Belgium 
was equally within the range of possibilities. The Minister 

<i'[For then proceeds as follows'^' : 
tion of " VON der franzosischen Seite her droht die Gefahr 
Baron nicht nur im Siiden von Luxemburg. Sie bedroht uns auf 
remarks^ unserer ganzen gemeinsamen Grenze. Fiir diese Behauptung 
sgg ' sind wir nicht nur auf Mutmassungen angewiesen. Wir 
p. 328.] haben dafiir positive Anhaltspunkte. 

" Der Gedanke einer Umfassungsbewegung von Norden 
her gehort zweifellos zu den Kombinationen der Entente 
cordiale. Wenn das nicht der Fall ware, so hatte der Plan, 
Vlissingen zu befestigen, nicht ein solches Geschrei in Paris 
und London hervorgerufen. Man hat dort den Grund gar 
nicht verheimlicht, aus dem man wiinschte, dass die Schelde 
ohne Verteidigung bliebe. Man verfolgte dabei den Zweck, 
unbehindert eine englische Garnison nach Antwerpen iiber- 
f iihren zu konnen, also den Zweck, sich bei uns eine Operations- 
basis fiir eine Offensive in der Richtung auf den Niederrhein 
und Westfalen zu schaffen und uns dann mit fortzureissen, 
was nicht schwer gewesen ware. Denn nach Preisgabe 
unseres nationalen Zufiuchtsortes hatten wir durch unsere 
eigene Schuld uns jeder Moglichkeit begeben, den Forde- 
rungen unserer zweifelhaften Beschiitzer Widerstand zu 
leisten, nachdem wir so unklug gewesen waren, sie dort 
zuzulassen. Die ebenso perfiden wie naiven Eroffnungen 
des Obersten Barnardiston zur Zeit des Abschlusses der 
Entente cordiale haben uns deutlich gezeigt, um was es sich 
handelte. Als es sich herausstellte, dass wir uns durch die 
angeblich drohende Gefahr einer Schliessung der Schelde 
nicht einschiichtern liessen, wurde der Plan zwar nicht 
aufgegeben, aber dahin abgeandert, dass die englische Hilfsar- 
mee nicht an der belgischen Kiiste, sondern in den nachstheg- 
enden franzosischen Hafen gelandet werden soUte. Hierfiir 
zeugen auch die Enthiillungen des Kapitans Faber, die 
ebensowenig dementiert worden sind wie die Nachrichten 



der Zeitungen, durch die sie bestatigt oder in einzelnen 
Punkten erganzt worden sind. Diese in Calais und Diinkirchen 
gelandete englische Armee wiirde nicht an unserer Grenze 
entlang nach Longwy marschieren, um Deutschland zu er- 
reichen. Sie wiirde sofort bei uns von Nordwesten her eindring- 
en. Das wiirde ihr den Vorteil verschaffen, sofort in Aktion 
treten zu konnen, die belgische Armee in einer Gegend zu 
treffen, in der wir uns auf keine Festurig stiitzen konnen, 
falls wir eine Schlacht riskieren wollen. Es wiirde ihr 
ermoglichen, an Ressourcen aller Art reiche Provinzen zu 
besetzen, auf alle Falle aber unsere Mobilmachung zu 
behindern oder sie nur zuzulassen, nachdem wir uns formell 
verpfiichtet batten, die Mobilmachung nur zum Vorteil 
Englands und seines Bundesgenossen durchzufiihren. 

" Es ist dringend geboten, im voraus einen Schlachtplan 
fiir die belgische Armee auch fiir diese Eventualitat aufzus- 
tellen. Das gebietet sowohl das Interesse an unserer 
militarischen Verteidigung als auch die Fiihrung unserer 
auswartigen Politik im Falle eines Krieges zwischen Deutsch- 
land und Frankreich." 

These remarks, made by an unbiassed personality, prove 
conclusively that the same Great Britain who is now pretend- 
ing to be the protectress of Belgian neutrality induced Belgium 
to side with the Entente Powers, and that at one time England 
even thought of infringing on the Netherlands' neutrahty. 
Moreover it is clearly shown that the Belgian Government 
itself, by lending its ear to the British proposals, has rendered 
itself guilty of a grave offence against the obligations resting 
upon it as a neutral power. Had the Belgian Government 
acted in. full accordance with the duties of a neutral country, 
it would have come to an arrangement with Germany similar 
to the one made with France and England. The papers 
discovered supply the documentary proof of the fact, known 
to the German authorities long before the outbreak of war, 
that Belgium was conniving with the Entente Powers. These 
papers may serve as a justification of our military action, and 
also as a confirmation of the reports received by the German 
military authorities regarding the intentions of France. 
May they open the eyes of the Belgian people as to whom 
the catastrophe is due which has overtaken their unfortunate 
country ! 





in {North German Gazette* November 25, 1914, Special 
D.O.W.] Supplement.) 

The Breach of Belgian Neutrality by England and 


<^'[S«e The British Government has confined its answer'^' to our 

P- 329-] revelations from the archives of the Belgian Ministry of War, 
concerning the Anglo-Belgian military agreements in 1906, 
to the statement that Major-General Grierson, who took part 
in their formulation, had, died ; that Colonel Barnardiston was 
away as chief of the English troops before Kiao-chau ; and 
that it was possible that an academic discussion had taken 
place between those two British officers and the Belgian 
Military authorities, concerning the assistance which the 
British Army would be able to give to Belgium in case her 
neutrality were violated by one of her neighbours. 
(" [See The Belgian Government has observed'^' that it could only 

P- 350] be considered as natural that the English Military Attache 
in Brussels should, during the Algeciras crisis, have asked 
the Chief of the Belgian General Staff about the measures 
which were to prevent the violation of Belgian neutrality 
guaranteed by England. The Chief of the General Staff, 
'"t"^",', . General Ducarme,"' had answered, that Belgium would 
"^Ataian^^^ capable of warding off an attack, no matter from which 
ach de side it might come. The Belgian Government adds to this the 
Gotha" following remark ■.'°' "Did the conversation exceed these 
for 1907, limits, and did Colonel Barnardiston explain the war plan 
^%y\ which the British General Staff wished to follow in case our 
J^*^ neutrahty should be violated ? We doubt it." Demanding 
ments.] the unabridged publication of the material found in the 
[Seep. Belgian secret archives, the Belgian Government makes 
351] the solemn assertion that it was never asked directly or in- 
directly to take sides with the Triple Entente in case of a 
Franco-German war. 

As may be seen from these declarations, the British Govern- 
ment from the beginning has failed to dispute the statements 

* [Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeitung.] 



of the Imperial Government. It has Umited itself to mini- 
mising them. It perhaps suggested itself to the British 
Government that, owing to the overwhelming abundance of 
evidence, a denial of the facts would be useless and risky. 
The discovery, in the meantime, of an Anglo-Belgian military 
news service, and of Belgian war maps prepared by the 
British Authorities, prove anew how far the preparations for 
the Anglo-Belgian war plan against Germany had proceeded. 

We reproduce herewith in fascimile the text of the rough 
draft discovered of the report of General Ducarme'" to the 
Belgian Minister of War of April loth, 1906, which can hardly 
be unknown to the Belgian Government, inasmuch as the 
Belgian Minister in Berlin, Baron Greindl, expressly referred 
to its contents in his report of December 23rd, 191 1.'" If, 
however, the memory of the Belgian Government should be 
faulty, its doubts concerning the themes treated in the con- 
versations of General Ducarme'" with Lieutenant-Colonel 
Barnardiston may be dissipated by the following text of the 
report which was preserved in the Belgian Ministry of War, in 
an envelope containing the inscription, " Conventions '*' 

The report of General Ducarme'" reads, in translation, as 
follows : — 

[For the original French text and English translation of 
General Ducame's report see pp. 331-339. 

. The North German Gazette gives the document in facsimile, 
and also prints in facsimile, as the inscription on the cover of 
the report, the words " Conventions anglo-belges." But as 
to the word " Conventions " see British of&cial comment, 
vol. I., p. 23, footnote.] 

It will be noted thai: the following note appears on the 
margin of the document : " L'entree des Anglais en Belgique 
ne se ferait qu'apres la violation de notre neutralite par 
I'Allemagne." (The entry of the English into Belgium shall 
not take place until after the violation of our neutrality by 
Germany.) How the matter really stood appears from a note 
found in the Belgian Ministry of the Interior, concerning a 
conversation of a successor of Lieutenant-Colonel Barnar- 
diston, the British Military Attache in Brussels, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Bridges, with the Belgian Chief of the General Staff, 


p. 318.] 

p. 328.] 

vol. I., 

P- 23, 



General Jungbluth. The document, which is dated April 23rd 
[In and probably dates from the year 1912,'" bears the inscription 

C.p.D. " confidentielle " in the handwriting of Count van der Straaten, 
officiaU Director in the Belgian Ministry of the Interior, and reads 
dated "^ in translation as follows : 

"Apnl j-ppj. ^jjg French original and English translation of this 

1^12."] document see pp. 339-34I-] 

Here it is plainly stated that the British Government had 
the intention, in case of a Franco-German war, to send troops 
to Belgium immediately, that is to say, to violate Belgian 
neutrality and do the very thing which England, at the time 
when Germany, justified by reasons of self-protection, 
anticipated her, used as a pretext for declaring war on 
Germany. Moreover, the British Government, with a 
cynicism that is unparalleled in history, has taken advantage 
of Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality for the purpose 
of raising sentiment against us all over the world and of 
posing as the protector of small and weak States. 

As regards the Belgian Government, it was its duty not 
only to reject most emphatically the British insinuations, 
but also to point out to the other signatories of the London 
(""[See Protocol of 1839,"' ^^d especially to the German Government, 
P- 487-] that England had repeatedly tempted Belgium to disregard the 
duties incumbent upon her as a neutral power. The Belgian 
Government, however, did not do so. That Government 
considered itself justified in taking, in agreement with the 
British General Staff, military precautions against the supposed 
plan of a German invasion of Belgium. On the other hand, the 
Belgian Government has never made the slightest attempt 
to take, in agreement with the German Government or the 
military authorities of Germany, defensive measures against 
the possibility of an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium. 
Yet the documentary evidence which has been found proves 
that Belgium was fully informed that such an invasion was 
intended by the two Entente Powers. This shows that the 
Belgian Government was determined from the outset to join 
Germany's enemies and to make common cause with them. 



[North German Gazette* November 6, 1914.) 

Je soussigne Dale Long, attache k I'E. M. requisitionne 

headed in 



A whole package of formulas like the one printed above 
was foimd in the writing-room of the British central office for 
espionage in Brussels. 

Long before the war it had become known that a certain 
Dale Long lived in Brussels and carried on espionage against 
Germany for England. It has also been possible to bring 
a great number of his agents before the court, but it was never 
possible to establish definitely that Dale Long belonged to the 
British General Staff. From the formulas found, however, 
it appears that Dale Long was to join the British General 
Staff in case of war, that he was authorised, as a member of 
the British Army, to make requisitions in Belgium, and that 
this authorisation was attested by the British Legation in 
Brussels, as the seal indicates. The presence of a great pile 
of blank formulas of this sort moreover proves in quite 
unimpeachable manner that this was a measure of mobilisa- 
tion which would be impossible without the consent of the 
Belgian Government. 

[Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeilung.'\ 

II— X 






D.O.W.] [North German Gazette* December 2, 1914.) 

EVIDENCE is accumulating that England, working in 
conjunction with Belgium, had done its utmost, not only 
diplomatically, but also in a military way, to prepare for war 
against Germany. Our troops recently captured secret 
military handbooks dealing with Belgium's roads and rivers, 
which the English General Staff had published (Belgium, 
Road and River Reports prepared by the General Staff, War 
Of&ce) . Four volumes of this handbook are in our possession, 
of which the first volume was printed as long ago as 1912, 
the second in 1913, the third (in two parts) and the fourth in 

They are marked : Confidential. This Book is the 
property of H.B.M. Government, and is intended for the 
personal information of . . . who is personally responsible 
for its' safe custody. The contents are to be disclosed only 
to authorised persons. 

These handbooks contain the most exact descriptions of 
territory conceivable, based upon military investigations. 
The introductory notice reads : These reports can only give 
the state of the roads at the time they were reconnoitred. 
It will always be advisable to reconnoitre them immediately 
before using them, to make sure that they are not blocked 
owing to repairs or pipe-laying, apart from possible obstruc- 
tions arranged by hostile forces or inhabitants. 

Thus, for example, in volume I., pages 130 sqq., the high 
road Nieuport — Dixmuide — Ypres — Menin — Tourcoing — 
Tournai is dealt with as regards the nature of the road, the 
country traversed, tactical considerations, observation points 
and water conditions, and illustrated by special maps. The 
report includes an enumeration and description of places 
along the way. It contains their exact distances from each 
other, as well as exhaustive details concerning the roads under 
discussion, their grades, bridges, cross-roads, telephone and 

* [Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeitung.} 


telegraph stations, railway stations, including the length of 
their platforms and embankments, narrow-gauge railways, 
oiltanks, etc. It is always stated whether all or part of the 
inhabitants speak French. 

Let us, for example, give literally the tactical observations 
about Dixmuide found on page 151 : — 

" Dixmuide would be difficult to take, whether attacked 
from the north or from the south. The best line to hold 
against an attack from the south would be the railway embank- 
ment W. of and up to the road, continuing along a line of 
knolls to the east of the road. West of the road the field of 
fire is good for 1,500 yards, east of it trees limit the view. A 
suitable garrison would be Hoogmolen and Veartkant. There 
is nothing else of tactical importance, nor is there anything 
likely to retard the rate of marching. Observation points : 
(a) the mill at Reencheeck, view all round ; {b) Koelberg 
(7 J miles beyond Ypres) view to east and south. Incidentally 
it may be remarked that the church towers are, as a rule, 
noted as good observation points." 

In a similarly thorough manner the whole course of the 
Scheldt is described, with all tributary rivers, villages, landing 
and fording places, breadth and depth, bridges, boats on 
hand, etc. 

Thus the handy volumes form a splendid guide for com- 
manders. General Staff officers, and subordinate leaders of 
every grade. There are appended : 

(i) A list of billeting possibilities in the various communes 
and villages, giving figures on billets for men, transport 
facilities at hand, and all other details which a commander 
requires ; 

(2) A Report on Belgium, south of the line Charleroi — 
Namur — ^Liege, and on Brussels from the point of view of 
aviation, containing valuable information for aviators. 

This lucid report, compiled most carefully and supple- 
mented by a map of landing-places, bears the inscription 
" secret," and was drawn up in July, 1914. 

Now these handbooks drawn up from a military and 
geographical point of view were not made just a short time 
before or during the war. Except perhaps the printing of 



them, that would not have been possible. The material on 
which they are based was, as may be gathered from the notes 
regarding the various parts, acquired since 1909 through 
careful and separate investigations. The first volume was 
then printed in 1912. 

These reports therefore prove, that there has been going on 
for the last five years a thorough preparation for a campaign , 

in neutral Belgium. They are nothing else than a set of secret 
regulations for an English army waging war in that country. 
Thus the British General Staff, for some considerable time, 
prepared for this eventuality to such an extent, and foresaw 
it so clearly, that it carried out the tedious work of the com- 
pilation of these military handbooks. 

Such a work could not have been accomplished without 
the ready and most extensive support of the Belgian Govern- 
ment and military officials. Such exhaustive and detailed 
strategic and tactical information as that mentioned above, 
or such exact data concerning all the railways and the entire 
traffic, concerning the rolling stock, the locks and bridges 
systems, cannot be obtained in any other way. The lists of 
billeting possibilities drawn up for the British Army and 
which deal with Belgium as if it were their own country, can 
only have been supplied by the Belgian Government. Without 
question official Belgian material was used here. It was 
adapted to suit English purposes, or in many places simply 
translated into English. 

Such was the thoroughness with which England and 
Belgium had arranged in time of peace for joint miUtary action. 
Belgium was, politically and from a military point of view, 
nothing but England's vassal. The indignation exhibited 
before the world by England over Germany's alleged breach of 
neutrality, is shown by these documents to be absolutely 
groundless and unjustified. If anybody has a right to be 
indignant, it is Germany. 

When, on the occasion of our operations on the coast, 
the English and French Press asserted contemptuously that 
we were not informed as to the dangers of the submergible 
territory in the so-called Polderland, it was correct in so far 
as we knew Belgian territory at the beginning of the war only 
through what we had been able to find in the sources available 
in the bookstores. 



For this reason, the EngUsh reports of their investigations 
and their excellent maps were valuable booty for us. We 
were able to make immediate use of this extraordinarily 
valuable material for our own purposes, and to fight England 
with her own weapons. - In this fact may be found the best 
tribute to the painstaking work of our enemies. 



LEGATION.""' . "'[So 


{North German Gazette* December 15, 1914.) n n w i 

NEW and important proofs have been found of the 
Anglo-Belgian complicity. Some time ago Mr. Grant- Wat- 
son, f the Secretary of the British Legation, was arrested in 
Brussels. He had remained at the legation quarters, after 
the legation had been transferred to Antwerp and later to 
Havre. The said gentleman was recently caught trying to 
do away with some documents, which he had carried away 
unnoticed from the legation when arrested. An examination 
of the papers revealed that they were official documents, 
with data of the most intimate character concerning the 
Belgian mobilisation and the defence of Antwerp, dating from 
the years 1913 and 1914. They include circular orders to 
the higher Belgian officers in command, bearing the signature 
in facsimile of the Belgian Minister of War and of the Belgian 
General Staff, and also a note concerning a conference of the 
" Commission de la base d'approvisionnements a Anvers," 
on May 27th, 1913. The fact that these papers were found 
in the British Legation shows sufficiently that the Belgian 
Government had no mihtary secrets to hide from the English 
Government, and that both governments, with regard to 
military matters, are in very close touch with each other. 

* [Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeitung.] 

I [Much diplomatic correspondence subsequently passed between 
London and Berlin, through the hands of the United States Ambassadors, 
concerning the arrest and detention of Mr. Grant- Watson, Second Secretary 
of the British Legation at Brussels, and the charges brought against him 
by the Germans.! 



There is also a handwritten note of especial interest which 
was found among the papers that the British Secretary 
endeavoured to destroy. It reads as follows : — 


1°. Les ofl&ciers frangais ont regu ordre de rejoindre 
des le 27. apres-midi. 

2°. Le meme jour, le chef de Gare de Feignies a regu 
ordre de concentrer vers Maubeuge tous les wagons fermes 
disponibles, en vue du transport de troupes. 

Communique par la Brigade de gendarmerie de 

Feignies, it may be remarked, is a railway station in 
France on the road from Maubeuge to Mons, about three 
kilometres from the Belgian frontier. Frameries is on the 
same line in Belgium, ten kilometres from the French frontier. 

From this notice it must be gathered that France had 
already made her first mobilisation plans on July 27th, and 
that the British Legation immediately received information 
thereof from Belgian sources. 

The material thus discovered furnishes an additional and 
valuable proof — ^if indeed any be needed — of the relations 
existing between England and Belgium. It shows anew that 
Belgium had sacrificed her own neutrality in favour of the 
Entente, and that she was an active member of the coalition 
which had been formed to fight the German Empire. For 
England, on the other hand, Belgian neutrality really was 
nothing but " a scrap of paper," to which she appealed when 
it was in her interest, and which she disregarded when she 
found it expedient to do so. It is obvious that the British 
Government made use of the violation of Belgian neutrality 
by Germany, only as a pretext to justify the war against us 
before the world and the British people. 


[The documents that follow emanated from the British 
Foreign Office and were printed, in the order here preserved, 
in the Blue-book entitled : " Collected Diplomatic Docu- 
ments Relating to the Outbreak of the European War " 



(Miscellaneous, No. 10 (1915). Cd. 7860), as an Appendix 
to the translation of the Belgian Grey-book [G]. They 
include, as will be seen, translations into English of a number 
of documents originally pubhshed in the Norddeutsche Allge- 
meine Zeitung, which reappeared in the " Aktenstiicke zum 
Kriegsausbruch," and in its English translation, " Docu- 
ments relating to the Outbreak of the War," both of which 
were published in Berlin by the German Foreign Office. It 
is the Enghsh version pubhshed by the British Foreign 
Office in the " Collected Diplomatic Documents " that is here 


No. I. 

Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels* 

Sir, Foreign Office, April 7, 1913. 

IN speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speak- 
ing unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge 
that there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be 
the first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that 
this apprehension could have come from a British source. 

The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been 
talk, in a British source which he could not name, of the 
landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to 
anticipate a possible despatch of German troops through 
Belgium to France. 

I said that I was sure that this Government would not be 
the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not 
believe that any British Government would be the first to do 
so, nor would pubhc opinion here ever approve of it. What 
we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing 
question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for 

* A record of this despatch was communicated by Sir F. Villiers to the 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if 
Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to 
be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium 
would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for 
sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the 
case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was 
that their neutraUty should be respected, and as long as it 
was not violated by any other Power we should certainly 
not send troops ourselves into their territory. 

I am, &c., 


No. 2. 

Extract from a Despatch from Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister 
at Berlin, to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
dated December 23, 1911. 

{From the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," October 13, 


»i [For the (TRANSLATION.) '" 


version. " From the French side the danger threatens not only in 

*^^ the south from Luxemburg ; it threatens us along our whole 

Gennan common frontier.' For this assertion we are not dependent 

com- only on surmises. We have positive facts to go upon. 

ments, " The combinations of the Entente cordiale include, without 

PP- 315- doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from the 

317] north. If that were not the case, the plan of fortifying 

Flushing would not have evoked such an outcry in Paris 

and London. No secret was made there about the reasons 

why it was wished that the Scheldt should remain unfortified. 

The object was to be able to ship a British garrison without 

hindrance to Antwerp, and to obtain in our country a base 

of operations for an offensive in the direction of the Lower 

Rhine and Westphaha, and then to carry us along with them, 

which would not have been difficult. For after giving up 

our national place of refuge, we should by our own fault 

have deprived ourselves of any possibility of resisting the 

demands of our doubtful protectors after being so foolish 



as to admit them to it. The equally perfidious and naif 
revelations of Colonel Bamardiston at the time of the con- 
clusion of the Entente cordiale showed us clearly what was 
intended. When it became evident that we were not to be 
intimidated by the alleged threatening danger of the closing 
of the Scheldt, the plan was not indeed abandoned, but 
altered in so far as the British auxiliary force was not to be 
landed on the Belgian coast, but in the nearest French har- 
bours. The revelations of Captain Faber, which have been 
no more denied than the information "of the newspapers 
by which they were confirmed or elaborated in certain particu- 
lars, are evidence of this. This British army, landed at 
Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to 
Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately 
invade us from the north-west. This would gain for it the 
advantage of going into action at once, of meeting the Belgian 
army in a region where we cannot obtain support from any 
fortress, in the event of our wishing to risk a battle. It 
would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in 
every kind of resource, but in any case to hinder our mobiUsa- 
tion or to allow it only when we had formally pledged ourselves 
to complete mobilisation solely for the benefit of Great 
Britain and her allies. 

" I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be 
drawn up for this eventuality also. This is demanded as 
much by the requirements of our military defence as by the 
conduct of our foreign policy in the case of a war between 
Germany and France." 

No. 3. 

Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Repre- w [On 

sentatives Abroad* Oct. 

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, October 14, 1914. 19^4, 

THE story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 314-317 
1906 published in the German Press,"' and based on "The 

^ „ _, . , Brussels 
' JMOTE.— This telegram was sent on receipt of a summary of the docu- Docu- 
ments contained in No. 4, issued by the German Government on the 13th ments 
October in advance of the pubUcation of the documents themselves. I."] 



documents said to have been found at Brussels, is only a 
story which has been reproduced in various forms' and 
denied on several occasions. No such agreement has ever 

As the Germans well know, General Grierson is dead, and 
Colonel (now General) Barnardiston is commanding the 
British forces before Tsing-tao. In 1906 General Grierson 
was on the General Staff at the War Office and Colonel 
Barnardiston was military attache at Brussels. In view of 
the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect the 
neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some 
academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of 
Colonel Barnardiston, have taken place between General 
Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what 
assistance the British army might be able to afford to Belgium 
should one of her neighbours violate that neutrality. Some 
notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives 
at Brussels. 

It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 
1906, was the year following that in which Germany 
had, as in 1911, adopted a threatening attitude towards 
France with regard to Morocco, and, in view of the appre- 
hensions existing of an attack on France through Bel- 
gium, it was natural that possible eventualities should be 

The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any 
agreement of the nature indicated, or to any design for the 
violation of Belgian neutrality, is clearly shown by the 
reiterated declarations that she has made for many years 
past, that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her 
neutrality from whatever quarter and in whatever form 
such violation might come. 

It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive 
designs on the part of other Powers are made by Germany, 
who, since 1906, has established an elaborate network of 
strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian 
frontier through a barren thinly-populated tract, deliberately 
constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon Belgium 
which was carried out two months ago. 




No. 4. 

Documents as published in facsimile in a special Supplement 
to the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung " of November 
25, 1914. 

Lettre d M. le Ministre de la Guerre au sujet des Entretiens 

confidentiels. "' 

(Confidentielle.) Bruxelles, le 10 avril, 1906. 

M. LE Ministre, 

J'AI I'honneur de vous rendre compte sommairement des 
entretiens que j'ai eus avec le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston 
et qui ont fait I'objet de mes communications verbales. 

La premiere visite date de la mi- Janvier. M. Barnardiston 
me fit part des preoccupations de I'etat-major de son pays 
relativement a la situation politique generale et aux eventu- 
alites de guerre du moment. Un envoi de troupes, d'un 
total de 100,000 hommes environ, etait projete pour le cas 
ou la Belgique serait attaquee. 

Le lieutenant-colonel m'ayant demande comment cette 
action serait interpretee par nous, je lui repondis que, au 
point de vue militaire, elle ne pourrait qu'etre favorable ; 
mais que cette question d'intervention relevait egalement du 
pouvoir politique et que, des lors, j'etais tenu d'en entretenir 
le Ministre de la Guerre. 

M. Barnardiston me repondit que son Ministre a Bruxelles 
en parlerait a notre Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. 

II continua dans ce sens : le debarquement des troupes 
anglaises se ferait sur la cote de France, vers Dunkerque et 
Calais, de fagon a hater le plus possible le mouvement.* 
Le deijarquement par Anvers demanderait beaucoup plus de 
temps, parce qu'il faudrait des transports plus considerables 
et d' autre pars la securite serait moins complete, 

* The following marginal note occurs in the facsimile : — 

" L' entree des Anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'apres la violation de 
notre neutrality par I'Allemagne." 


(II [For 
on this 

pp. 314- 


Ceci admis, il resterait a regler divers autres points, 
savoir : les transports par chemin de fer, la question des 
requisitions auxquelles I'armee anglaise pourrait avoir recours, 
la question du commandement superieur des forces aUiees. 

II s'informa si nos dispositions etaient suffisantes pour 
assurer la defense du pays durant la traversee et les trans- 
ports des troupes anglaises, temps qu'il evaluait a une dizaine 
de jours. 

Je repondis que les places de Namur et de Liege etaient 
a I'abri d'un coup de main et que, en quatre jours, notre 
arm6e de campagne, forte de 100,000 hommes, serait en etat 
d'intervenir. Apres avoir exprime toute sa satisfaction au 
sujet de mes declarations, mon interlocuteur insista sur le 
fait que : (i) notire conversation etait absolument con- 
fidentielle ; (2) elle ne pouvait lier son Gouvernement ; 
(3) son Ministre, I'etat-major general anglais, lui et moi 
etions seuls, en ce moment, dans la confidence ; (4) il ignorait 
si son Souverain avait ete pressenti. 

Dans un entretien subsequent, le Lieutenant-Colonel 
Barnardiston m'assura qu'il n'avait jamais regu de con- 
fidences d' autres attaches militaires au sujet de notre 
armee. II precisa ensuite les donnees numeriques concernant 
les forces anglaises ; nous pouvions compter que, en douze 
ou treize jours, seraient debarques : deux corps d'arm6e, 
quatre brigades de cavalerie, et deux brigades d'infanterie 

II me demanda d' examiner la question du transport de 
ces forces vers la partie du pays ou elles seraient utiles et, 
dans ce but, il me promit la composition detaillee de I'armee 
de debarquement. 

22 II revint sur la question des effectifs de notre armee de 
campagne en insistant pour qu'on ne fit pas de detachements 
de cette armee a Namur et a Liege, puisque ces places etaient 
pourvues de garnisons suf&santes. 

II me demanda de fixer mon attention sur la necessite 
de permettre a I'armee anglaise de beneficier des avantages 
prevus par le reglement sur les prestations militaires. Enfin, 
il insista sur la question du commandement supreme. 
^ Je lui repondis que je ne pouvais rien dire quant k ce 
dernier point, et je lui promis un examen attentif des autres 



Plus tard, rattacM militaire anglais confirma son esti- 
mation prec6dente : douze jours seraient au moins indispen- 
sables pour faire le d6barquement sur la cote de France. 
II faudrait beaucoup plus (un a deux mois et demi) pour 
debarquer 100,000 troupes a Anvers. 

Sur mon objection qu'il 6tait inutile d'attendre I'acheve- 
ment du debarquement pour commencer les transports par 
chemin de fer, et qu'il valait mieux les faire au fur et a 
mesure des arrivages, a la cote, le Lieutenant - Colonel 
Barnardiston me promit des donnees exactes sur I'etat 
journalier du debarquement. 

Quant aux prestations militaires, je fis part a mon in- 
terlocuteur que cette question serait facilement reglee. 

A mesure que les etudes de I'etat-major anglais avangaient, 
les donnees du probleme se precisaient. Le colonel m'assura 
que la moitie de I'armee anglaise pourrait etre debarquee en 
huit jours, et que le restant le serait a la fin du douzieme ou 
treizieme jour, sauf I'infanterie montee, sur laquelle il ne 
fallait compter que plus tard. 

Neanmoins, je eras devoir insister a nouveau sur la 
n^cessite de connaitre le rendement journalier, de fagon a 
regler les transports par chemin de fer de chaque jour. 

L'attache anglais m'entretint ensuite de diverses autres 
questions, savoir : (i) necessite de tenir le secret des opera- 
tions et d'obtenir de la presse qu'elle I'observat soigneuse- 
ment ; (2) avantages qu'il y aurait a adjoindre un ofl&cier 
beige a chaque etat-major anglais, un traducteur a. chaque 
commandant de troupes, des gendarmes a chaque unite pour 
aider les troupes de police anglaises. 

Dans une autre entrevue, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardis- 
ton et moi examinames les op6rations combinees dans le cas 
d'une- agression de la part de I'AUemagne ayant comme 
objectif Anvers et dans I'hypothese d'une traversee de notre 
pays pour atteindre les Ardennes fran9aises. 

Par la suite, le colonel me marqua son accord sur le plan 
que je lui avals presente et m'assura de I'assentiment du 
General Grierson, chef de I'etat-major anglais. 

D'autres questions secondaires furent egalement reglees, 
notamment en ce qui regarde les officiers intermediaires, 
les traducteurs, les gendarmes, les cartes, les albums des 
uniformes, les tir6s a part traduits en anglais de certains 



reglements beiges, le reglement des frais de douane pour les 
approvisionnements anglais, 1' hospitalisation des blesses de 
I'armee alliee, &c. Rien ne fut arrete quant a Taction que 
pourrait exercer sur la presse le Gouvemement ou I'autorite 

Dans les dernieres rencontres que j'ai cues avec I'attache 
anglais, il me communiqua le rendement journalier des de- 
barquements a Boulogne, Calais et Cherbourg. L'eloignement 
de ce dernier point, impose par des considerations d'ordre 
technique, occasionne un certain retard. Le premier corps 
serait debarque le dixieme jour, et le second corps le quin- 
zieme jour. Notre materiel des chemins de fer executerait 
les transports, de sorte que I'arrivee, soit vers BruxeUes- 
Louvain, soit vers Namur-Dinant, du premier corps serait 
achevee le onzieme jour, et celle du deuxieme corps, le seizieme 

J'ai insiste une derniere fois et aussi energiquement que 
je le pouvais, sur la necessite de hater encore les transports 
maritimes de fagon que les troupes anglaises fussent pres 
de nous entre le onzieme et le douzieme jour ; les resultats 
les plus heureux, les plus favbrables peuvent etre obtenus 
' par une action convergente et simultanee des forces alliees. 
Au contraire, ce sera un echec grave si cet accord ne se 
produit pas. Le Colonel Barnardiston m'a assure que tout 
sera fait dans ce but. 

Au cours de nos entretiens, j'eus I'occasion de convaincre 
I'attache militaire anglais de la volonte que nous avians 
d'entraver, dans la limite du possible, les mouvements de 
I'ennemi et de ne pas nous refugier, des le debut, dans Anvers. 
De son cote, le Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston me fit part 
de son peu de confiance actuellement dans I'appui ou I'inter- 
vention de la HoUande. II me confia egalement que son 
Gouvernement projetait de transporter la base d' approvision- 
nements anglaise de la cote frangaise a Anvers, des que la mer 
du nord serait nettoyee de tous les navires de guerre allemands. 

Dans tous nos entretiens le colonel me communiqua regu- 
lierement les renseignements confidentiels qu'il possedait sur 
I'etat militaire et la situation de notre voisin de Test, &c. 
En meme temps, il insista sur la necessite imperieuse pour la 
Belgique de se tenir au courant de ce qui se passait dans 
les pays rhenans qui nous avoisinent. Je dus lui confesser 



que, chez nous, le service de surveillance au dela de la frontiere, 
au temps de paix, ne releve pas directement de notre etat- 
major ; nous n'avons pas d' attaches militaires aupres de 
nos legations. Je me gardai bien, cependant, de lui avouer 
que j'ignorais si le service d' espionage, qui est present par 
nos r^glements, etait ou non prepar6. Mais il est de mon 
devoir de signaler ici cette situation qui nous met en etat 
d'inferiorite flagrante vis-^-vis de nos voisins, nos ennemis 

Le General-Major, Chef d'£.-M.'" '"[General 

(Initialled.) Sf^^' 

P- 318.] 
Note. — Lorsque je rencontrai le General Grierson a Com- 
piegne, pendant les manoeuvres de 1906, il m'assura que la 
reorganisation de I'armee anglaise aurait pour resultat non 
seulement d'assurer le debarquement de 150,000 hommes, 
mais de permettre leur action dans un delai plus court que 
celui dont il est question precedemment. 

Fin septembre 1906. 



Letter [from the Chief of the Belgian General Staff] '*' to the "' [General 
[Belgian] Minister of War respecting the confidential Inter- Ducame.] 


(Confidential.) Brussels, April 10, 1906. 


I HAVE the honour to furnish herewith a summary of 
the conversations which I have had with Lieutenant-Colonel 
Barnardiston, which I have already reported to you verbally.' 

His first visit was in the middle of January. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Barnardiston told me of the pre-occupation of the 
British General Staff concerning the general political situation 
and the existing possibilities of war. Should Belgium be 
attacked, it was proposed to send about 100,000 men. 

The lieutenant-colonel having asked me how we should 
interpret such a step, I answered that, from the miUtary 
point of view, it could only be advantageous ; but that this 



question of intervention had also a political side, and that I 
must accordingly consult the Minister of War. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston replied that his Minister 
at Brussels would speak about it to our Minister for Foreign 

He continued as follows : The disembarkation of the 
British troops would take place on the French coast, in the 
neighbourhood of Dunkirk and Calais, in such a manner that 
the operation might be carried out in the quickest possible 
way.* Landing at Antwerp would take much longer, as 
larger transports would be required, and, moreover, the risk 
would be greater. 

This being so, several other points remained to be decided, 
viz., transport by rail, the question of requisitions to which 
the British Army might have recourse, the question of the 
chief command of the allied forces. 

He enquired whether our arrangements were adequate to 
secure the defence of the country during the crossing and 
transport of the British troops — a period which he estimated 
at about ten days. 

I answered that the fortresses of Namur and Liege were 

safe against a surprise attack, and that in four days our field 

army of 100,000 men would be ready to take the field. After 

having expressed his. entire satisfaction at what I had said, 

my visitor emphasised the following points : (i) Our con- 

''i[See versation'" was absolutely confidential ; (2) it was in no way 

footnote, binding on his Government ; (3) his Minister, the British 

p ■ i' General Staff, he, and myself were the only persons then aware 

of the matter ; (4) he did not know whether his Sovereign 

had been consulted. 

At a subsequent meeting Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston 
assured me that he had never received any confidential 
information from other military attaches about our army. 
He then gave me a detailed statement of the strength of the 
British forces ; we might rely on it that, in twelve or thirteen 
days, two army corps, four cavalry brigades, and two brigades 
of mounted infantry would be landed. 

* The following marginal note occurs in the facsimile : — 

" The entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the 
violation of our neutrality by Germany." 



He asked me to study the question of the transport of 
these forces to that part of the country where they would be 
most useful, and with this object in view he promised me a 
detailed statement of the composition of the landing force. 

He reverted to the question of the effective strength of 
our field army, and considered it important that no detach- 
ments from that army should be sent to Namur and Liege, 
as those fortresses were provided with adequate garrisons. 

He drew my attention to the necessity of letting the 
British Army take full advantage of the facilities afforded 
under our regulations respecting military requirements. 
Finally, he laid stress on the question of the chief command. 

I replied that I could say nothing on the latter point, and 
I promised that I would study the other questions with care. 

Later, the British military attache confirmed his previous 
estimate : twelve days at least were indispensable to carry 
out the landing ,on the coast of France. It would take much 
longer (from one to two and a half months) to land 100,000 
men at Antwerp. 

On my objecting that it would be useless to wait till the 
disembarkation was finished, before beginning the transport 
by rail, and that it would be better to send on the troops by 
degrees as they arrived on the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bamardiston promised me precise details of the daily dis- 
embarkation table. 

With regard to the question of military requirements, I 
informed my visitor that that question would easily be 

As the plans of the British General Staff advanced, the 
details of the problem were worked out with greater precision. 
The colonel assured me that half the British Army could be 
landed in eight days, and the remainder at the end of the 
twelfth or thirteenth day, except the mounted infantry, on 
which we could not count till later. 

Nevertheless, I felt bound once more to urge the necessity 
of knowing the numbers to be landed daily, so as to work out 
the railway arrangements for each day. 

The British attache then spoke to me of various other 
questions, viz. : (i) The necessity of maintaining secrecy 
about the operations, and of ensuring that the Press should 
observe this carefully ; (2) the advantages there would be in 

II-Y ' 337 


attaching a Belgian officer to each British staff, an interpreter 
to each commanding officer, and gendarmes to each unit 
to help the British military police. 

At another interview Lie]itenant-Colonel Barnardiston aiid 
I examined the question of combined operations in the event 
of a German attack directed against Antwerp, and on the 
hypothesis of our country being crossed in order to reach 
the French Ardennes. 

Later on, the colonel signified his concurrence in the scheme 
I had laid before him, and assured me of the assent of General 
Grierson, Chief of the British General Staff. 

Other questions of secondary importance were likewise 
disposed of, particularly those respecting intermediary officers, 
interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, 
English translations of extracts from certain Belgian regula- 
tions, the regulation of customs dues chargeable on the 
British supplies, hospital accommodation for the wounded 
of the allied army, &c. Nothing was settled as to the possible 
control of the Press by the Government or the military 

In the course of the last meetings which I had with the 
British attach^ he communicated to me the daily disembarka- 
lion table of the troops to be landed at Boulogne, Calais 
and Cherbourg. The distance of the latter place, included 
owing to certain technical considerations, would cause a 
certain delay. The first corps would be landed on the tenth 
■day, the second corps on the fifteenth day. Our railways 
would carry out the transport operations in such a way 
that the arrival of the first corps, either towards Brussels- 
Louvain or towards Namur-Dinant, would be completed on 
the eleventh day and that of the second corps on the sixteenth 

I finally urged once again, as forcibly as was within my 
power, the necessity of accelerating the transport by sea in 
order that the British troops might be with us between the 
eleventh and the twelfth day ; the very best and most favour- 
able results would accrue from the concerted and simultaneous 
action by the allied forces. On the other hand, a serious 
check would ensue if such co-operation could not be achieved. 
Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything would be 1 

done with that end in view. 


In the course of our conversations I took the opportunity 
of convincing the niihtary attache of our resolve to impede 
the enemies' movements as far as lay within our power, and 
not to take refuge in Antwerp from the outset. Lieutenant- 
Colonel Bamardiston, on his side, informed me that he had 
at present little confidence in the support or intervention 
of Holland. He likewise confided to me that his Government 
intended to move the British base of supplies from the French 
coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been cleared 
of all German warships. 

At all our interviews the colonel regularly communicated 
to me any confidential information he possessed respecting 
the military condition and general situation of our eastern 
neighbour, &c. At the same time he laid stress on the impera- 
tive need for Belgium to keep herself well informed of what 
was going on in the neighbouring Rhine country. I had to 
admit to him that in our country the intelligence service 
beyond the frontier was not, in times of peace, directly under 
our General Staff. We had no military attaches at our 
legations. I took care, however, not to admit to him that I 
was unaware whether the secret service, prescribed in our 
regulations, was organised or not. But it is my duty here 
to call attention to this state of affairs, which places us in a 
position of glaring inferiority to that of our neighbours, our 
possible enemies. 

Major-General, Chief, of General Staff. ^^^ ''' [General 

(Initialled.) Ducarne.] 

Note. — ^When I niet General Grierson at Goittpidgne at the 
manoeuvres of 1906 he assured me that the reorganisation of 
the British army would result not only in ensuring the landing 
of 150,000 men, but in enabling them to take the field in a 
shorter period than had been previously estimated. 

End of September 1906. 



L'attache militaire anglais a demande k voir le General 
Jungbluth. Ces messieurs se sont rencontres le 23 avril. 



Le Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges a dit au general que I'Angle- 
terre disposait d'une armee pouvant etre envoyee sur le 
continent, composee de six divisions d'infanterie et huit 
brigades de cavalerie, soit en tout 160,000 hommes. Elle 
a aussi tout ce qu'il lui faut pour defendre son territoire insu- 
laire. Tout est pret. 

Le Gouvernement britannique, lors des demiers evene- 
ments, aurait debarque immediatement chez nous, meme si 
nous n'avions pas demande de secours. 

Le general a objecte qu'il faudrait pour cela notre con- 

L'attache militaire a repondu qu'il le savait, mais que 
comme nous n'etions pas a meme d'empecher les AUemands 
de passer chez nous, I'Angleterre aurait debarque ses troupes 
en Belgique en tout etat de cause. 

Quant au lieu de debarquement, l'attache militaire n'a 
pas precis^ ; il a dit que la cote etait assez longue ; mais le 
general sait que M. Bridges a fait, d'Ostende, des visites 
journalieres k Zeebrugge pendant les fetes de Paques. 

Le general a ajoute que nous etions, d'ailleurs, parfaite- 
ment a meme d'empecher les AUemands de passer. 

Le 24 avril, 1912. 

w [For (Translation.) '" 

German (Confidential.) 

ments on ^^^ British military attache asked to see General Jung- 
this docu- bluth. "" These gentlemen met on the 23rd April, 
ment, see Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the general that Great 
pp. 319- Britain had, available for despatch to the Continent, an army 
3^^-l composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of 
'^' [Chief of cavalry, in all 160,000 men. She had also all that she 
Belgian needed for home defence. Everything was ready. 
General jj^g British Government, at the time of the recent events, 

-ts^n.] would have immediately landed troops on our territory,, 
even if we had not asked for help. 

The general protested that our consent would be necessary 
for this. 

The military attache answered that he knew that, but 
that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans 
passing through our territory. Great Britain would have 
landed her troops in any event. 


As to the place of landing, the military attache was not 
explicit. He said the coast was rather long ; but the general 
knows that Mr. Bridges made daily visits to Zeebrugge from 
Ostend during the Easter holidays. 

The general added that, after all, we were, besides, per- 
fectly able to prevent the Germans from going through. 

April 24, 1912. 

No. 5. 

Extract from a brochure entitled " On the Violation of Belgian 

Neutrality," by M. J. Van den Heuvel, Belgian Minister 

of State}'' '''[of. 


(Translation.) Answer, 

. P-350.] 

AN official communique appeared at once in the 

Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, of the 13th October."" The ""[Se^ 
whole German press hastened to echo the Norddeutsche pp-3i4-7-] 
Allgemeine Zeitung. Large notices were posted on the walls 
in Brussels and innumerable little yellow notices made their 
appearance in the public places of other occupied towns. 
The discovery was of paramount importance ; it was bound 
to prove to all impartial people the guilt of the Governments 
both of England and of Belgium and to show the foresight 
and correctitude of Germany. 

According to the communique, it appeared from documents 
found in Brussels that; at the request of Great Britain, at the 
beginning of the year 1906, Belgium had, in anticipation of 
the violation of her neutrality by Germany, concluded with 
the Powers of the Entente a convention which had for its 
object the defence of her territory. Although a marginal 
note on the dossier of 1906 stated expressly that " the entry 
of the English into Belgium would only take place after the 
violation of her neutrality by Germany,""" the suggestion was '^' [See p. 
that Belgium, in settling the arrangements for this contingent 336.] 

entry, had seriously misunderstood the duties of neutrals. 
Germany alone was the object of her suspicion and she had 
not " also foreseen the violation of Belgian neutrality by 
Prance, and to provide for that event, concluded with Ger- 
many a convention analogous to that concluded with France 
and Great Britain." 



The communique recognises that it was open to Belgium, 
in the interests of self -protection, to make arrangements with 
the Powers which had guaranteed her international position. 
Indeed a neutralised State retains the right of making defen- 
sive treaties. The fact that the inviolabiUty of such a State 
is under the aegis or guarantee of certain Powers does not 
deprive her of this right. But the arrangements which such a 
State can make with the guaranteeing Powers to guard against 
a contingent invasion are, after all, nothing but measures for 
carrying out the pre-existing engagements of the guarantee. 
The grievance alleged by the communique is that a con- 
vention should have been made by Belgium in anticipation of 
a penetration of hostile troops into Belgian territory, without 
notice being given to Germany, and without the latter Power 
being appealed to to make a similar convention in anticipation 
of an invasion of Belgium by French or British troops. 

If a convention really existed, as the communique states, 
it is just to observe that a State which has prepared a plan of 
invasion is in an anomalous position in addressing reproaches 
to a State which limits its action to putting itself on guard 
and organising necessary measures of defence. And we must 
remember that the invasion of Belgium by Germany was, 
according to Herr von Jagow, forced upon the German General 
Staff by an event of long standing, namely, the Franco-Russian 
^^^[See As a matter of fact the convention'" which forms the 

footnote gravamen of the German charges never existed. 
p° ■ V Belgium did not make any special arrangements in antici- 

pation of the violation of her territory by Germany, either 
with England or with France, either in 1906 or at any other 
date. It is in vain that Germany has searched and will search 
our archives, she will not find there any proof of her allegation. 
The official communique of the 13th October published 
three documents ; the second communique of the 24th 
""[5ee pp. November"' added a fourth document to the dossier. None 
31 -20.J qJ these documents establishes the existence of any convention 

The first document is a report made to the Minister of War 

<^>[See on the loth April, igo6, by General Ducarne,"" Chief of the 

note Belgian General Staff. It relates to the conversations which 

P- 3^8.1 j.qq]j place at the request of Lieutenant-Colonel Bamardiston. 



the British mihtary attache, between himself and General 
Ducarne, on the subject of the arrangements that England 
might be disposed to make to assist Belgium in the event of 
a German invasion. According to the German notices : — 

" The Chief of the Belgian General Staff worked out a 
comprehensive plan for joint operations by a British Expedi- 
tionary Force of 100,000 men with the Belgian Army against 
Germany in repeated conferences with Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bc|.rnardiston, at the instigation of the latter. The plan was 
approved by the Chief of the British General Staff, Major- 
Geheral Grierson. The Belgian General Staff were supplied 
with all data as to the strength and organisation of the British 
forces. ... The latter thoroughly prepared for the transport. 
. . . Co-operation was carefully worked out in every detail. 
. . . Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne were contemplated as the 
points of disembarkation for the British troops." 

This document shows th3,t though the Belgian General 
Staff did not take the initiative, yet it did not refuse to discuss 
with the British military attach^ a plan for the help which 
Britain, acting as guaranteeing Power, would be able, in case 
of need, to send to Belgium to repiilse a German attack. 

But what accusation against Belgium can be based on 

Since it is recognised that Belgium has the right to ma^ke 
defensive agreements for putting into operation the guarantees 
given by the guaranteeing Powers, the Belgian General Staff 
would have found it difficult to refuse entirely to consider 
suggestions made by the military attaches of those Powers. 
Such discussions do not interfere in any way with the freedom 
or responsibility of the Government, and it is they alone who 
can decide whether it is expedient or opportune to enter into 
a convention and, if so, what convention they should make, 
having regard to the duties and interests of the country. 

In 1906 the Government believed that it was proper for 
them to rest content, as they had rested for more than sixty, with the general guarantee embodied in the Treaty of 
1839,'^' and that the details of carrjdng out the guarantee »> [See 
could not be fixed beforehand, that in their very nature they p. 487.1 
must vary according to circumstances. Thus no convention 
was entered upon. The work of the British military attache 
and the Belgian officers resulted in nothing but the submission 



of a report to the Minister of War by the Chief of the General 

The second document is a military map. " A map show- 
ing the method of deployment of the French army was found 
in the secret dossier." 

The only inference to be drawn from this document — 
which is not connected in any way with the report already 
mentioned — is that the Belgian General Staff has always 
sought, as is the duty of all General Staffs, to obtain the most 
precise information possible as to the military plans of neigh- 
bouring Powers. 

But to pretend to argue from the mere possession of this 
map that France must have been a party to the alleged con- 
vention, of which Britain and Belgium are wantonly accused, 
is to transcend the bounds of fancy. 

The third document is a report on the international position 
(1) ^see <^f Belgium sent by Baron Greindl, '" Belgian Minister Plenipo- 
p. 316 ; tentiary at Berlin, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 
English Brussels on the 23rd December, 1911. 

trans- Baron Greindl thought that a " French invasion was as 

if ^281 probable as a German invasion." 

" The combinations of the Entente Cordiale include, 
without doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from 
the north. . . . The equally perfidious and naif revelations of 
Colonel Bamardiston . . . showed us clearly what was in- 
tended. . . . This British army, landed at Calais and Dun- 
kirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in order 
to reach Germany. It would immediately invade us from 
the north-west. . . . 

" / would strongly urge that a plan of action should he drawn 
up for this eventuality also." 

The inference to be drawn from this document is that the 
plans of the Belgian General Staff communicated to Baron 
Greindl dealt with the contingency either of an entry into 
Belgium through the gap of the Meuse or of an invasion of 
Luxemburg by one or other of the belligerents. Baron 
Greindl thought it his duty to lay stress upon another hypothe- 
sis, namely, the danger of an enveloping movement by the 
north of France, which he had so often heard talked about in 
Berlin. But the whole of this report rebuts the accusation 
that Belgium had formed any engagements either with 


p. 328.] 


England or with France. Baron Greindl's attitude towards 
Barnardiston's suggestions proves conclusively that he knew 
that these suggestions had not resulted in any convention. 

Such are the three documents pubUshed on the 13th 
October hy the Nor ddeutsche AUegmeine Zeitung and placarded 
everywhere with such a flourish of trumpets. They do not 
contain the smallest scrap of evidence to support the German 
charge. No criticism adverse to Belgium can be based upon 
them. The German Government themselves understood this 
so well that they ordered fresh searches to be made in the 

The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of 24th November"' '" [Novem- 
gave us the result of this second search. It is a fourth docu- ^^^ ^5. 
ment, reporting a conversation which took place between ^^1^* 
the British military attache, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, 
and General Jungbluth. It bears date the 23rd April, 
igi2 : — 

" Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the General that Great 
Britain had ... an army of 160,000 men. . . . The British 
Government at the time of the recent events would have 
immediately landed troops in Belgium even if we had not 
asked for help. The general protested that our consent would 
be necessary for this. The military attache answered that he 
knew that, but, that as we were not in a position to prevent 
the Germans from passing through Belgium, Great Britain 
would have landed her troops in any event. As to the place 
of landing the military attache was not explicit. . . . The 
general added that we were perfectly well able to prevent 
the Germans from going through." 

The inference to be drawn from this document is that, 
in a private conversation between two officers of high rank, 
which had no reference to any official mission, the British 
officer expressed the personal opinion that in case of war 
Great Britain could land " immediately " troops in Belgium 
" even if we had not asked for help." The Belgian general 
at once protested. He insisted that " our consent " weis 
necessary, and that there was all the less reason for dispensing 
with it since we " were perfectly well able " to stop the 
Germans ; that is to say, to make them lose sufficient time 
to deprive them of the advantage of a sudden attack, 



How is it possible to draw any inference unfavourable to 
Great Britain from the personal opinion of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Bridges when, from what has since happened, it is 
certain that the British Government did not intend to send, 
and did not in fact send, troops in Belgium, except upon a 
request from the Belgian Government put forward after the 
violation of her territory ? 

How is it possible to draw an inference unfavourable to 
Belgium from this conversation ? General Jungbluth de- 
fended her freedom and her neutrality. And the very fact 
that the discussion took place, and the vagueness which 
remained as to the places of landing, both prove that Belgium 
was not bound by any convention determining the manner 
in which help should be furnished by England. 

Germany ought then to cease to accuse the Belgian 
Government of having given themselves since 1906 into the 
hands of the Powers of the Triple Entente. The first three 
documents which the Germans have taken from the files of 
the General Staff, like the fourth which has been brought 
up to support them, far from establishing any improper 
action whatever on the part of the Belgian authorities, show 
clearly that they have always taken the most scrupulous 
care to reconcile the precautions exacted by the necessity 
of safeguarding the independence and maintaining the 
honour of the country with the duties of the strictest 

The loyal attitude of Belgium and Great Britain is clearly 
shown by the action which preceded the German ultimatum. 

When Belgium saw the storm-clouds gathering on the 
darkened horizon she wanted to accelerate her military 
re-organisation. She worked at it for years. In 1902 she 
strengthened her cadres. After two years of discussion in 
1905 and 1906 she decided to finish the fortifications of the- 
fortress of Antwerp and to raise her defensive organisation 
to a pitch commensurate with the offensive force then at 
the disposal of the armies of Europe. Then came the renewal 
of the artillery, then the introduction of service personelle, 
finally the imposition of general liability to serve. These 
stages were arrived at with considerable difficulty because- 
the nation, relying on treaties and determined herself to 
observe neutrality with the strictest impartiality, could not. 



discussions have taken place before this war have been 
limited entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to 
defend France if Germany attacked her through Belgium. 
The Germans have stated that we contemplated sending 
troops to Belgium. We had never committed ourselves at 
all to the sending of troops to the Continent, and we had 
never contemplated the possibility of sending troops to 
Belgium to attack Germany. The Germans have stated that 
British military stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a 
French fortress near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak 
of the war, and that this is evidence of an intention to attack 
Germany through Belgium. No British soldiers and no 
British stores were landed on the Continent till after Ger- 
many had invaded Belgium, and Belgium had appealed to 
France and England for assistance. It was only after this 
appeal that British troops were sent to France ; and, if the 
Germans found British munitions of war in Maubeuge, these 
munitions were sent with our expedition to France after the 
outbreak of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality 
of Belgium was never discussed or contemplated by the 
British Government. 

The extract enclosed, which is taken from an official 
publication of the Belgian Government, and the extract 
from an of&cial statement by the Belgian Minister of War, 
prove that the Belgian Government had never connived, or 
been willing to connive, at a breach of the Treaty that made 
the maintenance of Belgian neutrality an international 
obligation. The moment that there appeared to be danger 
that this Treaty might be violated, the British Government 
'^'[B. 114.] made an appeal'" for an assurance from both France and 
Germany, as had been done in 1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that 
neither of those countries would violate the neutrality of 
Belgium if the other country respected it. The French 
<"[B. 125.3 agreed,"' the Germans declined to agree."' The appeal 
'" [B. 122.3 iTfi^'de by the British Government is to be found in the Parlia- 
mentary White-paper published after the outbreak of the war 
(see No. 114 of British Correspondence) [vol. I., p. 179]. The 
reason why Germany would not agree was stated very frankly 
by Herr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
to Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin ; and it is 
recorded in the second White-paper (see No. 160 of British 


Correspondence) [vol. I., pp. 207-8] that we published. The 
attitude of the British Government throughout has been to 
endeavour to preserve the neutrahty of Belgium, and we 
never thought of sending troops to Belgium until Germany 
had invaded it, and Belgium had appealed for assistance 
to maintain the international Treaty. 

We have known for some years past that, in Holland, in 
Denmark, and in Norway, the Germans have inspired the 
apprehension that, if England was at war with Germany, 
England would violate the neutrality of those countries and 
seize some of their harbours. This allegation is as baseless 
as the allegation about our intention to violate the neutrality 
of Belgium, and events have shown it to be so. But it seems 
to be a rule with Germany to attribute to others the designs 
that she herself entertains ; as it is clear now that, for some 
long time past, it has been a settled part of her strategic 
plans to attack France through Belgium. A statement is 
enclosed, which was issued by us on October 14 last, dealing 
with this point. 

This memorandum and its enclosures should provide 
ample material for a reply to the German statements. 

Foreign Office, ^th November, 1914. 

Enclosure 2. 

Despatch No. 22 in the Belgian Grey-book. 

{See pp. 29-31.) 

Enclosure 3. 

Extract from " The Times " of ^oth September, 1914. 

Neutrality of Belgium. 

Official Statement. 

THE German press has been attempting to persuade the 
public that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian 
neutrality France or Great Britain would have done so. It 
has declared that French and British troops had marched 
into Belgium before the outbreak of war. We have received 



from the Belgian Minister of War an official statement which 
<"[c/. G. denies absolutely these allegations.'" It declares, on the 
22.] one hand, that " before August 3 not a single French soldier 
had set foot on Belgian territory," and again, "it is untrue 
that on August 4 there was a single English soldier in Belgium." 
It adds : — 

For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian army 
would oppose by force a " preventive " disembarkation of 
British troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did 
not hesitate at the time of the Agadir crises to warn foreign 
Ambassadors, in terms which could not be misunderstood, of 
its formal intention to compel respect for the neutrality of 
Belgium by every means at its disposal, and against attempts 
upon it from any and every quarter. 

Enclosure 4. 

Circular telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Repre- 
sentatives abroad on the z^th October, 1914. 

{See page 329.) 




document, (From The Times, October 23, IQ14.) 

WE have received from the Belgian Legation the following 
statement, issued by the Belgian Government, replying to 
the article in the North German Gazette published in The 
Times of October 14th : — 

The Times of October 14th reproduces a long article from 

""[5ee the North German Gazette^'^ commenting on the discovery in 

pp. 314 et the archives at Brussels of a map entitled " English inter- 

seq.] vention in Belgium " and of a memorandum to the Belgian 

Minister of War which goes to prove that in the month of 

April, 1906, the Chief of the General Staff, on the suggestion 

of the British Military Attache and with the approval of 



General Grief son.had worked out a plan of co-operation between 
British fexpeditionary Forces and the Belgian Army agaiiist 
Germany in the event of a Fra;nco-Getnian war. This agree- 
meilt is assumed to have been preceded in all probability by 
a sitttilar arrangement with the Freiich General Staff. 

The North Gerrhan Gazette alsd publishes certain passages 
of a report'" of the Belgian Minister at Berlin in December, "'[See 
1911, relating to another plan of the Belgian General Staff, P- 328.] 
in which the measures to be taketi in case of the violation of 
Belgian neutrality by Germany are discussed. Baron Greindl 
pointed out that this pldn dealt only with the precautions to 
be taken in the event of an aggression on the part of Germany, 
while, owing to its geographical situation, Belgium might 
just as well be exposed to an attack by France arid England; 
The North German Gazette draws from this discovery the 
strange conclusion that England intended to. drag Belgium 
into the war, and at one time contemplated the violation of 
Dutch neutrality. 

We have only one regret to express on the subject of the 
disclosure of these documents, and that is that the publication 
of our military documents should be mangled and arranged 
in such a \vay as to give the reader the impression of duplicity 
on the |)art of England and adhesion by Belgium, in violation 
of her duties as a neutral State, to the policy of the Triple 
Entente. We ask the North German Gatette to publish in 
full the result of its search among our secret documents. 
Therein will be found fresh and striking proof of the loyalty, 
€Ori:ectness, and impartiality with which Belgium for eighty- 
four years has discharged her international obligations. 

It was stated that Colonel Bamardiston, the military 
representative at Brussels of a Power guaranteeing the neu- 
trality of Belgium,at the time of the Algeciras crisis, questioned 
the Chief of the Belgian General Staff as to the measures 
which he had taken to prevent any violation of that neutrality. 
The Chief of the General Staff, at that time Lieutenant- 
General Ducarne, replied that Belgium was ready to repel 
any invader. Did the conversation extend beyond these 
limits, and did Colonel Barnardiston, in an interview of a 
private and confidential nature, disclose to General Ducarne 
the plan of campaign which the British General Staff would 
have desired to follow if that neutrality were violated ? We 



doubt it, but in any case we can solemnly assert, and it will 
be impossible to prove the contrary, that never have the King 
or his Government been invited, either directly or indirectly, 
to join the Triple Entente in the event of a Franco-German 
war. By their words and by their acts they have always 
shown such a firm attitude that any supposition that they 
could have departed from the strictest neutrality is eliminated 
a priori. 

As for Baron Greindl's despatch of December 23rd, 191 1, 
it dealt with a plan for the defence of Luxemburg, due to the 
personal initiative of the chief of the ist Section of the War 
Ministry. This plan was of an absolutely private character 
and had not been approved by the Minister of War. If 
this plan contemplated above all an attack by Germany, there 
is no cause for surprise, since the great German mihtary 
writers, in particular T. Bernhardi, V. Schlivfeboch, and Von 
der Goltz, spoke openly in their treatises on the coming war 
of the violation of Belgian territory by the German armies. 

At the outbreak of hostilities the Imperial Government, 
through the mouth of the Chancellor and of the Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, did not search for vain pretexts for the aggres- 
sion of which Belgium has been the victim. They justified 
it on the plea of military interests. Since then, in face of the 
universal reprobation which this odious action has excited, 
they have attempted to deceive public opinion by representing 
Belgium as bound already before the war to the Triple Entente. 
These intrigues will deceive nobody. They will recoil on the 
head of Germany. History will record that this Power, 
after binding itself by treaty to defend the neutrality of 
Belgium, took the initiative in violating it, without even 
finding a pretext with which to justify itself. 





[Published in British " Collected Diplomatic Documents," 
as an Appendix to the translation of the German 
White-book [W.].] 



(11 (1) 

A STUPENDOUS fate is breaking over Europe. For 
forty-four years, since the time we fought for and won the 
German Empire and our position in the world, we have lived 
in peace and have protected the peace of Europe. In the 
works of peace we have become strong and powerful, and 
have thus aroused the envy of others. With patience we 
have faced the fact that, under the pretence that Germany 
was desirous of war, enmity has been awakened against us in 
the East and the West, and chains have been fashioned for 
us. The wind then sown has brought forth the whirlwind 
which has now broken loose. We wished to continue our 
work of peace, and, like a silent vow, the feeling that animated 
everyone from the Emperor down to the youngest soldier 
was this : Only in defence of a just cause shall our sword fly 
from its scabbard. 

The day has now come when we must draw it, against our 
wish, and in spite of our sincere endeavours. Russia has set 
fire to the building. We are at war with Russia and France 
— a war that has been forced upon us. 

Gentlemen, a number of documents, composed during the 
pressure of these last eventful days, is before you. Allow 
me to emphasise the facts that determine our attitude. 

"-Z 353 

[Part of 

speech is 
p. 382.] 


From the first moment of the Austro-Serbian conflict we 

'11 [S^ B. 9 declared'" that this question must be hmited to Austria- 

and note.] Hungary and Serbia, and we worked with this end in view. 

All Governments, especially that of Great Britain, took the 

same attitude. Russia alone asserted that she had to be 

heard in the settlement of this matter. 

Thus the danger of a European crisis raised its threatening 

As soon as the first definite information regarding the 

mihtary preparations in Russia reached us, we declared at 

St. Petersburg in a friendly but emphatic manner that 

military measures against Austria would find us on the side 

"" [c/. R. 12 of our ally, '^' and that military preparations against ourselves 

and note; would obUge US to take counter-measures; but that mobilisa- 

lob 1^^ ^^°^ would come very near to actual war. 

Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her desire 
for peace, and declared that she was making no military 
preparations against us. 

In the meantime. Great Britain, warmly supported by 
us, tried to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg. 
'"[Y. app. On July 28th the Emperor telegraphed to the Tsar"' 
V- (I-)-] asking him to take into consideration the fact that it was 
both the duty and the right of Austria-Hungary to defend 
herself against the pan-Serb agitation, which threatened to 
undermine her existence. The Emperor drew the Tsar's 
attention to the solidarity of the interests of all monarchs 
in face of the murder of Serajevo. He asked for the latter's 
personal assistance in smoothing over the difficulties existing 
between Vienna and St. Petersburg. About the same time, 
and before receipt of this telegram, the Tsar asked the Em- 
peror to come to his aid, and to induce- Vienna to moderate 
'^' [Y. app. her demands. '*' The Emperor accepted the role of mediator. '" 
V. (II.).] But scarcely had active steps on these lines begun, when 
""[Y. app. Russia mobilised all her forces directed against Austria, 
V. (III.).] while Austria-Hungary had mobilised only those of her corps 
which were directed against Serbia. To the north she had 
mobilised only two of her corps, far from the Russian frontier. 
The Emperor immediately informed the Tsar that this 
mobihsation of Russian forces against Austria rendered the 
[Y. app. role of mediator, which he had accepted at the Tsar's request, 
V. (IV.).] difficult, if not impossible.'" 



In spite of this we continued our task of mediation at 
Vienna, and carried it to the utmost point which was com- 
patible with our position as an ally. 

•Meanwhile, Russia of her own accord renewed her assur- 
ances that she was making no military preparations against 

We come now to July 31st. The decision was to be taken 
at Vienna. Through our representations we had already 
obtained the resumption of direct conversations between 
Vienna and St. Petersburg, after they had been for some time 
interrupted. But before the final decision was taken at 
Vienna, the news arrived that Russia had mobilised her entire 
forces, and that her mobilisation was therefore directed 
against us also. The Russian Government, who knew from 
our repeated statements what mobilisation on our frontiers 
meant, did not notify us of this mobilisation, nor did they 
even offer any explanation. It was not until the afternoon 
of July 31st that the Emperor received a telegram from the 
Tsar in which he guaranteed that his army would not assume 
a provocative attitude towards us. '" But mobilisation on ''' [Y. app. 
our frontiers had been in full swing since the night of July ^- (VI)1 

While we were mediating at Vienna in compliance with 
Russia's request, Russian forces were appearing all along our 
extended and almost entirely open frontier, and France, 
though indeed not actually mobilising, was admittedly making 
military preparations. What was our position ? For the 
sake of the peace of Europe we had, up till then, deUberately 
refrained from calling up a single reservist. Were we now to 
wait further in patience until the nations on either side of us 
chose the moment for their attack ? It would have been a 
crime to expose Germany to such peril. Therefore, on July 
31st we called upon Russia to demobilise as the only measure 
which could still preserve the peace of Europe.'" The ''"[W. exh. 
Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also instructed 24 ; O. 
to inform the Russian Government that in case our demand 7o] 
met with a refusal, we should have to consider that a state of 
war (Kriegszustand) existed. 

The Imperial Ambassador has executed these instructions. 
We have not yet learnt what Russia answered to our demand 
for demobilisation. Telegraphic reports on this question 



have not reached us even though the wires still transmitted 
much less important information. 

Therefore, the time limit having long since expired, the 

Emperor was obliged to mobilise our forces on the ist August 

"'LW. at 5 p.m.'" 

P- 135] At the same time we had to make certain what attitude 

France would assume. To our direct question, whether she 

''^'[W. exh. would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German War,"" 

25] France replied that she would do what her interests de- 

''' [W. exh. manded. '" That was an evasion, if not a refusal. 

27] In spite of this, the Emperor ordered that the French 

frontier was to be unconditionally respected. This order, 

with one single exception, was strictly obeyed. France, who 

mobilised at the same time as we did, assured us that she 

would respect a zone of 10 kilometres on the frontier. 

What really happened ? Aviators dropped bombs, and 

cavalry patrols and French infantry detachments appeared 

on the territory of the Empire ! Though war had not 

been declared, France thus broke the peace and actually 

attacked us. 

Regarding the one exception on our side which I men- 
tioned, the Chief of the General Staff reports as follows : 

" Only one of the French complaints about the crossing 
of the frontier from our side is justified. Against express 
orders, a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, apparently led by an 
officer, crossed the frontier on August 2nd. They seem to 
have been shot down, only one man having returned. But 
long before this isolated instance of crossing the frontier had 
occurred, French aviators had penetrated' into Southern 
Germany and had thrown bombs on our railway lines. French 
troops had attacked our frontier guards on the Schlucht 
Pass. Our troops, in accordance with their orders, have 
remained strictly on the defensive." This is the report of 
the General Staff. 

Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity {Notwehr), 
'cf. G. and necessity {Not) knows no law.'" Our troops have 
35] occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered 
Belgian territory. 

Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law. It is 
true that the French Government declared at Brussels that 



France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adver- 
sary respected it. We knew, however, that France stood 
ready for an invasion. France could wait, we could not. A 
French attack on our flank on the lower Rhine might have 
been disastrous. Thus we were forced to ignore the rightful 
protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. 
The wrong — I speak openly — ^the wrong we thereby commit 
we will try to make good as soon as our mihtary aims have 
been attained. 

He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest 
possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through 

Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria- 

As for Great Britain's attitude, the statements made by 
Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons yesterday'" show ("[See pp. 
the standpoint assumed by the British Government. We 400 & 
have informed the British Government that, as long as Great 4i7-] 
Britain remains neutral, our fleet wiU not attack the northern 
coast of France, and that we will not violate the territorial 
integrity and independence of Belgium. These assurances 
I now repeat before the world, and I may add that, as long as 
Great Britain remains neutral, we would also be willing, upon 
reciprocity being assured, to take no warlike measures against 
French commercial shipping. 

Gentlemen, so much for the facts. I repeat the words of 
the Emperor : " With a clear conscience we enter the lists." 
We are fighting for the fruits of our works of peace, for the 
inheritance of a great past and for our future. The fifty years 
are not yet past during which Count Moltke said we should 
have to remain armed to defend the inheritance that we won 
in 1870. Now the great hour of trial has struck for our 
people. But with clear confidence we go forward to meet it. 
Our army is in the field, our navy is ready for battle — ^behind 
them stands the entire German nation — the entire German 
nation united to the last man. 

^ Gentlemen, you know your duty and all that it means. 
The proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask 
you to pass them quickly. 





headed in 

For {North German Gazette* August 21, 1914. English version 

Sir E. published in D.O.W.) 


reply, OFFICIAL documents relating to the political exchange of 

^^^ ' «_ "^^^ws between Germany and England immediately before 

4?q1^ ~ *^^ outbreak of the war, are published below. These com- 

munications elucidate the fact that Germany was prepared 

to spare France, provided England remained neutral and 

guaranteed the neutrality of France. 

Telegrams Exchanged between London and. Berlin, 
30TH JULY-2ND August, 1914.! 

No. I. 

His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to His Majesty 
King George, dated July 30, 1914. 

I ARRIVED here yesterday and have communicated 
what you were so good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace 
"''[July 26.] last Sunday"" to William, who was very thankful to receive 
your message. 

William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to 
comply with the request of Nicholas to work for the main- 
tenance of peace. He is in continual telegraphic communi- 
ty" [See Y. cation with Nicholas, '^' who has to-day confirmed the news that 
app. v.] he has ordered military measures which amount to mobilisa- 
'^1 [Y. app. tion, and that these measures were taken five days ago. '*' 
V. (V.).] -yyg have also received information that France is making 
military preparations while we have not taken measures of 
any kind, but may be obliged to do so at any moment if our 
neighbours continue their preparations. This would then 
mean a European war. 

* [Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.} 

t [The text of these telegrams is here taken from the British " Col- 
lected Diplomatic Documents," not from the English version published 
by the German Foreign Office in " Documents relating to the Outbreak 
of the War," where the substance is the same but the wording differs.] 



If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this 
terrible misfortune, may I propose to you to use your influence 
on France and also on Russia that they should remain neutral. 
In my view this would be of the greatest use. I consider 
that this is a certain and, perhaps, the only possible way of 
maintaining the peace of Europe. I might add that Germany 
and England should now more than ever give each other 
mutual support in order to prevent a terrible disaster, which 
otherwise appears inevitable. 

Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sin- 
cerity in his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the 
military preparations of his two neighbours may end in 
competing him to follow their example for the safety of his, 
own country, which otherwise would remain defenceless. 
I have informed William of my telegram to you, and I hope 
that you will receive my communication in the same friendly 
spirit which has inspired it. 

(Signed) HENRY. 

No. 2. 

His Majesty King George to His Royal Highness Prince Henry 
of Prussia, dated July 30, 1914. 

THANKS for your telegram. I am very glad to hear of 
William's efforts to act with Nicholas for the maintenance 
of peace. I earnestly desire that such a misfortune as a 
European war — the evil of which could not be remedied^ — 
may be prevented. My Government is doing the utmost 
possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone 
further military preparations, provided that Austria declares 
herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the 
neighbouring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory 
settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other 
countries suspend their preparations for war. I rely on 
William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria 
to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that 
Germany and England are working together to prevent 
what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure 
Wilham that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do 
all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe. 

(Signed) GEORGE. 



[July 30, 

'''[Y. app. 

V. (III. 



No. 3. 

His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George, 
dated July 30, 1914. 
MANY thanks for your friendly communication. Your 
proposals coincide with my ideas and with the communication 
which I have this evening received from Vienna, and which 
I have passed on to London. I have just heard from the 
Chancellor that intelligence has just reached him that Nicholas 
this evening has ordered the mobilisation of his entire army 
and fleet.'" He has not even awaited the result of the 
mediation in which I am engaged,'*' and he has left me 
completely without information. I am travelling to Berlin 
to assure the safety of my eastern frontier, where strong 
Russian forces have already taken up their position. 

(Signed) WILLIAM. 

No. 4. 

''» [De- 

II a.m. 
at 1.15, 
5.30, and 
8.30 p.m. 
See pp. 

'^'[c/. Nos. 


His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, 
dated August i, 1914. 

MANY thanks for your telegram of last night. I have 
sent an urgent telegram* to Nicholas, in which I have assured 
him of my readiness to do everything in my power to further 
the resumption of the negotiations between the Powers 

(Signed) GEORGE. 

No. 5. 

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chan- 
cellor, dated August i, 1914."' 

SIR EDWARD GREY has just called me to the telephone 
and has asked me whether I thought I could declare that in 
the event of France remaining neutral in a German-Russian 
war we would not attack the French.'*' I told him that I 
believed that I could assume responsibility for this.f 


* {See p. 309.] 

t [For Sir E. Grey's statements in Parliament with regard to the mis- 
understanding that arose on this matter, see pp. 436-9.] 


No. 6. 

His Majesty the EfHperor William to His Majesty King George, 
dated August 1, 1914. 

i HAVE just received the communication of your Govern- 
ment offering French neutrahty under the guarantee of 
Great Britain. To this offer there was added the question 
whether, under these conditions, Germany would refrain 
from attacking France. For technical reasons the mobilisation 
which I have already ordered this afternoon on two fronts — 
east and west — ^must proceed according to the arrangements 
made. A counter order cannot now be given, as your tele- 
gram unfortunately came too late, but if France offers me 
her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English 
army and navy, I will naturally give up the idea of an attack 
on France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that 
France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier 
are at this moment being kept back by telegraph and by 
telephone from crossing the French frontier. 

(Signed) WILLIAM. 

No. 7. 

German Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador at 
London, dated August i, 1914. 

GERMANY is ready to agree to the English proposal"' i'i[No. 5, 
in the event of England guaranteeing with all her forces the above.] 
unconditional neutrality of France in the conflict between 
Germany and Russia. Owing to the Russian challenge 
German mobilisation occurred to-day before the English 
proposals were received. In consequence our advance to the 
French frontier cannot now be altered. We guarantee, 
however, that the French frontier will not be crossed by our 
troops until Monday, the 3rd August, at seven p.m., in case 
England's assent is received by that time. 





No. 8. 

His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, 
dated August i, 1914. 

IN answer to your telegram, which has just been received, 

I beheve that there must be a misunderstanding"' with regard 

^- % to a suggestion which was made in a friendly conversation 

Grey on between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey'" when 

this they were discussing how an actual conflict between the 

point, German and the French army might be avoided, so long as 

pp. 436-9.] there is still a possibility of an agreement being arrived at 

'2' [See No. between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will see 

5, p. 360.1 pj-ince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning in order to 

ascertain whether there is any misunderstanding on his 


(Signed) GEORGE. 

No. g. 

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial 
Chancellor, dated August 2, 1914. 



THE suggestions of Sir Edward Grey, '^' based on the desire 

, „ of creating the possibility of lasting neutrality on the part of 

^^''^ T" England, were made without any previous inquiry of France'^' 

and without knowledge of the mobilisation, and have since 

f?^!, been given up as quite impracticable. 

Feb^'ii, (Signed) LICHNOWSKY. 


p. 439.] 


The pith of the declarations made by Germany lies in the 

telegram of the Emperor William to the King of England. 

Even if there had been a misunderstanding as to an English 

[c/. Sir proposal, the offer made by His Majesty nevertheless gave 

E. Grey, England an opportunity to prove honestly her love of peace 

p. 439.] and to prevent war between Germany and France.'"' 




[North German Gazette,] September 6, 1914. English version 
published in D.O.W.) 

ACCORDING to reports to hand. Sir Edward Grey de- 
clared in the House of Commons'" that the publication made wvq^ 
by the German Government of the German-English exchange Aug. 
of telegrams before the war was incomplete. Prince Lich- 28, 
nowsky, it is declared, cancelled by telegram his report on 1914- 
the well-known telephone conversation immediately he was ^^^ 
informed that a misunderstanding existed. This telegram, P' ^3 i 
it is asserted, was not published. The Times, apparently upon 
information from official sources, made the same assertion, 
adding the comment that the telegram had been suppressed 
by the German Government in order that it might accuse 
England of perfidy and prove Germany's love of peace. 

In answer to this we are able to state that such a telegram 
is non-existent. Apart from the telegram already published, "" (a)[No. 5, 
which was despatched from London at 11 a.m.. Prince Lich- p. 360.] 
nowsky on August ist sent the following telegrams : — 

Telegrams from the Germak Ambassador at London 
TO THE German Imperial Chancellor, August i, 

No. I. 

August I, 1. 15 p.m. 

. . . SIR EDWARD GREY'S Private Secretary has 
just been to see me in order to say that the Minister wishes 
to make proposals to me for the neutrality of England, even 
in the case that we had war with Russia and France. I see 
Sir Edward Grey this afternoon and will communicate at 

* [So headed in D.O.W.] 

t [Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeifung.'] 

j prhe text of the translations here given is taken from the British 
" Collected Diplomatic Documents," not from the German official " Docu- 
ments relating to the Outbreak of the War."] 



No. 2. 

August I, 5.30 p.m. 

SIR EDWARD GREY has just read to me the following 
declaration which has been unanimously adopted by the 
<''[c/. B. Cabinet:—'" 


" The reply of the German Government with regard to 
the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, 
because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this 
country. If Germany could see her way to give the same 
positive reply as that which has been given by France, it 
would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension 
here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the 
neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other 
respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public 
feeling in this country." 

On my question whether, on condition that we would 
maintain the neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite 
declaration with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain, 
the Minister answered that that was impossible, but that 
this question would play a great part in public opinion in this 
country. If we violated Belgian neutrality in a war with 
France there would certainly be a change in public opinion 
which would make it difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain 
friendly neutrality. For the time there was not the slightest 
intention to proceed in a hostile manner against us. It 
would be their desire to avoid this if there was any possibility 
of doing so. It was, however, difficult to draw a line up to 
which we could go without intervention on this side. He 
turned again and again to Belgian neutrality, and was of 
opinion that this question would also play a great part. 

He had also thought whether it was not possible that we 
and France should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed 
opposite to one another without attacking. I asked him if 
he would be in a position to arrange that France would assent 
to an agreement of this kind. As we wanted neither to 
destroy France nor to annex portions of French territory, I 
could think that we would give our assent to an arrangement 
of this kind which would secure for us the neutrality of Great 



Britain. The Minister said he would make inquiries ; he 
also recognised the difficulties of holding back the military 
on both sides. 

No. 3. 

August I, 8.30 p.m. 

MY communication of this morning is cancelled by my 
communication of this evening. As there is no positive 
English proposal before us, any further step in the sense of 
the message I sent {der mir erteilten Weisungen)^^^ is super- (i)r„ai, 

fluous. the li] 

of the 

As will be observed, these telegrams contain no sort of ^™^^ 
indication that there had been a misunderstanding, and ^g". 
nothing concerning the assertion made from the English side d.0.\ 
of a clearing up of the alleged misunderstanding. "" ,2, .^^^ 





{North German Gazette,] September 12, 1914.) 

ON July 31st, 1914, a letter was posted bearing the follow- 
ing address : — 

" Madame Costermans, 

107 Rue Froissard, Bruxelles, Belgique." 

Since, as is known, the territory of the empire was on 
the same day declared to be in a state of war, and the expedi- 
tion of private letters to foreign countries therefore ceased, 
the letter was returned to the post office of origin bearing an 
inscription by the postal authorities, " returned because of 
state of war." The letter remained there and, after the 
expiration of the prescribed time, was officially opened by the 

* [The English translation of this article from the North German Gazette, 
under the heading and in the form here preserved, appears in the German 
official " Documents relating to the Outbreak of the War," but is not in- 
cluded in the British " Collected Diplomatic Documents."] 

t [Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.'] 



Imperial head postal authorities in order to discover the name 
of the sender. Inside the outer envelope there was a second 
envelope, addressed : — 

" Son Excellence Monsieur Davignon, 

Minis tre des Affaires Etrangeres." 

Inasmuch as the name of the sender did not appear on 
this envelope either, it was also opened. Therein was found 
an official report of the Royal Belgian Charge d' Affaires in 
St. Petersburg, Mr. B. de I'Escaille, concerning the poUtical 
situation there on July 30th of this year. This report, in 
view of its political significance, was sent to the Foreign Office 
by the Imperial postal officials. 

The report reads : — 

Legation de Belgique a St. Petersbourg. 

795/402. Le ^ojuillet 1914. 

Situation politique. 

Monsieur Le Ministre, 

Les journees d'hier et d'avant-hier se sont passees dans 
I'attente d'evenements qui devaient suivre la declaration de 
guerre de I'Autriche-Hongrie a la Serbie. Les nouvelles les 
plus contradictoires ont circule sans qu'il soit possible de 
demeler exactement le vrai du faux touchant les intentions 
du Gouvernement Imperial. Ce qui est incontestable c'est 
que I'Allemagne s'est efforcee, autant ici qu'a Vienne, de 
trouver un moyen quelconque d'eviter un conflit general, 
mais qu'elle a rencontre d'un cote I'obstination du Cabinet 
de Vienne a ne pas faire un pas en arriere, et de 1' autre la 
mefiance du Cabinet de St. Petersbourg devant les assurances 
de I'Autriche-Hongrie qu'elle ne songeait qu'a punir la 
Serbie et non. a s'en emparer. 

M. Sazonof a declare qu'il etait impossible a la Russie 
de ne pas se tenir prete et de ne pas mobiliser, mais que ces 
preparatifs n'etaient pas diriges contre I'Allemagne. Ce 
matin un communique officiel aux joumaux annonce que 
" les reservistes ont ete appeles sous les armes dans un certain 
nombre de Gouvemements.". Connaissant la discretion des 



communiqu6s officiels russes, on peut hardiment pr6tendre 
qu'on mobilise partout. 

L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne a declare ce matin qu'il 
etait a bout des essais de conciliation qu'U n'a cess6 de faire 
depuis samedi et qu'il n'avait plus guere d'espoir. On vient 
de me dire que I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre s'etait prononce 
dans le meme sens. La Grande Bretagne a propose demiere- 
ment un arbitrage, M. Sazonof a repondu : " Nous I'avons 
propose nous memes a rAutrictie-Hongrie, elle I'a refuse." 
A la proposition d'une Conference, I'Allemagne a repondu 
par la proposition d'une entente entre cabinets. On peut 
se demander vraiment si tout le monde ne desire pas la guerre, 
et tache seulement d'en retarder un peu la declaration pour 
gagner du temps. 

L'Angleterre a commence par donner a entendre qu'elie 
ne voulait pas se laisser entrainer dans un conflit. Sir George 
Buchanan le disait ouvertement. Aujourd'hui on est ferme- 
ment convaincu a St. Petersbourg, on en a meme I'assurance, 
que I'Angleterre soutiendra la France. Cet appui est d'un 
poids enorme et n'a pas peu contribue a donner la haute 
main au parti de la guerre. 

Le Gouvernement Russe a laisse dans ces derniers jours 
libre cours a toutes les manifestations pro-Serbes et hostiles 
a I'Autriche et n'a aucunement cherche a les etouifer. II 
s'est encore produit des divergences de vues dans le sein du 
Conseil des Ministres qui s'est reuni hier matin ; on a retarde 
la publication de la mobilisation. Mais depuis s'est produit 
un revirement, le parti de la guerre a pris le dessus et ce 
matin a 4 heures cette mobilisation etait publiee. 

L'armee qui se sent forte est pleine d'enthousiasme et 
fonde de grandes esperances sur les enormes progres realises 
depuis la guerre japonaise. La marine est si loin d'avoir 
realise le programme de sa reconstruction et de sa reorganisa- 
tion qu'elie ne peut vraiment pas entrer en ligne de compte. 
C'est bien la le motif qui donnait tant d'importance a I'assur- 
ance de I'appui de I'Angleterre. 

Comme j'ai eu I'honneur de vous le tel^graphier aujourd'hui 
(T. 10) tout espoir de solution pacifique parait ecarte. C'est 
I'opinion des cercles diplomatiques, 

Je me suis servi pour mon telegramme de la voie via 
Stockholm par le Nordisk Kabel comme plus sftre que I'autre. 



Je confie cette depeche a un courrier prive qui la mettra a 
la poste en AUemagne. 

Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de 
mon plus profond respect. 

{Signed) B. DE L'ESCAILLE. 


d' Affaires. 

See p. Belgian Legation, St. Petersburg. 

366.] 795/402. Jw/y 30, 1914. 

On the political situation. 

To His Excellency M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

YESTERDAY and the day before yesterday have passed 
in the expectation of events that must follow Austria- 
Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia. The most 
contradictory reports have been circulating ; it was impossible 
to make out what was true or not true as regards the intentions 
of the Imperial Russian Government. There is, however, 
no denying the fact that Germany has made serious efforts 
both here and in Vlfenna to find some way of avoiding a general 
conflict. On the one hand, however, it has met with the 
firm decision of the Vienna Cabinet not to yield a step, and 
on the other hand with the fact that the St. Petersburg 
Cabinet mistrusted the assurance made by Austria-Hungary 
that she only intended to punish Serbia, but not to annex her 
<2'[c/. territory.*^' 

B. 18.] M. Sazonof declared that it was impossible for Russia to 

avoid holding herself in readiness and not to mobilise, but 
(3)|-(.^ that these preparations were not directed against Germany.'" 

B. 70 (i), This morning an official communication to the newspapers 
93 (2).] announced that " the reserves in a certain number of districts 
have been called to the colours." Anyone who knows the 
reservedness of the official Russian communications can 
safely maintain that a general mobilisation is taking place. 

The German Ambassador declared this morning that the 
efforts which since Saturday he had been making incessantly 
to bring about a satisfactory arrangement had come to an 
end, and that he had almost given up hope. 


I have been told that the British Ambassador also expressed 
himself in the same way. England recently proposed arbi- 
tration.'" Sazonof answered : " We have ourselves proposed '"[«/• 
it to Austria-Hungary, but she has rejected the proposal." B. 36.] 
To the proposal of a conference, Germany answered by pro- 
posing in turn a settlement between the Cabinets."" One i*>[c/. 
might truly ask whether the whole world does not wish war B. 43.] 
and only seeks to postpone for a while the formal declaration 
of it, in order to gain time. 

England at first let it be understood that she did not wish 
to be drawn into a conflict. Sir George Buchanan said so quite 
openly. To-day in St. Petersburg one is fully convinced, 
and even the assurance has been given, that England will 
stand by the side of France. This support is of quite extra- 
ordinary weight, and has in no small degree contributed to 
give the war party the upper hand. The Russian Government 
have in these last days given free rein to all demonstrations 
friendly to Serbia and hostile to Austria, and have in no way 
attempted to suppress them. In the Cabinet Council, which 
took place yesterday morning, there were differences of 
opinion ; the notification of a mobihsation was postponed, 
but since then a change has taken place, the war party has 
obtained the upper hand, and this morning at four o'clock the 
mobilisation order was published. '" '" [c/. 

The army, which is conscious of its strength, is fuU of R- 52.] 
enthusiasm, and bases great hopes on the extraordiaary pro- 
. gress which it has made since the Japanese war. The navy 
is still so far from the completion of its projected reorganisa- 
tion that it is scarcely to be taken into accoimt. For this very 
reason, the assurance of English assistance is considered of such 
great importance. 

As I had the honour of wiring you to-day (T. 10), all hope 
of a peaceful solution seems to have vanished ; such is the 
view of the diplomatic corps. 

I have made use of the route via Stockholm by the Nordisk 
Cable for sending my telegram, as it is safer than the other. 

I am entrusting this report to a private courier, who 
will post it in Germany. 

Please receive. Monsieur le Ministre, the assurance of my 
greatest respect. 

{Signed) B. DE L'ESCAILLE. 

II — 2 A 369 


Our enemies are to-day declaring to the whole world, 
slanderously and with a deliberate misrepresentation of the 
real facts, that the Powers of the Triple Entente had up to 
the last moment in view solely the maintenance of peace, 
but that they were forced into war through Germany's 
brusque attitude, which made any understanding impossible ; 
that Germany, in her wild desire for conquest, wanted war 
under all circumstances. In answer to this the foregoing 
document evidences that in diplomatic circles in St. Peters- 
burg, as early as July 30th, that is to say, two days before 
the German mobilisation, the conviction prevailed that 
Germany had been at the greatest pains, in Vienna as well as 
in St. Petersburg, to localise the Austro-Serbian conflict and 
to prevent the breaking out of a general world-conflagration. 
It is furthermore important as evidence that the same circles 
were even then convinced that England, through the assurance 
that she would not remain neutral in an eventual war, but 
would support France against Germany, had stiffened the 
backbone of the Russian war party and thus contributed 
largely to provoke the war. And, finally, this document is 
also of interest because its author felt that he must report 
to his Government that he considered untrustworthy the 
assurances of Russia that the troops were being called to the 
colours only in certain districts, and that no general mobilisa- 
tion was taking place. 


(From The Times, September 15, 1914.) 

following statement to the Danish Press Bureau for pub- 
lication : 

"'[Sept. 4, The English Prime Minister, in his Guildhall speech,'" 
see p. reserved to England the rdle of protector of the smaller and 
439. «' weaker States, and spoke about the neutrality of Holland, 
s«?] Belgium, and Switzerland as being exposed to danger from 



the side of Germany. It is true that we have broken Belgium's 
neutrality because bitter necessity compelled us to do so, but 
we promised Belgium full indemnity and integrity'" if she ^'^[See 
would take account of this state of necessity. If so, she would G- 20.] 
not have suffered any damage, as, for example, Luxemburg. 
If England, as protector of the weaker States, had wished to 
spare Belgium infinite suffering she should have advised 
Belgium to accept our offer. England has not " protected " 
Belgium, so far as we know ; I wonder, therefore, whether it 
can really be said that England is such a disinterested 

We knew perfectly well that the French plan of campaign 
involved a march through Belgium to attack the unprotected 
Rhineland. Does anyone believe England would have inter- 
fered to protect Belgian freedom against France ? 

We have firmly respected the neutraUty of Holland and 
Switzerland ; we have also avoided the slightest violation of 
the frontier of the Dutch province of Limburg. 

It is strange that Mr. Asquith only mentioned the neutral- 
ity of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, but not that of the 
Scandinavian countries. He might have mentioned Switzer- 
land with reference to France, but Holland and Belgium are 
situated close to England on the opposite side of the Channel, 
and that is why England is so concerned for the neutrality of 
these countries. 

Why is Mr. Asquith sUent about the Scandinavian 
countries ? Perhaps because he knows that it does not 
enter our head to touch these countries' neutrality ; or would 
England possibly not consider Denmark's neutrality as a 
noli me tangere for an advance in the Baltic or for Russia's 
warlike operations. 

Mr. Asquith wishes people to believe that England's fight 
against us is a fight of freedom against might. The world is 
accustomed to this manner of expression.'*' In the name of '"'[For Mr. 
freedom England, with might and with the most recklessly Asquith's 
egotistic policy, has founded her mighty Colonial Empire, in ^c^^I' jo 
the name of freedom she has destroyed for a century the ^^f' ' 
independence of the Boer Republics, in the name of freedom ^7.j 

she now treats Egypt as an English colony and thereby violates 
international treaties and solemn promises, in the name of 
freedom one after another of the Malay States is losing its 



independence for England's benefit, in the name of freedom she 
tries, by cutting German cables, to prevent the truth being 
spread in the world. 

The English Prime Minister is mistaken. When England 
joined with Russia and Japan against Germany she, with a 
blindness unique in the history of the world, betrayed civilisa- 
tion and handed over to the German sword the care of freedom 
for European peoples and States. 


[North German Gazette,] October i6, 1914.) 

IN view of the apparent endeavours of our opponents to 
ascribe the responsibihty for the present war to the German 
" military party " and German militarism, we publish below 
a number of reports made by German diplomatic representa- 
tives in foreign countries, which have for their subject the 
political and politico-military relations of the Entente Powers 
before the outbreak of the war. For obvious reasons the 
places from which the reports have been sent, and their 
exact dates, are not given. These documents speak for them- 


March . . ., 1913. 

The meshes of the net into which French diplomacy is 
succeeding in entangling England are steadily growing 
narrower. Even in the first phases of the Morocco conflict, 
England, as is known, made concessions of a military nature 
to France which have in the meantime developed into concrete 
agreements between the General Staffs of both countries. 

* [The English translation of this article from the North German GazettCy 
under the heading and in the form here preserved, appears in the German 
official " Documents relating to the Outbreak of the War," but is not in- 
cluded in the British " Collected Diplomatic Documents."] 

t [Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.] 



In regard to the agreements concerning a co-operation at sea, 
I learn from a generally well informed source the following : — 

The English fleet will protect the North Sea, the Enghsh 
Channel, and the Atlantic Ocean, in order to inake it possible 
for France to concentrate her naval forces in the western 
basin of the Mediterranean, in connection wherewith Malta 
is placed at her disposal as a naval base. Details arrange for 
the employment of French torpedo flotillas and submarines 
in the channel, and of the EngUsh Mediterranean squadron, 
which, on the outbreak of war, is to be placed under the 
command of the French Admiral. 

In the meantime the attitude of the British Government 
during the Moroccan crisis in 1911, during which it showed 
itself to be a tool of French politics, as uncritical as it was 
submissive, and which, through the speech made by Mr. Lloyd 
George, encouraged French chauvinism to new hopes, has 
given the French Government an opportunity to drive another 
nail into the coffin in which Entente poUtics have already 
buried England's freedom of political decision. 

I obtain from a special source knowledge of an exchange 
of notes which took place in the autimm of the preceding year 
between Sir Edward Grey and Ambassador Cambon, and 
which, with the request that it be employed in strict confidence, 
I have the honour to submit to you herewith. In the 
exchange of notes the British and the French Governments 
agree, in the case of an attack threatened by a third Power, 
to enter at once into an exchange of views as to whether joint 
action was indicated to repulse the attack, and, in that event, 
as to how and to what extent the existing miUtary arrange- 
ments should be made use of. 

The form of the agreements is calculated in such a way 
that the latter shall be in technical conformity with British 
neutraUty. England does not formally assume in any 
manner the duty of furnishing mihtary help. Under the 
wording she retains a free hand to act at all times in accord- 
ance with the demands of her own interests. It hardly 
requires, however, any special amphfication to show that 
England, through these compacts, in conjunction with the 
military arrangements made, has already pledged herself 
de facto beyond redemption to the French revanche idea. 



The British Government is playing a dangerous game. 
Through its pohcy in the Bosnian and Moroccan questions it 
has evoked crises which have twice brought the world to the 
verge of a war. The encouragement which it gives to French 
chauvinism directly and indirectly can one day lead to a 
catastrophe in which English as well as French soldiers will 
pay with their blood on French battlefields for the British 
policy which aims at the isolation of Germany. 

The seed sowed by King Edward is sprouting. 

[Here follow the letters exchanged between Sir E. Grey 
and M. Paul Cambon, November 22nd and 23rd, 1912. 
For text of these see B. 105, ends, i and 2, vol. I., pp.170-2.] 


May . . ., 1914. 
Concerning the pohtical results of the visit of the King 
of England in Paris* I learn that a number of political questions 
were discussed between Sir Edward Grey and M. Doumergue. '" 
'^' [Minister Moreover, a suggestion came from the French side to supple- 
for ment the existing politico-military understandings between 

Foreign France and England by analogous understandings between 
^^^^'^ England and Russia. Sir Edward Grey received the sugges- 
tion sympathetically, but declared that he was not in a 
position to undertake anything of binding force without con- 
sulting the British Cabinet. The reception given to the 
English guests by the French Government as well as by the 
people of Paris is said to have made a great impression on the 
Minister. It is to be feared that the English statesman, 
who visited a foreign country for the first time in an official 
capacity, and who, it is asserted, had never been out of 
England before, will in the future be even more subject to 
French influences than has already been the case. 


June . . ., 1914. 

I have received confirmation of the report that military 
arrangements between England and Russia were proposed 
from the French side on the occasion of the visit of the King 

* [King George and Queen Mary visited Paris, attended by Sir E. Grey, 
April 21-24, 1914.] 



of England in Paris. Concerning the preliminary events 

I learn from a reliable source that the moving spirit was 

M. Isvolsky."' It was the Ambassador's idea to make use "'[Russian 

of the anticipated festive spirit of the days in Paris in order Ambassa- 

to change the Triple Entente into an alliance analogous to p^g", 

the Triple Alliance. If however Paris and St. Petersburg ■' 

have been finally satisfied with less, their attitude appears 

to have been dictated by the consideration that public opinion 

in England is in great part firmly opposed to entering into 

formal treaties of alliance with other Powers. In view of 

this fact, there was plainly some hesitation about going to the 

root of things, despite the numerous proofs of the utter lack 

of resistance of English politicians to French and Russian 

influences. (I may recall the support which Russia recently 

received from England in the matter of the German military 

mission in Turkey.) Therefore were the tactics of a slow, 

pace-by-pace advance decided upon. Sir Edward Grey 

warmly advocated the Franco-Russian suggestions in the 

British Cabinet Council, and the Cabinet adopted his ideas. It 

was decided to work, in the first place, for a naval agreement, 

and to cause negotiations to take place in London between 

the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attache. 

The satisfaction of Russian and French diplomacy at 
having again taken the English politicians by surprise, is 
great. The conclusion of a formal treaty of alliance is now 
considered only a matter of time. To hasten this event, 
St. Petersburg would even be prepared to make certain sham 
concessions to England in the Persian question. The 
differences of opinion in this matter that have recently come 
to hght between the two Powers have not yet been disposed 
of. On the Russian side the procedure is, for the time being, 
one of concihatory promises, on account of the uneasiness 
which has been again manifested in England lately concerning 
the future of India. 


June . . ., 1914. 

There is much uneasiness in St. Petersburg and London 

on account of the French indiscretions concerning the Russo- 

English naval convention. Sir Edward Grey is afraid there 

will be interpellations in Parhament. The Naval Attache, 



Captain Wolkoff, who was in St. Petersburg for a few days, 
presvunably to receive instructions for the negotiations, has 
returned to London. The negotiations have already begun. 


June . . ., 1914- 

In the House of Commons the question was put to the 
Government from the Ministerial side as to whether Great 
Britain and Russia had recently concluded a naval agreement, 
or as to whether negotiations for the conclusion of such an 
agreement had recently taken place between the two countries 
or were now taking place. 

In his answer Sir Edward Grey referred to similar questions 
put to the Government last year. The Prime Minister, 
continued Sir Edward, had at that time replied that there 
existed for the event of the outbreak of a war between Euro- 
pean Powers no unpublished agreements which would restrict 
or hamper the free decision of the Government or of Parliament 
as to whether England should take part in the war or not. 
This answer was just as applicable to-day as a year ago. 
Since that time no negotiation which could now make the 
declaration less applicable had been concluded with any 
Power ; no negotiations of the sort were in progress, and, so 
far as he could judge, it was not probable that any such 
would be entered into. If, however, any agreement should be 
concluded which should involve a retraction or an alteration 
of the above-mentioned declaration made by the Prime Minister 
the year before, it was his opinion that it would have to be 
submitted to Parliament, and that would doubtless be done. 

The great majority of the Enghsh press refrains from 
•commenting on the Minister's declaration in any way. 

Only two Radical papers, the Daily News and the Man- 
chester Guardian, express their opinion in short lea,ding articles. 
The first named views Sir Edward Grey's words with satis- 
iaction and thinks that they are definite enough to dissipate 
every doubt. England is not under the control of any other 
■country. She is not the vassal of Russia, nor the ally of 
France, nor the enemy of Germany. The declaration, it 
says, is a wholesome lesson for that section of the EngUsh 
press which would create the belief that there was in 



existence a Triple Entente of the same nature as the Triple 

The Manchester Guardian, on the other hand, is not 
satisfied with the Minister's declaration. It finds fault with 
its obscure form and endeavours to show that it admits of 
interpretations which do not altogether exclude the existence 
of certain, perhaps conditional, agreements of a nature in 
conformity with that which rumour lends them. 

The declarations by Sir Edward Grey are in accordance 
with a confidential statement made by a personage of the 
> immediate entourage of the Minister, to the effect that " he 
could declare most emphatically and definitely that no 
agreements of miUtary or naval nature existed between 
England and France, although from the French side the 
desire of such compacts had been repeatedly uttered. The 
British Cabinet would not grant to Russia what it had refused 
to France. No naval convention had been concluded with 
Russia, and none would be concluded." 


June . . ., 1914. 
Sir Edward Grey has plainly felt it necessary to take a 
stand immediately and emphatically against the comments 
of the Manchester Guardian on his answer to the interpellation 
in the matter of the alleged Anglo- Russian naval understand- 
ing. The Westminster Gazette publishes in a leading colrmm 
a denial from the pen of Mr. Spender, who, as is weU known, 
is one of Sir Edward Grey's most intimate friends ; this denial 
leaves nothing to be desired in the way of definiteness. It is 
remarked therein that there exists no naval agreement, and 
that no negotiations are in progress between Great Britain and 
Russia concerning a naval agreement, and that no one who 
knew the character and methods of Sir Edward Grey would 
even for a moment assume that the statement made by him 
was designed to cover up the truth. 


June . . ., 1914. 
The fact that Sir Edward Grey's statement in the EngUsh 
House of Commons concerning the Russo-English naval 



agreement has been so readily accepted by public opinion in 
England, has brought about a feeling of great relief here and 
in St. Petersburg. The wirepullers in this matter had already 
feared that the lovely dream of the new " Triple Alliance " 
had come to an end. Moreover, I can hardly believe that 
the Manchester Guardian should alone have been able to see 
through the trick which Sir Edward Grey employed in not 
answering at all the questions put to him as to whether 
negotiations with Russia concerning a naval agreement were 
imminent or in progress, but rather in denying the question, 
which had never been put, as to whether England had entered 
into binding undertakings concerning participation in any 
European war. I am, rather, incUned to believe that the 
British press in this matter has again given a proof of its 
weU-known discipline in the treatment of questions of foreign 
policy, and has, whether upon a mot d'ordre or out of pohtical 
instinct, kept quiet. To what criticisms and fault-finding by 
the German people's representatives and the German press 
would not the Imperial German Government be exposed, what 
a cry over our foreign policy and our diplomacy would not 
be raised, if a similar declaration had been made before the 
Imperial Diet ! In parliamentary England everybody keeps 
quiet when a Minister seeks in such a barefaced manner to 
mislead his own party, the people's representatives, and the 
public opinion of the whole country. What does England 
not sacrifice to her Germanophobia ? 


June . . ., 1914. 

From a quarter which has retained its old sympathy for 
Germany I have received, with request to keep the matter 
strictly secret, a note, which I most respectfully submit 
herewith, concerning a conference which took place on May 
26th, of this year, with the chief of the Russian Naval Staff, 
and in which the foundations were laid for the negotiations 
concerning the Russo-EngUsh naval agreement. My infor- 
mant did not yet know to what results the negotiations have 
thus far led, but he expressed very earnest concern about 
the benefit which would accrue to Russian nationalism if 
the agreement really came into being. As soon as the 



co-operation of England were assured, the notorious Pan-Slav 
agitators would not hesitate to employ the first opportunity 
offered to bring about war. M. Sazonof himself, he thought, 
was clearly being driven into the arms of the Russian war party. 

Enclosure. ■ 

St. Petersburg, May i^j26th, 1914. 

Considering that an agreement between Russia and 
England is desired regarding the co-operation of their naval 
forces in the event of warlike operations of Russia and England 
with the participation of France, the conference arrived at 
the following conclusions : — 

The projected naval convention shall in all details regulate 
the relations between the Russian and British armed forces 
at sea, and therefore an understanding concerning signals and 
special codes, wireless telegrams and the form of intercourse 
between the Russian and British naval staffs is to be brought 
about. The two naval staffs shaU furthermore regularly 
make to one another reports on the navies of other powers 
and on their own fleets, especially as to technical data and 
newly introduced machinery and inventions. 

As in the case of the Franco-Russian naval convention, 
there shall take place between the Russian and British naval 
staffs regular exchanges of opinions for the consideration of 
questions interesting the naval boards of both states. 

The Russian naval agreement with England, Uke the 
Franco-Russian naval agreement, shall provide for separate 
actions of the Russian and British navies, which however shall 
be based on mutual understanding. In regard to the strategic 
aims a distinction must be made on the one hand between 
the maritime operations in the Black Sea and the North Sea, 
and on the other hand the probable naval war in the Medi- 
terranean. In both places it must be Russia's endeavour to 
secure compensation from England in return for drawing off 
a part of the German fleet against the Russian. 

In the region of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles 
temporary undertakings in the straits shall be kept in view 
as strategic operations by Russia in case of war. 

The Russian interests in the Baltic Sea demand that 
England immobilise as great a part of the German fleet in 



the North Sea as possible. In this way the great superiority 
of the German over the Russian fleet would be anntilled and 
a Russian landing in Pomerania would perhaps be rendered 
possible. In this connection the British Government could 
render an important service by sending into the Baltic 
harbours before the beginning of war such a number of 
merchant ships as would compensate for the lack of Russian 

As to the situation in the Mediterranean, it is most 
highly important for Russia that the absolute superiority of 
the fighting forces of the Entente over those of Austria and 
Italy be assured. For if the Austro-Italian forces should 
dominate this sea, attacks of the Austrian fleet in the Black 
Sea would be possible, which would be a dangerous blow for 
Russia. It must be surmised that the Austro-Italian forces 
are superior to the French. England would therefore have 
to leave the necessary number of ships in the Mediterranean 
to insure the superiority of the forces of the Entente Powers 
until such time as the Russian navy's development should 
have proceeded sufficiently far to enable it to take over the 
solution of this question itself. Russian vessels would have 
to use the British harbours in the Mediterranean as naval 
bases with England's permission, just as the French naval 
agreement permits Russia to use the French harbours in the 
Western Mediterranean as bases. 


July . . ., 1914. 

During my talk to-day with M. Sazonof the conversation 
<''[To the turned to President Poincare's visit."' The Minister em- 
Tsar, in phasised the pacific tone of the toasts exchanged. I could 
J^y- not refrain from caUing M. Sazonof 's attention to the fact 
I9I4-J tiiat it was not the toasts exchanged at such visits that gave 
grounds for uneasiness, but rather the comments of the press 
on the matter. I said such comments had not been lacking 
this time, either, and that among them even the report of the 
alleged conclusion of a Russo-EngHsh naval convention had 
been published. M. Sazonof seized upon this sentence and 
declared angrily that such a naval convention existed only 
" in the mind of the Berliner Tagehlatt and in the moon." 


^' July . . ., 1914. 

I have the honour to send you herewith the copy of a 
letter which the adjutant of a Russian Grand Duke, who was 
at the time sojourning here, wrote from St. Petersburg under 
date of the 26th inst. to the Grand Duke, the important 
contents of which letter I have already been able to report 
by telegraph. The letter, of which I obtained knowledge 
in a confidential way, shows, in my respectful opinion, that 
Russia has been decided on war ever since the 24th of the 


July i2j2Sth, St. Petersburg. 

There have been great disorders among the workmen in 
St. Petersburg ; it is remarkable that they took place at the 
time of the visit of the French President to the Russian Capital, 
and of the Austrian ultimatum"' to Serbia. Yesterday I '"[B. 4.] 
heard from the French military agent General de la Guiche 
that he had learnt that Austria was not without guilt in the 
matter of the disorder among the workmen. Now, however, 
everything is rapidly assuming normal conditions. And 
it appears that, encouraged by the French, our Government 
has stopped trembling before the Germans. It was high 
time ! It is better to express oneself clearly at last than 
everlastingly to hide behind the " professional lies " of the 
diplomats. Austria's ultimatum is of unheard-of effrontery, 
as all the papers here unite in saying. I have just read the 
evening paper : — yesterday there was a sitting of the Council 
of Ministers ; the Minister of War spoke very energetically 
and confirmed the news that Russia was ready for war, and 
the other Ministers unanimously agreed with him ; a report 
to the Emperor in the same spirit was prepared, and this 
report was confirmed on the same evening. There was 
published to-day in the Russian Invalid a preliminary com- 
munication by the Government, stating that " the Govern- 
ment was greatly concerned about the events that had 
occurred and the despatch of the Austrian ultimatum to 
Serbia. The Government is following carefully the develop- 
ment of the Austro-Serbian conflict, with regard to which m rsee O. 
Russia cannot remain indifferent."'^' This communication has 10.] 



been reprinted with most favourable comments by all papers. 
We are all convinced that no Rasputins will this time impede 
Russia from doing her duty. Germany, who is sending 
Austria on ahead, is firmly decided to fight us before we build 
up our fleet, and the Balkan States have not yet recovered 
from the last wars. We, too, must feel the danger and not 
hide our heads, as we did during the Balkan War, when 
Kokovtsof thought only of the Bourse. At that time, how- 
ever, the war would have been easier, for the Balkan federa- 
tion was fully armed. But we let the police scatter the street 
demonstrations directed against that miserable Austria ! 
Now, however, such demonstrations would be joyfully greeted. 
Let us hope above all that the regime of the cowards (of the 
stamp of Kokovtsof) and of certain criers and mystics is 
over. War is a storm. Even if catastrophes were to come, 
it would still be better than to remain in this unbearably 
oppressive atmosphere. I know for a certainty, from experi- 
ence, that the quietest place for me is at the front, where one 
sees danger in its natural proportions, and that is not so 
fearful ; the worst place is the rearguard, in which the 
atmosphere of cowardice prevails, improbable rumours circu- 
late, and panics arise. In the future war, however, the 
interior of Russia will be the rearguard. 


German Chancellor's Explanation and Great Britain's Reply. 
[British Foreign Office Communique.] 


January 25, 1915. 

THE Associated Press publishes the following account of 
an interview which its correspondent has had with Herr von 
Bethmann HoUweg, the German Imperial Chancellor : 

" German Field Headquarters of the German Armies. 

" I am surprised to learn that my phrase, ' a scrap of 
paper,' which I used in my last conversation with the British 

* [See B. 160 (vol, I., p. 209) ; also G. 35.] 


Ambassador'" in reference to the Belgian neutrality treaty <"[Stf«B. 
should have caused such an unfavourable impression in the ^^o.] 

United States. The expression was used in quite another 
connection and meaning from that implied in Sir Edward 
Goschen's report"' and the turn given to it in the biased 
comment of our enemies is undoubtedly responsible for this 

The speaker was Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, and the 
conversation occurred at the Headquarters in a town of 
Northern France, in a villa serving as office and dwelling for 
the Chancellor, Minister von Jagow, and the members of the 
diplomatic suite accompanying the Emperor in the field. 
The Chancellor had apparently not realised until his attention 
was caUed to it the extent to which the phrase had been used 
in the discussion on the responsibility for the war. He 
volunteered the explanation of his meaning, which, in sub- 
stance, was that he had spoken of the treaty, not as a scrap 
of paper for Germany, but as an instrument which had become 
so through Belgium's forfeiture of its neutrahty, and that 
England had quite other reasons for entering the war, com- 
pared with which the neutrality treaty, to which she appealed, 
had only the value of a scrap of paper. 

The British Ambassador 

" My conversation with Sir E. Goschen," said the Chan- 
cellor, " occurred on the 4th August. I had just declared 
in the Reichstag"" that only dire necessity, only the struggle ""[SeeG. 
for existence, compelled Germany to march through Belgium, 35-1 

but that Germany was ready to make compensation for the 
wrong committed. When I spoke I already had certain 
indications, but no absolute proof, on which to base a pubUc 
accusation that Belgium had long before abandoned its 
neutrahty in its relations with England. Nevertheless, I 
took Germany's responsibilities towards neutral States so 
seriously that I spoke frankly on the wrong committed by 
Germany. What was the British attitude on the same 
question ? " said the Chancellor. " The day before my con- 
versation with the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Grey 
had delivered his well-known speech in Parliament, '" wherein, '^i [p. 400.I 
while he did not state expressly that England would take 



part in the war, he left the matter in little doubt. One needs 
only to read this speech through carefully to learn the reason 
of England's intervention in the war. Amid all his beautiful 
phrases about England's honour and England's obligations 
we find it over and over again expressed that England's 
interests — ^its own interests — called for participation in war, 
for it was not in England's interests that a victorious, and 
therefore stronger, Germany should emerge from the war. 
This old principle of England's policy — ^to take as the sole 
criterion of its actions its private interests regardless of right, 
reason, or considerations of humanity — ^is expressed in that 
speech of Gladstone's in 1870 on Belgian neutrality from which 
<" [p. 409.] Sir Edward quoted. '"' Mr. Gladstone then declared that he was 
unable to subscribe to the doctrine that the simple fact of the 
existence of a guarantee is binding upon every party thereto, 
irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it 
may find itself at the time when the occasion for action on the 
guarantee arrives, and he referred to such English statesmen 
as Aberdeen and Palmerston as supporters of his views." 

" England drew the sword," continued the Chancellor, 
" only because she believed her own interests demanded it. 
Just for Belgian neutrality she would never have entered the 
war. That is what I meant when I told Sir E. Goschen, in 
that last interview when we sat down to talk the matter over 
privately man to man, that among the reasons which had 
impelled England into war the Belgian neutraUty treaty had 
for her only the value of a scrap of paper. I may have been 
a bit excited and aroused," said the Chancellor. " Who 
would not have been at seeing the hopes and work of the 
whole period of my Chancellorship going for naught ? I 
recalled to the Ambassador my efforts for years to bring 
about an understanding between England and Germany, 
an understanding which, I reminded him, would have made 
a general European war impossible, and have absolutely 
guaranteed the peace of Europe. Such understanding," the 
Chancellor interjected parenthetically, " would have formed the 
basis on which we could have approached the United States as 
a third partner. But England had not taken up this plan, and 
through its entry into the war had destroyed for ever the 
hope of its fulfilment. In comparison with such momentous 
consequences, was the treaty not a scrap of paper ? " 



The Belgian Papers 

" England ought really to cease harping on this theme of 
Belgian neutraUty," said the Chancellor. " Documents on 
the Anglo-Belgian military agreement, which we have found 
in the meantime, show plainly enough how England regarded 
this neutrality. As you know, we found in the archives of 
the Belgian Foreign Ofi&ce papers'" which showed that England ''' [See 
in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium without "The 
the assent of the Belgian Government if war had then broken j^™^. 
out. In other words, do exactly the same thing for which, ^aents 
with all the pathos of virtuous indignation, she now reproached n./' 
Germany. In some later despatch Grey, I believe, informed Bel- p. 318.] 
gium that he did not believe England would take such a step 
because he did not think EngUsh public opinion would justify 
such action, "" and still people in the United States wonder that ^^^[See 
I characterised as a scrap of paper a treaty whose observance, p. 327] 
according to responsible British statesmen, should be dependent 
upon the pleasure of British public opinion, a treaty which Eng- 
land herself had long since undermined by military agreements 
with Belgium. Remember, too, that Sir E. Grey expressly 
refused to assure us of England's neutrality even in the 
eventuality that Germany respected Belgian neutraUty. I 
can understand therefore English displeasure at my character- 
isation of the treaty of 1839"" as a scrap of paper, for this scrap ^'>[See 
of paper was for England extremely valuable, as furnishing p. 487-] 
an excuse before the world for embarking in the war. I hope, 
therefore, that in the United States you will think clearly 
enough and realise that England in this matter, too, acted 
solely on the principle, ' Right or wrong, my interests.' " 

The United States Note.* 

The more immediate object of the interview had been to 
obtain the views of the Chancellor and Herr von Jagow on 
the Anglo-American negotiations regarding the neutral 

* [The remainder of the interview, from this point on, relates to matters 
which do not concern the present volume ; but the whole is here given 
just as it appears in the Foreign Office communique.] 

II— 2 B 385 


shipping, and after an examination of the British note the 
Chancellor made the following statement : 

" I shall not comment on the note of the 7th January 
which, so far as the facts and questions of trade are concerned, 
Sir Edward Grey, however, considered it appropriate to add 
two statements intended to carry weight far beyond the 
scope of this particular interchange of notes. I mean the 
paragraph where he speaks of leaving open the question of 
permitting the shipment of food supplies npt intended for 
the enemies' armies or Government, and his slurs upon us for 
abandoning the rules of civilisation and humanity. j 

" It should not be forgotten that England in this war set [ 

out to starve over 65,000,000 of people directly by cutting 
off their food, and indirectly by closing the arteries of their 
commerce. In attempting this she did not refrain from 
.destroying a considerable part of the trade of neutral nations. 
It is now beginning to dawn upon Great Britain that she 
cannot force us into submission by these methods. Sir 
Edward Grey inserted the sentences in question in the docu- 
ment to stand as a record of English magnanimity which 
actually never existed, and so tries to mould out of this note 
a precedent upon which he may some day fall back when the 
British may have ceased to hold the whiphand control of 
maritime avenues of supply. 

Exorbitant British Demands. 

" It will be well, then, to remember with what brutal 
means England tried to throttle us. The nation boasting 
the most powerful fleet and the strictest adherence to inter- 
national agreements demands a greater control of neutral 
shipping than it would be allowed to command if it had 
declared an effective blockade, which, according to the 
Hague ruling, it should do, but which it cannot do, being 
powerless to uphold such a blockade. This is rather remark- 
able for a nation which vents its moral indignation upon us 
so frequently for the purpose of creating anti-German senti- 
ment abroad, and so consolidating public sentiment at home ; 
but it is even more extraordinary how this time Sir Edward 
Grey overdraws his morality account by calling attention to 
what evil things we might do in the future. 



" I rather admire this faciUty which frequently enables 
the British Foreign Office to turn defeat ashore or on sea into 
a victory in the domain of public opinion. When our vessels 
successfully bombarded the towns on the east coast of England, 
towns equipped with defences, arsenals, batteries, and other 
military establishments, despite everything emanating to 
the contrary from London, no powerful fleet appeared to 
defend the coast, but all England was made to arise in indigna- 
tion about our lack of civilisation. Recruiting lists bulged 
with new names, and reports were spread broadcast which 
shocked the world with horror at our alleged infamy." 

Explosive Bullets. 

. " These reports defaming us gained in intensity when our 
dirigibles threw bombs over the fortified town of Great 
Yarmouth, and warded off attacks from below as they passed 
over British soil. Now is not this rather audacious diplomatic 
journalism, in view of the fact that British vessels bombarded 
the open cities of Dar-es-Salaam, Victoria, Swakopmund, 
and have often bombarded towns on the Belgian coast without 
previous announcement, destroying thereby private dwellings 
belonging to the subjects of the Allies without regard as to 
who might be living there, and that Great Britain supplies her 
troops with rifles and ammunition which only outwardly 
correspond with the rules of The Hague ? Bullets with the 
core constructed in two parts in such a manner that in loading 
the soldier can easily wrench off the points by inserting them 
in a sharp-edged hole drilled in the lever attached to the rifle, 
thus becoming dum-dum ammunition, were produced in large 
quantities and were found. We have now in our possession 
many such rifles. We have them still loaded with dum-dum 

" Nor does Britain show so very deUcate a sentiment as 
to the actions of its Allies. Great Britain claims to fight for 
the hberty of peoples, but she does not interfere with Russia, 
■who even now is adopting in her own provinces of Poland, 
Finland, and the Baltic Provinces, and against the Jews a 
police terrorism barely equalled in history. England's other 
ally, France, time and again sent aviators to bombard towns 
which had no fortifications whatever, and no importance 



from a military point of view, prominent among these being 
Luxemburg and Freiburg in the Black Forest. Now, 
thousands of German women and children and a few old men 
have returned from France. Many are still there who for 
months and months have suffered in French concentration 
camps treatment so inhuman that it almost beggars descrip- 
tion. No hostile civilian man or woman was ever put into a 
concentration camp in Germany until the beginning of 
November, when it was found necessary to retaliate against 
the British, and later the French, as these nations continued 
to refuse to let German civilians go free. No British, French, 
or Russian woman living in the Empire was ever put in a 
concentration camp in Germany. 

" With such a score counting against England and the 
Allies, let nobody in the future ever be deceived by mag- 
nanimous appeals to civilisation and humanity, although 
they be so ingeniously inserted in diplomatic notes dealing 
with the throttling of neutral traffic." 


January 26, 1915. 

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs authorises the 
pubhcation of the following observations upon the report of 
an interview recently granted by the German Chancellor to 
an American correspondent : 

It is not surprising that the German Chancellor should 
show anxiety to explain away his now historic phrase about 
a treaty being a mere " scrap of paper." The phrase has 
made a deep impression because the progress of the world 
largely depends upon the sanctity of agreements between 
individuals and between nations, and the pohcy disclosed in 
Herr von Bethmann HoUweg's phrase tends to debase the 
legal and moral currency of civilisation. 

What the German Chancellor said was that Great Britain, 
in requiring Germany to respect the neutrality of Belgium, 
" was going to make war just for a word, just for a scrap 
of paper " ; that is, that Great Britain was making a 
mountain out of a molehill. He now asks the American 
public to believe that he meant the exact opposite of what 
he said ; that it was Great Britain who really regarded 



the neutrality of Belgium as a mere trifle, and Germany who 
" took her responsibilities towards neutral States seriously." 
The arguments by which Herr von Bethmann HoUweg seeks 
to establish the two sides of this case are in flat contradiction 
of plain facts. 

First, the German Chancellor alleges that " England in 
1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium without 
the assent of the Belgian Government." This allegation is 
absolutely false. It is based upon certain documents found 
in Brussels which record conversations between British and 
Belgian officers in 1906 and again in 191 1."' The fact that '"[See 
there is no note of these conversations at the British War PP- 314- 
Of&ce or Foreign Office shows that they were of a purely ^ao.J 

informal character, and no military agreement of any sort 
was at either time made between the two Governments. 
Before any conversations took place between British and 
Belgian officers, it was expressly laid down on the British 
side that the discussion of military possibilities was to be 
addressed to the manner in which, in case of need, British 
assistance could be most effectually afforded to Belgium 
for the defence of her neutrality, and on the Belgian side a 
marginal note upon the record explains that " the entry 
of the English into Belgium would only take place after 
the violation of our neutrality by Germany." As regards the 
conversation of 1911, the Belgian officer said to the British, 
"You could only land in our country with our consent," 
and in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a 
categorical assurance"" that no British Government would '"'[See 
violate the neutraUty of Belgium, and that " so long as it was p. 327-! 
not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send 
troops ourselves into their territory." 

The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be 
illustrated in this connection. He represents Sir Edward 
Grey as saying, " He did not believe England would take 
such a step, because he did not think English public opinion 
would justify such action." What Sir Edward Grey actually 
wrote was : " I said that I was sure that this Government 
would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, 
and I did not believe that any British Government would 
be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever 
approve of it." 



If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were 
conversations on military subjects between British and 
Belgian officers, he may find one reason in a fact well known 
to him, namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate 
network of strategical railways, leading from the Rhine to the 
Belgian frontier, through a barren, thinly-populated tract : 
railways deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden 
attack upon Belgium, such as was carried out in August last. 
This fact alone was enough to justify any communications 
between Belgium and other Powers on the footing that 
there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality unless it 
were previously violated by another Power. On no other 
footing did Belgium ever have any such communications. 
In spite of these facts the German Chancellor speaks of 
Belgium having thereby " abandoned " and " forfeited " her 
neutrality, and he implies that he would not have spoken of 
the German invasion as a " wrong " had he then known of 
the conversations of 1906 and 1911. It would seem to follow, 
that according to Herr von Bethmann HoUweg's code, a 
wrong becomes a right if the party which is to be the subject 
of the wrong foresees the possibility and makes preparations 
to resist it. Those who are content with older and more 
generally accepted standards are likely to agree rather with 
what Cardinal Mercier said in his Pastoral letter : " Belgium 
was bound in honour to defend her own independence. She 
kept her oath. The other Powers were bound to respect and 
protect her neutrality. Germany violated her oath ; England 
kept hers." These are the facts. 

In support of the second part of the German Chancellor's 
thesis, namely, that Germany " took her responsibilities 
towards neutral States seriously," he alleges nothing except 
that " he spoke frankly on the wrong committed by Germany " 
in invading Belgium. That a man knows the right, while 
doing the wrong, is not usually accepted as proof of his serious 
conscientiousness . 

The real nature of Germany's view of her " responsibilities 
towards neutral States " may, however, be learnt, on 
authority which cannot be disputed, by reference to the 
English White Paper. If those responsibilities were in 
truth taken seriously, why, ^hen Germany was asked to 
"'[B. 114.] respect the neutrahty of Belgium'" if it were respected by 



France, did Germany refuse ? "' France, when asked the "» [B. 122.] 
corresponding question at the same time, agreed."' This '"[B. 125.] 
would have guaranteed Germany from all danger of attack 
through Belgium. The reason of Germany's refusal was 
given by Herr von Bethmann HoUweg's colleague. It may 
be paraphrased in the well-known gloss upon Shakespeare : 

" Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just ; 
But four times he that gets his blow in fust." 

" They had to advance into France," said Herr von Jagow, 
" by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well 
ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some 
decisive blow as early as possible."''' "'[B. 160.] 

Germany's real attitude towards Belgium was thus frankly 
given by the German Foreign Secretary to the British 
Ambassador, and the German Chancellor, in his speech to the 
Reichstag, claimed the right to commit a wrong in virtue of 
the military necessity of " hacking a way through." The 
treaty which forbade the wrong was by comparison a mere 
scrap of paper. The truth was spoken in the first statements 
by the two German Ministers. All the apologies and argu- 
ments which have since been forthcoming are afterthoughts 
to excuse and explain away a flagrant wrong. Moreover, 
all attacks upon Great Britain mi regard to this matter, and 
all talk about " responsibilities towards neutral States," 
come badly from the man who on the 29th July asked Great 
Britain to enter into a bargain to condone the violation of the 
neutrality of Belgium. ''" '*'[B. 85.] 

The German Chancellor spoke to the American corre- 
spondent of his " efforts for years to bring about an under- 
standing between England and Germany," an understanding, 
he added, which would have " absolutely guaranteed the 
peace of Europe." He omitted to mention what Mr. Asquith 
made pubhc in his speech at Cardiff,'" that Germany re- ""[5ee 
quired, as the price of an understanding, an unconditional P- 462.] 
pledge of England's neutrality. The British Government 
were ready to bind themselves not to be parties to any aggres- 
sion against Germany ; they were not prepared to pledge their 
neutrality in case of aggression by Germany. '" An Anglo-Ger- '°'[B. 101.3 
man understanding on the latter terms would not have meant 
an absolute guarantee for the peace of Europe ; but it would 



THE ACTION OF GERMANY [Jan. 26, 1915] 

have meant an absolutely free hand for Germany, so far as 
England was concerned, for Germany to break the peace of 

The Chancellor says that in his conversation with the 
British Ambassador in August last he " may have been a bit 
excited at seeing the hopes and work of the whole period of 
his chancellorship going for nought." Considering that at 
the date of tlie conversation (4th August) Germany had 
"•[Y. 147.] already made war on France"' the natural conclusion is that 
the shipwreck of the Chancellor's hopes consisted, not in the 
fact of a European war, but in the fact that England had not 
agreed to stand out of it. 

The sincerity of the German Chancellor's professions to 
the American correspondent may be brought to the very 
simple test, the application of which is the more apposite 
because it serves to recall one of the leading facts which pro- 
duced the present war. Herr von Bethmann HoUweg re- 
[B. 36, fused the proposal, which England put forward"" and in 
43-] which France, Italy, and Russia concurred, for a Conference 
at which the dispute would have been settled on fair and 
honourable terms without war. If he really wished to work 
with England for peace, why did he not accept that proposal ? 
He must have known after the Balkan Conference in London 
that England could be trusted to play fair. Herr von Jagow 
had given testimony in the Reichstag to England's good 
faith in those negotiations. The proposal for a second Con- 
ference between the Powers was made by Sir Edward Grey 
with the same straightforward desire for peace as in 1912 
and 1913. The German Chancellor rejected this means of 
averting war. He who does not will the means must not 
complain if the conclusion is drawn that he did not will the 

The second part of the interview with the American 
correspondent consists of a discourse upon the ethics of war. 
The things which Germany has done in Belgium and France 
have been placed on record before the world by those who 
have suffered from them and who know them at first hand. 
After this, it does not lie with the German Chancellor to read 
to other belligerents a lecture upon the conduct of war. 


[Dec. 6, 1914] 


[Documents published in the British " Collected Diplomatic 
Documents " as an Appendix to the translation of the 
Serbian Blue-book [S.].] 


No. I. 

Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward 
Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 

Rome, December 6, 1914. 

WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday's date 
reporting the vote of confidence in the Government recorded 
in the Italian Chamber, I have the honour to inform you 
that in his speech which closed the discussion, Signor Giolitti 
stated, in illustration and justification of the attitude of 
Italy in separating herself from her allies and remaining 
neutral, that on the 9th August, 1913, being himself absent 
from Rome, he had received a telegram from the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, the late Marquis di San Giuliano, to the 
following effect :— "' '" [cf. B. 

" Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her ^^^■•' 

intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such 



action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the casus 
foederis of the Triple AUiance, which, on the contrary, I 
beheve to be inappUcable. I am endeavouring to arrange 
for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action 
on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state 
clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be 
taken, as defensive, and that therefore we do not consider 
that the casus foederis arises." 

Signor Giolitti's answer was as follows : — " If Austria 
intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a casus foederis cannot 
be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own 
account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch as 
no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a 
declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the 
most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the 
part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous 

This, he said, was done, and the action of Italy in no 
respect disturbed her relations with her allies. He explained 
this point in order to make it clear in the eyes of Europe that 
Italy had acted with entire loyalty, as she would do to the 

It is interesting to notice that it was on the following day„ 
the loth August, that the peace of Bucharest, against which 
Austria was disposed to promulgate reserves, was signed. 

No. 2. 

Speech of Signor Giolitti before the Italian Chamber of Deputies^ 
on the $th December, 1914. 

(Translated from the Official Report of the Pro- 
> ceedings of the Chamber.) 

SIGNOR GIOLITTI : The President of the Council, when 
speaking of the declaration of neutrality made by Italy on 
the outbreak of war, recalled the fact that this decision was 
the subject of heated debates and divided counsels, but that 
later, both in Italy and abroad, the view gradually prevailed 
that we were only exercising a right secured to us. 



Therefore, inasmuch as I hold it necessary that Italy's, 
loyal observance of international treaties shall be considered, 
as being above any possibility of dispute — [Hear, hear) — I 
feel it my duty to recall a precedent, which proves that the 
interpretation placed by the Government on the Treaty of 
the Triple Alliance is the correct interpretation, and was. 
admitted as correct in identical circumstances by the Allied 

During the Balkan War, on the gth August, 1913, about a_ 
year before the present war broke out, during my absence 
from Rome, I received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San 
Giuliano, the following telegram : — 

" Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her 
intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such 
action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the casus. 
foederis of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I 
believe to be inapplicable. {Sensation.) 

" I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort 
with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria,, 
but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not 
consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and. 
that, therefore, we do not consider that the casus foederis. 

" Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve." 

I replied : — 

" If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a. 
casus foederis cannot be established. It is a step which she- 
is taking on her own account, since there is no question of. 
defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her.. 
It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made 
to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for 
action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this, 
most perilous adventure." [Hear, hear.) 

This course was taken, and our interpretation was upheld, 
and recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed 
our relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration, 
of neutrality made by the present Government conforms, 
therefore in all respects to the precedents of Italian policy,, 
and conforms also to an interpretation of the Treaty of 
Alliance which has been already accepted by the Allies. 



I wish to recall this, because I think it right that in the 
eyes of all Europe it should appear that Italy has remained 
completely loyal to the observance of her pledges. {Loud 

I should like now to make a very short statement in 
-explanation of my vote on this question. I approve the 
^Government's programme of an armed and vigilant neutrality 
for the guardianship of the vital interests of Italy. The 
Honourable President of the Council said truly that the vast 
upheaval becomes greater every day, and that it is given to 
none to foresee the end. The immense military and financial 
resources which the belligerent Powers have at their disposal 
exclude the possibility of an early termination of the confhct. 
As long as the necessity does not arise for us to come down 
into the arena to preserve our own vital interests, we ought all 
loyally to observe neutrality, since it is only by such loyal 
observance that we can preserve intact that great source of 
strength which is freedom of action. {Loud applause.) 

In this conflict, which is without precedent in history, the 
political life of Italy may be at stake. The greatest prudence 
is therefore incumbent on all ; and it is incumbent above Eill, 
not only on the Government and on Parliament, but also on 
that great force, the Press — {Hear, hear) — to keep a single 
eye to the great interests of Italy and to remember only that 
they are Italians. {Loud applause.) 

In conclusion, I hope from the bottom of my heart that the 
rmen who at this supreme moment have the responsibility of 
Government may deserve the full gratitude of the country. 
{Loud cheers and applause, during which many Deputies went 
up to the speaker and congratulated him.) 




[Of these speeches in the House of Commons, the twa 
statements made by Sir Edward Grey on August 3rd and 
the three statements by Mr. Asquith — on August 4th, 
August 5th and August 6th — ^were printed as Part II. of the 
British Blue-book " Great Britain and the European Crisis " 
[B.]. The other speeches and statements, here added, are 
taken from " Hansard."] 

(i) Sir Edward Grey (July 27, 1914) . . page 397 

(2) Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Bonar Law (August 3, 1914) 400 

(3) Sir Edward Grey, further statement (August 3, 1914) 417 

(4) Mr. Asquith (August 4, 1914) 418 

(5) Mr. Asquith (August 5, 1914) . . . . . . 420 

(6) Mr. Asquith and Mr. Bonar Law (August 6, 1914) . . 421 

(7) Sir Edward Grey, answers to questions (August 27 

and 28, 1914, and February 11, 1915) . . . . 436 



Mr. Bonar Law. — I rise to ask the Foreign Secretary a 
question of which I have given him notice : whether he 
would communicate any information to the House as to the 
situation which exists between Austria and Serbia ? 

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs {Sir E. Grey). — 
The House will, of course, be aware through the public Press 

* [This statement by Sir E. Grey is not printed in the British Blue-book, 
but there are several references to it : see B. 62, 83, and 161 (vol. I., p. 217).] 



of what the nature of the situation in Europe is at this 
moment, I think that it is due to the House that I should 
give in short narrative form the position which His Majesty's 
Government have so far taken up. 

'"[July 24.] Last Friday"' morning I received from the Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador the text of the communication 
made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, 
which has appeared in the Press, and which included textually 
the demand made by the Austro-Hungarian Government 

'"'DB. 4-] upon Serbia."' 

'"[See B. In the afternoon I saw other Ambassadors,'" and expressed 

5, 10, II.] the view that, as long as the dispute was one between Austria- 
Hungary and Serbia alone, I felt that we had no title to 
interfere, but that, if the relations between Austria-Hungary 
and Russia became threatening, the question would then be 
one of the peace of Europe : a matter that concerned us all. 
I did not then know what view the Russian Government 
had taken of the situation, and without knowing how things 
were likely to develop I could not make any immediate 

'*i[c/. B. proposition; but I said"' that, if relations between Austria- 
"•] Hungary and Russia did become threatening, the only chance 
of peace appeared to me to be that the four Powers — Germany, 
France, Italy, and Great Britain, who were not directly 
interested in the Serbian question — should work together 
both in St. Petersburg and Vienna simultaneously to get 
both Austria-Hungary and Russia to suspend military oper- 
ations while the four Powers endeavoured to arrange a settle- 

After I had heard that Austria-Hungary had broken off 
diplomatic relations with Serbia, I made by telegraph yester- 
day afternoon the following proposal, as a practical method 
of applying the views that I had already expressed : — 

"'EB. 36.] I instructed"" His Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, 

Berlin, and Rome to ask the Governments to which they 
were accredited whether they would be willing to arrange 
that the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors in London 
should meet me in a Conference to be held in London immedi- 
ately to endeavour to find a means of arranging the present 
difficulties. At the same time, I instructed His Majesty's 
Ambassadors to ask those Governments to authorise their 


representatives in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade to 
inform the Governments there of the proposed Conference, 
and to ask them to suspend all active miUtary operations 
pending the result of the Conference. 

To that I have not yet received complete replies, and it 
is, of course, a proposal in which the co-operation of all four 
Powers is essential. In a crisis so grave as this, the efforts 
of one Power alone to preserve the peace must be quite 

The time allowed in this matter has been so short that 
I have had to take the risk of making a proposal without the 
usual preliminary steps of trying to ascertain whether it 
would be well received. But, where matters are so grave 
and the time so short, the risk of proposing something that 
is unwelcome or ineffective cannot be avoided. I cannot 
but feel, however, assuming that the text of the Serbian 
reply"' as published this morning in the Press is accurate, "'[B-39-] 
as I believe it to be, that it should at least provide a basis on 
which a friendly and impartial group of Powers, including 
Powers who are equally in the confidence of Austria-Hungary 
and of Russia, should be able to arrange a settlement that 
would be generally acceptable. 

It must be obvious to any person who reflects upon the 
situation that the moment the dispute ceases to be one between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia and becomes one in which 
another Great Power is involved, it can but end in the greatest 
catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of Europe 
at one blow"" : no one can say what would be the limit of ""f'^A B. 
the issues that might be raised by such a conflict, the con- ^6.] 

sequences of it, direct and indirect would be incalculable.'^' "'[c/- B. 

9> 48.J 

Mr. Harry Lawson. — May I ask the right hon. Gentleman 

whether it is true that this morning the German Emperor 
accepted the principle of mediation which he has proposed ? 

Sir E. Grey. — I understand that the German Government 
are favourable to the idea of mediation in principle'*' as'"['^^*B. 
between Austria-Hungary and Russia, but that as to the 46 and 
particular proposal of applying that principle by means of a °° 
Conference which I have described to the House, the reply 
of the German Government has not yet been received. 




'^'Quly 27, LAST week"' I stated that we were working for peace not 

seep. only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. 

397-] To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult 

to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, 

but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. 

Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon 

'"' [O.76.] each other.'"' 

Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's 
Government, I would like to clear the ground so that, before 
I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard 
to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under 
what obligations the Government is, or the House caii be 
said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of 
all let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked 
with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, 
to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that 
point. We have always done it. During these last years, 
as far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we would 
have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Through- 
out the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for 
peace. The co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe 
was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. 
It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in 
adjusting their points of view. It took much time and 
labour and discussion before they could settle their differ- 
ences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main 
object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather 
than accentuate differences rapidly. 

In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure 
the peace of Europe ; because there has been little time, and 
there has been a disposition — at any rate in some quarters 
on which I will not dwell — to force things rapidly to an issue, 
at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, 
the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the 
Great Powers generally are concerned, is in danger. I do 
riot want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say 
where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most 



in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or 
endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach 
this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of 
British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free 
from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved. 

We shall publish papers'" as soon as we can regarding (^'[B. 
what took place last week when we were working for peace ; i-i59-3J 
and when those papers are published I have no doubt that 
to every human being they wiU make it clear how strenuous 
and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, 
and that they wiU enable people to form their own judgment 
as to what forces were at work which operated against peace. 

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations, 
I have assured the House — and the Prime Minister has 
assured the House more than once — that if any crisis such 
as this arose we should come before the House of Commons 
and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide 
what the British attitude should be, that we would have no 
secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, 
and tell the House that because we had entered into that 
engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the 
country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first. 

There has [sic] been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the 
Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple Entente, 
for some years past. The Triple Entente was not an alliance 
— it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember 
that in igo8 there was a crisis — also a Balkan crisis — origin- 
ating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened 
to come to London, because his visit was planned before the 
crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a 
Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public 
opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give 
anything more than diplomatic support. More was never 
asked from us, more was never given, and more was never 

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given 
no promise of anything more than diplomatic support — up 
till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. 
Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the 
House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. 

II— 2 C 401 


That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came 
at a time of very great dif&culty to His Majesty's Govern- 
ment when a general election was in progress, and Ministers 
were scattered over the country, and I — spending three days 
a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign 
Office — was asked the question, whether, if that crisis de- 
veloped into war between France and Germany, we would 
give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing 
to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive 
the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the 
occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced 
upon France then on the question of Morocco — a question 
which had just been the subject of agreement between 
this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular 
on both sides — that if out of that agreement war was forced 
on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this 
country would have rallied to the material support of France. 

I gave no. promise, but I expressed that opinion during 
the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words, to 
the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador, at 
the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats ; but 
I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by 
the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and 
I think very reasonably, " If you think it possible that the 
public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis 
arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support 
which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able 
to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time 
comes, unless some conversations have already taken place 
between naval and military experts." There was force in 
that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to 
take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing 
which passed between military or naval experts should bind 
either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to 
make a decision as to whether or not they would give that 
support when the time arose. 

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general 
election was in prospect ; I had to take the responsibility 
of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be sum- 
moned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry 
CampbeU-Bannerman, the Prime Minister ; I consulted, I 



remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State 
for War ; and the present Prime Minister, who was then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could 
do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding 
that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the 
crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military 
and naval experts took place was later on — I think much 
later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to 
be of importance — ^but later on it was brought to the know- 
ledge of the Cabinet. 

The Agadir crisis came — another Morocco crisis — and 
throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been 
taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion 
and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we 
ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which 
was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that 
these conversations which took place were not binding upon 
the freedom of either Government ; and on the 22nd of 
November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the 
letter"' which I will now read to the House, and I received '^ C^- ^°5 
from him a letter in similar terms"" in reply. The letter mm X05 
which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known (2) ; c/.M. 
to the public now as the record that, whatever took place Viviani's 
between military and naval experts, they were not binding speech, 
engagements upon the Governments : — J' . ^59 

" My dear Ambassador, Sf^"" 

" From time to time in recent years the French and 
British naval and military experts have consulted 
together. It has always been understood that 
such consultation does not restrict the freedom of 
either Government to decide at any future time 
whether or not to assist the other by armed force. 
We have agreed that consultation between experts 
is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engage- 
ment that commits either Government to action 
in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may 
never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the 
French and British fleets respectively at the 
present moment is not based upon an engagement 
to co-operate in war. 



" You have, however, pointed out that, if either Govern- 
ment had grave reason to expect an unprovoked 
attack by a third Power, it might become essential 
to know whether it could in that event depend 
upon the armed assistance of the other. 

" I agree that, if either Government had grave reason 
to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, 
or something that threatened the general peace, 
it should immediately discuss with the other 
whether both Governments should act together 
to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, 
if so, what measures they would be prepared to 
take in common." 

Lord Charles Beresford. — What is the date of that ? ' 

Sir E. Grey. — The 22nd November, 1912. That is the 
starting point for the Government with regard to the present 
crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister 
and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, 
and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what 
our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether 
we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free, 
and, a fortiori, the House of Commons remains perfectly 
free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view 
of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to 
the House of Commons that I should give that full information 
to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the 
letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything 
which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations 
with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom 
of the Government to decide what attitude they should take 
now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to 
decide what their attitude should be. 

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this : The 
situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it 
was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it 
was primarily a dispute which concerned France — a dispute 
which concerned France and France primarily — a dispute, 
as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement 
subsisting between us and France, and published to the 
whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic 



support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but 
diplomatic support ; we were, at any rate, pledged by a 
definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically 
in that question. 

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not 
originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated 
as regards anything with which we had a special agreement 
with France ; it has not originated with anything which 
primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute 
between Austria and Serbia. I can say this with the most 
absolute confidence — ^no Government and no country has 
less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria 
and Serbia than the Government and the country of France. 
They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour 
under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair 
to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot 
apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the 
Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms 
of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and com- 
pletely cleared the ground with regard to the question of 

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. ''' '''[JFor M. 
For many years we have had a long-standing friendship Viviani 
with France. I remember well the feeling in the House — on this 
and my own feeling — ^for I spoke on the subject, I think, j^g ° ' 
when the late Government made their agreement with France — y. 159 
the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that (vol. I., 
these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the P- 429)-] 
past, had cleared these differences away ; I remember saying, 
I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had 
been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had 
made that possible. But how far that friendship entails 
obligation— it has been a friendship between the nations 
and ratified by the nations — ^how far that entails an obligation, 
let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, 
and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I 
construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon 
anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they 
should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and 
collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, 
and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter. 



The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the 
northern and western coasts of France are absolutely un- 
defended. The French fleet being concentrated in the 
Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it 
used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between 
the two countries has given them a sense of security that 
there was nothing to be feared from us. 

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French 
fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been 
concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and 
friendship which has existed between the two countries. 
My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war 
which France had not sought, and in which she had not been 
the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bom- 
barded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we 
could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within 
sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispas- 
sionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling 
of this country. There are times when one feels that if 
these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling 
which would spread with irresistible force throughout the 

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, 
and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on 
that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently 
going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, 
what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean ? 
If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what 
we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts abso- 
lutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming 
down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war 
of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may 
be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. 
We are in the presence of a European conflagration ; can 
anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of 
it ? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude 
of neutrality, sajdng, " No, we cannot undertake and engage 
to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the 
French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean ; and let 
us assume that the consequences — which are already tre- 
mendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries 



which are at peace — in fact, equally whether countries are 
at peace or at war — let us assume that out of that come 
consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden 
moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should 
go to war ; and let us assume — ^which is quite possible — 
that Italy, who is now neutral — because, as I understand, 
she considers that this war is an aggressive war,'" and the '"CB. 152.] 
Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance, her obligation did 
not arise — ^let us assume that consequences which are not 
. yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her 
own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neu- 
trality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British 
interests ourselves to fight — what then will be the position 
in the Mediterranean ? It might be that at some critical 
moment those consequences v/ould be forced upon us because 
our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this 

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks 
there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which 
may not be vital to this country. What will be our position 
then ? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which 
is equal to dealing alone with a combination "of other fleets 
in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when 
we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and 
we might have exposed this country" from our negative attitude 
at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that 
from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly 
that France was entitled to know — and to know at once — 
whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected 
northern and western coasts she could depend upon British 
support. In that emergency, and in these compelling cir- 
cumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Am- 
bassador the following statement"" : — ""[B. 148; 

Y. 137. 

" I am authorised to give an assurance that if the ^^^^ *°°*^ 
German fleet comes into the Channel or through the latter, 
the North Sea to undertake hostile operations and cf. y'. 
against the French coasts or shipping, the British 126, 143.] 
fleet will give all the protection in its power. 
This assurance is, of course, subject to the 
policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the 



support of Parliament, and must not be taken as 
binding His Majesty's Government to take any 
action until the above contingency of action by 
the German fleet takes place." 

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on 
our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on 
our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should 
that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from 
hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this 
in any very formal way ; but I understand that the German 
Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves 
to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the 
northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly 
before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an 
engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious con- 
sideration — becoming more serious every hour — there is the 
question of the neutrality of Belgium. 

I shall have to put before the House at some length 

what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing 

"'[See factor is the treaty of 1839,'^' but this is a treaty with a 

p. 487. c/. history — a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there 

g^^*y was war between France and Germany, the question of 

p. 488 1 ^^^ neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were 

said. Amongst other things. Prince Bismarck gave an 

assurance to Belgium that-^confirming his verbal assurance, 

he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous 

in reference to the treaty in existence — that the. German 

Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality 

of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality 

would be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That 

is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany 

of the sacredness of these treaty rights. 

What was our own attitude ? The people who laid 
down the attitude of the British Government were Lord 
Granville in the House of Lords and Mr. Gladstone in the 
House of Commons. Lord Granville on August 8, 1870, 
used these words. He said : — 

" We might have explained to the country and to 
foreign nations, that we could not think this 
country was bound either morally or inter- 



nationally, or that its interests were concerned 
in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium ; 
though this course might have had some con- 
veniences, though it might have been easy to 
adhere to it, though it might have saved us 
from some immediate danger, it is a course 
which Her Majesty's Government thought it 
impossible to adopt in the name of the country 
with any due regard to the country's honour 
or to the country's interests." 

Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later : — 

" There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It 
is not necessary, nor would time permit riie, to 
enter into the complicated question of the nature 
of the obligations of that treaty ; but I am not 
able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who 
have held in this House what plainly amounts 
to an assertion, that the simple fact of the exis- 
tence of a guarantee is binding on every party 
to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular 
position in which it may find itself at the time 
when the occasion for acting on the guarantee 
arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy 
to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such 
as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never 
to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may 
venture to say so, that impracticable view of 
the guarantee. The circumstance that there is 
already an existing guarantee in force is, of 
necessity, an important fact, and a weighty 
element in the case, to which we are bound to 
give full and ample consideration. There is also 
this further consideration, the force of which we 
must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common 
interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement 
of any Power whatever." 

The treaty is an old treaty — 1839 — and that was the 
view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which 
are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which 



benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who 
guarantee the neutraUty of Belgium. The honour and 
interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we 
cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of 
our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, 
than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870. 

I will read to the House what took place last week on 
this subject. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew 
that this question must be a most important element in our 
policy — a most important subject for the House of Commons. 
I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris 

''|[B. 114.] and Berlin"' to say that it was essential for us to know 
whether the French and German Governments respectively 
were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the 
neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from 

•"'[B. 125, the French Government this reply"" : — 

" The French Government are resolved to respect the 
neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in 
the event of some other Power violating that 
neutrality that France might find herself under 
the necessity, in order to assure the defence 
of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance 
has been given several times. The President 
of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the 
Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels 
has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day." 

i"[B, 122.] From the German Government the reply'" was : — 

" The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could 
not possibly give an answer before consulting 
the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor." 

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important 

to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would 

not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign 

Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that 

he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any 

reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, 

1*1 [cf. B. to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain 

122.] extent, part of their plan of campaign.'*' I telegraphed at 



the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government,'" "'[B. 115.I 
and I got the following reply'" from Sir Francis Villiers : — (^ip. 128.] 
" Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will 
observe and uphold her neutrality, which she 
intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. 
In so informing me. Minister for Foreign Affairs 
said that, in the event of the violation of the 
neutrality of their territory, they believed that 
they were in a position to defend themselves 
against intrusion. The relations between Belgium 
and her neighbours were excellent, and there 
was no reason to suspect their intentions ; but 
he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared 
against emergencies." 

It now appears from the news I have received to-day — 
which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure 
how far it has reached me in an accurate form — that an 
ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany,"' the '''[B. 153; 
object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with G. 20.] 
Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage 
of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one 
has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, 
I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in 
a position to give the House full, complete and absolute 
information upon the point. We were sounded'*' in the i*'[B. 85.] 
course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given 
that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that 
would content us. We replied"" that we could not bargain i»|[B.ioi.] 
away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian 

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that 
the following telegram'" had been received from the King f«i[B. 133; 
of the Belgians by our King — King George : — G, 25.] 

" Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's 
friendship and that of your predecessors, and the 
friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the 
proof of friendship she has just given us again, I 
make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic inter- 
vention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard 
the integrity of Belgium." 



Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our 
part. What can diplomatic intervention do now ? We 
have great and vital interests in the independence — and 
integrity is the least part — of Belgium. If Belgium is com- 
pelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of 
course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she 
admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could 
only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region 
of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they 
should be left alone and independent. The one thing they 
fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that 
their independence should be interfered with. If in this 
war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those 
countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants 
violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, 
at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the 
independence will be gone. 

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to 
what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It 
will be found in " Hansard," volume 203, p. 1787. I have 
not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, 
but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could 
make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone 
said : — 

" We have an interest in the independence of Belgium 
which is wider than that which we may have 
in the literal operation of the guarantee. It 
is found in the answer to the question whether, 
under the circumstances of the case, this country, 
endowed as it is with influence and power, would 
quietly stand by and witness the perpetration 
of the direst crime that ever stained the pages 
of history, and thus become participators in the 

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything 

1^' [See B. in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium,"' asking her to 

153 i text, compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have 

G. 20.] been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if 

that holds. If her independence goes, the independence 

of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of 



view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. 
If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten 
to her knees, loses her position as a great Power, becomes 
subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself 
— consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am 
sure that France has the power to defend herself with all 
the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown 
so often — stUl, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell 
under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, 
and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words 
come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common 
interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any 
Power ? 

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, 
husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the 
course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect 
to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point 
of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those 
obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian 
treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might 
have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of 
the respect that we should have lost. And I do not believe, 
whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is 
going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior 
strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe 
able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to 
protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer 
but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside. 

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, 
whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign 
trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, 
but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental 
nations engaged in war— all their populations, all their 
energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle — 
they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carry- 
ing on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war 
or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that 
at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained 
aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to 
use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the 
course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe 



opposite to us — if that had been the result of the war — 
falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am 
quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have 
lost us all -respect. I can only say that I have put the ques- 
tion of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not 
yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as 
they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there 
is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent 
the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are 

<''[c/. Y. undisputed.'" 

126.] I have read to the House the only engagements that we 

have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. 
I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no 
engagement yet with regard to sending an expeditionary 
armed force out of the country. Mobilisation of the fleet 

'^' [cf. B. has taken place ; '" mobilisation of the army is taking place ;* 
47. 48 ; Y. ]3^^ ^g have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that . 
^vol ¥^ — ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ °^ ^ European conflagration such as this, un- 
p. 427).]' precedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and 
other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupa- 
tion, with all the unknown factors — we must take very 
carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending 
an expeditionary force out of the country until we know 
how we stand. One thing I would say. 

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation 
is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland— and I 
would like this to be clearly understood abroad — does not 
make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we 
have now to take into account. I have told the House how 
far we have at present gone in commitments and the condi- 
tions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House 
and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the 
neutrality of Belgium. 

What other policy is there before the House ? There is 
but one way in which the Government could make certain 
at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that 
would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation 
of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have 
made the commitment to France that I have read to the 

* [Mobilisation Orders were issued by the British Admiralty on Sunday, 
August 2nd ; the Army Reservists were called up on Tuesday, August 4th.] 


House which prevents us doing that. We have got the 
consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any 
unconditional neutrality, and, without these conditions abso- 
lutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink 
from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. 
If we did take that line by saying, " We will have nothing 
whatever to do with this matter " under no conditions — the 
Belgian treaty obligations, the possible position in the Medi- 
terranean, with damage to British interests, and what may 
happen to France from our failure to support France — if we 
were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as 
nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I be- 
lieve, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation 
before the world, and should not escape the most serious and 
grave economic consequences. 

My object has been to explain the view of the Government, 
and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I 
do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after 
the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the 
House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, 
and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use 
all the strength we have at any moment — we know not how 
soon — to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, 
if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have an- 
nounced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final 
decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we 
know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced 
upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, 
we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right 
hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt 
whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces 
were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never 
was there a. time when confidence was more justified in the 
power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect 
our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering 
and misery entaUed, from which no country in Europe will 
escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will 
save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy 
ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount 
of harm that must be done by the economic condition that 
is caused on the Continent. 



The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Govern- 
ment in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to 
do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons. 
We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, 
and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared 
to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably 
it may develop, we wUl face it. We worked for peace up to 
the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, 
how persistently and how earnestly we strove for peace last 
week the House will see from the papers that will be before it. 

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. 
We are now face to face with a situation and all the conse- 
quences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we 
shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding 
to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures 
may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action 
taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the 
situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realise 
the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between 
Austria and Serbia, and not the complications of this matter 
which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and 
Serbia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do 
not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany 
is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a 
'" [c/.Y. 159 good deal has been happening on the French frontier. "' We 
(vol. I., do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris, 
p. 425).] -pj^g situation has developed so rapidly that technically, 
as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to 
describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring 
out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, 
and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now 
put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not 
improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our 
stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country 
realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magni- 
tude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which 
I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall be 
supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, 
but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and 
the endurance of the whole country. 



Mr. Bonar Law's Comments. 

Mr. Bonar Law. — ^The right hon. Gentleman (Sir E. Grey) 
has made an appeal for support, and it is necessary I should 
say a word or two. They shall be very few. I wish to say, 
in the first place, that I do not believe there is a single Member 
of this House who doubts that, not only the right hon. Gentle- 
man himself, but the Government which he represents, have 
done everything in their power up to the last moment to 
preserve peace, and I think we may be sure that, if any other 
course is taken, it is because it is forced upon them, and that 
they have absolutely no alternative. One thing only, further, 
I would like to say. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the 
bright spot in the picture*" which only a day or two ago was "'[.Seg 
a black spot on the poUtical horizon. Everything he has said P- 414] 
I am sure is true. I should like to say, further, that if the 
contingencies, which he has not put into words, but which 
are all in our minds as possible, arise, then we have already 
had indications that there is another bright spot, and that 
every one of His Majesty's Dominions beyond the Seas will be 
behind us in whatever action it is necessary to take. This 
only I shall add ; The Government already know, but I 
give them now the assurance on behalf of the party of which 
I am Leader in this House, that in whatever steps they think 
it necessary to take for the honour and security of this country, 
they can rely on the unhesitating support of the Opposition. 


Germany and Belgium. 

I want to give the House some information which I have 
received, and which was not in my possession when I made 
my statement this afternoon. It is information I have re- 
ceived from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to the 
following effect : — 

" Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note 
proposing to Belgium friendly neutrality, covering 

II— 2 D 417 



153 ; 





; G. 




free passage on Belgian territory, and promising 
maintenance of independence of the kingdom 
and possessions at the conclusion of peace, and 
threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium 
as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours"' 
was fixed for the reply. The Belgians have 
answered that an attack on their neutrality would 
be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, 
and that to accept the German proposal would 
be to sacrifice the honour of a nation. Conscious 
of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel 
aggression by all possible means." 

Of course, I can only say that the Government are pre- 
pared to take into grave consideration the information which 
it has received. I make no further comment upon it. 


Mr. Bonar Law. — I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether 
he has any statement that he can now make to the House ? 

V'* The Prime Minister {Mr. Asquiih). — In conformity with 
the statement of policy made here by my right hon. friend 
the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a telegram was early this 
[B. 153.] morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin."' It 
was to this effect : — 

" The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His 
Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on 
behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's Government 
are also informed that the German Government 
has delivered to the Belgian Government a note 
proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage 
through Belgian territory, and promising to main- 
tain the independence and integrity of the kingdom 
and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, 
threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium 
as an .enemy. An answer was requested within 
twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium 
has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation 


of the law of nations. His Majesty's Govern- 
ment are bound to protest against this violation 
of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common 
with themselves, and must request an assurance 
that the demand made upon Belgium may not 
be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will 
be respected by Germany. You should ask for 
an immediate reply." 

We received this morning from our Minister at Brussels 
the following telegram"' : — w[B. 154; 

"German Minister has this morning addressed note ^- ^7-1 
to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating 
that, as Belgian Government have declined the 
well-intended proposals submitted to them by 
the Imperial Government, the latter wUl, deeply 
to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if 
necessary by force of arms, the measures con- 
sidered indispensable in view of the French 

Simultaneously — almost immediately afterwards — ^we re- 
ceived from the Belgian Legation here in London the following 
telegram ''' :— '''^- J59 

" General staff announces that territory has been 
violated at Gemmenich (near Aix-la-ChapeUe)." 

Subsequent information tended to show that the German 
force has penetrated still further into Belgian territory.'" '^'t^- ^57-1 
We also received this morning from the German Ambassador 
here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign Secre- 
tary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is 
in these terms : — 

" Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the 
part of the British Government with regard to 
our intentions by repeating most positively formal 
assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict 
with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence 
whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of 
this declaration is borne out by fact that we 
solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to 



respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we 
could not profitably annex Belgic territory without 
making at the same time territorial acquisitions 
at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir 
E. Grey that German army could not be exposed 
to French attack across Belgium, which was 
planned according to absolutely unimpeachable 
information. Germany had consequently to dis- 
regard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a 
question of life or death to prevent French ad- 

I have to add this on behalf of His Majesty's Government : 
We cannot regard this as in any sense a satisfactory com- 
'^'p3. I59-] munication. We have, in reply'" to it, repeated the request 
'"'[B. 114.] we made last week "" to the German Government, that they 
should give us the same assurance in regard to Belgian neu- 
trality as was given to us and to Belgium by France last week. 
We have asked that a reply to that request and a satisfactory 
answer to the telegram of this morning — which I have read 
to the House — should be given before midnight. 


Mr. Bonar Law. — May I ask the Prime Minister if he has 
any information he can give us to-day ? 

The Prime Minister {Mr. Asquith). — Our Ambassador at 
Berlin received his passports at 7 o'clock last evening, and 
since 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed between 
'" [B. 160 Germany and ourselves. '^' 

i7°;^^ -i' We have received from our Minister at Brussels the 
following telegram : — 

" I have just received from Minister for Foreign 
Affairs " 

— that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs — 

" a note'*' of which the following is a literal 
translation : — 

" ' Belgian Government regret to have to inform His 
Majesty's Government that this morning armed 


p. 211).] 









forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian terri- 
tory in violation of engagements assumed by 

" ' Belgian Government are further '" resolved to resist ''' For 

by all means in their power. "further" 

" ' Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and yfgrmlv" 

Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, in defence Ngy^g. 

of her territory. ment) ; see 

" ' There would be"" concerted and common action G. 40.] 
with the object of resisting the forcible measures 

employed by Germany against Belgium, and at '"[Trans- 

the same time of guarding the maintenance for Ifg^Q^j^j 

future of the independence and integrity of j^g .. ^ii y 

Belgium. amait) in 

" ' Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she G. 40.] 
will assume defence of her fortified places.' " 

We have also received to-day from the French Ambassa- 
dor here the following telegram received by the French 
Government from the French Minister at Brussels : — 

" The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of 
War has asked the French military attache to 
prepare at once for the co-operation and contact 
of French troops with the Belgian army pending 
the results of the appeal to the guaranteeing 
Powers now being made. Orders have therefore 
been given to Belgian provincial Governors not 
to regard movements of French troops as a 
violation of the frontier." 

This is all the information I am at the moment able to 
give to the House, but I take the opportunity of giving 
notice that to-morrow, in Committee of Supply, I shall move 
a vote of credit of ioo,ooo,oooZ. 


Motion made, and Question proposed, " That a sum, not 
exceeding £100,000,000 be granted to His Majesty, beyond 
the ordinary grants of Parliament, towards defrajdng ex- 
penses that may be incurred during the year ending March 



31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the 
security of the country, for the conduct of Naval and Military 
operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the 
continuance of trade, industry, and business communications, 
whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, 
or otherwise for the relief of distress, and generally for all 
expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war." 

The Prime Minister {Mr. Asquith). — In asking the House 
to agree to the resolution which Mr. Speaker has just read 
from the Chair, I do not propose, because I do not think it 
is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again which 
was covered by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary 
''' [Aug. 3 ; two or three nights ago. '" He stated — and I do not think 
see speech, any of the statements he made are capable of answer and 
p. 400.] certainly have not yet been answered — the grounds upon 
which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, 
His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put this 
country in a state of war with what, for many years and 
indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power. But, 
''''[B Sir, the papers"" which have since been presented to Parlia- 

1-159.] ment, and which are now in the hands of hon. Members, 
will, I think, show how strenuous, how unremitting, how 
persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to 
have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. friend 
to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace. 
Everyone knows, in the great crisis which occurred last year 
in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the 
acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps takenjby 
my right hon. friend that the area of the conflict was limited, 
and that, so far as the great Powers are concerned, peace 
was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, 
unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House 
and the country, and I will add posterity and history, will 
accord to him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be 
paid to any statesman : that, never derogating for an instant 
or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, 
he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and 
preserve the greatest interest of all countries — universal peace. 
These papers which are now in the hands of hon. Members 
show something more than that. They show what were the 


terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. 

I trust that not only the Members of this House, but all our 

feUow-subjects everywhere, will read the communications, 

will read, learn and mark the communications'" which <''|B, 85, 

passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London lo^-] 

in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy 

our neutrality are contained in the communication made 

by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 

29th July, No. 85 of the published Paper."' I think I must <« [6,85.] 

refer to them for a moment. After referring to the state of 

things as between Austria and Russia, Sir Edward Goschen 

goes on : — 

" He then proceeded to make the following strong bid 
for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, 
so far as he was able to judge the main principle 
which governed British policy, that Great Britain 
would never stand by and allow France to be 
crushed in any conflict there might be. That, 
however, was not the object at which Germany 
aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain 
were certain, every assurance would be given to 
the British Government that the Imperial Govern- 
ment " 

Let the House observe these words — 

" aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense 
of France should they prove victorious in any 
war that might ensue." 

Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent 
question : — 

" I questioned His Excellency about the French 
colonies " 

What are the French colonies ? They mean every part of 
the dominions and possessions of France outside the geo- 
graphical area of Europe — 

" and he said that he was unable to give a similar 
undertaking in that respect." 



Let me come to what, in my mind, personally, has always 
"been the crucial, and almost the governing consideration, 
namely the position of the small States : — 

" As regards Holland, however. His Excellency said 
that so long as Germany's adversaries respected 
the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, 
Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Govern- 
ment an assurance that she would do likewise." 

Then we come to Belgium : — 

" It depended upon the action of France what oper- 
ations Germany might be forced to enter upon in 
Belgium, but, when the war was over, Belgian 
neutrality would be respected if she had not sided 
against Germany." 

Let the House observe the distinction between those two 
cases. In regard to Holland it was not only independence 
and integrity but also neutrality ; but in regard to Belgium, 
there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an 
assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity 
of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency 
added : — 

" Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his 
policy had been to bring about an understanding 
with England. He trusted that these assur- 
ances " 

the assurances I have read out to the House — 

" might form the basis of that understanding 
which he so much desired." 

What does that amount to ? Let me just ask the House. 
I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly 
not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, 
but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the 
British Government in this matter. What did that proposal 
amount to ? In the first place, it meant this : That behind 
the back of France — they were not made a party to these 
communications — we should have given, if we had assented 
to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of 
a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions 


and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards 
Belgium ? When she addressed, as she has addressed in 
these last few days, her moving appeal to us'" to fulfil our 'i'[pp.43o- 
solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we 421-] 

have given ? What reply should we have given to that 
Belgian appeal ? We should have been obliged to say that, 
without her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power 
threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. 
The House has read, and the country has read, of course, 
in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal'" addressed ""[5ee 
by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can P- -*" : 
read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are G^as!] 
fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the 
position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle, 
if we had assented to this infamous proposal ? Yes, and what 
are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the 
dishonour of our obligations ? What are we to get in return ? 
A promise — ^nothing more ; a promise as to what Germany 
would do in certain eventualities ; a promise, be it observed 
— I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record 
— ^given by a Power which was at that very moment announc- 
ing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to 
do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, 
we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with 
dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of 
this country, of which we are trustees. I am glad, and I 
think the country wiU be glad, to turn to the reply which 
my right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the 
House two of the more salient passages. This document. 
No. loi of my Paper,'" puts on record a week ago the attitude '^'P- ^oi.] 
of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British 
people. My right hon. friend says : — 

" His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment 
entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they 
should bind themselves to neutrality on such 
terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to 
stand by while French Colonies are taken if France 
is beaten, so long as Germany does not take 
French territory as distinct from the Colonies. 

From the material point of view " 



My right hon. friend, as he always does, used very temperate 
language : — 

" such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, 
without further territory in Europe being taken 
from her, could be so crushed as to lose her posi- 
tion as a Great Power, and become subordinate 
to German policy." 

That is the material aspect. But he proceeded : — 

" Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace 
for us to make this bargain with Germany at 
the expense of France, a disgrace from which the 
good name of this country would never recover. 
The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain 
away whatever obligation or interest we have 
as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could 
not entertain that bargain either." 

He then says : — 

" We must preserve our full freedom to act as circum- 
stances may seem to us to require." 

And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will 
appreciate : — 

" You should . . . add most earnestly that the one 
way of maintaining the good relations between 
England and Germany is that they should continue 
to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. 
. . . For that object this Government will work 
in that way with all sincerity and good will. 

If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the 
present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour 
will be to promote some arrangement to which 
Germany could be a party, by which she could 
be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy 
would be pursued against her or her allies by 
France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separ- 
ately. I have desired this and worked for it " 

The statement was never more true — 

" as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, 
and, Germany having a corresponding object, our 



relations sensibly improved. The idea has hither- 
to been too Utopian to form the subject of definite 
proposals, but if this present crisis, so much 
more acute than any that Europe has gone 
through for generations, be safely passed, I am 
hopeful that the relief and reaction which will 
follow may make possible some more definite 
rapprochement between the Powers than has been 
possible hitherto." 

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate 
and convincing language the attitude of this Government. 
Can anyone who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious 
sincerity and earnestness which underlies it ; can anyone 
honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite 
of great provocation — and I regard the proposals made to 
us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without 
consideration and almost without answer — can anyone doubt 
that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman, 
who had already earned the title — and no one ever more 
deserved it — of Peace Maker of Europe, persisted to the 
very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but 
unhappily frustrated purpose ? I am entitled to say, and 
I do so on behalf of this country — I speak not for a party, 
I speak for the country as a whole — that we made every 
effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But 
this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting 
for ? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the 
Government, the terrible incalculable suffering, economic, 
social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war 
between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There 
is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying 
days — more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen 
for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not 
a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that 
time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled 
suffering which war, even in a just cause, must bring about, 
not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in 
this country and in the other countries of the world, but ta 
posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. 
Every step we took we took with that vision before our eyes,^ 



and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to 
describe. Unhappily, if — in spite of all our efforts to keep 
the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness 
of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war — ^we 
have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the 
interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well 
assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the 
country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just 

If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two 
sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international 
obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into 
between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, 
would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law 
but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly 
have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate 
the principle which, in these days when force, material force, 
sometimes seems to be the dominant influence' and factor 
in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate 
the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, 
in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will 
of a strong and over-mastering Power. I do not believe any 
nation ever entered into a great controversy — and this is 
one of the greatest history will ever know — with a clearer 
conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting not 
for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own 
selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles, 
the maintenance of which is vital to the civUisation of the 
world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and 
justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge 
this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us 
now make sure that all the resources, not only of this United 
Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the centre, 
shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object 
may be adequately secured that I am now about to ask this 
Committee — to make the very unusual demand upon it — 
to give the Government a Vote of Credit of £100,000,000. 
I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not wish it, 
into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and 
Supplementary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements 
which arise in that connection. There is a much higher 



point of view than that. If it were necessary, I could justify,, 
upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose ,ta 
adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would 
be foreign to the temper and disposition of the Committee. 
There is one thing to which I do call attention, that is, the 
Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the past, Vote& 
of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military 
operations, but we have thought it right to ask the Com- 
mittee to give us its confidence in the extension of the 
traditional area of Votes of Credit so that this money, which 
we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be applied 
not only for strictly naval and military operations, but ta 
assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of trade, 
industry, business, and communications — whether by means 
of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise — for the 
relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out 
of the existence of a state of war. I believe the Committee 
will agree with us that it was wise to extend the area of the 
Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. 
It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury 
will account for it, and any expenditure that takes place will 
be subject to the approval of the House. I think it would 
be a great pity — in fact, a great disaster — if, in a crisis of this, 
magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision — ^provision 
far more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions 
that prevailed in the old days — for all the various ramifica- 
tions and developments of expenditure which the existence 
of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must 
entail on any one of them. 

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State 
for War — a position which I held until this morning* — for a 
Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps 
the Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on 
that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of 
Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I 
need not go back but which are fresh in the minds of every- 
one, in the hope and with the object that the condition of 
things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily 
be brought to an end and complete confidence re-established. 
I believe that is the case ; in fact, I know it to be. There is. 
* [Lord Kitchener was Mr. Asquith's successor at the War Office.] 



no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spirit 
and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished 
than in the British Army. Glad as I should have been to 
continue the work of that office, and I would have done so 
under normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army, 
it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should 
divide his attention between that Department and another, 
still less that the First Minister of the Crown, who has to 
look into the affairs of all departments and who is ultimately 
responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should give, 
as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs 
of our Army in a great war. I am very glad to say that a 
very distinguished soldier and administrator, in the person 
of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism 
that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped 
into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not 
a politician. His association with the Government as a 
Member of the Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken 
as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. 
He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great 
public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the 
discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever 
fallen upon a Minister, the complete confidence of all parties 
and all opinions. 

I am asking, on his behalf for the Army, power to increase 
the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number 
already voted, by no less than 500,000. I am certain the 
Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged 
to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and 
the necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India 
is prepared to send us certainly two Divisions, and that 
every one of our self-governing Dominions, spontaneously 
and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of 
their possibilities, both in men and in money, every help 
they can afford to the Empire in a moment of need. Sir, the 
Mother Country must set the example, while she responds 
with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from 
the outlying members of her family. 

Sir, I will say no more. This is not an occasion for con- 
troversial discussion. In all that I have said, I believe I 
have not gone, either in the statement of our case or in the 



general description of the provision we think it necessary to 
make, beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not my 
purpose — ^it is not the purpose of any patriotic man — ^to 
inflame feehng, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite international 
animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We 
have a great duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, 
and confidently we believe that Parliament and the country 
will enable us to do it. 

Mr. Bonar Law's Comments. 

Mr. Bonar Law. — ^No Minister has ever fulfilled a duty 
more responsible or in regard to which the responsibility 
was more acutely felt than that which has just been fulfilled 
by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Asquith). This is not a 
time for speech making, and I should have been quite ready 
to leave the statement which he has given to the Committee 
as the expression of the view, not of a party but of a nation. 
But as this, I think, will be the only opportunity which will 
be given for expressing the views of a large section of this 
Committee, I feel that I am bound to make clear to the 
Committee and to the country what is the attitude of His 
Majesty's Opposition on this question. There are two 
things which I desire to impress upon the Committee. The 
first is that we have dreaded war and have longed for peace 
as strongly as any Member of this Committee ; and the second 
is that in our belief we are in a state of war against our wiU, 
and that we, as a nation, have done everything in our power 
to prevent such a condition of things arising. When this 
crisis first arose I confess I was one of those who had the hope 
that even then, though a European conflagration took place, 
we might be able to stay out of it. I held that hope strongly, 
but in a short time I became convinced of this, that into this 
war we should inevitably be drawn, and that it really was a 
question, and a question only, whether we should enter it 
honourably or be dragged into it with dishonour. I remember 
that on the first occasion after the retirement of my right hon. 
Friend,* when I had to speak on foreign affairs, I made this 

• [Mr. A. J. Balfour resigned the leadership of the Unionist party on 
November 9, 1911, and Mr. Bonar Law was chosen to succeed him as 
Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, on November 14, 



statement, which perhaps is wrong, though I do not think so 
even yet. I said that if ever war arose between Great Britain 
and Germany it would not be due to inevitable causes, for I 
did not believe in inevitable war. I said it would be due to 
human folly. It is due to human folly, and to human wicked- 
ness, but neither the folly nor the wickedness is here. What 
other course was open to us ? It is quite true, as the Foreign 
<''rAuff. Secretary explained to the House the other day,"' that we 
3rd, see were under no formal obligation to take part in such a 
pp. 400 struggle, but every Member in this House knows that the 
et sfi?.] Entente meant this in the minds of this Government and of 
every other Government, that if any of the three Powers 
were attacked aggressively the others would be expected to 
step in to give their aid. The question, therefore, to my 
mind was this : Was this war in any way provoked by those 
who will now be our allies ? No one who has read the White 
Paper can hesitate to answer that question. I am not going 
to go into it even as fully as the Prime Minister has done, but 
I would remind the House of this, that in this White Paper is 
contained the statement made by the German Ambassador, 
I think, at Vienna, that Russia was not in a condition and 
<='[B. 32.] could not go to war, and in the same letter"" are found these 
words : 

" As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about 
in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter." 

Every one for years has known that the key to peace or 
war lay in Berlin. Every one knew it, and at this crisis there 
is no one who can doubt that BerUn, if it had chosen, could 
have prevented this terrible conflict. I am afraid that the 
miscalculation which was made about Brussels was made 
also about us. The despatch which the right hon. Gentle- 
<='[B. 85.] man referred to'^' is a despatch of a nature that I, at least, 
believe would not have been addressed to Great Britain if it 
had been believed that our hands were free, and that we held 
the position which we had always held before. That, at least, 
is my belief. Now what does this mean ? We are fighting, 
as the Prime Minister said, for the honour, and with the honour 
is bound up always the interest, of our country. But we are 
fighting also for the whole basis of the civilisation for which 
we stand, and for which Europe stands. I do not wish, any 



more than the Prime Minister, to inflame passion, and I only 
ask the House to consider this one aspect. 

Look at the way Belgium is being treated to-day. There 
is a report — ^if it is not true now, it may be true to-morrow — 
that the city of Liege is attacked by German troops, and that 
civilians, as in the days of the middle ages, are fighting for 
their hearths and homes against trained troops. How has 
that been brought about ? In a state of war, war must be 
waged, but remember that this plan is not of to-day or of 
yesterday. It has been long matured. The Germans knew 
^ that they would have others to face, and they were ready to 
take the course which they took the other day of sajdng to 
Belgium,'^' "Destroy your independence and allow our '"[G. 20.] 
troops to go through, or we will come down upon you with 
a might which it is impossible for you to resist." If we had 
allowed that to be done, our position as one of the great nations 
of the world, and our honour as one of the nations of the 
world, would, in my opinion, have been gone. This is no 
small struggle. It is the greatest, perhaps, that this country 
has ever been engaged in, and the issue is uncertain. It is 
Napoleonism once again. Thank heaven, so far as we know, 
there is no Napoleon. 

I am not goings to say anything more about the causes of 
the war, for I do not desire to encourage controversy on this 
subject. But, if I may be allowed to say so, I should like 
to say this, that I read yesterday with'real pleasure an article 
in a paper which does not generally commend itself to me, the 
Manchester Guardian. In that article it still held that the 
war ought not to have been entered into, but it took this view, 
that that was a question for history, and that now we were 
in it, there was only one question for us, and that was to bring 
it to a successful issue. I have felt S5niipathy, far more than 
at any other time, for the Prime Minister and for the Foreign 
Secretary. I can imagine nothing more terrible than that the 
Foreign Secretary should have a feehng that perhaps he has 
brought this country into an unnecessary war. No feeling 
can be worse. I can say this, and whether we are right or 
wrong, the whole House agrees with it I am sure, that that 
is a burden which the right hon. Gentleman can carry with a 
good conscience, and that every one of us can put up unhesitat- 
ingly this prayer, may God defend the right. 

II-2 E 433 


I should like, if I may, to go to another topic — this is the 
only opportunity I shall have, and I think it is worth saying — 
and to ask the House to consider the conditions under which 
this war is going to be carried on. I was pleased to hear the 
Prime Minister say the other day in answer to a speech by the 
hon. Member (Mr. Arthur Henderson), and he has developed 
it in describing the terms of this Vote of Credit, that he 
realised, as we all must realise, that in a country situated like 
ours the development of industry and the supply of food at 
home is just as much an operation of war as is the conduct of 
our armed forces. I do not wish to minimise our difficulties, 
but I am quite sure, as sure as I can be of anything, that there 
is no danger of a scarcity of food, and that the only danger 
is the fear of scarcity of food. Everyone who has been in 
business knows that what causes panic prices is not actual 
scarcity at the time, but the fear of scarcity coming, and this 
is a case where every one of us must do what he can to impress 
upon the^people of this country that there is, as I beheve, no 
danger. Here I should like, if I may, to give one warning 
note. Remember, at least I believe it, this war, unexpected 
by us, is not unexpected by our enemy. I shall be greatly 
surprised if we do not find that at first on our trade routes 
there is a destruction of our property which might raise a 
panic. That is inevitable, I think, at the outset. Let us 
be prepared for it, and let us realise that it has no bearing 
whatever on the ultimate course of the war. There is some- 
thing else which I think, if I am right, it is important to say. 
We had a discussion yesterday about credit. That is the 
basis of successful war, as it is of every branch of industry 
at this moment. I think the Government have taken the 
right course. I have followed it closely, and I know that 
they have been supported by those who best understand 
the situation. I think the danger is minimised as much 
as it can be. But, after all, the question of credit really 
depends on what we believe is going to be the effect of 
this war upon our trade and our industry. I hope the 
House will not think I am too optimistic, but I do think 
there is a danger of our taking too gloomy a view of 
what the effects may be, and by taking that gloomy view, 
helping to bring about the very state of affairs that we wish 
to avoid. 



Again, I wish to guard myself against seeming to be too 
hopeful. But let us look at the facts as if we were examining 
a chess problem. If we keep the command of the sea, what 
is going to happen ? It aU depends on that. I admit that 
if that goes the position is gloomy indeed, but of that I have 
no fear. If we keep the command of the sea, what is going 
to happen ? Five-sixths of our production is employed in 
the Home trade. What goes abroad is very important, for, 
of course, if the population which suppUed the sixth were 
thrown out of work, that would react upon the Home trade. 
But, after all, the total amount of our exports to all the 
European countries which are now at war is only a small 
part of our total exports. There is here no question of fiscal 
policy. We are far beyond that. It is a fact. Our total 
exports to all the countries which are now at war do not, in 
my belief — I have not looked into the figures — exceed our 
exports to India and Australia taken alone. 

We shall have free trade, if the sea routes are maintained, 
with the Colonies and with the whole of the American Contin- 
ent, and, unfortunately for them, both our allies and our 
enemies will not be competing with us in those markets. Look 
at it as a problem, and I think we have a right to beheve, 
not that trade will be good, but that it will be much more 
nearly normal than is generally believed. I hope the House 
will not think that a useless thing to say. There is one thing 
more which I would desire to say. This is the affair of the 
nation. Everyone would desire to help. There is a great 
deal of work to be done which cannot be done by the Govern- 
ment. I was glad that the right hon. Gentleman the Prime 
Minister has already asked the co-operation of my right hon. 
Friend the Member for West Birmingham"* and my right 'o [Mr. 
hon. Friend the Member for the Strand."" They gave it Austen 
gladly. But I am sure that I speak not only for this bench. Chamber- 
but for the whole of our party, when I say that the Govern- ^^"-^ 
ment has only got to requisition any one of us and we will '"'P^r. 
serve it and our country to the best of our abihty. Walter 



German Proposals for Neutrality. 

August 27, 1914. 

Mr. Keir Hardie asked the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs whether the suggestions for a peace settlement made 
by the German Ambassador (White Paper, p. 66, item No. 
'1' [».«., 123),'" together with his invitation to the Foreign Secretary 
B. 123.] to put forward proposals of his own which would be acceptable 
as a basis for neutrality, were submitted to and considered 
by the Cabinet ; and, if not, why proposals involving such 
far-reaching possibilities were thus rejected ? 

Sir E. Grey. — ^These were personal suggestions made 
by the Ambassador on August ist, and without authority, 
to alter the conditions of neutrality proposed to us by the 
'^'[B. 85.] German Chancellor in No. 85"' in the White Paper (Miscellan- 
eous No. 6, 1914). 

The Cabinet did, however, consider most carefully the next 
morning — ^that is Sunday, August 2nd — ^the conditions on 
which we could remain neutral, and came to the conclusion 
that respect for the neutrahty of Belgium must be one of these 
conditions. The German Chancellor had already been told 
(s)rg jQj ] on July 30th that we could not bargain that away.'" 

On Monday, August 3rd, I made a statement in the House 
(4) |-5gg accordingly. '^' I had seen the German Ambassador again at 
p. 400.] his own request on Monday, and he urged me most strongly, 
though he said he did not know the plans of the German 
military authorities, not to make the neutrality of Belgium 
one of our conditions when I spoke in the House. It was a 
day of great pressure, for we had another Cabinet in the 
morning, and I had no time to record the conversation, and it 
does not therefore appear in the White Paper, but it was 
impossible to withdraw that condition without becoming a 
consenting party to the violation of the Treaty, and sub- 
sequently to a German attack on Belgium. 

After I spoke in the House we made to the German Govern- 
<^'[B. i53.]ment the communication described in- No. 153''' in the 
White Paper about the neutrality of Belgium. 


Sir Edward Goschen's report of the reply to that com- 
munication had not been received when the White Paper was 
printed and laid. It will be laid before Parliament to complete 
the White Paper. '"' '"_[B. 160 

I have been asked why I did not refer to No. 123"" in the ^ ^^^r^\ 
White Paper when I spoke in the House on August 3rd. If ^°^^i^? ^ 
I had referred to suggestions to us as to conditions of neutrality, ^^^ ^ 
I must have referred to No. 85/^' the proposals made not ^ ' '^^^'J 
personally by the Ambassador but officially by the German ^^- ^5-J 
Chancellor, which were so condemned by the Prime Minister 
subsequently, and this would have made the case against 
the German Government much stronger than I did make it 
in my speech. I deliberately refrained from doing that then. 

Let me add this about personal suggestions made by the 
German Ambassador, as distinct from communications made 
on behalf of his Government : He worked for peace ;' but 
real authority at Berlin did not rest with him and others 
like him, and that is one reason why our efforts for peace 

Mr. Keir Hardie. — May I ask whether any attempt was 
made to open up negotiations with the German Government 
on the basis of the suggestions here set forth by the German 
Ambassador ? 

Sir E. Grey. — ^The German Ambassador did not make 
any basis of suggestions ; it was the German Chancellor who 
made the basis of suggestions. The German Ambassador, 
speaking on his own personal initiative and without authority, 
asked whether we would formulate conditions on which we 
would be neutral. We did go into that question, and the 
conditions were stated to the House and made known to the 
German Ambassador. 

Mr. Keir Hardie. — May I ask whether the German author- 
ities at BerUn repudiated these suggestions of their Ambassa- 
dor in London, and whether any effort at all was made to 
find out how far the German Government would have agreed 
to the suggestions put forward by their own Ambassador ? 

Mr. T. M. Healy. — Before the right hon. Gentleman 
answers that question may I ask him if Socialists in the 
E.eichstag are asking any questions like this ? 




Sir E. Grey. — The German Ambassador — [Hon. 
Members : " Do not answer ! "] — I should Uke not to have any 
misunderstanding — did not make to us suggestions different 
from those which his Government made. The suggestions 
'''[B. 83.] that his Government made were those in No. 85"' in the 
White Paper. The German Ambassador never suggested to 
us that Germany would be able to agree to the condition of 
the neutrality of Belgium. On the contrary, he did suggest 
to me that we should not put that condition forward because 
he was afraid his Government would not be able to accept it. 

August 28, 1914. 

[cf. Ques- Lord Robert Cecil asked the Secretary of State for Foreign 

tions and Affairs whether his attention has been called to the pubUca- 

pp 436- ^^°^ "y ^^^ German Government of certain proposals which 

427.] are alleged to have been made to secure French and EngHsh 

[See pp. neutrality during the War ;'" and whether the pubUcation is 

358-62.] complete and accurate ? 

Sir E. Grey*. — I have seen an incomplete publication. 
The circumstances were as follows : It was reported to me 
one day that the German Ambassador had suggested that 
Germany might remain neutral in a war between Russia 
and Austria, and also engage not to attack France, if we 
would remain neutral and secure the neutrality of France. 
I said at once that if the German Government thought such 
an arrangement possible I was sure we could secure it. It 
appeared, however, that what the Ambassador meant was 
that we should secure the neutrality of France if Germany 
went to war with Russia. This was quite a different proposal, 
and, as I supposed it in all probability to be incompatible 
with the terms of the Franco-Russian AUiance, it was not in 
my power to promise to secure it. Subsequently, the Am- 
bassador sent for my private secretary, and told him that, 
as soon as the misunderstanding was cleared up, he had sent 
a second telegram to Berlin to cancel the impression produced 
by the first telegram he had sent on the subject. The first 
telegram has been published. This second telegram does not 
seem to have been published. 

* [The German reply to this statement by Sir E. Grey will be found on 
PP- 363-5 above.] 


February 11, 1915. 

Mr. Jowett asked whether the telegram relative to a 
guarantee by Great Britain of the neutrality of France, referred 
to in Appendix II. (6) of Miscellaneous, No. 15, 1914,'" was "'[».«., 
communicated to M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, before tfansla- 
August 3rd, to the French Government before August 4th, p°eu°ij 
and to the British Cabinet before August 3rd ? Yellow- 

Sir E. Grey. — I would refer the hon. Member to the reply book 
which I gave to the noble Lord the Member for Hitchin'^' tY.].] 
on August 28th last, from which it is clear that there was '"'[Lord 
a complete misunderstanding as to the nature of the -sug- Robert 
gestion made by the German Ambassador and that there was Cecil, s«e 
therefore nothing on the subject to communicate to the French ^' '^^ '■' 
Government or the Cabinet on the dates named. If the 
German proposal had been, as at first" supposed, that Germany 
would remain neutral if France remained neutral, I should, 
of course, have submitted it to the French Government. - 
But the German proposal was ascertained to be that France 
should remain neutral when Germany went to war with 
Russia. In other words, that France should be faithless to 
her alliance with Russia. I could not suggest that to the 
French and they would have rightly resented any suggestion 
of the kind.'" ^ '^'[^A 


p. 362.] 

SEPTEMBER 4, 1914.* 

My Lord Mayor and Citizens of London : 

IT is three and a half years since I last had the honour 
of addressing in this hall a gathering of the citizens. We 
were then meeting, under the presidency of one of your 
predecessors, men of all creeds and parties, to celebrate and 

* "A Call to Arms." Authorised Edition revised by Mr. Asquith. 
(London : Methuen & Co., with whose permission it is quoted.) 

[The German Chancellor replied to this speech in a statement to the 
Danish Press Bureau, for which see pp. 370-372.] 



approve the joint declaration of the two great English^ 
speaking States that for the future any differences between 
them should be settled, if not by agreement, at least by 
judicial inquiry and arbitration, and never in any circum- 
stances by war. Those of us who hailed that great eirenicon 
between the United States and ourselves as a landmark on 
the road of progress were not sanguine enough to think, or 
even to hope, that the era of war was drawing to a close. 
But still less were we prepared to anticipate the terrible 
spectacle which now confronts us — a contest, which for the 
number and importance of the Powers engaged, the scale of 
their armaments and armies, the width of the theatre of con- 
flict, the outpouring of blood and loss of life, the incalculable 
toll of suffering levied upon non-combatants, the material 
and moral loss accumulating day by day to the higher inter- 
ests of civilised mankind — a contest which in every one of 
these aspects is without precedent in the annals of the world. 
We were very confident three years ago in the rightness of 
our position when we welcomed the new securities for peace. 
We are equally confident in it to-day, when reluctantly, and 
against our will, but with clear judgment and a clean con- 
science, we find ourselves involved with the whole strength 
of this Empire in this bloody arbitration between might 
and right. The issue has passed out of the domain of argu- 
ment into another field. ' But let me ask you, and through 
you the world outside, what would have been our condition 
as a nation to-day, if through timidity, or through a perverted 
calculation of self-interest, or through a paralysis of the 
sense of honour and duty, we had been base enough to be 
false to our word, and faithless to our friends ? Our eyes 
would have been turned at this moment with those of the 
whole civilised world to Belgium, a small State which has 
lived for more than seventy years under a several and collective 
guarantee, to which we, in common with Prussia and Austria, 
were parties. We should have seen, at the instance and by 
the action of two of those guaranteeing Powers, her neutrality 
violated, her independence strangled, her territory made use 
of as affording the easiest and most convenient road to a 
war of unprovoked aggression against France. We, the 
British people, should at this moment have been standing 
by, with folded arms and with such countenance as we could 


command, while this small and unprotected State, in defence 
of her vital liberties, made a heroic stand against overweening 
and overwhelming force. We should have been admiring as 
detached spectators the siege of Liege, the steady and manful 
resistance of a small army, the occupation of Brussels with 
all its splendid traditions and memories, the gradual forcing 
back of the patriotic defenders of their fatherland to the 
ramparts of Antwerp, countless outrages suffered by them, 
buccaneering levies exacted from the unoffending civil popu- 
lation, and, finally, the greatest crime committed against 
civilisation and culture since the Thirty Years War, the 
sack of Louvain, with its buildings, its pictures, its unique 
library, its unrivalled associations, a shameless holocaust of 
irreparable treasures, lit up by blind barbarian vengeance. 
What account could we, the Government and the people 
of this country, have been able to render to the tribunal of 
our national conscience and sense of honour, if, in defiance 
of our plighted and solemn obligations, we had endured, 
and had not done our best to prevent, yes, to avenge, these 
intolerable wrongs ? For my part, I say that sooner than 
be a silent witness, which means in effect a willing accom- 
plice, to this tragic triumph of force over law, and of brutality 
over freedom, I would see this country of ours blotted out of 
the pages of history. 

That is only a phase, a lurid and illuminating phase, in 
the contest into which we have been called by the mandate 
of duty and of honour to bear our part. The cjmical viola- 
tion of the neutrahty of Belgium was not the whole, but a 
step, a first step, in a deliberate pohcy of which, if not the 
immediate, the ultimate and not far distant aim was to crush 
the independence and the autonomy of the Free States of 
Europe. First Belgium, then Holland and Switzerland, 
countries, like our own, imbued and sustained with the spirit 
of liberty, were, one after another, to be bent to the yoke. 
And these ambitions were fed and fostered by a body of 
new doctrine, a new philosophy, preached by professors and 
learned men. The free and full self-development which to 
these small States, to ourselves, to our great and growing 
Dominions over the seas, to our kinsmen across the Atlantic, is 
the well-spring and life-breath of national existence, that free 
self-development is the one capital offence in the code of 



those who have made force their supreme divinity, and upon 
its altars they are prepared to sacrifice, both the gathered 
fruits and the potential germs of the unfettered human 
spirit. I use this language advisedly. 

This is not merely a material, it is also a spiritual conflict. 
Upon its issue everything that contains the promise of hope, 
that leads to emancipation and a fuller Uberty for the millions 
who make up the mass of mankind, will be found sooner or 
later to depend. 

Let me now turn for a moment to the actual situation in 
Europe. How do we stand ? For the last ten years by what 
I believe to be happy and well-considered diplomatic arrange- 
ments we have established friendly and increasingly intimate 
relations with the two Powers, France and Russia, with whom 
in days gone by we have had in various parts of the world 
occasion for constant friction, and now and again for possible 
conflict. These new and better relations, based in the first 
instance upon business principles of give and take, matured 
into a settled temper of confidence and goodwill. They were 
never in any sense or at any time, as I have frequently stated 
in this hall, directed against other Powers. 

No man in the history of the world has ever laboured 
more strenuously or more successfully than my right hon. 
friend Sir Edward Grey for that which is the supreme interest 
of the modem world — a general and abiding peace. It is, I 
venture to think, a very superficial criticism which suggests 
that under his guidance the policy of this country has ignored, 
still less that it has counteracted and hampered, the Concert 
of Europe. It is little more than a year ago when, imder 
the stress and strain of the Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors 
of the Great Powers met here day after day and week after 
week, curtailing the area of possible differences, reconciling 
warring ambitions and aims, and preserviag against almost 
incalculable odds the general harmony, and it was in the 
same spirit and with the same purpose when a few weeks 

<''[B. 4.] ago Austria delivered her ultimatum to Serbia'^' that the 
Foreign Secretary — ^for it was he — ^put forward the proposal 
for a mediating conference between the four Powers not 

""[B. 36.] directly concerned — Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves."" 
If that proposal had been accepted the actual controversy 
would have been settled with honour to everybody, and the 


whole of this terrible welter would have been avoided.* And 
with whom does the responsibility rest for its refusal and for 
all the illimitable sufferings which now confront the world ? 
One Power, and one Power only, and that Power is Germany. 
There is the foundation and origin of this world-wide catas- 
trophe. We persevered to the end, and no one who has not 
been confronted, as we were, with the responsibility — which 
unless you had been face to face with it you could not possibly 
measure, the responsibility of determining the issues of 
peace and war — ^no one who has not been in that position can 
realise the strength, energy, and persistence with which we 
laboured for peace. We persevered by every expedient that 
diplomacy could suggest — straining almost to the breaking 
point our most cherished friendships and obligations — even 
to the last moment making effort upon effort, and indulging 
hope against hope. Then, and only then, when we were 
at last compelled to realise that the choice lay between 
honour and dishonour, between treachery and good faith — 
when we at last reached the dividing line which makes or 
mars a nation worthy of the name, it was then only that we 
declared for war. 

Is there any one in this hall, or in this United Kingdom, 
or in the vast Empire of which we here stand in the capital 
and centre, who .blames us or repents our decision ? If not, 
as I believe there is not, we must steel ourselves to the task, 
and, in the spirit which animated our forefathers in their 
struggle against the dominion of Napoleon, we must, and we 
shall, persevere to the end. 

It would be a criminal mistake to underestimate either 
the magnitude, the fighting quality, or the staying power of 
the forces which are arrayed against us ; but it would be- 
equally foolish, and equally indefensible, to belittle our own 
resources whether for resistance or for attack. Belgium has 
shown us by memorable and glorious example what can be 
done by a relatively small State when its citizens are animated, 
and fired by the spirit of patriotism. 

In France and Russia we have as allies two of the greatest 
Powers in the world, engaged with us in a common cause, who- 
do not mean to separate themselves from us any more than 
we mean to separate ourselves from them. We have upon 
the seas the strongest and most magnificent Fleet the world 



has ever seen. The Expeditionary Force which left our 
shores less than a month ago has never been surpassed, as its 
glorious achievements in the field have already made clear, 
not only in material equipment, but in the physical and moral 
.quality of its constituent parts. 

As regards the Navy, I am sure my right honourable 
friend Mr. ChurchiU, whom we are glad to see here, will tell 
you there is happily little more to be done. I do not flatter 
it when I say that its superiority is equally marked in every 
department and sphere of its activity. We rely on it with the 
most absolute confidence, not only to guard our shores against 
the possibiUty of invasion, not only to seal up the gigantic 
battleships of the enemy in the inglorious seclusion of their 
own ports, whence from time to time he furtively steals forth 
to sow the sea with murderous snares, which are more full of 
menace to neutral ships than to the British Fleet. Our Navy 
does all this, and while it is thirsting, I do not doubt, for that 
trial of strength in a fair and open fight which has so far 
been prudently denied it, it does a great deal more. It 
has hunted the German Mercantile Marine from the high 
seas. It has kept open our own stores of food supply, and 
largely curtailed those of the enemy, and when the few 
German cruisers which still infest the more distant ocean 
routes have been disposed of — as they will be very soon — 
it will achieve for British and neutral commerce, passing 
backwards and forwards, from and to every port of our 
Empire, a security as complete as it has ever enjoyed in the 
days of unbroken peace. Let us honour the memory of the 
gallant seamen who, in the pursuit of one or another of these 
varied and responsible duties, have already laid down their 
lives for their country. 

In regard to the Army, there is a call for a new, a con- 
tinuous, a determined, and a united effort. For, as the war 
goes on, we shall have not merely to replace the wastage caused 
by casualties, not merely to maintain our military power at its 
original level, but we must, if we are to play a worthy part, 
enlarge its scale, increase its numbers, and multiply many 
times its effectiveness as a fighting instrument. The object of 
the appeal which I have made to you, my Lord Mayor, and 
to the other Chief Magistrates of our capital cities, is to 
impress upon them the imperious urgency of this supreme duty. 



Our self-governing Dominions throughout the Empire, 
without any soUcitation on our part, demonstrated with a 
spontaneousness and unanimity unparalleled in history their 
determination to affirm their brotherhood with us, and ta 
make our cause their own. 

From Canada, from Australia, from New Zealand, from 
South Africa, and from Newfoundland, the children of the 
Empire assert, not as an obhgation, but as a privilege, their 
right, and their willingness to contribute money, material, 
a;nd, what is better than all, the strength and sinews, the 
fortunes, and lives of their best manhood. 

India, too, with not less alacrity, has claimed her share 
in the common task. Every class and creed, British and 
native, princes and people, Hindoos and Mohammedans, vie 
with one another in a noble and emulous rivalry. Two 
divisions of our magnificent Indian Army are already on their 
way. We welcome with appreciation and affection their 
proffered aid, and, in an Empire which knows no distinctioa 
of race or class, where all alike, as subjects of the King 
Emperor, are joint and equal custodians of our common 
interest and fortunes, we here hail with profound and heart- 
felt gratitude their association side by side and shoulder to 
shoulder with our home and Dominion troops, under the flag 
which is a symbol to all of a unity that the world in arms 
cannot dissever or dissolve. 

With these inspiring appeals and examples from our 
fellow-subjects all over the world, what are we doing, and 
what ought we to do at home ? Mobilisation was ordered 
on August 4th. Immediately afterwards Lord Kitchener 
issued his call for 100,000 recruits for the Regular Army, 
which has been followed by a second call for another 100,000. "' '^' iSee first, 
The response up to to-day gives us between 250,000 and Military 
300,000 men, and I am glad to say that London has done its '^ 
share. The total number of Londoners accepted is not less 
than 42,000. I need hardly say that the appeal involves 
no disparagement or discouragement of the Territorial Force. 
The number of units in that force who have volunteered for 
foreign service is most satisfactory, and grows every day. 
We look to them with confidence to increase their numbers, 
to perfect their organisation in training, and to play the 
efficient part which has always been assigned to them, 



both offensive and defensive, in the military system of the 

But to go back to the expansion of the Regular Army, 
we want more men, men of the best fighting quality, and if 
for the moment the number who offer and are accepted 
should prove to be in excess of those who can at once be 
adequately trained and equipped, do not let them doubt 
that appropriate provision will be made for incorporation 
of all willing and able men in the fighting forces of the King. 
We want first of all men, and we shall endeavour to secure 
that men desiring to serve together shall, wherever possible, 
be allotted to the same regiment or corps. The raising of 
battalions by counties or by municipalities with this object 
wiU be in every way encouraged, but we want not less urgently 
a larger supply of ex-non-commissioned ofiicers, the pick of 
the men who have served their country in the past, and 
whom, therefore, in most cases, we shall be asking to give up 
regular employment in order that they may return to the 
work for the State which they alone are competent to do. 

The appeal which we make is addressed quite as much to 
their employers as to the men themselves. They ought 
surely to be assured of reinstatement in their positions at the 
end of the war. Finally, there are numbers of commissioned 
officers now in retirement with large experience of handling 
troops, who have served their country in the past. Let 
them come forward, too, and show their willingness, if need 
be, to train bodies of men, for whom for the moment no regular 
cadres or units can be found. I have little more to say. 

As to the actual progress of the war I will not say any- 
thing except that, in my judgment, in whatever direction 
we look there is abundant ground for pride and for comfort. 

I say nothing more, because I think we should bear in 
mind, all of us, that we are at present watching the fluctuation , 
of fortune only in the early stages of what is going to be a 
protracted struggle. We must learn to take long views and 
to cultivate above all other qualities — those of patience, 
endurance, and steadfastness. 

Meanwhile, let us go, each one of us, to his or her appro- 
priate part in the great common task. 

Never had a people more or richer sources of encourage- 
ment and inspiration. Let us realise, first of all, that we are 



fighting as a United Empire, in a cause worthy of the highest 
traditions of our race. Let us keep in mind the patient and 
indomitable seamen who never relax for a moment, night or 
day, their stern vigil on the lonely sea. Let us keep in mind 
our gallant troops, who to-day, after a fortnight's continuous 
fighting under conditions which would try the mettle of the 
best army that ever took the field, maintain not only an 
undefeated but an unbroken front. 

Finally, let us recall the memories of the great men and the 
great deeds of the past, commemorated some of them in the 
monuments which we see around us on these waUs, not for- 
getting the dying message of the younger Pitt — ^his last 
public utterance, made at the table of your predecessor, 
my Lord Mayor, in this very hall, " England has saved herself 
by her exertions, and will, as I trust, save Europe by her 
example." The England of those days gave a noble answer 
to his appeal and did not sheathe the sword until after nearly 
twenty years of fighting the freedom of Europe was secured. 
Let us go and do likewise. 


A FORTNIGHT ago to-day, in the Guildhall of the City 
of London,"' I endeavoured to present to the nation and to w[See 
the world the reasons which have compelled us, the people p-43§-] 
of all others who have the greatest interest in the maintenance 
of peace, to engage in the hazards and the horrors of war. 
I do not wish to repeat to-night in any detail what I then 
said. The war has arisen immediately and ostensibly, as 
everyone knows, out of a dispute between Austria and Serbia, 
in which we in this country had no direct concern. The 
diplomatic history of those critical weeks — the last fortnight 
in July and the first few days of August — is now accessible 
to all the world. It has been supplemented during the 
last few days by the admirable and exhaustive despatch'" of '*'[B- 161.] 
our late Ambassador at Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen — a 
despatch which I trust everybody will read, and no one who 
reads it can doubt that largely through the efforts of my 

* "The War of Civilisation." Authorised Edition revised by Mr. 
Asquith. (London : Methuen & Co., with whose permission it is quoted.) 


BRITISH SPEECHES [September i8, 

right hon. friend and colleague, Sir Edward Grey, the con- 
ditions of a peaceful settlement of the actual controversy- 
were already within sight when on July 31st Germany, by 
P'[0. 70.] her own deliberate act, made war a certainty.'" 

The facts are incontrovertible. They are not sought to 
be controverted, except, indeed, by the invention and circula- 
tion of such wanton falsehoods as that France was contem- 
plating and even commencing the violation of Belgian territory 
""[G. 20, as a first step on her road to Germany.'" The result is that 
22 ; Y. we are at war, and we are at war — as I have already shown 
147. 148.] elsewhere, and as I repeat here to-night — for three reasons. 
In the first place, to vindicate the sanctity of treaty obliga- 
tions and of what is properly called the public law of Europe ; 
in the second place, to assert and to enforce the independence 
of free States, relatively small and weak, against encroachment 
and violence by the strong ; and in the third place, to with- 
stand, as we believe in the best interests not only of our own 
Empire, but of civilisation at large, the arrogant claim of 
a single Power to dominate the development of the destinies 
of Europe. 

Since I last spoke some faint attempts have been made in 

Germany to dispute the accuracy and the sincerity of this 

statement of our attitude and aim. It has been suggested, 

'''[See p. for instance,'^' that our professed zeal for treaty rights and 

370. for the interests of small States is a new-bom and stimulated 

Ch™-^'^ passion. What, . we are asked, has Great Britain cared in 

cellor the past for treaties or for the smaller nationalities except 

to when she had some ulterior and selfish purpose of her own 

Danish to serve ? I am quite ready to meet that challenge, and to 

Press meet it in the only way in which it could be met, by reference 

Bureau.] ^^ history ; and out of many illustrations which I might take 

I will content myself with two, widely removed in point of 

time, but both, as it happens, very apposite to the present 

case. I will go back first to the war carried on at first against 

the revolutionary Government of France and then against 

Napoleon, which broke out in 1793 and which lasted for more 

than 20 years. We had then at the head of the Government 

in this country one of the most peace-loving Ministers who 

has ever presided over our fortunes, Mr. Pitt. For three 

years, from 1789 to 1792, he resolutely refused to interfere 

in any way with the revolutionary proceedings in France 



or in the wars that sprang out of them, and as late, I think, 
as February in 1792, in a memorable speech in the House of 
Commons, which shows amongst other things the shortness 
of human foresight, he declared that there never was a time 
when we in this country could more reasonably expect 15 
years of peace. And what was it^that, within a few months 
of that declaration, led this pacific Minister to war ? It was 
the invasion of the treaty rights, guaranteed by ourselves, of a 
small European State — the then States General of Holland. 

For nearly 200 years the Great Powers of Europe had 
guaranteed to Holland the exclusive navigation. of the River 
Scheldt. The French revolutionary Government invaded 
what is now Belgium, and as a first act of hostility to Holland 
declared the navigation of the Scheldt to be open. Our 
interest in that matter then, as now, was relatively small and 
insignificant. But what was Mr. Pitt's reply? I quote you 
the exact words he used in the House of Commons ; they 
are so applicable to the circumstances of the present moment. 
This is in 1793 : — 

" England wiU never consent that another country should 
arrogate the power of annulling at her pleasure the political 
system of Europe established by solemn treaties and guaran- 
teed by the consent of the Powers." 

He went on to say that " If this House — the House of 
Commons — means substantial good faith to its engagements, 
if it retains a just sense of the solemn faith of treaties, it must 
show a determination to support them." And it was in 
consequence of that stubborn and unyielding determination 
to maintain treaties, to defend small States, to resist the 
aggressive domination of a single Power that we were involved 
in a war which we had done everything to avoid and which 
was carried on upon a scale both as to area and as to duration 
up to then unexampledjn the history of mankind. 

That is one precedent. Let me give you one more. I 
come down to 1870, when this very treaty to which we are 
parties no less than Germany, and which guarantees the 
integrity and independence of Belgium, was threatened. Mr. 
Gladstone was then Prime Minister of this country, and he 
was, if possible, a stronger and more ardent advocate of 
peace even than Mr. Pitt himself.- Mr. Gladstone, pacific as 

II — 2 F 449 

BRITISH SPEECHES [September i8, 

he was, felt so strongly the sanctity of our obUgations that — 
though here again we had no direct interest of any kind at 
stake — ^he made agreements with France and Prussia to 
co-operate with either of the belligerents if the other violated 
"'[See pp. Belgian territory.'" I should like to read a passage from a 
488-9.] speech 10 years later, delivered in 1880 by Mr. Gladstone 
himself in this city of Edinburgh, in which he reviewed that 
transaction and explained his reasons for it. 

After narrating the facts which I have summarised, he 
said this : " If we had gone to war " — which he was prepared 
to do — " we should have gone to war for freedom. We should 
have gone to war for public right, we should have gone to war 
to save human happiness from being invaded by a t5nrannous 
and lawless Power. That," Mr. Gladstone said, " is what 
I call a good cause, gentlemen. And though I detest war, and 
there are no epithets too strong if you will supply me with 
them that I will not endeavour to heap upon its head ; in 
such a war as that, while the breath in my body is continued 
to me, I am ready to engage." 

So much for our own action in the past in regard to treaties 
and small States. But, faint as is this denial of this part of 
our case, it becomes fainter still, it dissolves into the thinnest 
of thin air, when it has to deal with our contention that we 
and our Allies are withstanding a Power whose aim is nothing 
less than the domination of Europe. It is, indeed, the avowed 
belief of the leaders of German thought, I will not say of the 
German people, but of those who for many years past have 
controlled German pohcy, that such a domination, carrying 
with it the supremacy of what they call German culture and 
the German spirit, is the best thing that could happen to the 

Let me, then, ask for a moment what is this German 
culture ? What is this German spirit of which the Emperor's 
armies are at present the missionaries in Belgium and in 
France ? Mankind owes much to Germany, a very great 
debt for the contributions she has made to philosophy, to 
science, and to the arts, but that which is specifically German 
in the movement of the world in the last 30 years has been, 
on the intellectual side, the development of the doctrine of 
the supreme and ultimate prerogative in human affairs of 
material force, and on the practical side the taking of the 



foremost place in the fabrication and the multiplication of the 
machinery of destruction. To the men who have adopted 
this gospel, who believe that power is the be aU and end all 
of a State, naturally a treaty is nothing more than a piece 
of parchment, and all the old world talk about the rights of 
the weak and the obligations of the strong is only so much 
threadbare and nauseating cant. 

One very remarkable feature of this new school of doctrine, 
whatever be its intellectual or its ethical merits, is that it has 
turned out, as an actual code for life, to be a very purbhnd 

For German culture and the German spirit did not save 
the Emperor and his people from delusions and miscalcula- 
tions as dangerous as they were absurd in regard to the 
British Empire. We were believed by these cultivated 
observers to be the decadent descendants of a people who, 
by a combination of luck and of fraud had managed to obtain 
dominion over a vast quantity of the surface and the popula- 
tions of the globe. This fortuitous aggregation which goes 
by the name of the British Empire was supposed to be so 
insecurely founded, and so loosely knit together, that, at the 
first touch of serious menace from without, it would fall to 
pieces and tumble to the ground. Our great Dominions were 
getting heartily tired of the Imperial connection. India, 
it was notorious to every German traveller, was on the verge 
of open revolt, and here at home, we, the people of this United 
Kingdom, were riven by dissension so deep and so fierce that 
our energies, whether for resistance or for attack, would be 
completely paralysed. What a fantastic dream ! And what 
a rude awakening ! And in this vast and grotesque, and yet 
tragic, miscalculation is to be found one of the roots, perhaps 
the matin root, of the present war. 

But let us go one step more. It has been said " By their 
fruits ye shall know them," and history will record that, when 
the die was cast and the struggle began, it was the disciples 
of that same creed who revived methods of warfare which 
have for centuries past been condemned by the common 
sense, as well as by the humanity, of the great mass of the 
civilised world. 

Louvain, Malines, Termonde. These are names which 
win henceforth be branded on the brow of German culture. 



The ruthless sacking of the ancient and famous towns of Bel- 
gium is fitly supplemented by the story that reaches us only 
to-day from our own Headquarters in France, of the 
proclamation issued less than a week ago by the German 
authorities, who were for a moment, and, happily, for little 
more than a moment, in occupation of the venerable city of 
Reims. Let me read, for it should be put on record, the 
concluding paragraph of the proclamation : 

" With a view to securing adequately the safety of the 
troops, and to instil calm into the population of Reims, the 
persons named below [8i in number, and including all the 
leading citizens of the town] have been seized as hostages by 
the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. These hos- 
tages will be hanged at the slightest attempt at disorder. 
Also the town will be totally or partially burned and the 
inhabitants will be hanged for any infraction of the above. 

" By order of German authorities." 

Do not let it be forgotten that it is from a Power whose 
intellectual leaders are imbued with the ideal that I have 
described, and whose generals in the field sanction and even 
direct those practices — it is from that Power that the claim 
proceeds to impose its culture, its spirit — ^which means its 
domination — ^upon the rest of Europe. That is a claim, I say 
to you, to all my fellow-countr57men, to every citizen and 
subject of the British Empire whose ears and eyes my words 
can reach — that is a claim that everything that is great in 
our past and everything that promises hope or progress in 
our future summons us to resist to the end. The task — do 
not let us deceive ourselves — ^the task will not be a light one. 
Its full accomplishment — and nothing short of full accom- 
plishment is worthy of our traditions or will satisfy our 
resolve — ^will certainly take months, it may even take years. 
I have come here to-night, not to ask you to count the cost, 
for no price can be too high to pay when honour and freedom 
are at stake, but to put before you, as I have tried to do, the 
magnitude of the issue and the supreme necessity that lies 
upon us as a nation, nay, as a brotherhood and family of 
nations, to rise to its height and acquit ourselves of our duty. 

The war has now lasted more than six weeks. Our supre- 
macy at sea has not been seriously questioned. Full supplies 



of food and of raw materials are making their way to our 
shores from every quarter of the globe. Our industries, with 
one or two exceptions, maintain their activities. Unemploy- 
ment is so far not seriously in excess of the average. The 
monetary situation has improved, and every effort that the 
zeal and the skill of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the 
co-operation and expert advice of the bankers and business 
men of the country, can devise — every effort is being made to 
achieve what is most essential — the complete re-establishment 
of thetforeign exchanges. Meanwhile, the merchant shipping 
of the enemy has been hunted from the seas, and our seamen 
are still, patiently or impatiently, waiting a chance to try 
conclusions with the opposing Fleet. Great and incalculable is 
the debt which we have owed during these weeks, and which 
in increasing measure we shall continue to owe, to our Navy. 
The Navy needs no help, and as the months roU on — thanks 
to a far-sighted policy in the past — its proportionate strength 
will grow. 

If we turn to our Army we can say with equal justice and 
pride that, during these weeks, it has revived the most glorious 
records of its past. Sir John French and his gallant officers 
and men live in our hearts as they will live in the memories 
of those who come afterwards. But splendid achievements 
such as these — equally splendid in retirement and in advance 
— cannot be won without a heavy expenditure of life and 
limb, of equipment, and supplies. Even now, at this very 
early stage, I suppose there is hardly a person here who is 
not suffering from anxiety and suspense. Some of us are 
plunged in sorrow for the loss of those we love, cut off, some 
of them, in the. springtime of their young Uves. We will not 
mourn for them overmuch. 

" One crowded hour of glorious life 
Is worth an age without a name." 

But these gaps have to be filled. The wastage of modem 
war is relentless and almost inconceivable. We have — I 
mean His Majesty's Government have — since the war began 
dispatched to the front already considerably over 200,000 
men, and the amplest provision has been made for keeping 
them supplied with all that was necessary in food, in stores, 
and in equipment. They will very soon be reinforced by 


BRITISH SPEECHES . [September i8. 

Regular troops from India, from Egypt, and the Mediterra- 
nean, and in due time by the contingents which our Dominions 
are furnishing with such magnificent patriotism and HberaUty. 
We have with us here our own gallant Territorials, becoming 
every day a fitter and a finer force, eager and anxious to 
respond to any call, either at home or abroad, that may be 
made upon them. 

But that is not enough. We must do still more. Already 
in little more than a month we have half a million recruits 
for the four new Armies which, as Lord Kitchener told the 
country yesterday, he means to have ready to bring into the 
field. Enlisting, as we were last week, in a single day as many 
men as we have been accustomed to enlist in the course of a 
whole year, it is not, I think, surprising that the machinery 
has been over-strained, and there have been many cases of 
temporary inconvenience and hardship and discomfort. With 
time and patience and good organisation these things will be 
set right, and the new scale of allowances which was announced 
in Parliament yesterday will do much to mitigate the lot of 
wives and children and dependents who are left behind. We 
want more men, and perhaps most of all help for training 
them. Every one in the whole of this kingdom who has in 
days gone by, as officer or as non-commissioned officer, served 
his country never had a greater or a more fruitful opportunity 
of service than is presented to him to-day. 

We appeal to the manhood of the three kingdoms. To 
such an appeal I know well, coming from your senior repre- 
sentative in the House of Commons, that Scotland will not 
turn a deaf ear. Scotland is doing well, and indeed more than 
well, and no part of Scotland, I believe, in proportion better 
than Edinburgh. I cannot say with what pleasure I heard 
the figures given out by the Lord Provost, and those which 
have been supphed to me by the gallant general who has the 
Scottish Command, which show, indeed, as we expected, that 
Scotland is more than holding her own. 

In that connection let me repeat what I said two weeks 
ago in London. We ; think it of the highest importance 
that, as far as possible^and subject to the accidents of war, 
people belonging to the same place, breathing the same 
atmosphere, having the same associations, should be kept 



I have only one word more to say. What is it that we 
can offer to our recruits ? They come to us spontaneously, 
under no kind of compulsion, of their own free will, to meet a 
national and an Imperial need ; we present to them no 
material inducement in the shape either of bounty or bribe, 
and they have to face the prospect of a spell of hard training 
from which most of the comforts and all the luxuries that many 
of them have been accustomed to are rigorously banished. 
But then, when they are fully equipped for their patriotic 
task, they wiU have the opportunity of striking a blow, it 
may be even of laying down their lives, not to serve the cause 
of ambition or aggression, but to maintain the honour and the 
good faith of our country, to shield the independence of free 
States, to protect against brute force the principles of civilisa- 
tion and the liberties of Europe. 



IT is no part of my mission to-night — ^it is indeed at this 
time of day wholly unnecessary — ^to justify, still less to excuse, 
the part that the Government of the United Kingdom has 
taken in this supreme crisis in our national affairs. There 
have been wars in the past in regard to which there has been 
among us diversity of opinion, uneasiness as to the wisdom of 
our diplomacy, anxiety as to the expediency of our policy, 
doubts as to the essential righteousness of our cause. That 
is not the case to-day. Even in the memorable struggle 
which we waged a hundred years ago against the domination 
of Napoleon there was always a minority, respectable not 
merely in number, but in the sincerity and in the eminence 
of its adherents, which broke the front of our national unity. 
Again I say that is not the case to-day. We feel as a nation — 
or rather, I ought to say, speaking here and looking round 
upon our vast Empire in every quarter of the globe, as a 
family of nations — without distinction of creed or party, of 
race or climate, of class or section, that we are united in 

* "A United Empire." Authorised Edition revised by Mr. Asquith. 
(London : Methuen & Co., with whose permission it is quoted.) 


BRITISH SPEECHES [September 25, 

defending principles and in maintaining interests which 
are vital, not only to the British Empire, but to all that is 
worth having in our common civilisation and all that is worth 
hoping for in the future progress of mankind. 

What better or higher cause, whether we succeed or fail, 
and we are going not to fail but to succeed, what higher cause 
can arouse and enlist the best energies of a free people than 
to be engaged at one and the same time in the vindication 
of international good faith, the protection of the weak against 
the violence of the strong, and in the assertion of the best 
ideals of all the free communities in all the ages of time and 
in every part of the world against the encroachments of those 
who believe, and who preach, and who practise the religion 
of force ? 

It is not — I am sure you will agree with me — it is not neces- 
sary to demonstrate once more that of this war Germany is the 
real and the responsible author. The proofs are patent, 
manifold, and overwhelming. Indeed, on the part of Ger- 
many herself we get upon this point, if denial at all, a denial 
only of the faintest and the most formal kind. For a gener- 
ation past she has been preparing the ground, equipping 
herself both by land and sea, fortifying herself with alliances, 
what is perhaps even more important, teaching her youth 
to seek and to pursue as the first and the most important 
of all human things the supremacy of German power and 
the German spirit, and all that time biding her opportunity. 
Many of the great wars of history have been almost acciden- 
tally brought on. There was nothing in the quarrel, such 
as it was, between Austria and Serbia that could not, and 
would not, have been settled by pacific means. But in 
the judgment of those who guide and control German policy 
the hour had come to strike the blow that had been long 
and deliberately prepared. In their hands lay the choice 
between peace and war, and their election was for war. In 
so deciding, as everybody now knows, Germany made two 
profound miscalculations, both of them natural enough in 
men who had come to believe that in international matters 
everything can be explained and measured in terms of material 

What were those mistakes ? The first was that Belgium, 
a small and prosperous country, entirely disinterested in 



European quarrels, guaranteed by the joint and several 
compacts of the Great Powers, would not resent, and cer- 
tainly would not resist, the use of her territory as a high 
road for an invading German force into France. How could 
they imagine that this little covmtry, rather than allow her 
neutrality to be violated and her independence insulted and 
menaced, was prepared that her fields should be drenched 
with the blood of her soldiers, her towns and villages de- 
vastated by marauders, her splendid heritage of monuments 
and of treasures buUt up for her by the piety, art, and learn- 
ing of the past ruthlessly laid in ruins? The passionate 
attachment of a numerically smcill popvilation to the bit of 
territory, which looks so little upon the map, the pride of 
unconquerable devotion of a free people to their own free 
State — ^these were things which apparently had never been 
dreamed of in the philosophy of Potsdam. 

Rarely in history has there been a greater material dis- 
parity between the invaders and the invaded. But the 
moral disparity was at least equally great, for the indomitable 
resistance of the Belgians did more than change the whole 
face of the campaign. It proved to the world that ideas 
which cannot be weighed or measured by any material cal- 
culus can stiU inspire and dominate mankind. That is the 
reason why the whole sympathy of the civilised world at 
this moment is going out to these smaU States — Belgium, 
Serbia, and Montenegro — ^that have played so worthy a 
part in this historic struggle. 

But Germany was guUty of another and a stiU more 
capital blunder in relation to ourselves. I am not referring 
for the moment to the grotesque misunderstanding upon 
which I dwelt a week ago at Edinburgh'" — their carefuUy ^^>iSee 
fostered belief that we here were so rent with civil distrac- p. 451] 
tion, so paralysed by lukewarmness or disaffection in our 
Dominions and Dependencies, that if it came to fighting 
we might be brushed aside as an impotent and even a 
negligible factor. The German misconception went even 
deeper than that. They asked themselves what interest, 
direct or material, had the United Kingdom in this conflict. 
Could any nation, least of all the cold, calculating, phleg- 
matic, egotistic British nation, embark upon a costly and 
bloody contest from which it had nothing in the hope of profit 



to expect ? They forgot that we, hke the Belgians, had 
something at stake which cannot be translated into what 
one of our poets has called " the lore of nicely calculated less 
or more." 

What was it we had at stake ? First and foremost, the 
fulfilment to the small and relatively weak country of our 
plighted word, and behind and beyond that the maintenance 
of the whole system of international good will, which is the 
moral bond of the civilised world. Here again they were 
wrong in thinking that the reign of ideas, old-world ideas 
like those of duty and good faith, had been superseded by 
the ascendancy of force. War is at all times a hideous thing ; 
at the best an evil to be chosen in preference to worse evils, 
and at the worst little better than the letting loose of hell 
upon earth. The Prophet of old spoke of the " confused 
noise of battle and the garments rolled in blood," but in 
these modem days, with the gigantic scale of the opposing 
armies and the scientific developments of the instruments 
of destruction, war has become an infinitely more devastating 
thing than it ever was before. The hope that the general 
recognition of a humaner code would soften or abate some 
of its worst brutalities has been rudely dispelled by the events 
of the last few weeks. The German invasion of Belgium and 
France contributes indeed some of the blackest pages to its 
sombre annals. Rarely has a non-combatant population 
suffered more severely, and rarely, if ever, have the monu- 
ments of piety and of learning and of those sentiments of 
religious and national association of which they are the 
permanent embodiment, even in the worst times of the most 
ruthless warriors been so shamefully and cynically desecrated ; 
and behind the actual theatre of conflict, with its smoke and 
its carnage, there are the sufferings of those who are left 
behind, the waste of wealth, the economic dislocation, the 
heritage — the long heritage — of enmities and misunder- 
standing which war brings in its train. 

Why do I dwell upon these things ? It is to say this — 
that great indeed is the responsibility of those who allow 
their country — as we have done — to be drawn into such a 
welter. But there is one thing much worse than to take 
such a responsibility, and that is upon a fitting occasion to 
shirk it. Our record in the matter is clear. We strove up 



ta the last moment for peace, and only when we were satis- 
fied that the price of peace was the betrayal of other countries 
and the dishonour and degradation of our own did we take 
up the sword. 

I should like, beyond this inquiry into causes and motives, 
to ask your attention and that of my fellow-countrymen to 
the end which, in this war, we ought to keep in view. Forty- 
four years ago, at the time of the war of 1870, Mr. Gladstone 
used these words. He said : " The greatest triumph of our 
time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as 
the governing idea of European politics." Nearly 50 years 
have passed. Little progress, it seems, has as yet been made 
towards that good and beneficent change, but it seems to me to 
be now at this moment as good a definition as we can have of 
our European policy. The idea of public right — what does 
it mean when translated into concrete terms ? It means, 
first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite 
repudiation of militarism as the governing factor in the 
relation of States and of the future moulding of the European 
world. It means next that room must be found and kept 
for the independent existence and the free development of 
the smaller nationahties each with a corporate consciousness 
of its own. Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian 
countries, Greece, and the Balkan States — they must be 
recognised as having exactly as good a title as their more 
powerful neighbours — ^more powerful in strength and in 
wealth — ^to a place in the sun. And it means finally, or it 
ought to mean, perhaps, by a slow and gradual process, the 
substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambition, 
for groupings and alliances and a precarious equipoise, of a 
real European partnership based on the recognition of equal 
right and established and enforced by a common will. A 
year ago that would have sounded like a Utopian idea. It 
is probably one that may not, or will not, be realised either 
to-day or to-morrow, but if and when this war is decided in 
favour of the Allies it will at once come within the range and 
before long within the grasp of European statesmanship. 





... I am not here to-night to argue out propositions 
which British citizens in every part of the world to-day regard 
as beyond the reach of controversy. I do not suppose that 
in the history of mankind there has ever been in such a vast 
and diverse community agreement so unanimous in purpose 
and so concentrated, a corporate conscience so clear and so 
convinced, co-operation so spontaneous, so ardent, and so 
resolute. Just consider what it means, here in this United 
Kingdom — ^England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales — to hear 
one plain, harmonious, great united voice over the seas from 
our great Dominions. Canada, Australia, South Africa, 
New Zealand, our Crown Colonies swell the chorus. 

In India — where whatever we won by the sword we hold 
and we retain by the more splendid title of just and disinterested 
rule, by the authority, not of a despot, but of a trustee — 
the response to our common appeal has moved all our feeUngs 
to their profoundest depths, and has been such as to shiver 
and to shatter the vain and ignorant imaginings of our ene- 
mies. That is a remarkable and indeed a unique spectacle. 

What is it that stirred the imagination, aroused the 
conscience, enlisted the manhood, welded into one compact 
and irresistible force the energies and the will of the greatest 
Imperial structure that the world has ever known ? That 
is a question which, for a moment, at any rate, it is weU 
worth asking and answering. Let me say, then, first nega- 
tively, that we are not impelled, any of us, by some of the 
motives which have occasioned the bloody struggles of the 
past. In this case, so far as we are concerned, ambition and 
aggression play no part. What do we want ? What do we 
aim at ? What have we to gain ? 

We are a great, world-wide, peace-loving partnership. 
By the wisdom and the courage of our forefathers, by great 
deeds of heroism and adventure by land and sea, by the 

* " Why We are at War." Authorised Edition revised by Mr. Asquith. 
^London : Methuen & Co., with whose permission it is quoted.) 



insight and corporate sagacity, the tried and tested experience 
of many generations, we have built up a dominion which is 
buttressed by the two pillars of Liberty and Law. We are 
not vain enough or foolish enough to think that in the course 
of a long process there have not been blunders, or worse 
than blunders, and that to-day our Dominion does not fall 
short of what in our ideals it might and it ought and, we 
believe, it is destined to be. But such as we have received 
it, and such as we hope to have it, with it we are content. 

' We do not covet any people's territory. We have no 
desire to impose our rule upon alien populations. The 
British Empire is enough for us. All that we wished for, 
all that we wish for now, is to be allowed peaceably to con- 
solidate our own resources, to raise within the Empire the 
level of common opportunity, to draw closer the bond of 
affection and confidence between its parts, and to make it 
everywhere the worthy home of the best traditions of British 
liberty. Does it not follow from that that nowhere in the world 
is there a people who have stronger motives to avoid war 
and to seek and ensue peace ? Why, then, are the British 
people throughout the length and breadth of our Empire 
everywhere turning their ploughshares into swords ? -Why 
are the best of our able-bodied men leaving the fields and the 
factory and the counting-house for the recruiting office and 
the training camp ? 

If, as I have said, we have no desire to add to our Imperial 
burdens, either in area or in responsibility, it is equally true 
that in entering this war we had no iU will to gratify nor 
wrongs of our own to avenge. In regard to Germany in 
particular, our policy — ^repeatedly stated in Parliament, 
resolutely pursued year after year both in London and in 
Berlin — our policy has been to remove one by one the out- 
standing causes of possible friction and so to establish a 
firm basis for cordial relations in the days to come. 

We have said from the first — I have said it over and over 
again, and so has Sir Edward Grey — ^we have said from the 
first that our friendships with certain Powers, with France, 
with Russia, and with Japan, were not to be construed as 
impl3dng cold feelings and still less hostile purposes against 
any other Power. But at the same time we have always 
made it clear, to quote words used by Sir Edward Grey as 



far back as November, 1911 — I quote his exact words — 
" One does not make new friendships worth having by de- 
serting old ones. New friendships by all means let us have, 
but not at the expense of the ones we have." That has 
been, and I trust will always be, the attitude of those whom 

<"ESee first the Kaiser in his now notorious proclamation'" describes as 
Military ^j^g treacherous English. 

' We laid down — and I wish to call not only your attention 

but the attention of the whole world to this, when so many 
false legends are now being invented and circulated — ^in the 
following year — ^in the year 1912 we laid down in terms 
carefully approved by the Cabinet, and which I will textually 
quote, what our relations with Germany ought in our view 
to be. We said, and we communicated this to the German 
Government — " Britain declares that she will neither make, 
nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggres- 
sion upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any 
treaty, understanding, or combination to which Britain is 
now a party, nor will §he become a party to anything that 

'<"'[c/.SirE. has such an object."'^ There is nothing ambiguous or 
Grey, p. equivocal about that. 

465] But that was not enough for German statesmanship. 

They wanted us to go further. They asked us to pledge 
ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany 
being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a time when 
Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive 
and her defensive resources, especially upon the sea. They 
asked us, to put it quite plainly, for a free hand, so far as we 
were concerned, when they selected the opportunity to over- 
bear, to dominate the European world. 

To such a demand but one answer was possible, and that 
was the answer we gave. None the less we have continued 
■during the whole of the last two years, and never more ener- 
getically and more successfully than during the Balkan 
crisis of last year, to work not only for the peace of Europe 
but for the creation of a better international atmosphere 
and a more cordial co-operation between all the Powers. 
Prom both points of view, that of our domestic interests as 
a kingdom and an Empire, and that of our settled attitude 
and policy in the counsels of Europe, a war such as this, 
which injures the one and frustrates the other, was and 


could only be regarded as among the worst of catastrophes — 
among the worst of catastrophes, but not the worst. 

Four weeks ago, speaking at the Guildhall, in the City 
of London, when the war was still in its early days, I 
asked my fellow-countrymen"' with what countenance, with '"|Se« pp. 
what conscience, had we basely chosen to stand aloof, we 44o-il 
could have watched from day to day the terrible unrolling 
of events — ^public faith shamelessly broken, the freedom of 
a small people trodden in the dust, the wanton invasion 
of Belgium and then of France, by hordes who leave behind 
them at every stage of their progress a dismal trail of savagery, 
of devastation, and of desecration worthy of the blackest 
annals in the history of barbarism. That was four weeks 
ago. The war has now lasted for 60 days, and every one 
of those days has added to the picture its share of sombre 
and repulsive traits. We now see clearly written down in 
letters of carnage and spoliation the real aims and methods 
of this long-prepared and well-organised scheme against the 
liberties of Europe. 

I say nothing of other countries. I pass no judgment 
upon them. But if we here in Great Britain Imd abstained 
and remained neutral, forsworn our word, deserted our 
friends, faltered and compromised with the plain dictates 
of our duty — ^nay, if we had not shown ourselves ready to 
strike with all our forces at the common enemy of civilisation 
and freedom, there would have been nothing left for our 
country but to veil her face in shame and to be ready in her 
turn — ^for her time would have come — ^to share the doom 
which she would have richly deserved, and after centuries 
of glorious life to go down to her grave " unwept, unhonoured, 
and unsung." 

Let us gladly acknowledge what becomes clearer and 
clearer every day, that the world is just as ready as it ever 
was, and no part of it readier than the British Empire, to 
understand and to respond to moral issues. The new 
school of German thought has been teaching for a generation 
past that in the affairs of nations there is no code of ethics. 
According to their doctrine force and nothing but force is 
the test and the measure of right. As the events which are 
going on before our eyes have made it plain, they have suc- 
ceeded only too well in indoctrinating with their creed — I 



will not say the people of Germany — ^like Burke, I will not 
attempt to draw up an indictment against a nation — I will 
not say the people of Germany, but those who control and 
execute German policy. 

But it is one of those products of German genius which, 
whether or not it was intended exclusively for home con- 
sumption, has not, I am happy to say, found a market 
abroad, and certainly not within the boundaries of the British 
Empire. We still believe here, old-fashioned people as we 
are, in the sanctity of treaties, that the weak have rights and 
that the strong have duties, that small nationalities have 
every bit as good a title as large ones to life and independence, 
and that freedom for its own sake is as well worth fighting 
for to-day as it ever was in the past. And we look for- 
ward at the end of this war to a Europe in which these 
great and simple and venerable truths will be recognised 
and safeguarded for ever against the recrudescence of the 
era of blood and iron. Stated in a few words that is the 
reason for our united front, the reason that has brought 
oiK gallant Indian warriors to Marseilles, that is extracting 
from our most distant Dominions the best of their man- 
hood, and which in the course of two months has transformed 
the United Kingdom into a vast recruiting ground. 


MARCH 22, 1915. 

{Authenticated, Report) 

WHILE we are taken up by the particular methods by 
which the war is to be prosecuted to a successful conclusion, 
do not let us lose sight, even for a moment, of the character 
and origin of this war and of the main issue for which we are 

Hundreds of millions of money have been spent, hundreds 
of thousands of lives have been lost, and millions have been 
wounded or maimed, in Europe during the last few months. 
All this might have been avoided by the simple method of a 
Conference or joint discussion between the European Powers 
concerned, which might have been held m London or in The 



Hague or wherever or in whatever form Germany would have 
consented to have it. It would have been far easier to have 
settled by a Conference the dispute between Austria-Hungary 
and Serbia, which Germany made the occasion for this war, 
than it was to get successfully through the Balkan crisis of 
two years ago, Germany knew, from her experience of the 
Conference in London which settled the Balkan crisis, that 
she could count upon our goodwill for peace in any Concert 
or Conference of the Powers. We had sought no diplomatic 
triumph in the Balkan Conference. We had not given our- 
selves to any intrigue. We had pursued impartially and 
honourably the end of peace. We were ready, last July, 
to do the same again. '" In recent years, we had given Germany w [See B. 
every assurance that no aggression upon her would receive 36.] 

any support from us. We had withheld from her but one 
thing : an unconditional promise to stand aside, however 
aggressive Germany herself might be to her neighbours."" ""[5ee 
Last July, France was ready to accept a Conference, Italy P- 462.] 
was ready to accept a Conference, Russia was ready to accept 
a Conference ; and we know now that, after the British 
proposal for a Conference was made, the Emperor of Russia 
himself proposed to the German Emperor that the dispute 
should be referred to The Hague.'" Germany refused every (')[See the 
suggestion made to her for settling the dispute in this way, Tsar's 
and on her rests now, and must rest for all time, the appalling telegram, 
responsibility for having plunged Europe into this war, and ^°\. \'' 
for involving herself and the greater part of a whole Continent ^' •' 
in the consequences of it. 

We know now that the German Government had pre- 
pared for war as only people who plan can prepare. This 
is the fourth time within living memory that Prussia has 
made war in Europe. In the Schleswig-Holstein war, in 
the war against Austria in 1866, in the war against France 
in 1870, as we now know from all the documents that have 
been revealed, it was Prussia who planned and prepared 
these wars. The same thing has occurred again, and we are 
determined that it shall be the last time that war shall be 
made in this way. 

As to our own part : We had assured Belgium that never 
would we violate her neutrality so long as it was respected "'[See 
by others.'^' I had given this pledge to Belgium long before p. 327.] 

II— 2 G 465 


the war. On the eve of the war, we asked France and Ger- 

'''[B. 114.] many to give the same pledge.'" France at once did so,"" 

'"'[B. 125.] but Germany dechned to give it.'^* When, after that, 

''' [B. 122.] Germany invaded Belgium, we were bound to oppose Germany 

with all our strength ; and, if we had not done so at the first 

moment, is there anyone who now believes that, when Germany 

attacked the Belgians, shot combatants and non-combatants, 

and ravaged the country in a way that violated all rules of 

war of recent times, and all rules of humanity of all times, 

is there any one who thinks it possible that we could have 

sat still and looked on, without eternal disgrace ? 

Now, what are the issues for which we are fighting ? In 
due time, the terms of peace will be put forward by our 
Allies in common with us, in accordance with the Alliances 
that now exist between us and are public to the world. But 
one essential condition must be the restoration of Belgium 
to her independent national life and the free possession of 
her territory ; and reparation to her, as far as reparation 
is possible, for the cruel wrong done to her. 

That is part of the great issue for which we with our Allies 
are contending, and which is this : We wish the nations of . 
Europe to be free to live their independent lives, working 
out their own forms of government for themselves and their 
own national development, whether they be great States 
or small States, in full liberty. That is our ideal. The Ger- 
man ideal — ^we have had it poured out by German Professors 
and publicists since the war began — is that of the Germans 
as a superior people ; to whom all things are lawful in the 
securing of their own power ; against whom resistance of 
every sort is unlawful and to be savagely put down ; a people 
establishing a domination over the nations of the Continent ; 
imposing a peace that is not to be a liberty for other nations, 
but subservience to Germany. I would rather perish or leave 
this Continent altogether than live in it under such conditions. 
After this war, we and the other nations of Europe must 
be free to live, not menaced by talk of supreme War Lords 
and shining armour and the sword continually rattled in the 
scabbard, and Heaven continually invoked as an accomplice 
to German arms, and not having our policy dictated and our 
national destinies and activities controlled by the military 
caste of Prussia. We claim for ourselves, and our Allies claim 


for themselves and together we will secure for Europe, the 
right of independent sovereignty for the different nations ; 
the right to pursue national existence, not in the shadow of 
Prussian hegemony or supremacy but in the light of equal 

All honour for ever be given from us, whom age or cir- 
cumstances have kept at home, to those who voluntarily 
have come forward to risk their lives, and give their lives, 
on the field of battle on land or sea. They have their reward 
in enduring fame and honour. And aU honour be from us 
to the brave Armies and Navies of our Allies, who have 
exhibited such splendid courage and noble patriotism. The 
admiration they have aroused and the comradeship in arms 
will be an ennobling and endearing memory between us, 
cementing friendship and perpetuating National Goodwill. 

And for all of us who are serving the State at home in 
whatever capacity, whether ofiicials, employers or wage- 
earners, doing our utmost to carry on the National life in this 
time of stress, there is the knowledge that there can be no 
nobler opportunity than that of serving one's country when 
its very existence is at stake, and when its cause is just and 
right ; that never was there a time in our history when the 
crisis was so great and imperative as it is now, or the cause 
more just and right. 


[August i, 


[Addresses, etc., of a military character will be found in the 
first Military Volume.] 


Proclamation by the President of the Republic. 

To THE French Nation : 

[Pages IN spite of all the efforts of diplomacy, the situation in 

d'His- Europe has in the last few days become considerably worse. 
ioire.] jj^g outlook has become darker. At this moment most 
nations have mobilised their forces, and even those countries 
whose neutrality is guaranteed have taken the same precau- 
tionary measure. Those Powers whose constitutional laws 
are different from ours have, without actually mobilising, 
commenced, and are proceeding with, preparations which are 
equivalent to actual mobilisation, and in anticipation of it. 

France, which has always plainly asserted her pacific 
intentions, which has, in these tragic days, given to Europe 
counsels of moderation and a living example of wise prudence, 
and which has redoubled her efforts to maintain the peace of 
the world, has prepared herself for all eventualities, and has 
now taken the first indispensable steps for safeguarding her 
territory ; but our legislation does not permit these prepara- 
tions to be completed without a decree of mobilisation. 

The Government, mindful of its responsibilities, and know- 
ing that it would fail in its sacred duty if it left matters in 
their present state, has just ordered the necessary decrees to 
be issued. Mobilisation is not war ; on the contrary, it 
appears to be the best means, in the present circumstances, 
of securing peace with honour. Strong in its ardent wish 
to arrive at a peaceful solution of the crisis, the Government 
will continue its diplomatic efforts, sheltered by these pre- 
cautionary measures, and still hopes that these efforts will be 



crowned with success. It counts on the self-restraint of our 
noble nation not to be carried away by unwarrantable excite- 
ment. It counts on the patriotism of every Frenchman, and 
knows that there is not one who is not ready to do his duty. 
At this moment there are no more parties, there is only the 
same France as of old, France peaceful and resolute, the 
Fatherland of right and justice, absolutely unanimous in its 
calmness, vigilance and dignity. 

The President of the French Republic, 

The President of the Council, 


[Signed also by all the Ministers and Under-Secretaries of 

Paris, August ist. 

Appeal by the President of the Council to the Women of France. 

IN spite of the efforts of France, Russia and England [Pages 
to maintain peace, Germany has plunged us into war. At ^'His- 
their country's call, your fathers, your brothers and your ^<'*''*-J 
husbands have risen, and will to-morrow have taken up the 

The departure on active service of all who are capable 
of bearing arms interrupts the work in the fields. The harvest 
is not yet gathered in, and the time of the vintage is approach- 
ing. In the name of the Government of the Republic, and 
in the name of the entire nation at its back, I appeal to your 
fortitude and to that of your children, whose age alone and 
not lack of courage keeps from the fight. I ask you to 
continue the cultivation of the fields, to complete the gathering 
of this year's crops, and to prepare for those of next year. 
You can render no greater service to your country than this, 
and I appeal to you for her sake. You have to secure your 
own subsistence and the provisioning of the population of 
the towns, and above all the provisioning of those who are 
defending on the frontier civilisation and justice, as well 
as the independence of the country. 

Up then, French women, young children, sons and 
daughters of the Fatherland ! Take the place on the field 
of toil of those who have gone to the field of battle. Prepare 



to show them, later on, the ground cultivated, the crops 
gathered in, and the fields sown ! In these grave hours 
no labour is menial, all is noble that serves the country. 
Up ! then ; to action and to work ! to-morrow there will be 
glory for everyone ! 

Vive la R^publique ! Vive la France ! 

The President of the Council of Ministers, 



V Imperial Manifesto. 

[Official.] BY God's Grace, We, Nicholas IL, Emperor and Autocrat 

of All the Russias, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, 
etc., etc., etc., 

Declare to all Our loyal subjects : 

In pursuance of her historical covenants, Russia, one in 
faith and blood with the Slav peoples, has never regarded 
their fate with indifference. The fraternal sentiments of 
the Russian people towards the Slavs have recently been 
aroused with entire unanimity and special force when 
Austria-Hungary presented to Serbia demands notoriously 
inacceptable for a sovereign State. 

Treating with contempt the concihatory and peace-loving 
reply of the Serbian Government, and rejecting the well- 
intentioned mediation of Russia, Austria hurriedly had 
recourse to armed attack, and began a bombardment of 
defenceless Belgrade. 

Compelled by force of conditions thus created to adopt 
indispensable measures of precaution. We commanded the 
Army and Navy to be placed upon a war footing, but, careful 
of the blood and property of Our subjects. We exerted every 
effort for a pacific outcome to the negotiations which had 

Amid friendly negotiations Austria's ally, Germany, 
despite Our hopes of prolonged good neighbourly relations 
and disregarding Our assurances that the measures adopted 
had absolutely no hostile intention towards herself, began to 



urge their immediate abrogation and, on meeting with a 
refusal of this demand, suddenly declared war on Russia. 

It now behoves us no longer merely to intervene on behalf 
of a country akin to Us and unjustly insulted, but to guard 
the honour, dignity, and integrity of Russia and her position 
among the Great Powers. We firmly believe that in the 
defence of Russian Soil all Our loyal subjects will harmoni- 
ously and devotedly come forward. 

In the threatening hour of trial let all internal dissensions 
be forgotten ! May the union of the Tsar with His people 
be still more closely strengthened, and may Russia, rising as 
one man, repel the insolent attack of the foe ! 

With profound faith in the justice of Our cause and humble 
reliance on Almighty Providence, We prayerfully invoke 
God's blessing on Holy Russia and Our valiant troops. 

Given at St. Petersburg on the Twentieth day of July 
(August 2) in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Nine 
Hundred and Fourteen and the Twentieth year of Our Reign. 

Signed by His Imperial Majesty's own Hand 


Message from the Municipal Council of Petrograd to the 
Municipal Councils of Paris and London, August 8, 1914. 

WE are with you, and our feelings towards you are [Pages 
unchanged. We were your friends in peace, and remain d'His- 
your friends in war. We will all rise for the protection of *°*^^-^ 
our common interests, and to fight against the common 
enemy, hostile to the world and to the fraternal unity of 
nations. We appreciate your friendship ; accept our cordial 

The Tsar at the Kremlin. 

August 18. 
THE Emperor and Empress to-day received in the Hall [^mes, 
of St. George, the Great Palace of the Kremlin, deputations ^^• 
of the nobihty, the City of Moscow, the Zemstvo, and the j°' ■, 
merchants, who presented loyal addresses to their Majesties. 



In a general reply, his Majesty said : — 

" At this stormy, warlike hour, which, suddenly and 
against my wishes, has fallen upon my peaceful people, I seek, 
according to the custom of my ancestors, to strengthen the 
forces of my soul in the sanctuaries of Moscow. 

" Within the walls of the old Kremlin I greet in you, 
inhabitants of Moscow, my beloved ancient capital, all my 
people, who everywhere, in the villages of their birth, in the 
Duma, and in the Council of the Empire, unanimously replied 
to my appeal and rose with vigour throughout the country, 
forgetting all private differences, to defend the land of their 
birth and the Slav race. 

" In a powerful common impulse all nationalities, all tribes 
of our vast Empire, have united. Russia, like myself, will 
never forget these historic days. 

" This union of thought and sentiment in all my people 
affords me deep consolation and a calm assurance for the 
future. From here, from the heart of the Russian land, I 
send a warm greeting to my gallant troops and to our brave 
Allies who are making common cause with us to safeguard 
the down-trodden principles of peace and truth. May God 
be with us." 

Message from Imperial Duma of Russia. 

House of Commons, August 25, 1914. 

[Hansard.] MR. SPEAKER : I have to inform the House that since 
the House adjourned, I have received a telegram from the 
President of the Imperial Duma of Russia, M. Michel de 
Rodzianko, which I should like to read to the House : 

August 10, 1914. 

" The Duma of the Empire, assembled in extraordinary 
Session, in view of the exceptional events passing in the 
civilised world, begs the House of Commons of Great Britain 
to accept their warm and sincere greeting in the name of the 
sentiments of profound friendship which unite our two great 
nations. The whole of Russia has welcomed with enthusiasm 
the resolution of the British people to give their powerful 
support to the friendly nations in the historic struggle which 
is developing at this moment. May God bless the arms of the ' 
friendly nations of the Triple Entente. Long live His Majesty 



King George and his valiant Fleet and Army ! Long live the 
British Pariiament ! Long live Great Britain ! " 

In reply I sent the following telegram : 

" I hasten to thank you warmly for the telegram in which 
you have been good enough to convey to me the sentiments 
of friendship which the Duma of the Empire has expressed 
towards the House of Commons. 

" As soon as the House meets again, towards the end of 
this month, I shall not fail to inform it of this graceful mani- 
festation of the cordial relations which so happily exist between 
our two countries." 


King Albert's Speech to the Belgian Chambers, Brussels, 

August 4, 1914. 
Gentlemen : 

NEVER since 1830 has a graver hour struck for Belgium : [Neutralite 
the integrity of our territory is threatened. j^ Y- 

The very strength of our right, the sympathy which ^«m»«i 
Belgium, proud of her free institutions and her moral con- 
quests, has continued to enjoy among the other nations, the 
fact that our independent existence is essential to the balance 
of power in Europe, induce us still to hope that the events 
which are dreaded will not occur. 

But if our hopes are vain, if we are called upon to resist 
the invasion of our soil and to defend our threatened hearths, 
this duty, however hard it may be, will find us armed and 
ready for the greatest sacrifices. 

Henceforth, prepared for any emergency, our brave youths 
are on their feet, firmly resolved, with the tenacity and self- 
possession traditional among Belgians, to defend the country 
in its danger. 

I offer them, in the name of the nation, a fraternal greeting. 
Everywhere, throughout Flanders and the land of the Wal- 
loons, in town and country alike, one single feeling unites our 
hearts — ^patriotism ; one vision alone fills our thoughts — 
our menaced independence ; one duty alone presents itself to 
our wills — stubborn resistance. 



In these grave circumstances two virtues are requisite, 
a courage that is calm and steadfast, and complete unity 
among all Belgians. 

Both of these have already been conspicuously displayed 
before the eyes of an enthusiastic nation. 

The faultless mobilisation of our army, the multitude of 
voluntary enlistments, the devotion of the civilian popula- 
tion, the self-sacrifice of families, have shown in the most 
unmistakable manner the fortifying courage which animates 
the Belgian people. 

The moment has come for action. 

I have called you together. Gentlemen, in order to give 
the legislative Chambers an opportunity to associate them- 
selves with the enthusiasm of the people in a common feeling 
of sacrifice. 

You will know how to take with urgency all those measures, 
both for war and for public order, which the situation demands. 

When I look at this assembly, stirred with emotion, in 
which there is now only one party, that of the country, where 
at this moment all hearts beat in unison, my thoughts are 
carried back to the Congress of 1830, and I ask you. Gentle- 
men, Are you resolutely determined to maintain inviolate 
the sacred patrimony of our ancestors ? 

No one in this country will fail in his duty. 

The Army, strong and disciplined, is equal to its task ; 
my Government and I myself have full confidence in its 
leaders and in its rank and file. 

In close touch with, and supported by the people, the 
Government knows its responsibilities and will fulfil them to- 
the end, with the deliberate conviction that the efforts of alU 
united in the most fervent and most generous patriotism, 
will secure the highest welfare of the country. 

If the foreigner violates our territory, in contempt of the 
neutrality whose claims we have always scrupulously observed,, 
he will find all Belgians grouped around their Sovereign, who will 
never betray his constitutional oath, and around the Govern- 
ment which enjoys the full confidence of the entire nation. 

I have faith in our destinies. A country which defends 
itself wins the respect of all. That country does not perish.. 

God will be with us in this just cause. 

Long live independent Belgium ! 



Sympathy with Belgium. 

Address to His Majesty. 

House of Commons, August 27, 1914. 

THE PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Asquith) : I beg to [Hansard.^ 
move, " That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty 
praying Him to convey to His Majesty the King of the Bel- 
gians the sympathy and admiration with which this House 
regards the heroic resistance offered by his army and people 
to the wanton invasion of his territory, and an assurance of 
the determination of this country to support in every way the 
efforts of Belgium to vindicate her own independence and the 
public law of Europe." 

Sir, very few words are needed to commend to the House 
the Address, the terms of which will shortly be read from the 
Chair. The War which is now shaking to its foundations the 
whole European system originated in a quarrel in which this 
country had no direct concern. We strove with all our might, 
as everyone now knows, to prevent its outbreak, and when 
that was no longer possible, to limit its area. It is aU impor- 
tant, and I think it is relevant to this Motion, that it should 
be clearly understood when it was, and why it was, that we 
intervened. It was only when we were confronted with the 
choice between keeping and breaking solemn obligations — 
between the discharge of a binding trust and of shameless 
subservience to naked force — ^that we threw away the scab- 
bard. We do not repent our decision. The issue was one 
which no great and self-respecting nation — certainly none 
bred and nurtured like ourselves, in this ancient home of 
liberty — could, without undjdng shame, have declined. We 
were bound by our obligations, plain and paramount, to 
assert and maintain the threatened independence of a small 
and neutral State. Belgium had no interests of her own to 
serve, save and except the one supreme and ever-widening 
interest of every State, great or little, which is worthy of the 
name, the preservation of her integrity and of her national 

History tells us that the duty of asserting and maintaining 
that great principle — which is, after all, the well-spring of 



civilisation and of progress — has fallen once and again at the 
most critical moment in the past to States relatively small in 
area and in population, but great in courage and in resolve 
— to Athens and Sparta, to the Swiss Cantons, and, not least 
gloriously, three centuries ago, to the Netherlands. Never, 
Sir, I venture to assert, has the duty been more clearly and 
bravely acknowledged, and never has it been more strenuously 
and heroically discharged, than during the last weeks by the 
Belgian King and the Belgian people. They have faced, 
-without flinching and against almost incalculable odds, the 
horrors of irruption, of devastation, of spoliation, and of 
outrage. They have stubbornly withstood and successfully 
arrested the inrush, wave after wave, of a gigantic and an 
overwhelming force. The defence of Liege will always be 
the theme of one of the most inspiring chapters in the annals 
of liberty. The Belgians have won for themselves the immor- 
tal glory which belongs to a people who prefer freedom to 
-ease, to security, even to life itself. We are proud of their 
alhance and their friendship. We salute them with respect 
and with honour. We are with them heart and soul, because, 
by their side and in their company, we are defending at the 
same time two great causes — the independence of small 
States and the sanctity of international covenants. We 
assure them — as I ask the House in this Address to do — we 
assure them to-day, in the name of this United Kingdom and 
of the whole Empire, that they may count to the end on our 
whole-hearted and unfailing support. 

[An Address identical in wording was passed on the same 
4ay in the House of Lords, on the motion of Lord Crewe.] 

Reply from King Albert. 

House of Commons, September 17, 1914. 

THE PRIME MINISTER : I have to state to the House 
-that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has received 
from His Majesty's Minister at the Court of Belgium a despatch, 
dated the 17th inst., stating that he has had the honour of 
being received in audience by His Majesty the King of the 
Belgians, and that, in obedience to the King's Command, 



he presented to His Majesty a copy of the Address adopted 
by the House of Commons on the 27th ultimo. He had 
received a reply thereto in these terms : — 

" His Majesty, the King of the Belgians, desires His 
Majesty's Minister to convey, his heartfelt thanks to the 
Prime Minister and the Marquis of Crewe, and, through them, 
to the Members of both Houses of Parliament. His Majesty 
deeply appreciates the language employed in the Address as 
a further and striking proof of the S5niipathy and support 
of the whole British nation, to which he attaches the utmost 

[A similar statement was made on the same day in the 
House of Lords by Lord Crewe.] 


Message from the Skupshtina to the French Chamber of 
Deputies. {Communicated August 4, 1914.) 


IN the name of the national Skupshtina assembled at [Pages 
Nish ; and by virtue of a unanimous resolution, I have the d' Hisioire.'] 
honour to transmit to you the warmest greetings of the Serbian 
Skupshtina, and ask you to communicate them to the Chamber 
of Deputies. The Serbian people has always had the liveliest 
synipathy and the very highest respect for the great French 
nation. At this historic moment, the whole of Serbia derives 
fresh strength from finding itself on the same side as France 
in the defence of right and justice. 

The President, 

I. — The Emperor William. [AUfrom 

cj. 7 1 T T- Kriegsaus- 

bpeech by the Emperor on July 31, 1914, from the Balcony bruch.'] 

of the Royal Palace. 

A MOMENTOUS hour has struck for Germany. Envious 
rivals everywhere drive us to legitimate defence. The sword 




has been forced into our hand. I hope that, if my endeavours 
up to the very last moment should not succeed in bringing 
the adversaries to reason and in preserving peace, we may 
wield the sword, with God's help, so that we may sheath it 
again with honour. War would demand enormous sacrifices 
from the German people, but we would show the enemy 
what it means to attack Germany. And so I commend you 
to God. Go now into the churches, kneel before God and 
implore His help for our brave army. 

Speech of the Emperor on the Day of Mobilisation, August i, 
1914, from the Balcony of the Royal Palace. 

I THANK you from the bottom of my heart for the 
expression of your affection and your loyalty. In the struggle 
which now lies before us I recognise no longer any parties 
\pt- P- amongst my people. '" There are none but Germans amongst 
'^ '^ us, and whatever parties may have turned against me in the 
course of past controversies, I forgive them all whole-heartedly. 
Now the only course is for us to stand together as brothers 
and then God will help the German sword to victory. 

Speech from the Throne, Delivered on August 4, 1914, in 
the White Hall of the Royal Palace at Berlin. 


IN a fateful hour I have gathered round me the chosen 
representatives of the German people. For nearly half a 
century we have been able to persevere in the path of peace. 
Attempts to impute warlike designs to Germany and to cramp 
her position in the world have often placed a heavy strain 
upon the patience of our people. In unerring sincerity my 
Government has pursued, even in circumstances of great 
provocation, the development of all moral, intellectual and 
economic forces as its highest goal. The world has been a 
witness how indefatigably in the stress and storm of recent 
years we have striven in the first rank to spare the peoples of 
Europe a war between the Great Powers. 

The gravest dangers conjured up by the events in the 
Balkan Peninsula appeared to have been overcome. Then, 
with the murder of my friend, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, 



the abyss opened up. My exalted Ally, the Emperor and 
King, Francis Joseph, was compelled to have recourse to 
arms, to defend the safety of his realm against dangerous 
intrigues from a neighbouring state. In the pursuit of its 
legitimate interests the Allied Monarchy found the Russian 
Empire standing in its path. It is not only our duty as an 
Ally that calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. There 
devolves upon us equally the formidable task of defending, 
together with the ancient culture common to both realms, our 
own position against the storm of hostile forces. 

With a heavy heart have I been compelled to mobilise 
my army against a neighbour with whom it has fought 
shoulder to shoulder on so many battle-fields. With sincere 
sorrow have I seen a friendship broken which Germany had 
faithfully preserved. The Imperial Russian Government, 
yielding to the pressure of an insatiable nationalism, has 
cast in its lot with a State which has brought on the disaster 
of this war by favouring criminal conspiracies. That France 
should also have placed herself at the side of our adversaries 
cannot surprise us. Too often have our endeavours to arrive 
at more friendly relations with the French Republic been 
defeated by long-standing aspirations and long-standing 

Gentlemen, what human insight and power can do to 
arm a nation for the supreme decisions, that has been done 
with your patriotic help. The hostility which, for a long 
time past, has been spreading in the East and in the West has 
now broken out into open flames. The present situation 
has not arisen out of trivial conflicts of interest or diplomatic 
combinations, it is the result of an active ill will for long years 
past towards the power and prosperity of the German Empire. 

No lust of conquest drives us. We are animated by 
the unconquerable will to preserve for ourselves and all 
generations to come the place to which God has called us. 

From the documents which have been laid before you 
you will see how my Government and, above all, my Chan- 
cellor, strove to the very last moment to avert extremities. 
In compulsory self-defence we drew the sword, with a clean 
hand and a clean conscience. 

To the peoples and races of the German Empire my 
cry goes forth to defend with their combined weight, and in 



brotherly association with our Allies, that which we have 
wrought in peaceful endeavour. Staunch and true, after the 
manner of our fathers, earnest and chivalrous, humble before 
God, and joyfully brave before the enemy, we put our trust 
in the Eternal and Omnipotent Power to strengthen our 
defence and to lead it to a fortunate issue. 

To you, gentlemen, the whole German nation, mustered 
around its princes and leaders, looks up to-daj^. May you 
come to unanimous and prompt decisions, that is my inner- 
most wish. 

His Majesty added : — 

" You have read. Gentlemen, what I said to my people 
•'' [See from the balcony of the Palace. '" I repeat it to you here — 
p. 478.] J ifnow no longer any parties, I know only Germans (pro- 
longed and enthusiastic cheers) ; and in witness that you are 
determined, without difference of party, without difference 
of race, without difference of creed, to stand fast with me, 
through thick and thin, through trials and through death, 
I invite the leaders of the parties to come forward and to 
give me their hands as the pledge thereof." 

The leaders of the parties came forward in answer to this 
invitation amidst a storm of cheers. Thereupon the Chan- 
cellor stepped forward and declared the Reichstag open. 

All Highest Decree of Amnesty. 

WE, Wilhelm, by the Grace of God, King of Prussia, etc., 
in view of the self-sacrificing love of the Fatherland which 
the whole nation is displaying in the war which has been 
forced upon us, do unto all persons who, up to the present 
day, have 

(i) For Use majesti against their own ruler or against a 
federal Prince (paragraphs 94-101 of the Criminal Code) ; for 
hostile action against friendly states in the sense of para- 
graphs 103-104 of the Criminal Code ; for offences and mis- 
demeanours in the exercise of civic rights (paragraphs 105-109 
of the Criminal Code) ; for resistence to the authority of the 
State (paragraphs 110-122 of the Criminal Code) ; for offences 
and misdemeanours against pubUc order in the sense of 
paragraphs 123-138 of the Criminal Code; for insults in 



cases provided for by paragraphs 196-197 of the Criminal 
Code ; for offences in the sense of paragraph 153 of the 
Industrial Regulations ; for punishable actions committed 
through the Press or punishable under the Press Law of 
May 7th, 1874. {Imperial Law Gazette, page 65), or under 
the Law of Public Meetings of April 19th, igo8 {Imperial 
Law Gazette, page 151) 

Been condemned to a fine, to arrest, to confinement within 
a fortress up to two years, inclusive, or to imprisonment up 
to two years ; or 

(2) For theft or embezzlement (paragraphs 242-248 of 
the Criminal Code, paragraph 138 of the Military Code) for 
fraud in the sense of paragraph 264a of the Criminal Code ; 
for criminal appropriation in the sense of paragraphs 288-289 
of the